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use std::{fmt::Debug, iter::Sum};
use itertools::izip;
use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, PrimInt, Zero};
use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;
use crate::{
backend::{GetModulus, Modulus},
decomposer::{Decomposer, NumInfo, RlweDecomposer},
lwe::{decrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch},
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
random::{DefaultSecureRng, RandomFillUniformInModulus},
rgsw::{
decrypt_rlwe, rlwe_auto, rlwe_auto_scratch_rows, RlweCiphertextMutRef, RlweKskRef,
RuntimeScratchMutRef,
},
utils::{encode_x_pow_si_with_emebedding_factor, tests::Stats, TryConvertFrom1},
ArithmeticOps, ClientKey, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, ModInit, Ntt, NttInit, RowEntity, RowMut,
VectorOps,
};
use super::keys::tests::{ideal_sk_lwe, ideal_sk_rlwe};
pub(crate) trait CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats {
type M;
/// RGSW ciphertext X^{s[s_index]} in evaluation domain where `s` the LWE
/// secret
fn rgsw_cts_lwe_si(&self, s_index: usize) -> &Self::M;
/// Auto key in evaluation domain for automorphism g^k. For auto key for
/// automorphism corresponding to -g, set k = 0
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: usize) -> &Self::M;
/// LWE key switching key
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M;
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct ServerKeyStats<T> {
/// Distribution of noise in RGSW ciphertexts
///
/// We collect statistics for RLWE'(-sm) separately from RLWE'(m) because
/// non-interactive protocol differents between the two. Although we expect
/// the distribution of noise in both to be the same.
brk_rgsw_cts: (Stats<T>, Stats<T>),
/// Distribtion of noise added to RLWE ciphertext after automorphism using
/// Server auto keys.
post_1_auto: Stats<T>,
/// Distribution of noise added in LWE key switching from LWE_{q, s} to
/// LWE_{q, z} where `z` is ideal LWE secret and `s` is ideal RLWE secret
/// using Server's LWE key switching key.
post_lwe_key_switch: Stats<T>,
}
impl<T: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + Debug + Sum> ServerKeyStats<T>
where
T: for<'a> Sum<&'a T>,
{
fn new() -> Self {
ServerKeyStats {
brk_rgsw_cts: (Stats::default(), Stats::default()),
post_1_auto: Stats::default(),
post_lwe_key_switch: Stats::default(),
}
}
fn add_noise_brk_rgsw_cts_nsm(&mut self, noise: &[T]) {
self.brk_rgsw_cts.0.add_many_samples(noise);
}
fn add_noise_brk_rgsw_cts_m(&mut self, noise: &[T]) {
self.brk_rgsw_cts.1.add_many_samples(noise);
}
fn add_noise_post_1_auto(&mut self, noise: &[T]) {
self.post_1_auto.add_many_samples(&noise);
}
fn add_noise_post_kwe_key_switch(&mut self, noise: &[T]) {
self.post_lwe_key_switch.add_many_samples(&noise);
}
fn merge_in(&mut self, other: &Self) {
self.brk_rgsw_cts.0.merge_in(&other.brk_rgsw_cts.0);
self.brk_rgsw_cts.1.merge_in(&other.brk_rgsw_cts.1);
self.post_1_auto.merge_in(&other.post_1_auto);
self.post_lwe_key_switch
.merge_in(&other.post_lwe_key_switch);
}
}
fn collect_server_key_stats<
M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
D: Decomposer<Element = M::MatElement>,
NttOp: NttInit<CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
ModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
+ ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
+ ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>
+ GetModulus<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>, Element = M::MatElement>,
S: CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats<M = M>,
>(
parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
client_keys: &[ClientKey],
server_key: &S,
) -> ServerKeyStats<i64>
where
M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + Clone,
M::MatElement: Copy + PrimInt + FromPrimitive + SampleUniform + Zero + Debug + NumInfo,
{
let ideal_sk_rlwe = ideal_sk_rlwe(client_keys);
let ideal_sk_lwe = ideal_sk_lwe(client_keys);
let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n().0) / parameters.br_q();
let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();
let rlwe_modop = ModOp::new(rlwe_q.clone());
