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use std::{
cell::RefCell,
collections::HashMap,
fmt::{Debug, Display},
marker::PhantomData,
};
use itertools::{izip, partition, Itertools};
use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Num, One, PrimInt, ToPrimitive, WrappingSub, Zero};
use crate::{
backend::{ArithmeticOps, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, VectorOps},
decomposer::{Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, NumInfo},
lwe::{decrypt_lwe, encrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch, lwe_ksk_keygen, measure_noise_lwe, LweSecret},
multi_party::public_key_share,
ntt::{self, Ntt, NttBackendU64, NttInit},
random::{DefaultSecureRng, NewWithSeed, RandomGaussianDist, RandomUniformDist},
rgsw::{
decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, galois_key_gen, generate_auto_map, public_key_encrypt_rgsw,
rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace, rlwe_by_rgsw, secret_key_encrypt_rgsw, IsTrivial, RlweCiphertext,
RlweSecret,
},
utils::{
fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, generate_prime, mod_exponent,
TryConvertFrom, WithLocal,
},
Matrix, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, Row, RowEntity, RowMut, Secret,
};
use super::parameters::{self, BoolParameters};
// thread_local! {
// pub(crate) static CLIENT_KEY: RefCell<ClientKey> =
// RefCell::new(ClientKey::random()); }
trait PbsKey {
type M: Matrix;
/// RGSW ciphertext of LWE secret elements
fn rgsw_ct_lwe_si(&self, si: usize) -> &Self::M;
/// Key for automorphism
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: isize) -> &Self::M;
/// LWE ksk to key switch from RLWE secret to LWE secret
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M;
}
trait PbsParameters {
type Element;
type D: Decomposer<Element = Self::Element>;
fn rlwe_q(&self) -> Self::Element;
fn lwe_q(&self) -> Self::Element;
fn br_q(&self) -> usize;
fn d_rgsw(&self) -> usize;
fn d_lwe(&self) -> usize;
fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize;
fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize;
/// Embedding fator for ring X^{q}+1 inside
fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize;
/// generator g
fn g(&self) -> isize;
fn decomoposer_lwe(&self) -> &Self::D;
fn decomoposer_rlwe(&self) -> &Self::D;
/// Maps a \in Z^*_{q} to discrete log k, with generator g (i.e. g^k =
/// a). Returned vector is of size q that stores dlog of a at `vec[a]`.
/// For any a, if k is s.t. a = g^{k}, then k is expressed as k. If k is s.t
/// a = -g^{k}, then k is expressed as k=k+q/2
fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize];
fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: isize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>);
}
#[derive(Clone)]
struct ClientKey {
sk_rlwe: RlweSecret,
sk_lwe: LweSecret,
}
impl ClientKey {
fn random() -> Self {
let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(0, 0);
let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(0, 0);
Self { sk_rlwe, sk_lwe }
}
}
// impl WithLocal for ClientKey {
// fn with_local<F, R>(func: F) -> R
// where
// F: Fn(&Self) -> R,
// {
// CLIENT_KEY.with_borrow(|client_key| func(client_key))
// }
// fn with_local_mut<F, R>(func: F) -> R
// where
// F: Fn(&mut Self) -> R,
// {
// CLIENT_KEY.with_borrow_mut(|client_key| func(client_key))
// }
// }
// fn set_client_key(key: &ClientKey) {
// ClientKey::with_local_mut(|k| *k = key.clone())
// }
struct MultiPartyDecryptionShare<E> {
share: E,
}
struct CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<R, S, P> {
share: R,
cr_seed: S,
parameters: P,
}
struct PublicKey<M, R, O> {
key: M,
