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\title{Notes on Halo}
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\author{arnaucube}
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\date{July 2022}
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\begin{document}
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\maketitle
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\begin{abstract}
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Notes taken while reading Halo paper \cite{cryptoeprint:2019/1021}. Usually while reading papers I take handwritten notes, this document contains some of them re-written to $LaTeX$.
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The notes are not complete, don't include all the steps neither all the proofs.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\section{modified IPA (from Halo paper)}
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Notes taken while reading about the modified Inner Product Argument (IPA) from the Halo paper \cite{cryptoeprint:2019/1021}.
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\subsection{Notation}
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\begin{description}
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\item[Scalar mul] $[a]G$, where $a$ is a scalar and $G \in \mathbb{G}$
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\item[Inner product] $<\overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{b}> = a_0 b_0 + a_1 b_1 + \ldots + a_{n-1} b_{n-1}$
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\item[Multiscalar mul] $<\overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{b}> = [a_0] G_0 + [a_1] G_1 + \ldots [a_{n-1}] G_{n-1}$
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\end{description}
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\subsection{Transparent setup}
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$\overrightarrow{G} \in^r \mathbb{G}^d$, $H \in^r \mathbb{G}$
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Prover wants to commit to $p(x)=a_0$
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\subsection{Protocol}
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Prover:
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$$P=<\overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{G}> + [r]H$$
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$$v=<\overrightarrow{a}, \{1, x, x^2, \ldots, x^{d-1} \} >$$
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where $\{1, x, x^2, \ldots, x^{d-1} \} = \overrightarrow{b}$.
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We can see that computing $v$ is the equivalent to evaluating $p(x)$ at $x$ ($p(x)=v$).
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We will prove:
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\begin{enumerate}[i.]
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\item polynomial $p(X) = \sum a_i X^i$\\
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$p(x) = v$ (that $p(X)$ evaluates $x$ to $v$).
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\item $deg(p(X)) \leq d-1$
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\end{enumerate}
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Both parties know $P$, point $x$ and claimed evaluation $v$. For $U \in^r \mathbb{G}$,
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$$P' = P + [v] U = <\overrightarrow{a}, G> + [r]H + [v] U$$
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Now, for $k$ rounds ($d=2^k$, from $j=k$ to $j=1$):
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\begin{itemize}
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\item random blinding factors: $l_j, r_j \in \mathbb{F}_p$
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\item
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$$L_j = < \overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{G}_{hi}> + [l_j] H + [< \overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{b}_{hi}>] U$$
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$$L_j = < \overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{G}_{hi}> + [l_j] H + [< \overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{b}_{hi}>] U$$
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\item Verifier sends random challenge $u_j \in \mathbb{I}$
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\item Prover computes the halved vectors for next round:
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$$\overrightarrow{a} \leftarrow \overrightarrow{a}_{hi} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \overrightarrow{a}_{lo} \cdot u_j$$
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$$\overrightarrow{b} \leftarrow \overrightarrow{b}_{lo} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \overrightarrow{b}_{hi} \cdot u_j$$
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$$\overrightarrow{G} \leftarrow \overrightarrow{G}_{lo} \cdot u_j^{-1} + \overrightarrow{G}_{hi} \cdot u_j$$
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\end{itemize}
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After final round, $\overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{b}, \overrightarrow{G}$ are each of length 1.
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Verifier can compute
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$$G = \overrightarrow{G}_0 = < \overrightarrow{s}, \overrightarrow{G} >$$
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and $$b = \overrightarrow{b}_0 = < \overrightarrow{s}, \overrightarrow{b} >$$
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where $\overrightarrow{s}$ is the binary counting structure:
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\begin{align*}
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&s = (u_1^{-1} ~ u_2^{-1} \cdots ~u_k^{-1},\\
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&~~~~~~u_1 ~~~ u_2^{-1} ~\cdots ~u_k^{-1},\\
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&~~~~~~u_1^{-1} ~~ u_2 ~~\cdots ~u_k^{-1},\\
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&~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\vdots\\
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&~~~~~~u_1 ~~~~ u_2 ~~\cdots ~u_k)
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\end{align*}
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And verifier checks:
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$$[a]G + [r'] H + [ab] U == P' + \sum_{j=1}^k ( [u_j^2] L_j + [u_j^{-2}] R_j)$$
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where the synthetic blinding factor $r'$ is $r' = r + \sum_{j=1}^k (l_j u_j^2 + r_j u_j^{-2})$.
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\vspace{1cm}
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Unfold:
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$$
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\textcolor{brown}{[a]G} + \textcolor{cyan}{[r'] H} + \textcolor{magenta}{[ab] U}
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==
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\textcolor{blue}{P'} + \sum_{j=1}^k ( \textcolor{violet}{[u_j^2] L_j} + \textcolor{orange}{[u_j^{-2}] R_j})
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$$
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\begin{align*}
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&Right~side = \textcolor{blue}{P'} + \sum_{j=1}^k ( \textcolor{violet}{[u_j^2] L_j} + \textcolor{orange}{[u_j^{-2}] R_j})\\
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&= \textcolor{blue}{< \overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{G}> + [r] H + [v] U}\\
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&+ \sum_{j=1}^k (\\
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&\textcolor{violet}{[u_j^2] \cdot <\overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{G}_{hi}> + [l_j] H + [<\overrightarrow{a}_{lo}, \overrightarrow{b}_{hi}>] U}\\
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&\textcolor{orange}{+ [u_j^{-2}] \cdot <\overrightarrow{a}_{hi}, \overrightarrow{G}_{lo}> + [r_j] H + [<\overrightarrow{a}_{hi}, \overrightarrow{b}_{lo}>] U}
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)
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\end{align*}
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\begin{align*}
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&Left~side = \textcolor{brown}{[a]G} + \textcolor{cyan}{[r'] H} + \textcolor{magenta}{[ab] U}\\
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& = \textcolor{brown}{< \overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{G} >}\\
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&+ \textcolor{cyan}{[r + \sum_{j=1}^k (l_j \cdot u_j^2 + r_j u_j^{-2})] \cdot H}\\
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&+ \textcolor{magenta}{< \overrightarrow{a}, \overrightarrow{b} > U}
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\end{align*}
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\section{Amortization Strategy}
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TODO
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\bibliography{paper-notes.bib}
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\bibliographystyle{unsrt}
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\end{document}
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