let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(rlwe_q, rlwe_n);
let lwe_modop = ModOp::new(*parameters.lwe_q());
let rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer = parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer::<D>();
let (rlwe_x_rgsw_gadget_a, rlwe_x_rgsw_gadget_b) = (
rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.a().gadget_vector(),
rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.b().gadget_vector(),
);
let lwe_ks_decomposer = parameters.lwe_decomposer::<D>();
let mut server_key_stats = ServerKeyStats::new();
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// RGSW ciphertext noise
// Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
{
ideal_sk_lwe.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(s_index, s_i)| {
let rgsw_ct_i = server_key.rgsw_cts_lwe_si(s_index);
// X^{s[i]}
let m_si = encode_x_pow_si_with_emebedding_factor::<M::R, _>(
*s_i,
embedding_factor,
rlwe_n,
rlwe_q,
);
// RLWE'(-sm)
let mut neg_s_eval = M::R::try_convert_from(ideal_sk_rlwe.as_slice(), rlwe_q);
rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_eval.as_mut());
rlwe_nttop.forward(neg_s_eval.as_mut());
for j in 0..rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count().0 {
// RLWE(B^{j} * -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]})
// -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut());
rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut(), neg_s_eval.as_ref());
rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut());
rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut(), &rlwe_x_rgsw_gadget_a[j]);
// RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
let mut rlwe_ct = M::zeros(2, rlwe_n);
rlwe_ct
.get_row_mut(0)
.copy_from_slice(rgsw_ct_i.get_row_slice(j));
rlwe_ct.get_row_mut(1).copy_from_slice(
rgsw_ct_i.get_row_slice(j + rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count().0),
);
// RGSW ciphertexts are in eval domain. We put RLWE ciphertexts back in
// coefficient domain
rlwe_ct
.iter_rows_mut()
.for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut()));
let mut m_back = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_ct,
&ideal_sk_rlwe,
&mut m_back,
&rlwe_nttop,
&rlwe_modop,
);
// diff
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut(), m_ideal.as_ref());
server_key_stats.add_noise_brk_rgsw_cts_nsm(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
m_back.as_ref(),
rlwe_q,
));
}
// RLWE'(m)
for j in 0..rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count().0 {
// RLWE(B^{j} * X^{s_lwe[i]})
// X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut(), &rlwe_x_rgsw_gadget_b[j]);
// RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
let mut rlwe_ct = M::zeros(2, rlwe_n);
rlwe_ct.get_row_mut(0).copy_from_slice(
rgsw_ct_i.get_row_slice(
j + (2 * rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count().0),
),
);
rlwe_ct
.get_row_mut(1)
.copy_from_slice(rgsw_ct_i.get_row_slice(
j + (2 * rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count().0)
+ rlwe_x_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count().0,
));
rlwe_ct
.iter_rows_mut()
.for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut()));
let mut m_back = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_ct,
&ideal_sk_rlwe,
&mut m_back,
&rlwe_nttop,
&rlwe_modop,
);
// diff
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut(), m_ideal.as_ref());
server_key_stats.add_noise_brk_rgsw_cts_m(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
m_back.as_ref(),
rlwe_q,
));
}
});
}
// Noise in ciphertext after 1 auto
// For each auto key g^k. Sample random polynomial m(X) and multiply with
// -s(X^{g^k}) using key corresponding to auto g^k. Then check the noise in
// resutling RLWE(m(X) * -s(X^{g^k}))
{
let neg_s = {
let mut s = M::R::try_convert_from(ideal_sk_rlwe.as_slice(), rlwe_q);
rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(s.as_mut());
s
};
let g = parameters.g();
let br_q = parameters.br_q();
let g_dlogs = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
let auto_decomposer = parameters.auto_decomposer::<D>();
let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(rlwe_auto_scratch_rows(&auto_decomposer), rlwe_n);
