

Notes on Halo

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Abstract

Notes taken while reading Halo paper [1]. Usually while reading papers I take handwritten notes, this document contains some of them re-written to *LaTeX*.

The notes are not complete, don't include all the steps neither all the proofs.

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1 modified IPA (from Halo paper)

Notes taken while reading about the modified Inner Product Argument (IPA) from the Halo paper [1].

Objective: Prover wants to prove that the polynomial $p(X)$ from the commitment P evaluates to v at x , and that $\deg(p(X)) \leq d - 1$.

1.1 Notation

Scalar mul $[a]G$, where a is a scalar and $G \in \mathbb{G}$

Inner product $\langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle = a_0b_0 + a_1b_1 + \dots + a_{n-1}b_{n-1}$

Multiscalar mul $\langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle = [a_0]G_0 + [a_1]G_1 + \dots + [a_{n-1}]G_{n-1}$

1.2 Transparent setup

$\vec{G} \in^r \mathbb{G}^d, H \in^r \mathbb{G}$

Prover wants to commit to $p(x) = a_0$

1.3 Protocol

Prover:

$$P = \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle + [r]H$$

$$v = \langle \vec{a}, \{1, x, x^2, \dots, x^{d-1}\} \rangle$$

where $\{1, x, x^2, \dots, x^{d-1}\} = \vec{b}$.

We can see that computing v is the equivalent to evaluating $p(X)$ at x ($p(x) = v$).

We will prove:

- i. polynomial $p(X) = \sum a_i X^i$
 $p(x) = v$ (that $p(X)$ evaluates x to v).
- ii. $\deg(p(X)) \leq d - 1$

Both parties know P , point x and claimed evaluation v . For $U \in^r \mathbb{G}$.

Prover computes P' :

$$P' = P + [v]U = \langle \vec{a}, G \rangle + [r]H + [v]U$$

Now, for k rounds ($d = 2^k$, from $j = k$ to $j = 1$):

- Prover sets random blinding factors: $l_j, r_j \in \mathbb{F}_p$
- Prover computes

$$L_j = \langle \vec{a}_{lo}, \vec{G}_{hi} \rangle + [l_j]H + [\langle \vec{a}_{lo}, \vec{b}_{hi} \rangle]U$$

$$R_j = \langle \vec{a}_{hi}, \vec{G}_{lo} \rangle + [r_j]H + [\langle \vec{a}_{hi}, \vec{b}_{lo} \rangle]U$$

- Verifier sends random challenge $u_j \in \mathbb{I}$
- Prover computes the halved vectors for next round:

$$\vec{a} \leftarrow \vec{a}_{hi} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \vec{a}_{lo} \cdot u_j$$

$$\vec{b} \leftarrow \vec{b}_{lo} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \vec{b}_{hi} \cdot u_j$$

$$\vec{G} \leftarrow \vec{G}_{lo} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \vec{G}_{hi} \cdot u_j$$

After final round, $\vec{a}, \vec{b}, \vec{G}$ are each of length 1.
 Verifier can compute

$$G = \vec{G}_0 = \langle \vec{s}, \vec{G} \rangle$$

and

$$b = \vec{b}_0 = \langle \vec{s}, \vec{b} \rangle$$

where \vec{s} is the binary counting structure:

$$s = (u_1^{-1} \ u_2^{-1} \ \dots \ u_k^{-1}, \\
u_1 \ u_2^{-1} \ \dots \ u_k^{-1}, \\
u_1^{-1} \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_k^{-1}, \\
\vdots \\
u_1 \ u_2 \ \dots \ u_k)$$

And verifier checks:

$$[a]G + [r']H + [ab]U == P' + \sum_{j=1}^k ([u_j^2]L_j + [u_j^{-2}]R_j)$$

where the synthetic blinding factor r' is $r' = r + \sum_{j=1}^k (l_j u_j^2 + r_j u_j^{-2})$.


Unfold:

$$[a]G + [r']H + [ab]U == P' + \sum_{j=1}^k ([u_j^2]L_j + [u_j^{-2}]R_j)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Left side} &= [a]G + [r']H + [ab]U \\ &= \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle \\ &+ [r + \sum_{j=1}^k (l_j \cdot u_j^2 + r_j u_j^{-2})] \cdot H \\ &+ \langle \vec{a}, \vec{b} \rangle U \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Right side} &= P' + \sum_{j=1}^k ([u_j^2]L_j + [u_j^{-2}]R_j) \\
&= \langle \vec{a}, \vec{G} \rangle + [r]H + [v]U \\
&+ \sum_{j=1}^k ([u_j^2] \cdot \langle \vec{a}_{lo}, \vec{G}_{hi} \rangle + [l_j]H + [\langle \vec{a}_{lo}, \vec{b}_{hi} \rangle]U \\
&+ [u_j^{-2}] \cdot \langle \vec{a}_{hi}, \vec{G}_{lo} \rangle + [r_j]H + [\langle \vec{a}_{hi}, \vec{b}_{lo} \rangle]U)
\end{aligned}$$

The following diagram illustrates the main steps in the scheme:



2 Amortization Strategy

TODO

References

- [1] Sean Bowe, Jack Grigg, and Daira Hopwood. Recursive proof composition without a trusted setup. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/1021, 2019. <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/1021>.