_phantom: PhantomData<(R, O)>,
}
impl<
M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
Rng: NewWithSeed + RandomUniformDist<[M::MatElement], Parameters = M::MatElement>,
ModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ModInit<Element = M::MatElement>,
>
From<
&[CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
M::R,
Rng::Seed,
BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
>],
> for PublicKey<M, Rng, ModOp>
where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
Rng::Seed: Copy + PartialEq,
M::MatElement: PartialEq + Copy,
{
fn from(
value: &[CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
M::R,
Rng::Seed,
BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
>],
) -> Self {
assert!(value.len() > 0);
let parameters = &value[0].parameters;
let mut key = M::zeros(2, parameters.rlwe_n);
// sample A
let seed = value[0].cr_seed;
let mut main_rng = Rng::new_with_seed(seed);
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_rng, &parameters.rlwe_q, key.get_row_mut(0));
// Sum all Bs
let rlweq_modop = ModOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q);
value.iter().for_each(|share_i| {
assert!(share_i.cr_seed == seed);
assert!(&share_i.parameters == parameters);
rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(key.get_row_mut(1), share_i.share.as_ref());
});
PublicKey {
key,
_phantom: PhantomData,
}
}
}
struct CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M: Matrix, P, S> {
rgsw_cts: Vec<M>,
auto_keys: HashMap<isize, M>,
lwe_ksk: M::R,
/// Common reference seed
cr_seed: S,
parameters: P,
}
struct SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M: Matrix, S, P> {
rgsw_cts: Vec<M>,
auto_keys: HashMap<isize, M>,
lwe_ksk: M::R,
cr_seed: S,
parameters: P,
}
fn aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares<
M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
S: Copy + PartialEq,
D: Decomposer<Element = M::MatElement>,
ModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ModInit<Element = M::MatElement>,
NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement> + NttInit<Element = M::MatElement>,
>(
shares: &[CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, S>],
d_rgsw_decomposer: &D,
) -> SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, S, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>
where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut + RowEntity,
M::MatElement: Copy + PartialEq + Zero,
M: Clone,
{
assert!(shares.len() > 0);
let parameters = shares[0].parameters.clone();
let cr_seed = shares[0].cr_seed;
let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n;
let g = parameters.g as isize;
let d_rgsw = parameters.d_rgsw;
let d_lwe = parameters.d_lwe;
let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q;
let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q;
// sanity checks
shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|s| {
assert!(s.parameters == parameters);
assert!(s.cr_seed == cr_seed);
});
let rlweq_modop = ModOp::new(rlwe_q);
let rlweq_nttop = NttOp::new(rlwe_q, rlwe_n);
// auto keys
let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
for i in [g, -g] {
let mut key = M::zeros(d_rgsw, rlwe_n);
shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
let auto_key_share_i = s.auto_keys.get(&i).expect("Auto key {i} missing");
assert!(auto_key_share_i.dimension() == (d_rgsw, rlwe_n));
izip!(key.iter_rows_mut(), auto_key_share_i.iter_rows()).for_each(
|(partb_out, partb_share)| {
rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(partb_out.as_mut(), partb_share.as_ref());
},
);
});
auto_keys.insert(i, key);
}
// rgsw ciphertext (most expensive part!)