let mut scratch_matrix_ref = RuntimeScratchMutRef::new(scratch_matrix.as_mut());
g_dlogs.iter().for_each(|k| {
let g_pow_k = if *k == 0 {
-(g as isize)
} else {
(g.pow(*k as u32) % br_q) as isize
};
// Send s(X) -> s(X^{g^k})
let (auto_index_map, auto_sign_map) = crate::rgsw::generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, g_pow_k);
let mut neg_s_g_k = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
izip!(
neg_s.as_ref().iter(),
auto_index_map.iter(),
auto_sign_map.iter()
)
.for_each(|(el, to_index, to_sign)| {
if !to_sign {
neg_s_g_k.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(el);
} else {
neg_s_g_k.as_mut()[*to_index] = *el;
}
});
let mut m = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut());
// We want -m(X^{g^k})s(X^{g^k}) after key switch
let want_m = {
let mut m_g_k_eval = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
// send m(X) -> m(X^{g^k})
izip!(
m.as_ref().iter(),
auto_index_map.iter(),
auto_sign_map.iter()
)
.for_each(|(el, to_index, to_sign)| {
if !to_sign {
m_g_k_eval.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(el);
} else {
m_g_k_eval.as_mut()[*to_index] = *el;
}
});
rlwe_nttop.forward(m_g_k_eval.as_mut());
let mut s_g_k = neg_s_g_k.clone();
rlwe_nttop.forward(s_g_k.as_mut());
rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_g_k_eval.as_mut(), s_g_k.as_ref());
rlwe_nttop.backward(m_g_k_eval.as_mut());
m_g_k_eval
};
// RLWE auto sends part A, A(X), of RLWE to A(X^{g^k}) and then multiplies it
// with -s(X^{g^k}) using auto key. Deliberately set RLWE = (0, m(X))
// (ie. m in part A) to get back RLWE(-m(X^{g^k})s(X^{g^k}))
let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, rlwe_n);
rlwe.get_row_mut(0).copy_from_slice(m.as_ref());
rlwe_auto(
&mut RlweCiphertextMutRef::new(rlwe.as_mut()),
&RlweKskRef::new(
server_key.galois_key_for_auto(*k).as_ref(),
auto_decomposer.decomposition_count().0,
),
&mut scratch_matrix_ref,
&auto_index_map,
&auto_sign_map,
&rlwe_modop,
&rlwe_nttop,
&auto_decomposer,
false,
);
// decrypt RLWE(-m(X)s(X^{g^k]}))
let mut back_m = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n);
decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe, &ideal_sk_rlwe, &mut back_m, &rlwe_nttop, &rlwe_modop);
// check difference
let mut diff = back_m;
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(diff.as_mut(), want_m.as_ref());
server_key_stats
.add_noise_post_1_auto(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(diff.as_ref(), rlwe_q));
});
// sample random m
// key switch
}
// LWE Key switch
// LWE key switches LWE_in = LWE_{Q_ks,N, s}(m) = (b, a_0, ... a_N) -> LWE_out =
// LWE_{Q_{ks}, n, z}(m) = (b', a'_0, ..., a'n)
// If LWE_in = (0, a = {a_0, ..., a_N}), then LWE_out = LWE(-a \cdot s_{rlwe})
for _ in 0..100 {
let mut lwe_in = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n + 1);
RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, lwe_q, &mut lwe_in.as_mut()[1..]);
// Key switch
let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(parameters.lwe_n().0 + 1);
lwe_key_switch(
&mut lwe_out,
&lwe_in,
server_key.lwe_ksk(),
&lwe_modop,
&lwe_ks_decomposer,
);
// -a \cdot s
let mut want_m = M::MatElement::zero();
izip!(lwe_in.as_ref().iter().skip(1), ideal_sk_rlwe.iter()).for_each(|(a, b)| {
want_m = lwe_modop.add(
&want_m,
&lwe_modop.mul(a, &lwe_q.map_element_from_i64(*b as i64)),
);
});
want_m = lwe_modop.neg(&want_m);
// decrypt lwe out
let back_m = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out, &ideal_sk_lwe, &lwe_modop);
let noise = lwe_modop.sub(&want_m, &back_m);
server_key_stats.add_noise_post_kwe_key_switch(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&noise)]);
}
server_key_stats
// Auto keys noise
// Ksk noise
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use itertools::Itertools;
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "interactive_mp")]
fn interactive_key_noise() {
use crate::{
aggregate_public_key_shares, aggregate_server_key_shares,
bool::{
evaluator::InteractiveMultiPartyCrs,
keys::{key_size::KeySize, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain},
},
collective_pk_share, collective_server_key_share, gen_client_key,
