use std::{
    borrow::BorrowMut,
    cell::{OnceCell, RefCell},
    clone,
    collections::HashMap,
    fmt::{Debug, Display},
    iter::Once,
    marker::PhantomData,
    ops::Shr,
    sync::OnceLock,
};

use itertools::{izip, partition, Itertools};
use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Num, One, Pow, PrimInt, ToPrimitive, WrappingSub, Zero};
use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;

use crate::{
    backend::{
        ArithmeticOps, GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, Modulus, ShoupMatrixFMA, VectorOps,
    },
    decomposer::{Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, NumInfo, RlweDecomposer},
    lwe::{decrypt_lwe, encrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch, lwe_ksk_keygen, measure_noise_lwe, LweSecret},
    multi_party::public_key_share,
    ntt::{self, Ntt, NttBackendU64, NttInit},
    pbs::{pbs, sample_extract, PbsInfo, PbsKey},
    random::{
        DefaultSecureRng, NewWithSeed, RandomFill, RandomFillGaussianInModulus,
        RandomFillUniformInModulus, RandomGaussianElementInModulus,
    },
    rgsw::{
        decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, galois_key_gen, generate_auto_map, public_key_encrypt_rgsw,
        rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace, rlwe_by_rgsw, secret_key_encrypt_rgsw, IsTrivial, RgswCiphertext,
        RlweCiphertext, RlweSecret,
    },
    utils::{
        fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, generate_prime, mod_exponent, Global,
        TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal,
    },
    Decryptor, Encryptor, Matrix, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, MultiPartyDecryptor, Row, RowEntity,
    RowMut, Secret,
};

use super::{
    keys::ClientKey,
    parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
    CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare,
    SeededMultiPartyServerKey, SeededServerKey, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
    ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
};

pub struct MultiPartyCrs<S> {
    pub(super) seed: S,
}

impl<S: Default + Copy> MultiPartyCrs<S> {
    /// Seed to generate public key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
    ///
    /// Public key seed equals the 1st seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
    /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
    pub(super) fn public_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
        let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);

        let mut seed = S::default();
        RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
        seed
    }

    /// Seed to generate server key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
    ///
    /// Server key seed equals the 2nd seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
    /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
    pub(super) fn server_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
        let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);

        let mut seed = S::default();
        RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
        RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
        seed
    }
}

pub(crate) trait BooleanGates {
    type Ciphertext: RowEntity;
    type Key: Global;

    fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
    fn not_inplace(&mut self, c: &mut Self::Ciphertext);

    fn and(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn nand(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn or(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn nor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn xor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn xnor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
    fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext;
}

struct ScratchMemory<M>
where
    M: Matrix,
{
    lwe_vector: M::R,
    decomposition_matrix: M,
}

impl<M: MatrixEntity> ScratchMemory<M>
where
    M::R: RowEntity,
{
    fn new(parameters: &BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self {
        // Vector to store LWE ciphertext with LWE dimesnion n
        let lwe_vector = M::R::zeros(parameters.lwe_n().0 + 1);

        // Matrix to store decomposed polynomials
        // Max decompistion count + space for temporary RLWE
        let d = std::cmp::max(
            parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0,
            std::cmp::max(
                parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().0 .0,
                parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().1 .0,
            ),
        ) + 2;
        let decomposition_matrix = M::zeros(d, parameters.rlwe_n().0);

        Self {
            lwe_vector,
            decomposition_matrix,
        }
    }
}

pub(super) trait BoolEncoding {
    type Element;
    fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
    fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
    fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element;
    fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool;
}

impl<T> BoolEncoding for CiphertextModulus<T>
where
    CiphertextModulus<T>: Modulus<Element = T>,
    T: PrimInt,
{
    type Element = T;

    fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element {
        if self.is_native() {
            T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 2)
        } else {
            self.q().unwrap() >> 2
        }
    }
    /// Q/8
    fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
        if self.is_native() {
            T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 3)
        } else {
            self.q().unwrap() >> 3
        }
    }
    /// -Q/8
    fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
        self.largest_unsigned_value() - self.true_el() + T::one()
    }
    fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool {
        let qby8 = self.true_el();
        let m = (((m + qby8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4.0f64) / self.q_as_f64().unwrap()).round()
            as usize
            % 4usize;

        if m == 0 {
            return false;
        } else if m == 1 {
            return true;
        } else {
            panic!("Incorrect bool decryption. Got m={m} but expected m to be 0 or 1")
        }
    }
}

pub(super) struct BoolPbsInfo<M: Matrix, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
    auto_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
    rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: (
        DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
        DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
    ),
    lwe_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
    g_k_dlog_map: Vec<usize>,
    rlwe_nttop: Ntt,
    rlwe_modop: RlweModOp,
    lwe_modop: LweModOp,
    embedding_factor: usize,
    rlwe_qby4: M::MatElement,
    rlwe_auto_maps: Vec<(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>)>,
    parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
}

impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> PbsInfo for BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
where
    M::MatElement: PrimInt + WrappingSub + NumInfo + FromPrimitive + From<bool> + Display,
    RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
    LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
    NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
{
    type M = M;
    type Modulus = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>;
    type D = DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>;
    type RlweModOp = RlweModOp;
    type LweModOp = LweModOp;
    type NttOp = NttOp;
    fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: usize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>) {
        &self.rlwe_auto_maps[k]
    }
    fn br_q(&self) -> usize {
        *self.parameters.br_q()
    }
    fn lwe_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
        &self.lwe_decomposer
    }
    fn rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(&self) -> &(Self::D, Self::D) {
        &self.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer
    }
    fn auto_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
        &self.auto_decomposer
    }
    fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize {
        self.embedding_factor
    }
    fn g(&self) -> isize {
        self.parameters.g() as isize
    }
    fn w(&self) -> usize {
        self.parameters.w()
    }
    fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize] {
        &self.g_k_dlog_map
    }
    fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize {
        self.parameters.lwe_n().0
    }
    fn lwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
        self.parameters.lwe_q()
    }
    fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize {
        self.parameters.rlwe_n().0
    }
    fn rlwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
        self.parameters.rlwe_q()
    }
    fn modop_lweq(&self) -> &Self::LweModOp {
        &self.lwe_modop
    }
    fn modop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::RlweModOp {
        &self.rlwe_modop
    }
    fn nttop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::NttOp {
        &self.rlwe_nttop
    }
}