let lwe_n = parameters.lwe_n;
let mut scratch_d_plus_rgsw_by_ring = M::zeros(d_rgsw + (d_rgsw * 4), rlwe_n);
let mut tmp_rgsw = M::zeros(d_rgsw * 2 * 2, rlwe_n);
let rgsw_cts = (0..lwe_n)
.into_iter()
.map(|index| {
// copy over rgsw ciphertext for index^th secret element from first share and
// treat it as accumulating rgsw ciphertext
let mut rgsw_i = shares[0].rgsw_cts[index].clone();
shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|si| {
// copy over si's RGSW[index] ciphertext and send to evaluation domain
izip!(tmp_rgsw.iter_rows_mut(), si.rgsw_cts[index].iter_rows()).for_each(
|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
rlweq_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut())
},
);
rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
&mut rgsw_i,
&tmp_rgsw,
d_rgsw_decomposer,
&mut scratch_d_plus_rgsw_by_ring,
&rlweq_nttop,
&rlweq_modop,
);
});
rgsw_i
})
.collect_vec();
// LWE ksks
let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n * d_lwe);
let lweq_modop = ModOp::new(lwe_q);
shares.iter().for_each(|si| {
assert!(si.lwe_ksk.as_ref().len() == rlwe_n * d_lwe);
lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(lwe_ksk.as_mut(), si.lwe_ksk.as_ref())
});
SeededMultiPartyServerKey {
rgsw_cts,
auto_keys,
lwe_ksk,
cr_seed,
parameters: parameters,
}
}
struct SeededServerKey<M: Matrix, P, S> {
/// Rgsw cts of LWE secret elements
pub(crate) rgsw_cts: Vec<M>,
/// Auto keys
pub(crate) auto_keys: HashMap<isize, M>,
/// LWE ksk to key switching LWE ciphertext from RLWE secret to LWE secret
pub(crate) lwe_ksk: M::R,
/// Parameters
pub(crate) parameters: P,
/// Main seed
pub(crate) seed: S,
}
impl<M: Matrix, S> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, S> {
pub(crate) fn from_raw(
auto_keys: HashMap<isize, M>,
rgsw_cts: Vec<M>,
lwe_ksk: M::R,
parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
seed: S,
) -> Self {
// sanity checks
auto_keys
.iter()
.for_each(|v| assert!(v.1.dimension() == (parameters.d_rgsw, parameters.rlwe_n)));
rgsw_cts
.iter()
.for_each(|v| assert!(v.dimension() == (parameters.d_rgsw * 3, parameters.rlwe_n)));
assert!(lwe_ksk.as_ref().len() == (parameters.d_lwe * parameters.rlwe_n));
SeededServerKey {
rgsw_cts,
auto_keys,
lwe_ksk,
parameters,
seed,
}
}
}
struct ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, R, N> {
/// Rgsw cts of LWE secret elements
rgsw_cts: Vec<M>,
/// Galois keys
galois_keys: HashMap<isize, M>,
/// LWE ksk to key switching LWE ciphertext from RLWE secret to LWE secret
lwe_ksk: M,
_phanton: PhantomData<(R, N)>,
}
impl<
M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
R: RandomUniformDist<[M::MatElement], Parameters = M::MatElement> + NewWithSeed,
N: NttInit<Element = M::MatElement> + Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
> From<&SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, R::Seed>>
for ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, R, N>
where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
M::MatElement: Copy,
R::Seed: Clone,
{
fn from(value: &SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, R::Seed>) -> Self {
let mut main_prng = R::new_with_seed(value.seed.clone());
let g = value.parameters.g as isize;
let ring_size = value.parameters.rlwe_n;
let lwe_n = value.parameters.lwe_n;
let d_rgsw = value.parameters.d_rgsw;
let d_lwe = value.parameters.d_lwe;
let rlwe_q = value.parameters.rlwe_q;
let lwq_q = value.parameters.lwe_q;
let nttop = N::new(rlwe_q, ring_size);
// galois keys
let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
for i in [g, -g] {
let seeded_auto_key = value.auto_keys.get(&i).unwrap();
assert!(seeded_auto_key.dimension() == (d_rgsw, ring_size));
let mut data = M::zeros(d_rgsw * 2, ring_size);
// sample RLWE'_A(-s(X^k))