parameters::CiphertextModulus,
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_common_reference_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::WithLocal,
BoolEvaluator, DefaultDecomposer, ModularOpsU64, NttBackendU64,
};
use super::*;
set_parameter_set(crate::ParameterSelector::InteractiveLTE8Party);
set_common_reference_seed(InteractiveMultiPartyCrs::random().seed);
let parties = 8;
let mut server_key_stats = ServerKeyStats::default();
let mut server_key_share_size = 0usize;
for i in 0..2 {
let cks = (0..parties).map(|_| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
let pk_shares = cks.iter().map(|k| collective_pk_share(k)).collect_vec();
let pk = aggregate_public_key_shares(&pk_shares);
let server_key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(index, k)| collective_server_key_share(k, index, parties, &pk))
.collect_vec();
// In 0th iteration measure server key size
if i == 0 {
// Server key share size of user with last id may not equal server key share
// sizes of other users if LWE dimension does not divides number of parties.
server_key_share_size = std::cmp::max(
server_key_shares.first().unwrap().size(),
server_key_shares.last().unwrap().size(),
);
}
// println!("Size: {}", server_key_shares[0].size());
let seeded_server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
let server_key_eval =
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, _, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&seeded_server_key,
);
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
server_key_stats.merge_in(&collect_server_key_stats::<
_,
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(parameters, &cks, &server_key_eval));
}
println!(
"Common reference seeded server key share key size: {} Bits",
server_key_share_size
);
println!(
"Rgsw nsm std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.0.std_dev().log2()
);
println!(
"Rgsw m std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.1.std_dev().log2()
);
println!(
"rlwe post 1 auto std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_1_auto.std_dev().log2()
);
println!(
"key switching noise rlwe secret s to lwe secret z std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev().log2()
);
}
const K: usize = 10;
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "interactive_mp")]
fn interactive_mp_bool_gates() {
use rand::{thread_rng, RngCore};
use crate::{
aggregate_public_key_shares, aggregate_server_key_shares,
backend::Modulus,
bool::{
keys::{
tests::{ideal_sk_rlwe, measure_noise_lwe},
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
},
print_noise::collect_server_key_stats,
},
collective_pk_share, collective_server_key_share, gen_client_key,
parameters::CiphertextModulus,
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_common_reference_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::{tests::Stats, Global, WithLocal},
BoolEvaluator, BooleanGates, DefaultDecomposer, Encoder, Encryptor, ModInit,
ModularOpsU64, MultiPartyDecryptor, NttBackendU64, ParameterSelector, RuntimeServerKey,
};
set_parameter_set(ParameterSelector::InteractiveLTE8Party);
let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
set_common_reference_seed(seed);
let no_of_parties = 8;
let cks = (0..no_of_parties).map(|_| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
// round 1
let pk_shares = cks.iter().map(|k| collective_pk_share(k)).collect_vec();
let pk = aggregate_public_key_shares(&pk_shares);
// round 2
let server_key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(user_id, k)| collective_server_key_share(k, user_id, no_of_parties, &pk))
.collect_vec();
let server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
server_key.set_server_key();
let mut m0 = false;
let mut m1 = true;
let mut ct0 = pk.encrypt(&m0);
let mut ct1 = pk.encrypt(&m1);
let ideal_sk_rlwe = ideal_sk_rlwe(&cks);
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
let rlwe_modop = ModularOpsU64::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
let mut stats = Stats::new();
for _ in 0..K {
// let now = std::time::Instant::now();
let ct_out =
BoolEvaluator::with_local_mut(|e| e.xor(&ct0, &ct1, RuntimeServerKey::global()));