pub(crate) struct BoolEvaluator<Info, SKey>
where
    M: Matrix,
{
    pbs_info: BoolPbsInfo<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp>,
    scratch_memory: ScratchMemory<M>,
    nand_test_vec: M::R,
    and_test_vec: M::R,
    or_test_vec: M::R,
    nor_test_vec: M::R,
    xor_test_vec: M::R,
    xnor_test_vec: M::R,
    _phantom: PhantomData<M>,
}

impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
    pub(super) fn parameters(&self) -> &BoolParameters<M::MatElement> {
        &self.pbs_info.parameters
    }

    pub(super) fn pbs_info(&self) -> &BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
        &self.pbs_info
    }
}

impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey>
where
    M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
    M::MatElement: PrimInt
        + Debug
        + Display
        + NumInfo
        + FromPrimitive
        + WrappingSub
        + SampleUniform
        + From<bool>,
    NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
    RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>
        + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
    LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
    M::R: TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + RowEntity + Debug,
    <M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
{
    pub(super) fn new(parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self
    where
        RlweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
        LweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
        NttOp: NttInit<CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
    {
        //TODO(Jay): Run sanity checks for modulus values in parameters

        // generates dlog map s.t. (+/-)g^{k} % q = a, for all a \in Z*_{q} and k \in
        // [0, q/4). We store the dlog `k` at index `a`. This makes it easier to
        // simply look up `k` at runtime as vec[a]. If a = g^{k} then dlog is
        // stored as k. If a = -g^{k} then dlog is stored as k = q/4. This is done to
        // differentiate sign.
        let g = parameters.g();
        let q = *parameters.br_q();
        let mut g_k_dlog_map = vec![0usize; q];
        for i in 0..q / 4 {
            let v = mod_exponent(g as u64, i as u64, q as u64) as usize;
            // g^i
            g_k_dlog_map[v] = i;
            // -(g^i)
            g_k_dlog_map[q - v] = i + (q / 4);
        }

        let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n().0) / q;

        let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q(), parameters.rlwe_n().0);
        let rlwe_modop = RlweModOp::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
        let lwe_modop = LweModOp::new(*parameters.lwe_q());

        let q = *parameters.br_q();
        let qby2 = q >> 1;
        let qby8 = q >> 3;
        // Q/8 (Q: rlwe_q)
        let true_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().true_el();
        // -Q/8
        let false_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().false_el();
        let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(qby2, -(g as isize));

        let init_test_vec = |partition_el: usize,
                             before_partition_el: M::MatElement,
                             after_partition_el: M::MatElement| {
            let mut test_vec = M::R::zeros(qby2);
            for i in 0..qby2 {
                if i < partition_el {
                    test_vec.as_mut()[i] = before_partition_el;
                } else {
                    test_vec.as_mut()[i] = after_partition_el;
                }
            }

            // v(X) -> v(X^{-g})
            let mut test_vec_autog = M::R::zeros(qby2);
            izip!(
                test_vec.as_ref().iter(),
                auto_map_index.iter(),
                auto_map_sign.iter()
            )
            .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
                if !to_sign {
                    // negate
                    test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
                } else {
                    test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = *v;
                }
            });

            return test_vec_autog;
        };

        let nand_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
        let and_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
        let or_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
        let nor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
        let xor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
        let xnor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);

        // auto map indices and sign
        // Auto maps are stored as [-g, g^{1}, g^{2}, ..., g^{w}]
        let mut rlwe_auto_maps = vec![];
        let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
        let g = parameters.g();
        let br_q = parameters.br_q();
        let auto_element_dlogs = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
        assert!(auto_element_dlogs[0] == 0);
        for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
            let el = if i == 0 {
                -(g as isize)
            } else {
                (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
            };
            rlwe_auto_maps.push(generate_auto_map(ring_size, el))
        }

        let rlwe_qby4 = parameters.rlwe_q().qby4();

        let scratch_memory = ScratchMemory::new(&parameters);

        let pbs_info = BoolPbsInfo {
            auto_decomposer: parameters.auto_decomposer(),
            lwe_decomposer: parameters.lwe_decomposer(),
            rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(),
            g_k_dlog_map,
            embedding_factor,
            lwe_modop,
            rlwe_modop,
            rlwe_nttop,
            rlwe_qby4,
            rlwe_auto_maps,
            parameters: parameters,
        };

        BoolEvaluator {
            pbs_info,
            scratch_memory,
            nand_test_vec,
            and_test_vec,
            or_test_vec,
            nor_test_vec,
            xnor_test_vec,
            xor_test_vec,
            _phantom: PhantomData,
        }
    }

    pub(super) fn client_key(&self) -> ClientKey {
        let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
            self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
            self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
        );
        let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
            self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
            self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
        );
        ClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_lwe)
    }

    pub(super) fn server_key(
        &self,
        client_key: &ClientKey,
    ) -> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]> {
        DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let mut main_seed = [0u8; 32];
            rng.fill_bytes(&mut main_seed);

            let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(main_seed);

            let rlwe_n = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
            let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
            let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();

            // generate auto keys
            let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
            let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
            let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
            let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
            let auto_els = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
            for i in auto_els.into_iter() {
                let g_pow = if i == 0 {
                    -(g as isize)
                } else {
                    (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
                };
                let mut gk = M::zeros(self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(), rlwe_n);
                galois_key_gen(
                    &mut gk,
                    sk_rlwe.values(),
                    g_pow,
                    &auto_gadget,
                    &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
                    &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
                    &mut main_prng,
                    rng,
                );
                auto_keys.insert(i, gk);
            }

            // generate rgsw ciphertexts RGSW(si) where si is i^th LWE secret element
            let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
            let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
            let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
                self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
                self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
            );
            let rlrg_gadget_a = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
            let rlrg_gadget_b = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
            let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
                .values()
                .iter()
                .map(|si| {
                    // X^{si}; assume |emebedding_factor * si| < N
                    let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
                    let si = (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32) * si;
                    // dbg!(si);
                    if si < 0 {
                        // X^{-i} = X^{2N - i} = -X^{N-i}
                        m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
                    } else {
                        // X^{i}
                        m.as_mut()[si.abs() as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
                    }

                    let mut rgsw_si = M::zeros(rlrg_d_a * 2 + rlrg_d_b, ring_size);
                    secret_key_encrypt_rgsw(
                        &mut rgsw_si,
                        m.as_ref(),
                        &rlrg_gadget_a,
                        &rlrg_gadget_b,
                        sk_rlwe.values(),
                        &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
                        &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
                        &mut main_prng,
                        rng,
                    );

                    rgsw_si
                })
                .collect_vec();