data.iter_rows_mut().take(d_rgsw).for_each(|ri| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_prng, &rlwe_q, ri.as_mut())
});
// copy over RLWE'B_(-s(X^k))
izip!(
data.iter_rows_mut().skip(d_rgsw),
seeded_auto_key.iter_rows()
)
.for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref()));
// Send to Evaluation domain
data.iter_rows_mut()
.for_each(|ri| nttop.forward(ri.as_mut()));
auto_keys.insert(i, data);
}
// RGSW ciphertexts
let rgsw_cts = value
.rgsw_cts
.iter()
.map(|seeded_rgsw_si| {
assert!(seeded_rgsw_si.dimension() == (3 * d_rgsw, ring_size));
let mut data = M::zeros(d_rgsw * 4, ring_size);
// copy over RLWE'(-sm)
izip!(
data.iter_rows_mut().take(d_rgsw * 2),
seeded_rgsw_si.iter_rows().take(d_rgsw * 2)
)
.for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref()));
// sample RLWE'_A(m)
data.iter_rows_mut()
.skip(2 * d_rgsw)
.take(d_rgsw)
.for_each(|ri| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_prng, &rlwe_q, ri.as_mut())
});
// copy over RLWE'_B(m)
izip!(
data.iter_rows_mut().skip(d_rgsw * 3),
seeded_rgsw_si.iter_rows().skip(d_rgsw * 2)
)
.for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref()));
// send polynomials to evaluation domain
data.iter_rows_mut()
.for_each(|ri| nttop.forward(ri.as_mut()));
data
})
.collect_vec();
// LWE ksk
let lwe_ksk = {
assert!(value.lwe_ksk.as_ref().len() == d_lwe * ring_size);
let mut data = M::zeros(d_lwe * ring_size, lwe_n + 1);
izip!(data.iter_rows_mut(), value.lwe_ksk.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(lwe_i, bi)| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_prng, &lwq_q, &mut lwe_i.as_mut()[1..]);
lwe_i.as_mut()[0] = *bi;
});
data
};
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain {
rgsw_cts,
galois_keys: auto_keys,
lwe_ksk,
_phanton: PhantomData,
}
}
}
impl<
M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
Rng: NewWithSeed,
N: NttInit<Element = M::MatElement> + Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
> From<&SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, Rng::Seed, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>>
for ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, Rng, N>
where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
Rng::Seed: Copy,
Rng: RandomUniformDist<[M::MatElement], Parameters = M::MatElement>,
M::MatElement: Copy,
{
fn from(
value: &SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, Rng::Seed, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>,
) -> Self {
let g = value.parameters.g as isize;
let rlwe_n = value.parameters.rlwe_n;
let lwe_n = value.parameters.lwe_n;
let rlwe_q = value.parameters.rlwe_q;
let lwe_q = value.parameters.lwe_q;
let d_rgsw = value.parameters.d_rgsw;
let mut main_prng = Rng::new_with_seed(value.cr_seed);
let rlwe_nttop = N::new(rlwe_q, rlwe_n);
// auto keys
let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
for i in [g, -g] {
let mut key = M::zeros(value.parameters.d_rgsw * 2, rlwe_n);
// sample a
key.iter_rows_mut().take(d_rgsw).for_each(|ri| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_prng, &rlwe_q, ri.as_mut())
});
let key_part_b = value.auto_keys.get(&i).unwrap();
assert!(key_part_b.dimension() == (d_rgsw, rlwe_n));
izip!(key.iter_rows_mut().skip(d_rgsw), key_part_b.iter_rows()).for_each(
|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
},
);
// send to evaluation domain
key.iter_rows_mut()
.for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.forward(ri.as_mut()));
auto_keys.insert(i, key);
}
// rgsw cts
let rgsw_cts = value
.rgsw_cts
.iter()
.map(|ct_i| {
let mut eval_ct_i = M::zeros(d_rgsw * 4, rlwe_n);
izip!(eval_ct_i.iter_rows_mut(), ct_i.iter_rows()).for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
rlwe_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut());
});
eval_ct_i
})
.collect_vec();
// lwe ksk
let d_lwe = value.parameters.d_lwe;