// println!("Time: {:?}", now.elapsed());
let m_expected = m0 ^ m1;
let decryption_shares = cks
.iter()
.map(|k| k.gen_decryption_share(&ct_out))
.collect_vec();
let m_out = cks[0].aggregate_decryption_shares(&ct_out, &decryption_shares);
assert!(m_out == m_expected, "Expected {m_expected}, got {m_out}");
{
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
&ct_out,
parameters.rlwe_q().encode(m_expected),
&ideal_sk_rlwe,
&rlwe_modop,
);
stats.add_sample(parameters.rlwe_q().map_element_to_i64(&noise));
}
m1 = m0;
m0 = m_expected;
ct1 = ct0;
ct0 = ct_out;
}
let server_key_stats = collect_server_key_stats::<
_,
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(
parameters,
&cks,
&ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, _, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(&server_key),
);
println!("## Bootstrapping Statistics ##");
println!("Bootstrapped ciphertext noise std_dev: {}", stats.std_dev());
println!("## Key Statistics ##");
println!(
"Rgsw nsm std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.0.std_dev()
);
println!(
"Rgsw m std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.1.std_dev()
);
println!(
"rlwe post 1 auto std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.post_1_auto.std_dev()
);
println!(
"key switching noise rlwe secret s to lwe secret z std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev()
);
println!();
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "non_interactive_mp")]
fn non_interactive_mp_bool_gates() {
use rand::{thread_rng, RngCore};
use crate::{
aggregate_server_key_shares,
backend::Modulus,
bool::{
keys::{
tests::{ideal_sk_rlwe, measure_noise_lwe},
NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
},
print_noise::collect_server_key_stats,
},
gen_client_key, gen_server_key_share,
parameters::CiphertextModulus,
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_common_reference_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::{tests::Stats, Global, WithLocal},
BoolEvaluator, BooleanGates, DefaultDecomposer, Encoder, Encryptor, KeySwitchWithId,
ModInit, ModularOpsU64, MultiPartyDecryptor, NttBackendU64, ParameterSelector,
RuntimeServerKey, SampleExtractor,
};
set_parameter_set(ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveLTE8Party);
let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut seed);
set_common_reference_seed(seed);
let parties = 8;
let cks = (0..parties).map(|_| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
let server_key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(user_index, ck)| gen_server_key_share(user_index, parties, ck))
.collect_vec();
let seeded_server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
seeded_server_key.set_server_key();
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
let rlwe_modop = ModularOpsU64::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
let ideal_sk_rlwe = ideal_sk_rlwe(&cks);
let mut m0 = false;
let mut m1 = true;
let mut ct0 = {
cks[0]
.encrypt(vec![m0].as_slice())
.unseed::<Vec<Vec<u64>>>()
.key_switch(0)
.extract_at(0)
.data
};
let mut ct1 = {
cks[1]
.encrypt(vec![m1].as_slice())
.unseed::<Vec<Vec<u64>>>()
.key_switch(1)
.extract_at(0)
.data
};
let mut stats = Stats::new();
for _ in 0..K {
// let now = std::time::Instant::now();
let ct_out =
BoolEvaluator::with_local_mut(|e| e.xor(&ct0, &ct1, RuntimeServerKey::global()));
// println!("Time: {:?}", now.elapsed());
let decryption_shares = cks
.iter()
.map(|k| k.gen_decryption_share(&ct_out))
.collect_vec();
let m_out = cks[0].aggregate_decryption_shares(&ct_out, &decryption_shares);
let m_expected = m0 ^ m1;
{
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
&ct_out,
parameters.rlwe_q().encode(m_expected),
&ideal_sk_rlwe,
&rlwe_modop,
);
stats.add_sample(parameters.rlwe_q().map_element_to_i64(&noise));
}
assert!(m_out == m_expected, "Expected {m_expected} but got {m_out}");
m1 = m0;
m0 = m_out;
ct1 = ct0;
ct0 = ct_out;
}
// server key statistics
let server_key_stats = collect_server_key_stats::<
_,
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(
parameters,
&cks,
&NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, _, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&seeded_server_key,