            // LWE KSK from RLWE secret s -> LWE secret z
            let d_lwe_gadget = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
            let mut lwe_ksk =
                M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
            lwe_ksk_keygen(
                &sk_rlwe.values(),
                &sk_lwe.values(),
                &mut lwe_ksk,
                &d_lwe_gadget,
                &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop,
                &mut main_prng,
                rng,
            );

            SeededServerKey::from_raw(
                auto_keys,
                rgsw_cts,
                lwe_ksk,
                self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
                main_seed,
            )
        })
    }

    pub(super) fn multi_party_server_key_share(
        &self,
        cr_seed: [u8; 32],
        collective_pk: &M,
        client_key: &ClientKey,
    ) -> CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]>
    {
        DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);

            let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
            let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();

            let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
            let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
            let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
            let lwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();

            let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
            let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;

            // sanity check
            assert!(sk_rlwe.values().len() == ring_size);
            assert!(sk_lwe.values().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0);

            // auto keys
            let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
            let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
            let auto_element_dlogs = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
            let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
            for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
                let g_pow = if i == 0 {
                    -(g as isize)
                } else {
                    (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
                };

                let mut ksk_out = M::zeros(
                    self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
                    ring_size,
                );
                galois_key_gen(
                    &mut ksk_out,
                    sk_rlwe.values(),
                    g_pow,
                    &auto_gadget,
                    rlweq_modop,
                    rlweq_nttop,
                    &mut main_prng,
                    rng,
                );
                auto_keys.insert(i, ksk_out);
            }

            // rgsw ciphertexts of lwe secret elements
            let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = self
                .pbs_info
                .parameters
                .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
            let (rgrg_d_a, rgrg_d_b) = (
                rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
                rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
            );
            let (rgrg_gadget_a, rgrg_gadget_b) = (
                rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(),
                rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector(),
            );
            let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
                .values()
                .iter()
                .map(|si| {
                    let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
                    //TODO(Jay): It will be nice to have a function that returns polynomial
                    // (monomial infact!) corresponding to secret element embedded in ring X^{2N+1}.
                    // Save lots of mistakes where one forgest to emebed si in bigger ring.
                    let si = *si * (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
                    if si < 0 {
                        // X^{-si} = X^{2N-si} = -X^{N-si}, assuming abs(si) < N
                        // (which it is given si is secret element)
                        m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
                    } else {
                        m.as_mut()[si as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
                    }

                    // public key RGSW encryption has no part that can be seeded, unlike secret key
                    // RGSW encryption where RLWE'_A(m) is seeded
                    let mut out_rgsw = M::zeros(rgrg_d_a * 2 + rgrg_d_b * 2, ring_size);
                    public_key_encrypt_rgsw(
                        &mut out_rgsw,
                        &m.as_ref(),
                        collective_pk,
                        &rgrg_gadget_a,
                        &rgrg_gadget_b,
                        rlweq_modop,
                        rlweq_nttop,
                        rng,
                    );

                    out_rgsw
                })
                .collect_vec();

            // LWE ksk
            let mut lwe_ksk =
                M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
            let lwe_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
            let d_lwe_gadget_vec = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
            lwe_ksk_keygen(
                sk_rlwe.values(),
                sk_lwe.values(),
                &mut lwe_ksk,
                &d_lwe_gadget_vec,
                lwe_modop,
                &mut main_prng,
                rng,
            );

            CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare::new(
                rgsw_cts,
                auto_keys,
                lwe_ksk,
                cr_seed,
                self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
            )
        })
    }

    pub(super) fn multi_party_public_key_share(
        &self,
        cr_seed: [u8; 32],
        client_key: &ClientKey,
    ) -> CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
        <M as Matrix>::R,
        [u8; 32],
        BoolParameters<<M as Matrix>::MatElement>,
    > {
        DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let mut share_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0);
            let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
            let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
            let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
            public_key_share(
                &mut share_out,
                client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
                modop,
                nttop,
                &mut main_prng,
                rng,
            );
            CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare::new(
                share_out,
                cr_seed,
                self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
            )
        })
    }

    pub(super) fn multi_party_decryption_share(
        &self,
        lwe_ct: &M::R,
        client_key: &ClientKey,
    ) -> <M as Matrix>::MatElement {
        assert!(lwe_ct.as_ref().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
        let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        let mut neg_s = M::R::try_convert_from(
            client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
            &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
        );
        modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s.as_mut());

        let mut neg_sa = M::MatElement::zero();
        izip!(lwe_ct.as_ref().iter().skip(1), neg_s.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(ai, nsi)| {
            neg_sa = modop.add(&neg_sa, &modop.mul(ai, nsi));
        });

        let e = DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let mut e =
                RandomGaussianElementInModulus::random(rng, self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
            e
        });
        let share = modop.add(&neg_sa, &e);

        share
    }

    pub(crate) fn multi_party_decrypt(&self, shares: &[M::MatElement], lwe_ct: &M::R) -> bool {
        let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        let mut sum_a = M::MatElement::zero();
        shares
            .iter()
            .for_each(|share_i| sum_a = modop.add(&sum_a, &share_i));

        let encoded_m = modop.add(&lwe_ct.as_ref()[0], &sum_a);
        self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().decode(encoded_m)
    }

    pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt(&self, pk: &M, m: bool) -> M::R {
        self.pk_encrypt_batched(pk, &vec![m]).remove(0)
    }

    /// Encrypts a batch booleans as multiple LWE ciphertexts.
    ///
    /// For public key encryption we first encrypt `m` as a RLWE ciphertext and
    /// then sample extract LWE samples at required indices.
    ///
    /// - TODO(Jay:) Communication can be improved by not sample exctracting and
    ///   instead just truncate degree 0 values (part Bs)
    pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt_batched(&self, pk: &M, m: &[bool]) -> Vec<M::R> {
        DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
            assert!(
                m.len() <= ring_size,
                "Cannot batch encrypt > ring_size{ring_size} elements at once"
            );

            let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
            let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;

            // RLWE(0)
            // sample ephemeral key u
            let mut u = vec![0i32; ring_size];
            fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(u.as_mut(), ring_size >> 1, rng);
            let mut u = M::R::try_convert_from(&u, &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
            nttop.forward(u.as_mut());

            let mut ua = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
            ua.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(0));
            let mut ub = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
            ub.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(1));