let mut lwe_ksk = M::zeros(rlwe_n * d_lwe, lwe_n + 1);
izip!(lwe_ksk.iter_rows_mut(), value.lwe_ksk.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(lwe_i, bi)| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut main_prng, &lwe_q, &mut lwe_i.as_mut()[1..]);
lwe_i.as_mut()[0] = *bi;
});
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain {
rgsw_cts,
galois_keys: auto_keys,
lwe_ksk,
_phanton: PhantomData,
}
}
}
//FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way for BoolEvaluator to have access to ServerKey
// via a pointer and implement PbsKey for BoolEvaluator instead of ServerKey
// directly
impl<M: Matrix, R, N> PbsKey for ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, R, N> {
type M = M;
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: isize) -> &Self::M {
self.galois_keys.get(&k).unwrap()
}
fn rgsw_ct_lwe_si(&self, si: usize) -> &Self::M {
&self.rgsw_cts[si]
}
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M {
&self.lwe_ksk
}
}
struct BoolEvaluator<M, E, Ntt, ModOp>
where
M: Matrix,
{
parameters: BoolParameters<E>,
decomposer_rlwe: DefaultDecomposer<E>,
decomposer_lwe: DefaultDecomposer<E>,
g_k_dlog_map: Vec<usize>,
rlwe_nttop: Ntt,
rlwe_modop: ModOp,
lwe_modop: ModOp,
embedding_factor: usize,
nand_test_vec: M::R,
rlweq_by8: M::MatElement,
rlwe_qby4: M::MatElement,
rlwe_auto_maps: Vec<(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>)>,
_phantom: PhantomData<M>,
}
impl<M, NttOp, ModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, M::MatElement, NttOp, ModOp>
where
NttOp: NttInit<Element = M::MatElement> + Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
ModOp: ModInit<Element = M::MatElement>
+ ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
+ VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
M::MatElement: PrimInt + Debug + Display + NumInfo + FromPrimitive + WrappingSub,
M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
M::R: TryConvertFrom<[i32], Parameters = M::MatElement> + RowEntity + Debug,
M: TryConvertFrom<[i32], Parameters = M::MatElement>,
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
DefaultSecureRng: RandomGaussianDist<[M::MatElement], Parameters = M::MatElement>
+ RandomGaussianDist<M::MatElement, Parameters = M::MatElement>
+ RandomUniformDist<[M::MatElement], Parameters = M::MatElement>
+ NewWithSeed,
{
fn new(parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self {
//TODO(Jay): Run sanity checks for modulus values in parameters
assert!(parameters.br_q.is_power_of_two());
let decomposer_rlwe =
DefaultDecomposer::new(parameters.rlwe_q, parameters.logb_rgsw, parameters.d_rgsw);
let decomposer_lwe =
DefaultDecomposer::new(parameters.lwe_q, parameters.logb_lwe, parameters.d_lwe);
// generatr dlog map s.t. g^{k} % q = a, for all a \in Z*_{q}
let g = parameters.g;
let q = parameters.br_q;
let mut g_k_dlog_map = vec![0usize; q];
for i in 0..q / 2 {
let v = mod_exponent(g as u64, i as u64, q as u64) as usize;
// g^i
g_k_dlog_map[v] = i;
// -(g^i)
g_k_dlog_map[q - v] = i + (q / 2);
}
let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n) / q;
let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q, parameters.rlwe_n);
let rlwe_modop = ModInit::new(parameters.rlwe_q);
let lwe_modop = ModInit::new(parameters.lwe_q);
// set test vectors
let el_one = M::MatElement::one();
let nand_map = |index: usize, qby8: usize| {
if index < (3 * qby8) {
true
} else {
false
}
};
let q = parameters.br_q;
let qby2 = q >> 1;
let qby8 = q >> 3;
let mut nand_test_vec = M::R::zeros(qby2);
// Q/8 (Q: rlwe_q)
let rlwe_qby8 =
M::MatElement::from_f64((parameters.rlwe_q.to_f64().unwrap() / 8.0).round()).unwrap();
let true_m_el = rlwe_qby8;
// -Q/8
let false_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q - rlwe_qby8;
for i in 0..qby2 {
let v = nand_map(i, qby8);
if v {