),
);
println!("## Bootstrapping Statistics ##");
println!("Bootstrapped ciphertext noise std_dev: {}", stats.std_dev());
println!("## Key Statistics ##");
println!(
"Rgsw nsm std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.0.std_dev()
);
println!(
"Rgsw m std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.1.std_dev()
);
println!(
"rlwe post 1 auto std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.post_1_auto.std_dev()
);
println!(
"key switching noise rlwe secret s to lwe secret z std_dev {}",
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev()
);
println!();
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "non_interactive_mp")]
fn non_interactive_key_noise() {
use crate::{
aggregate_server_key_shares,
bool::{
evaluator::NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs,
keys::{key_size::KeySize, NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain},
},
decomposer::DefaultDecomposer,
gen_client_key, gen_server_key_share,
parameters::CiphertextModulus,
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_common_reference_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::WithLocal,
BoolEvaluator, ModularOpsU64, NttBackendU64,
};
use super::*;
set_parameter_set(crate::ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveLTE8Party);
set_common_reference_seed(NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs::random().seed);
let parties = 8;
let mut server_key_stats = ServerKeyStats::default();
let mut server_key_share_size = 0;
for i in 0..2 {
let cks = (0..parties).map(|_| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
let server_key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(user_id, k)| gen_server_key_share(user_id, parties, k))
.collect_vec();
// Collect server key size in the 0th iteration
if i == 0 {
// Server key share size may differ for user with last id from
// the share size of other users if the LWE dimension `n` is not
// divisible by no. of parties.
server_key_share_size = std::cmp::max(
server_key_shares.first().unwrap().size(),
server_key_shares.last().unwrap().size(),
);
}
let server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
let server_key_eval = NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
_,
_,
DefaultSecureRng,
NttBackendU64,
>::from(&server_key);
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
server_key_stats.merge_in(&collect_server_key_stats::<
_,
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(parameters, &cks, &server_key_eval));
}
println!(
"Common reference seeded server key share key size: {} Bits",
server_key_share_size
);
println!(
"Rgsw nsm std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.0.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"Rgsw m std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.1.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"rlwe post 1 auto std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_1_auto.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"key switching noise rlwe secret s to lwe secret z std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
}
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "non_interactive_mp")]
fn enc_under_sk_and_key_switch() {
use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
use crate::{
aggregate_server_key_shares,
bool::keys::tests::ideal_sk_rlwe,
gen_client_key, gen_server_key_share,
rgsw::decrypt_rlwe,
set_common_reference_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::{tests::Stats, TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal},
BoolEvaluator, Encoder, Encryptor, KeySwitchWithId, ModInit, ModularOpsU64,
NttBackendU64, NttInit, ParameterSelector, VectorOps,
};
set_parameter_set(ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveLTE2Party);
set_common_reference_seed([2; 32]);
let parties = 2;
let cks = (0..parties).map(|_| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
let key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(user_index, ck)| gen_server_key_share(user_index, parties, ck))
.collect_vec();
let seeded_server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&key_shares);