            // a*u
            nttop.forward(ua.as_mut());
            modop.elwise_mul_mut(ua.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
            nttop.backward(ua.as_mut());

            // b*u
            nttop.forward(ub.as_mut());
            modop.elwise_mul_mut(ub.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
            nttop.backward(ub.as_mut());

            let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, ring_size);
            // sample error
            rlwe.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|ri| {
                RandomFillGaussianInModulus::<[M::MatElement], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>::random_fill(
                    rng,
                    &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
                    ri.as_mut(),
                );
            });

            // a*u + e0
            modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(0), ua.as_ref());
            // b*u + e1
            modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), ub.as_ref());

            //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
            let mut m_vec = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
            izip!(m_vec.as_mut().iter_mut(), m.iter()).for_each(|(m_el, m_bool)| {
                if *m_bool {
                    // Q/8
                    *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
                } else {
                    // -Q/8
                    *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
                }
            });

            // b*u + e1 + m
            modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), m_vec.as_ref());
            // rlwe.set(1, 0, modop.add(rlwe.get(1, 0), &m));

            // sample extract index required indices
            let samples = m.len();
            (0..samples)
                .into_iter()
                .map(|i| {
                    let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(ring_size + 1);
                    sample_extract(&mut lwe_out, &rlwe, modop, i);
                    lwe_out
                })
                .collect_vec()
        })
    }

    /// TODO(Jay): Fetch client key from thread local
    pub fn sk_encrypt(&self, m: bool, client_key: &ClientKey) -> M::R {
        //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
        let m = if m {
            // Q/8
            self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
        } else {
            // -Q/8
            self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
        };

        DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
            let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
            encrypt_lwe(
                &mut lwe_out,
                &m,
                client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
                &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
                rng,
            );
            lwe_out
        })
    }

    pub fn sk_decrypt(&self, lwe_ct: &M::R, client_key: &ClientKey) -> bool {
        let m = decrypt_lwe(
            lwe_ct,
            client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
            &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
        );
        self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().decode(m)
    }

    pub(super) fn aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares<S>(
        &self,
        shares: &[CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
            M,
            BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
            S,
        >],
    ) -> SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, S, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>
    where
        S: PartialEq + Clone,
        M: Clone,
    {
        assert!(shares.len() > 0);
        let parameters = shares[0].parameters().clone();
        let cr_seed = shares[0].cr_seed();

        let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
        let g = parameters.g() as isize;
        let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
        let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();

        // sanity checks
        shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|s| {
            assert!(s.parameters() == &parameters);
            assert!(s.cr_seed() == cr_seed);
        });

        let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;

        // auto keys
        let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
        let auto_elements_dlog = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
        for i in auto_elements_dlog.into_iter() {
            let mut key = M::zeros(parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n);

            shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
                let auto_key_share_i = s.auto_keys().get(&i).expect("Auto key {i} missing");
                assert!(
                    auto_key_share_i.dimension()
                        == (parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n)
                );
                izip!(key.iter_rows_mut(), auto_key_share_i.iter_rows()).for_each(
                    |(partb_out, partb_share)| {
                        rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(partb_out.as_mut(), partb_share.as_ref());
                    },
                );
            });

            auto_keys.insert(i, key);
        }

        // rgsw ciphertext (most expensive part!)
        let lwe_n = parameters.lwe_n().0;
        let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer =
            parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
        let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
            std::cmp::max(
                rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
                rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
            ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
                + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
            rlwe_n,
        );

        let mut tmp_rgsw =
            RgswCiphertext::<M, _>::empty(rlwe_n, &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer, rlwe_q.clone()).data;
        let rgsw_cts = (0..lwe_n).into_iter().map(|index| {
            // copy over rgsw ciphertext for index^th secret element from first share and
            // treat it as accumulating rgsw ciphertext
            let mut rgsw_i = shares[0].rgsw_cts()[index].clone();

            shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|si| {
                // copy over si's RGSW[index] ciphertext and send to evaluation domain
                izip!(tmp_rgsw.iter_rows_mut(), si.rgsw_cts()[index].iter_rows()).for_each(
                    |(to_ri, from_ri)| {
                        to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
                        rlweq_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut())
                    },
                );

                rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
                    &mut rgsw_i,
                    &tmp_rgsw,
                    &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
                    &mut scratch_matrix,
                    rlweq_nttop,
                    rlweq_modop,
                );
            });

            rgsw_i
        });
        // d_a and d_b may differ for RGSWxRGSW multiplication and RLWExRGSW
        // multiplication. After this point RGSW ciphertexts will only be used for
        // RLWExRGSW multiplication (in blind rotation). Thus we drop any additional
        // RLWE ciphertexts in RGSW ciphertexts after RGSw x RGSW multiplication
        let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposition_count();
        let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count();
        let rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
        let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
        assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
        assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
        let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
            .map(|ct_i_in| {
                assert!(ct_i_in.dimension() == (rgsw_ct_rows_in, rlwe_n));
                let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rlwe_n);

                // RLWE'(-sm) part A
                izip!(
                    reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
                    ct_i_in
                        .iter_rows()
                        .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
                        .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
                )
                .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
                    to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
                });

                // RLWE'(-sm) part B
                izip!(
                    reduced_ct_i_out
                        .iter_rows_mut()
                        .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
                        .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
                    ct_i_in
                        .iter_rows()
                        .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
                        .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
                )
                .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
                    to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
                });

                // RLWE'(m) Part A
                izip!(
                    reduced_ct_i_out
                        .iter_rows_mut()
                        .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
                        .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
                    ct_i_in
                        .iter_rows()
                        .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
                        .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
                )
                .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
                    to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
                });

                // RLWE'(m) Part B
                izip!(
                    reduced_ct_i_out
                        .iter_rows_mut()
                        .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
                        .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
                    ct_i_in
                        .iter_rows()
                        .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
                        .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
                )
                .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
                    to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
                });

                reduced_ct_i_out
            })
            .collect_vec();

        // LWE ksks
        let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
        let lweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
        shares.iter().for_each(|si| {
            assert!(si.lwe_ksk().as_ref().len() == rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
            lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(lwe_ksk.as_mut(), si.lwe_ksk().as_ref())
        });

