arnaucube.com/blogo-input/posts/ringsig.md
blogo-input/posts/ringsig.mdRaw
1# bLSAG ring signatures overview
2*2022-07-20*
3
4> Note: I’m not a mathematician, I’m just an amateur on math. These notes are just an attempt to try to sort the notes that I took while learning abut bLSAG.
5
6<br>
7bLSAG: Back's Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signatures
8
9- signer ambiguity
10- linkability
11- unforgeability
12
13### Setup
14Let $G$ be the generator of an EC group.
15We use a hash function $\mathcal{H}_p$, which maps to curve points in EC, and a normal hash $\mathcal{H}_n$, which maps to $\mathbb{Z}_p$.
16Signer's key pair: $k_{\pi}$, s.t. $K_{\pi} = k_{\pi} \cdot G \in \mathcal{R}$, with secret index $\pi$.
17Set of Public Keys: $\mathcal{R} = \{ K_1, K_2, \ldots, K_n \}$
18
19```python
20def new_key():
21 k = F.random_element()
22 K = g * k # g is the generator of the EC group
23 return K
24```
25
26### Signature
271. compute key image: $\tilde{K} = k_{\pi} \mathcal{H_p} ( K_{\pi}) \in G$
28 ```python
29 key_image = k * hashToPoint(K)
30 ```
31
322. Generate $\alpha \in^R \mathbb{Z}_p$, and $r_i \in^R \mathbb{Z}_p$, for $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n \}$, with $i \neq \pi$
33 - $r_i$ is used for the fake responses
34 ```python
35 a = F.random_element()
36 r = [None] * len(R)
37 for i in range(0, len(R)):
38 if i==pi:
39 continue
40
41 r[i] = mod(F.random_element(), p)
42 ```
43
443. Compute $c_{\pi + 1} = \mathcal{H}_n ( m, [\alpha G], [\alpha \mathcal{H}_p(K_{\pi})])$
45
46 ```python
47 c[pi1] = hash(R, m, a * g, hashToPoint(R[pi]) * a, p)
48 ```
49
504. for $i=\pi + 1, \pi +2, \ldots, n, 1, 2, \ldots, \pi -1$, calculate, replacing $n+1 \rightarrow 1$
51 $$
52 c_{i+1} = \mathcal{H}_n (m, [r_i G + c_i K_i], [r_i \mathcal{H}_p (K_i) + c_i \tilde{K}])
53 $$
54 - Notice that (from step 3 & 4):<br>
55 $\alpha \mathcal{H}_p (K_{\pi}) = r_{\pi} \mathcal{H}_p (K_{\pi}) + c_{\pi} \cdot (\tilde{K})$,<br>
56 where $\tilde{K}= k_{\pi} \mathcal{H_p} ( K_{\pi})$, so:<br>
57 $\alpha \mathcal{H}_p (K_{\pi}) = r_{\pi} \mathcal{H}_p (K_{\pi}) + c_{\pi} \cdot (k_{\pi} \mathcal{H}_p(K_{\pi}))$<br>
58 which is equal to,<br>
59 $\alpha \cdot \mathcal{H}_p (K_{\pi}) = (r_{\pi} + c_{\pi} \cdot k_{\pi}) \cdot \mathcal{H}_p(K_{\pi})$<br>
60 From where we can see: $\alpha = r_{\pi} + c_{\pi} \cdot k_{\pi}$<br>
61 which we can rearrange to
62 $r_{\pi} = \alpha - c_{\pi} \cdot k_{\pi}$.<br><br>
63
64 ```python
65 for j in range(0, len(R)-1):
66 i = mod(pi1+j, len(R))
67 i1 = mod(pi1+j +1, len(R))
68
69 c[i1] = hash(R, m, r[i] * g + c[i] * R[i],
70 r[i] * hashToPoint(R[i]) + c[i] * key_image, p)
71 ```
72
736. Define $r_{\pi} = \alpha - c_{\pi} k_{\pi} \mod{p}$
74
75```python
76r[pi] = mod(a - c[pi] * k, p)
77```
78
79Signature: $\sigma(m) = (c_1, r_1, \ldots, r_n)$, with key image $\tilde{K}$ and ring $\mathcal{R}$.
80- $len(\sigma(m)) = 1+n$
81
82```python
83return [c[0], r]
84```
85
86
87<br><br><br>
88
89#### Step by step (simplified):
90
91<div style="overflow:auto;">
92<div style="width: 60%; float:left; height: 360px; overflow-y:scroll;">
93
94<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step00.png" style="width:100%;" />
95<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step00.png" style="width:100%;" />
96<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step01.png" style="width:100%;" />
97<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step02.png" style="width:100%;" />
98<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step03.png" style="width:100%;" />
99<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step04.png" style="width:100%;" />
100<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step05.png" style="width:100%;" />
101<img src="img/posts/ring-sig/step06.png" style="width:100%;" />
102
103</div>
104
105
106<div style="width: 40%; float:right; margin-top:80px;">
107
108 <ul>
109<li>Generate $r_i \in^R \mathbb{Z_p}$</li>
110<li>Compute $c_{i+1}$ from $r_i$</li>
111<li>Link $r_{\pi}$ with $c_{\pi}$</li>
112</ul>
113
114</div>
115</div>
116
117*You can scroll down the images through the step-by-step diagrams.*
118
119<br>
120
121It reminds in some way to the approach to close a box like the one in the picture:
122
123
124
125<br><br><br>
126### Verification
1271. check $p \tilde{K} \stackrel{?}{=} 0$
128 - to ensure that $\tilde{K} \in G$ (and not in a cofactor group of $G$)
1292. for $i = 1, 2, \ldots, n$, replacing $n+1 \rightarrow 1$
130 $$
131 c'_{i+1} = \mathcal{H}_n (m, [r_i G + c_i K_i], [r_i \mathcal{H}_p (K_i) + c_i \tilde{K}])
132 $$
1333. check $c_1 \stackrel{?}{=} c'_i$
134 ```python
135 c[0] = c1
136 for j in range(0, len(R)):
137 i = mod(j, len(R))
138 i1 = mod(j+1, len(R))
139 c[i1] = hash(R, m, r[i] * g + c[i] * R[i],
140 r[i] * hashToPoint(R[i]) + c[i] * key_image, p)
141
142 assert c1 == c[0]
143 ```
144
145<br><br>
146
147## Links
148Toy implementation:
149
150- Sage: https://github.com/arnaucube/math/blob/master/ring-signatures.sage
151- Rust: https://github.com/arnaucube/ring-signatures-rs
152
153Resources:
154
155- *"Zero to Monero"* - https://web.getmonero.org/library/Zero-to-Monero-2-0-0.pdf
156(section *"3.4 Back’s Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group (bLSAG) signatures"*)
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