nand_test_vec.as_mut()[i] = true_m_el;
} else {
nand_test_vec.as_mut()[i] = false_m_el;
}
}
// // Rotate and negate by q/8
// let mut tmp = M::R::zeros(qby2);
// tmp.as_mut()[..qby2 - qby8].copy_from_slice(&nand_test_vec.as_ref()[qby8..]);
// tmp.as_mut()[qby2 - qby8..].copy_from_slice(&nand_test_vec.as_ref()[..qby8]);
// tmp.as_mut()[qby2 - qby8..].iter_mut().for_each(|v| {
// *v = parameters.rlwe_q - *v;
// });
// let nand_test_vec = tmp;
// v(X) -> v(X^{-g})
let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(qby2, -(g as isize));
let mut nand_test_vec_autog = M::R::zeros(qby2);
izip!(
nand_test_vec.as_ref().iter(),
auto_map_index.iter(),
auto_map_sign.iter()
)
.for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
if !to_sign {
// negate
nand_test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = parameters.rlwe_q - *v;
} else {
nand_test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = *v;
}
});
// auto map indices and sign
let mut rlwe_auto_maps = vec![];
let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n;
let g = parameters.g as isize;
for i in [g, -g] {
rlwe_auto_maps.push(generate_auto_map(ring_size, i))
}
let rlwe_qby4 =
M::MatElement::from_f64((parameters.rlwe_q.to_f64().unwrap() / 4.0).round()).unwrap();
BoolEvaluator {
parameters: parameters,
decomposer_lwe,
decomposer_rlwe,
g_k_dlog_map,
embedding_factor,
lwe_modop,
rlwe_modop,
rlwe_nttop,
nand_test_vec: nand_test_vec_autog,
rlweq_by8: rlwe_qby8,
rlwe_qby4: rlwe_qby4,
rlwe_auto_maps,
_phantom: PhantomData,
}
}
fn client_key(&self) -> ClientKey {
let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(self.parameters.lwe_n >> 1, self.parameters.lwe_n);
let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(self.parameters.rlwe_n >> 1, self.parameters.rlwe_n);
ClientKey { sk_rlwe, sk_lwe }
}
fn server_key(
&self,
client_key: &ClientKey,
) -> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]> {
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut main_seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut main_seed);
let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(main_seed);
let sk_rlwe = &client_key.sk_rlwe;
let sk_lwe = &client_key.sk_lwe;
let d_rgsw_gadget_vec = self.decomposer_rlwe.gadget_vector();
// generate auto keys -g, g
let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
let g = self.parameters.g as isize;
for i in [g, -g] {
let mut gk = M::zeros(self.parameters.d_rgsw, self.parameters.rlwe_n);
galois_key_gen(
&mut gk,
sk_rlwe.values(),
i,
&d_rgsw_gadget_vec,
&self.rlwe_modop,
&self.rlwe_nttop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
auto_keys.insert(i, gk);
}
// generate rgsw ciphertexts RGSW(si) where si is i^th LWE secret element
let ring_size = self.parameters.rlwe_n;
let rlwe_q = self.parameters.rlwe_q;
let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
.values()
.iter()
.map(|si| {
// X^{si}; assume |emebedding_factor * si| < N
let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
let si = (self.embedding_factor as i32) * si;
// dbg!(si);
if si < 0 {
// X^{-i} = X^{2N - i} = -X^{N-i}
m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - M::MatElement::one();
} else {
// X^{i}
m.as_mut()[si.abs() as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
}
let mut rgsw_si = M::zeros(self.parameters.d_rgsw * 3, ring_size);
secret_key_encrypt_rgsw(
&mut rgsw_si,
m.as_ref(),
&d_rgsw_gadget_vec,
sk_rlwe.values(),
&self.rlwe_modop,
&self.rlwe_nttop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
rgsw_si
})
.collect_vec();
// LWE KSK from RLWE secret s -> LWE secret z
let d_lwe_gadget = self.decomposer_lwe.gadget_vector();
let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(self.parameters.d_lwe * ring_size);
lwe_ksk_keygen(
&sk_rlwe.values(),
&sk_lwe.values(),
&mut lwe_ksk,
&d_lwe_gadget,