        SeededMultiPartyServerKey::new(rgsw_cts, auto_keys, lwe_ksk, cr_seed.clone(), parameters)
    }
}

impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
where
    M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
    M::R: RowMut + RowEntity,
    M::MatElement: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo,
    RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
    LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
    NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
{
    /// Returns c0 + c1 + Q/4
    fn _add_and_shift_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
        let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        modop.elwise_add_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
        // +Q/4
        c0.as_mut()[0] = modop.add(&c0.as_ref()[0], &self.pbs_info.rlwe_qby4);
    }

    /// Returns 2(c0 - c1) + Q/4
    fn _subtract_double_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
        let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        // c0 - c1
        modop.elwise_sub_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());

        // double
        c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.add(v, v));
    }
}

impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BooleanGates for BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
where
    M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
    M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + Clone,
    M::MatElement:
        PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo + From<bool>,
    RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
        + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
    LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
    NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
{
    type Ciphertext = M::R;
    type Key = Key;

    fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.nand_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        );
    }

    fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.and_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        );
    }

    fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.or_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        );
    }

    fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.nor_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        )
    }

    fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.xor_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        );
    }

    fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
        self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);

        // PBS
        pbs(
            &self.pbs_info,
            &self.xnor_test_vec,
            c0,
            server_key,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
            &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
        );
    }

    fn not_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R) {
        let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
        c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.neg(v));
    }

    fn and(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.and_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn nand(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.nand_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn or(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.or_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn nor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.nor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn xnor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.xnor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn xor(
        &mut self,
        c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
        c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
        key: &Self::Key,
    ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c0.clone();
        self.xor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
        out
    }

    fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext {
        let mut out = c.clone();
        self.not_inplace(&mut out);
        out
    }
}

// #[cfg(test)]
// mod tests {
//     use bool::parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_BOOL_PARAMS};
//     use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
//     use rand_distr::Uniform;

//     use crate::{
//         backend::{GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, WordSizeModulus},
//         bool::{
//             self, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare, PublicKey,
//             SeededMultiPartyServerKey,
//         },
//         ntt::NttBackendU64,
//         random::{RandomElementInModulus, DEFAULT_RNG},
//         rgsw::{
//             self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe,
// secret_key_encrypt_rlwe,             tests::{_measure_noise_rgsw,
// _sk_encrypt_rlwe},             RgswCiphertext,
// RgswCiphertextEvaluationDomain, SeededRgswCiphertext,
// SeededRlweCiphertext,         },
//         utils::{negacyclic_mul, Stats},
//     };

//     use super::*;

//     #[test]
//     fn bool_encrypt_decrypt_works() {
//         let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
//         let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();

//         let mut m = true;
//         for _ in 0..1000 {
//             let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m, &client_key);
//             let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_ct, &client_key);
//             assert_eq!(m, m_back);
//             m = !m;
//         }
//     }

//     #[test]
//     fn bool_nand() {
//         let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);

//         // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
//         let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
//         let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
//         let server_key_eval_domain =
//             ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
// NttBackendU64>::from(                 &seeded_server_key,
//             );

//         let mut m0 = false;
//         let mut m1 = true;

//         let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
//         let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);

//         for _ in 0..500 {
//             let ct_back = bool_evaluator.nand(&ct0, &ct1,
// &server_key_eval_domain);

//             let m_out = !(m0 && m1);

//             let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
//             assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");

//             m1 = m0;
//             m0 = m_out;

//             ct1 = ct0;
//             ct0 = ct_back;
//         }
//     }

//     #[test]
//     fn bool_xor() {
//         let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);

//         // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
//         let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
//         let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
//         let server_key_eval_domain =
//             ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
// NttBackendU64>::from(                 &seeded_server_key,
//             );

//         let mut m0 = false;
//         let mut m1 = true;

//         let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
//         let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);

//         for _ in 0..1000 {
//             let ct_back = bool_evaluator.xor(&ct0, &ct1,
// &server_key_eval_domain);             let m_out = (m0 ^ m1);

//             let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
//             assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");

//             m1 = m0;
//             m0 = m_out;

//             ct1 = ct0;
//             ct0 = ct_back;
//         }
//     }

//     #[test]
//     fn multi_party_encryption_decryption() {
//         let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);

//         let no_of_parties = 500;
//         let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
//             .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
//             .collect_vec();

//         let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
//         parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
//             izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {                 *ideal_i =
// *ideal_i + s_i;             });
//         });

//         let mut m = true;
//         for i in 0..100 {
//             let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];

//             let public_key_share = parties
//                 .iter()
//                 .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
// .collect_vec();

//             let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
//                 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//                 DefaultSecureRng,
//                 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
//             let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m);

//             let decryption_shares = parties
//                 .iter()
//                 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_ct,
// k))                 .collect_vec();

//             let m_back =
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_ct);

//             {
//                 let ideal_m = if m {
//                     bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().true_el()
//                 } else {
//                     bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().false_el()
//                 };
//                 let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
//                     &lwe_ct,
//                     &ideal_rlwe_sk,
//                     &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
//                     &ideal_m,
//                 );
//                 println!("Noise: {noise}");
//             }

//             assert_eq!(m_back, m);
//             m = !m;
//         }
//     }

//     fn _collecitve_public_key_gen(rlwe_q: u64, parties_rlwe_sk:
// &[RlweSecret]) -> Vec<Vec<u64>> {         let ring_size =
// parties_rlwe_sk[0].values.len();         assert!(ring_size.
// is_power_of_two());         let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
//         let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(&rlwe_q, ring_size);
//         let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q);

//         // Generate Pk shares
//         let pk_seed = [0u8; 32];
//         let pk_shares = parties_rlwe_sk.iter().map(|sk| {
//             let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
//             let mut share_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
//             public_key_share(
//                 &mut share_out,
//                 sk.values(),
//                 &modop,
//                 &nttop,
//                 &mut p_rng,
//                 &mut rng,
//             );
//             share_out
//         });

//         let mut pk_part_b = vec![0u64; ring_size];
//         pk_shares.for_each(|share| modop.elwise_add_mut(&mut pk_part_b,
// &share));         let mut pk_part_a = vec![0u64; ring_size];
//         let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
//         RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &rlwe_q,
// pk_part_a.as_mut_slice());