seeded_server_key.set_server_key();
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(parameters.rlwe_q(), parameters.rlwe_n().0);
let rlwe_q_modop = ModularOpsU64::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
let m = (0..parameters.rlwe_n().0)
.map(|_| thread_rng().gen_bool(0.5))
.collect_vec();
let ct = cks[0]
.encrypt(m.as_slice())
.unseed::<Vec<Vec<u64>>>()
.key_switch(0);
assert!(ct.data().len() == 1);
let ideal_rlwe_sk = ideal_sk_rlwe(&cks);
let message = m
.iter()
.map(|b| parameters.rlwe_q().encode(*b))
.collect_vec();
let mut m_out = vec![0u64; parameters.rlwe_n().0];
decrypt_rlwe(
&ct.data()[0],
&ideal_rlwe_sk,
&mut m_out,
&nttop,
&rlwe_q_modop,
);
let mut diff = m_out;
rlwe_q_modop.elwise_sub_mut(diff.as_mut_slice(), message.as_ref());
let mut stats = Stats::new();
stats.add_many_samples(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
diff.as_slice(),
parameters.rlwe_q(),
));
println!("Noise std log2: {}", stats.std_dev().abs().log2());
}
#[test]
fn mod_switch_noise() {
// Experiment to check mod switch noise using different secret dist in
// multi-party setting
use itertools::izip;
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
use crate::{
backend::{Modulus, ModulusPowerOf2},
parameters::SecretKeyDistribution,
random::{DefaultSecureRng, RandomFillGaussian, RandomFillUniformInModulus},
utils::{fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, tests::Stats},
ArithmeticOps, ModInit,
};
fn mod_switch(v: u64, q_from: u64, q_to: u64) -> f64 {
(v as f64) * (q_to as f64) / q_from as f64
}
fn mod_switch_round(v: u64, q_from: u64, q_to: u64) -> u64 {
mod_switch(v, q_from, q_to).round().to_u64().unwrap()
}
fn mod_switch_odd(v: u64, q_from: u64, q_to: u64) -> u64 {
let odd_v = mod_switch(v, q_from, q_to).floor().to_u64().unwrap();
odd_v + ((odd_v & 1) ^ 1)
}
fn sample_secret(n: usize, dist: &SecretKeyDistribution) -> Vec<i32> {
let mut s = vec![0i32; n];
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
match dist {
SecretKeyDistribution::ErrorDistribution => {
RandomFillGaussian::random_fill(&mut rng, s.as_mut_slice());
}
SecretKeyDistribution::TernaryDistribution => {
fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(&mut s, n >> 1, &mut rng);
}
}
s
}
let parties = 2;
let q_from = 1 << 40;
let q_to = 1 << 20;
let n = 480;
let lweq_in_modop = ModulusPowerOf2::new(q_from);
let lweq_out_modop = ModulusPowerOf2::new(q_to);
let secret_dist = SecretKeyDistribution::ErrorDistribution;
let mut stats_ms_noise = Stats::new();
let mut stats_ms_rounding_err = Stats::new();
for _ in 0..1000000 {
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// sample secrets
let s = {
let mut s = vec![0i32; n];
for _ in 0..parties {
let temp = sample_secret(n, &secret_dist);
izip!(s.iter_mut(), temp.iter()).for_each(|(si, ti)| {
*si = *si + *ti;
});
}
s
};
let m = 10;
// LWE encryption without noise
let mut lwe_in = vec![0u64; n + 1];
{
RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, &q_from, &mut lwe_in[1..]);
let mut b = m;
izip!(lwe_in.iter().skip(1), s.iter()).for_each(|(ai, si)| {
b = lweq_in_modop.add(
&b,
&lweq_in_modop.mul(ai, &q_from.map_element_from_i64(*si as i64)),
);
});
lwe_in[0] = b;
}
// Mod switch
let lwe_out = lwe_in
.iter()
.map(|v| {
// mod_switch_round(*v, q_from, q_to)
mod_switch_odd(*v, q_from, q_to)
})
.collect_vec();
let rounding_errors = izip!(lwe_out.iter(), lwe_in.iter())
.map(|(v_out, v_in)| {
let r_i = mod_switch(*v_in, q_from, q_to) - (*v_out as f64);
r_i
})
.collect_vec();
stats_ms_rounding_err.add_many_samples(&rounding_errors);
// LWE decrypt and calculate ms noise
let mut m_back = 0;
izip!(lwe_out.iter().skip(1), s.iter()).for_each(|(ai, si)| {
m_back = lweq_out_modop.add(
&m_back,
&lweq_out_modop.mul(ai, &q_from.map_element_from_i64(*si as i64)),
);
});
m_back = lweq_out_modop.sub(&lwe_out[0], &m_back);
let noise = lweq_out_modop.sub(&m_back, &m);
stats_ms_noise.add_many_samples(&vec![q_to.map_element_to_i64(&noise)]);
}
println!("ms noise variance: {}", stats_ms_noise.variance());
println!("ms rounding errors mean: {}", stats_ms_rounding_err.mean());
println!(
"ms rounding errors variance: {}",
stats_ms_rounding_err.variance()
);
}
}