//         vec![pk_part_a, pk_part_b]
//     }

//     fn _multi_party_all_keygen(
//         bool_evaluator: &BoolEvaluator<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >,
//         no_of_parties: usize,
//     ) -> (
//         Vec<ClientKey>,
//         PublicKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng,
// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>>,         Vec<
//             CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
//                 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//                 BoolParameters<u64>,
//                 [u8; 32],
//             >,
//         >,
//         SeededMultiPartyServerKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, [u8; 32],
// BoolParameters<u64>>,         ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>,
// DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>,         ClientKey,
//     ) {
//         let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
//             .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
//             .collect_vec();

//         let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();

//         // Collective public key
//         let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
//         rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
//         let public_key_share = parties
//             .iter()
//             .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed,
// k))             .collect_vec();
//         let collective_pk =
//             PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng,
// _>::from(public_key_share.as_slice());

//         // Server key
//         let mut pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
//         rng.fill_bytes(&mut pbs_cr_seed);
//         let server_key_shares = parties
//             .iter()
//             .map(|k| {
//                 bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed,
// &collective_pk.key(), k)             })
//             .collect_vec();
//         let seeded_server_key =
//
// bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
//         let server_key_eval = ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_,
// DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(             &seeded_server_key,
//         );

//         // construct ideal rlwe sk for meauring noise
//         let ideal_client_key = {
//             let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32;
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];             parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
//                 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;                 });
//             });
//             let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32;
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];             parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
//                 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {                     *ideal_i
// = *ideal_i + s_i;                 });
//             });

//             ClientKey::new(
//                 RlweSecret {
//                     values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
//                 },
//                 LweSecret {
//                     values: ideal_lwe_sk,
//                 },
//             )
//         };

//         (
//             parties,
//             collective_pk,
//             server_key_shares,
//             seeded_server_key,
//             server_key_eval,
//             ideal_client_key,
//         )
//     }

//     #[test]
//     fn multi_party_nand() {
//         let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);

//         let (parties, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key)
// =             _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 2);

//         let mut m0 = true;
//         let mut m1 = false;

//         let mut lwe0 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m0);
//         let mut lwe1 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m1);

//         for _ in 0..2000 {
//             let lwe_out = bool_evaluator.nand(&lwe0, &lwe1,
// &server_key_eval);

//             let m_expected = !(m0 & m1);

//             // multi-party decrypt
//             let decryption_shares = parties
//                 .iter()
//                 .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_out, k))
// .collect_vec();             let m_back =
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_out);

//             // let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_out,
// &ideal_client_key);

//             assert!(m_expected == m_back, "Expected {m_expected}, got
// {m_back}");             m1 = m0;
//             m0 = m_expected;

//             lwe1 = lwe0;
//             lwe0 = lwe_out;
//         }
//     }

//     #[test]
//     fn noise_tester() {
//         let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
//             Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//             NttBackendU64,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//         >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);

//         // let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
//         //     _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
//         let no_of_parties = 2;
//         let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
//         let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
//         let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0;
//         let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
//         let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
//         let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
//         let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;

//         // let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator
//         //     .pbs_info
//         //     .parameters
//         //     .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
//         // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_a = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
//         // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_b = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();

//         let rlwe_rgsw_decomposer =
// &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer;         let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a
// = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();         let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b =
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();

//         let auto_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.auto_decomposer;
//         let auto_gadget = auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();

//         let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
//             .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
//             .collect_vec();

//         let ideal_client_key = {
//             let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32;
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];             parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
//                 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;                 });
//             });
//             let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32;
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];             parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
//                 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {                     *ideal_i
// = *ideal_i + s_i;                 });
//             });

//             ClientKey::new(
//                 RlweSecret {
//                     values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
//                 },
//                 LweSecret {
//                     values: ideal_lwe_sk,
//                 },
//             )
//         };

//         // check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
//         if true {
//             let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
//             let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
//             for _ in 0..10 {
//                 // generate a new collective public key
//                 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
//                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
//                 let public_key_share = parties
//                     .iter()
//                     .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
// .collect_vec();                 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
//                     Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//                     DefaultSecureRng,
//                     ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//                 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());

//                 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice());                 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// 2];                 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
//                     &mut rlwe_ct,
//                     collective_pk.key(),
//                     &m,
//                     rlwe_modop,
//                     rlwe_nttop,
//                     &mut rng,
//                 );

//                 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                 decrypt_rlwe(
//                     &rlwe_ct,
//                     ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                     &mut m_back,
//                     rlwe_nttop,
//                     rlwe_modop,
//                 );

//                 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(),
// m.as_slice());

//                 check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
// rlwe_q).as_slice());             }

//             println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
//         }

//         if true {
//             // Generate server key shares
//             let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
//             let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
//             rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
//             let public_key_share = parties
//                 .iter()
//                 .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
// .collect_vec();             let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
//                 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
//                 DefaultSecureRng,
//                 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
//             >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());

//             let pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
//             rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
//             let server_key_shares = parties
//                 .iter()
//                 .map(|k| {
//                     bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed,
// collective_pk.key(), k)                 })
//                 .collect_vec();

//             let seeded_server_key =
//
// bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);

//             // Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
//             if false {
//                 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
//                 izip!(
//                     ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values.iter(),
//                     seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts().iter()
//                 )
//                 .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
//                     // X^{s[i]}
//                     let mut m_si = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     let s_i = *s_i *
// (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);                     if s_i
// < 0 {                         m_si[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] =
// rlwe_q.neg_one();                     } else {
//                         m_si[s_i as usize] = 1;
//                     }

//                     // RLWE'(-sm)
//                     let mut neg_s_eval =
//
// Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
//                     rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_eval);
//                     rlwe_nttop.forward(&mut neg_s_eval);
//                     for j in
// 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() {
// // RLWE(B^{j} * -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]})

//                         // -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
//                         let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
//                         rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
//                         rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(),
// neg_s_eval.as_slice());
// rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
// rlwe_modop
// .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a[j]);

//                         // RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
//                         let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
//                         rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j]);
//                         rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
//                             &rgsw_ct_i[j +
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()],                         );

//                         let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         decrypt_rlwe(
//                             &rlwe_ct,
//                             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                             &mut m_back,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                         );

//                         // diff
//                         rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
//                         check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
// rlwe_q));                     }

//                     // RLWE'(m)
//                     for j in
// 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() {
// // RLWE(B^{j} * X^{s_lwe[i]})

//                         // X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
//                         let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
//                         rlwe_modop
//                             .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(),
// &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b[j]);

//                         // RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
//                         let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
//                         rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(
//                             &rgsw_ct_i[j + (2 *
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count())],                         );
//                         rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
//                             &rgsw_ct_i[j
//                                 + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().
//                                   decomposition_count()
//                                     + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().
//                                       decomposition_count())],
//                         );

//                         let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         decrypt_rlwe(
//                             &rlwe_ct,
//                             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                             &mut m_back,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                         );

//                         // diff
//                         rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
//                         check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
// rlwe_q));                     }
//                 });
//                 println!(
//                     "RGSW Std: {} {} ;; max={}",
//                     check.mean(),
//                     check.std_dev().abs().log2(),
//                     check.samples.iter().max().unwrap()
//                 );
//             }

//             // server key in Evaluation domain
//             let server_key_eval_domain =
//                 ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
// NttBackendU64>::from(                     &seeded_server_key,
//                 );

//             // check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated
// RGSW ciphertext             if false {
//                 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };

//                 izip!(
//                     ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(),
//                     server_key_eval_domain.rgsw_cts().iter()
//                 )
//                 .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
//                     let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice());                     let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64;
// rlwe_n]; 2];                     public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32,
// _>(                         &mut rlwe_ct,
//                         collective_pk.key(),
//                         &m,
//                         rlwe_modop,
//                         rlwe_nttop,
//                         &mut rng,
//                     );

//                     // RLWE(m*X^{s[i]}) = RLWE(m) x RGSW(X^{s[i]})
//                     // let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_,
// DefaultSecureRng>::new_trivial(vec![                     //     vec![0u64;
// rlwe_n],                     //     m.clone(),
//                     // ]);
//                     let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_,
// DefaultSecureRng> {                         data: rlwe_ct.clone(),
//                         is_trivial: false,
//                         _phatom: PhantomData,
//                     };
//                     let mut scratch = vec![
//                         vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         std::cmp::max(
//                             rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
//                             rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count()
//                         ) + 2
//                     ];
//                     rlwe_by_rgsw(
//                         &mut rlwe_after,
//                         rgsw_ct_i,
//                         &mut scratch,
//                         rlwe_rgsw_decomposer,
//                         rlwe_nttop,
//                         rlwe_modop,
//                     );

//                     // m1 = X^{s[i]}
//                     let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     let s_i = *s_i *
// (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);                     if s_i
// < 0 {                         m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] =
// rlwe_q.neg_one()                     } else {
//                         m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
//                     }

//                     // (m+e) * m1
//                     let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     decrypt_rlwe(
//                         &rlwe_ct,
//                         ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                         &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
//                         rlwe_nttop,
//                         rlwe_modop,
//                     );
//                     rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
//                     rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
//
// rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(), m1.as_slice());
//                     rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());

//                     // Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) +
// e_{rlsw x rgsw}.                     // Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will
// have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}.                     // Here we're only
// concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise added by                     //
// RLWExRGSW. Also note in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
//                     // some i and var(em1) = var(e).
//                     let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     decrypt_rlwe(
//                         &rlwe_after,
//                         ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                         &mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
//                         rlwe_nttop,
//                         rlwe_modop,
//                     );

//                     // diff
//                     rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
//                         m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
//                         m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
//                     );

//                     // let noise = measure_noise(
//                     //     &rlwe_after,
//                     //     &m_plus_e_times_m1,
//                     //     rlwe_nttop,
//                     //     rlwe_modop,
//                     //     ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
//                     // );
//                     // print!("NOISE: {}", noise);

//                     check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
//                         &m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
//                         rlwe_q,
//                     ));
//                 });
//                 println!(
//                     "RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
//                     check.std_dev(),
//                     check.std_dev().abs().log2()
//                 )
//             }

//             // check noise in Auto key
//             if false {
//                 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };

//                 let mut neg_s_poly =
//
// Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
//                 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_poly.as_mut_slice());

//                 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
//                 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
//                 let auto_element_dlogs =
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();                 for
// i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {                     let g_pow = if i ==
// 0 {                         -g
//                     } else {
//                         (((g as usize).pow(i as u32)) % br_q) as isize
//                     };

//                     // -s[X^k]
//                     let (auto_indices, auto_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n,
// g_pow);                     let mut neg_s_poly_auto_i = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                     izip!(neg_s_poly.iter(), auto_indices.iter(),
// auto_sign.iter()).for_each(                         |(v, to_i, to_sign)| {
//                             if !to_sign {
//                                 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
//                             } else {
//                                 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = *v;
//                             }
//                         },
//                     );

//                     let mut auto_key_i =
// server_key_eval_domain.galois_key_for_auto(i).clone();                     //
// send i^th auto key to coefficient domain                     auto_key_i
//                         .iter_mut()
//                         .for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut_slice()));
//                     auto_gadget.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(i, b_i)| {
//                         // B^i * -s[X^k]
//                         let mut m_ideal = neg_s_poly_auto_i.clone();
//
// rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), b_i);

//                         let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
//                         rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[i]);
//                         rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
//                             &auto_key_i[auto_decomposer.decomposition_count()
// + i],                         ); decrypt_rlwe( &rlwe_ct,
//   ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), &mut m_out, rlwe_nttop, rlwe_modop, );

//                         // diff
//                         rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
// m_ideal.as_slice());

//                         check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_out,
// rlwe_q));                     });
//                 }

//                 println!("Auto key noise std dev: {}",
// check.std_dev().abs().log2());             }

//             // check noise in RLWE(X^k) after sending RLWE(X) -> RLWE(X^k)
// using collective             // auto key
//             if true {
//                 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
//                 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
//                 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
//                 let auto_element_dlogs =
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();                 for
// i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {                     for _ in 0..10 {
//                         let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng,
// rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());                         let mut rlwe_ct =
// RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {                             data:
// vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2],                             is_trivial: false,
//                             _phatom: PhantomData,
//                         };
//                         public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
//                             &mut rlwe_ct,
//                             collective_pk.key(),
//                             &m,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             &mut rng,
//                         );

//                         // We're only interested in noise increased as a
// result of automorphism.                         // Hence, we take m+e as the
// bench.                         let mut m_plus_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         decrypt_rlwe(
//                             &rlwe_ct,
//                             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                             &mut m_plus_e,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                         );

//                         let auto_key =
// server_key_eval_domain.galois_key_for_auto(i);                         let
// (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_auto_map(i);                         let mut
// scratch =                             vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + 2];
// galois_auto(                             &mut rlwe_ct,
//                             auto_key,
//                             &mut scratch,
//                             &auto_map_index,
//                             &auto_map_sign,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             auto_decomposer,
//                         );

//                         // send m+e from X to X^k
//                         let mut m_plus_e_auto = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         izip!(m_plus_e.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
// auto_map_sign.iter())                             .for_each(|(v, to_index,
// to_sign)| {                                 if !to_sign {
//                                     m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] =
// rlwe_modop.neg(v);                                 } else {
//                                     m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = *v
//                                 }
//                             });

//                         let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//                         decrypt_rlwe(
//                             &rlwe_ct,
//                             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                             &mut m_out,
//                             rlwe_nttop,
//                             rlwe_modop,
//                         );

//                         // diff
//                         rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
// m_plus_e_auto.as_slice());

//
// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(m_out.as_slice(), rlwe_q));
//                     }
//                 }

//                 println!("Rlwe Auto Noise Std: {}",
// check.std_dev().abs().log2());             }

//             // Check noise growth in ksk
//             // TODO check in LWE key switching keys
//             if true {
//                 // 1. encrypt LWE ciphertext
//                 // 2. Key switching
//                 // 3.
//                 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };

//                 for _ in 0..1024 {
//                     // Encrypt m \in Q_{ks} using RLWE sk
//                     let mut lwe_in_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
//                     let m = RandomElementInModulus::random(&mut rng,
// &lwe_q.q().unwrap());                     encrypt_lwe(
//                         &mut lwe_in_ct,
//                         &m,
//                         ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
//                         lwe_modop,
//                         &mut rng,
//                     );

//                     // Key switch
//                     let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
//                     lwe_key_switch(
//                         &mut lwe_out,
//                         &lwe_in_ct,
//                         server_key_eval_domain.lwe_ksk(),
//                         lwe_modop,
//                         bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer(),
//                     );

//                     // We only care about noise added by LWE key switch
//                     // m+e
//                     let m_plus_e =
//                         decrypt_lwe(&lwe_in_ct,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), lwe_modop);

//                     let m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise =
//                         decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(), lwe_modop);

//                     let diff = lwe_modop.sub(&m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise,
// &m_plus_e);

//                     check.add_more(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&diff)]);
//                 }

//                 println!("Lwe ksk std dev: {}",
// check.std_dev().abs().log2());             }
//         }

//         // Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equal
// noise in         // fresh RLWE ciphertext
//         if true {}
//         // test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
//         // if false {
//         //     let logp = 2;
//         //     let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();

//         //     let m = 1;
//         //     let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);

//         //     // Encrypt
//         //     let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
//         //     encrypt_lwe(
//         //         &mut lwe_ct,
//         //         &encoded_m,
//         //         ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
//         //         lwe_modop,
//         //         &mut rng,
//         //     );

//         //     // key switch
//         //     let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
//         //     let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
//         //     lwe_key_switch(
//         //         &mut lwe_out,
//         //         &lwe_ct,
//         //         &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
//         //         lwe_modop,
//         //         lwe_decomposer,
//         //     );

//         //     let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
//         // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop);     let m_back
//         // =         ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
//         // (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64;     dbg!(m_back, m);

//         //     let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
//         //         &lwe_out,
//         //         ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
//         //         lwe_modop,
//         //         &encoded_m,
//         //     );

//         //     println!("Noise: {noise}");
//         // }

//         // Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
//         // if true {
//         //     let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
//         //         bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
//         //         bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
//         //         bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
//         //     );

//         //     for i in 0..20 {
//         //         // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
//         //         let si =
//         //             ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
//         // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);         let mut
//         // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];         if si < 0 {
//         //             si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
//         //         } else {
//         //             si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
//         //         }

//         //         let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
//         //         rgsw_si
//         //             .iter_mut()
//         //             .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));

//         //         println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
//         //         _measure_noise_rgsw(
//         //             &rgsw_si,
//         //             &si_poly,
//         //             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
//         //             &gadget_vec,
//         //             rlwe_q,
//         //         );
//         //         println!("####### ##################### #######");
//         //     }
//         // }

//         // // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
//         // if true {
//         //     let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
//         //     let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//         //     RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
//         // carry_m.as_mut_slice());

//         //     // RGSW(carrym)
//         //     let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n],
// carry_m.clone()];         //     let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
//         // DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);

//         //     let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//         // d_rgsw + 2];     let mul_mod =
//         //         |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) %
// (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);

//         //     for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
//         //         rlwe_by_rgsw(
//         //             &mut rlwe_ct,
//         //             server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
//         //             &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
//         //             rlwe_decomposer,
//         //             rlwe_nttop,
//         //             rlwe_modop,
//         //         );

//         //         // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
//         //         let si =
//         //             ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
//         // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);         let mut
//         // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];         if si < 0 {
//         //             si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
//         //         } else {
//         //             si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
//         //         }
//         //         carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
//         // rlwe_q);

//         //         let noise = measure_noise(
//         //             &rlwe_ct,
//         //             &carry_m,
//         //             rlwe_nttop,
//         //             rlwe_modop,
//         //             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
//         //         );
//         //         println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
//         // monomial: {noise}");     }
//         // }

//         // // Check galois keys
//         // if false {
//         //     let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
//         //     let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
//         //     let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//         // d_rgsw + 2];     for i in [g, -g] {
//         //         let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//         //         RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
//         // m.as_mut_slice());         let mut rlwe_ct = {
//         //             let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
//         //             public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
//         //                 &mut data,
//         //                 &collective_pk.key,
//         //                 &m,
//         //                 rlwe_modop,
//         //                 rlwe_nttop,
//         //                 &mut rng,
//         //             );
//         //             RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
//         // false)         };

//         //         let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
//         //         let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
//         // generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i);         galois_auto(
//         //             &mut rlwe_ct,
//         //             auto_key,
//         //             &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
//         //             &auto_map_index,
//         //             &auto_map_sign,
//         //             rlwe_modop,
//         //             rlwe_nttop,
//         //             rlwe_decomposer,
//         //         );

//         //         // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
//         //         let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
//         //         izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
//         // auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each(             |(mi, to_index,
// to_sign)|         // {                 if !to_sign {
//         //                     m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi;
//         //                 } else {
//         //                     m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
//         //                 }
//         //             },
//         //         );

//         //         // measure noise
//         //         let noise = measure_noise(
//         //             &rlwe_ct,
//         //             &m_k,
//         //             rlwe_nttop,
//         //             rlwe_modop,
//         //             ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
//         //         );

//         //         println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
//         //     }
//         // }
//     }
// }