&self.lwe_modop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
SeededServerKey::from_raw(
auto_keys,
rgsw_cts,
lwe_ksk,
self.parameters.clone(),
main_seed,
)
})
}
fn multi_party_sever_key_share(
&self,
cr_seed: [u8; 32],
collective_pk: &M,
client_key: &ClientKey,
) -> CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]>
{
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
let sk_rlwe = &client_key.sk_rlwe;
let sk_lwe = &client_key.sk_lwe;
let g = self.parameters.g as isize;
let ring_size = self.parameters.rlwe_n;
let d_rgsw = self.parameters.d_rgsw;
let d_lwe = self.parameters.d_lwe;
let rlwe_q = self.parameters.rlwe_q;
let lwe_q = self.parameters.lwe_q;
let d_rgsw_gadget_vec = self.decomposer_rlwe.gadget_vector();
let rlweq_modop = ModOp::new(rlwe_q);
let rlweq_nttop = NttOp::new(rlwe_q, ring_size);
// sanity check
assert!(sk_rlwe.values().len() == ring_size);
assert!(sk_lwe.values().len() == self.parameters.lwe_n);
// auto keys
let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
for i in [g, -g] {
let mut ksk_out = M::zeros(d_rgsw, ring_size);
galois_key_gen(
&mut ksk_out,
sk_rlwe.values(),
i,
&d_rgsw_gadget_vec,
&rlweq_modop,
&rlweq_nttop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
auto_keys.insert(i, ksk_out);
}
// rgsw ciphertexts of lwe secret elements
let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
.values()
.iter()
.map(|si| {
let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
//TODO(Jay): It will be nice to have a function that returns polynomial
// (monomial infact!) corresponding to secret element embedded in ring X^{2N+1}.
// Save lots of mistakes where one forgest to emebed si in bigger ring.
let si = *si * (self.embedding_factor as i32);
if si < 0 {
// X^{-si} = X^{2N-si} = -X^{N-si}, assuming abs(si) < N
// (which it is given si is secret element)
m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - M::MatElement::one();
} else {
m.as_mut()[si as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
}
// public key RGSW encryption has no part that can be seeded, unlike secret key
// RGSW encryption where RLWE'_A(m) is seeded
let mut out_rgsw = M::zeros(d_rgsw * 4, ring_size);
public_key_encrypt_rgsw(
&mut out_rgsw,
&m.as_ref(),
collective_pk,
&d_rgsw_gadget_vec,
&rlweq_modop,
&rlweq_nttop,
rng,
);
out_rgsw
})
.collect_vec();
// LWE ksk
let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(d_lwe * ring_size);
let lwe_modop = ModOp::new(lwe_q);
let d_lwe_gadget_vec = self.decomposer_lwe.gadget_vector();
lwe_ksk_keygen(
sk_rlwe.values(),
sk_lwe.values(),
&mut lwe_ksk,
&d_lwe_gadget_vec,
&lwe_modop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare {
auto_keys,
rgsw_cts,
lwe_ksk,
cr_seed,
parameters: self.parameters.clone(),
}
})
}
fn multi_party_public_key_share(
&self,
cr_seed: [u8; 32],
client_key: &ClientKey,
) -> CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
<M as Matrix>::R,
[u8; 32],
BoolParameters<<M as Matrix>::MatElement>,
> {
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut share_out = M::R::zeros(self.parameters.rlwe_n);
let modop = ModOp::new(self.parameters.rlwe_q);
let nttop = NttOp::new(self.parameters.rlwe_q, self.parameters.rlwe_n);
let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
public_key_share(
&mut share_out,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&modop,
&nttop,
&mut main_prng,
rng,
);
CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare {
share: share_out,
cr_seed: cr_seed,
parameters: self.parameters.clone(),
}
})
}
fn multi_party_decryption_share(
&self,
lwe_ct: &M::R,
client_key: &ClientKey,
) -> MultiPartyDecryptionShare<<M as Matrix>::MatElement> {
assert!(lwe_ct.as_ref().len() == self.parameters.rlwe_n + 1);
let modop = &self.rlwe_modop;
let mut neg_s =
M::R::try_convert_from(client_key.sk_rlwe.values(), &self.parameters.rlwe_q);
modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s.as_mut());
let mut neg_sa = M::MatElement::zero();
izip!(lwe_ct.as_ref().iter().skip(1), neg_s.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(ai, nsi)| {
neg_sa = modop.add(&neg_sa, &modop.mul(ai, nsi));
});
let e = DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut e = M::MatElement::zero();
RandomGaussianDist::random_fill(rng, &self.parameters.rlwe_q, &mut e);
e
});
let share = modop.add(&neg_sa, &e);
MultiPartyDecryptionShare { share }
}
pub(crate) fn multi_party_decrypt(
&self,
shares: &[MultiPartyDecryptionShare<M::MatElement>],
lwe_ct: &M::R,
) -> bool {
let modop = &self.rlwe_modop;
let mut sum_a = M::MatElement::zero();
shares
.iter()
.for_each(|share_i| sum_a = modop.add(&sum_a, &share_i.share));
let encoded_m = modop.add(&lwe_ct.as_ref()[0], &sum_a);
let m = (((encoded_m + self.rlweq_by8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4f64)
/ self.parameters.rlwe_q.to_f64().unwrap())
.round() as usize
% 4usize;
if m == 0 {
return false;
} else if m == 1 {
return true;
} else {
panic!("Bool decryption failure. Expected m to be either 1 or 0, but m={m} ");
}
}
/// First encrypt as RLWE(m) with m as constant polynomial and extract it as
/// LWE ciphertext
pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt(&self, pk: &M, m: bool) -> M::R {
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let modop = &self.rlwe_modop;
let nttop = &self.rlwe_nttop;
// RLWE(0)
// sample ephemeral key u
let ring_size = self.parameters.rlwe_n;
let mut u = vec![0i32; ring_size];
fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(u.as_mut(), ring_size >> 1, rng);
let mut u = M::R::try_convert_from(&u, &self.parameters.rlwe_q);
nttop.forward(u.as_mut());
let mut ua = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
ua.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(0));
let mut ub = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
ub.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(1));
// a*u
nttop.forward(ua.as_mut());
modop.elwise_mul_mut(ua.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
nttop.backward(ua.as_mut());
// b*u
nttop.forward(ub.as_mut());
modop.elwise_mul_mut(ub.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
nttop.backward(ub.as_mut());
let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, ring_size);
// sample error
rlwe.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|ri| {
RandomGaussianDist::random_fill(rng, &self.parameters.rlwe_q, ri.as_mut());
});
// a*u + e0
modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(0), ua.as_ref());
// b*u + e1
modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), ub.as_ref());
let m = if m {
// Q/8
self.rlweq_by8
} else {
// -Q/8
self.parameters.rlwe_q - self.rlweq_by8
};
// b*u + e1 + m, where m is constant polynomial
rlwe.set(1, 0, modop.add(rlwe.get(1, 0), &m));
// sample extract index 0
let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(ring_size + 1);
sample_extract(&mut lwe_out, &rlwe, modop, 0);
lwe_out
})
}
/// TODO(Jay): Fetch client key from thread local
pub fn sk_encrypt(&self, m: bool, client_key: &ClientKey) -> M::R {
let m = if m {
// Q/8
self.rlweq_by8
} else {
// -Q/8
self.parameters.rlwe_q - self.rlweq_by8
};
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(self.parameters.rlwe_n + 1);
encrypt_lwe(
&mut lwe_out,
&m,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&self.rlwe_modop,
rng,
);
lwe_out
})
}
pub fn sk_decrypt(&self, lwe_ct: &M::R, client_key: &ClientKey) -> bool {
let m = decrypt_lwe(lwe_ct, client_key.sk_rlwe.values(), &self.rlwe_modop);
let m = {
// m + q/8 => {0,q/4 1}
(((m + self.rlweq_by8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4.0)
/ self.parameters.rlwe_q.to_f64().unwrap())
.round()
.to_usize()
.unwrap()
% 4
};
if m == 0 {
false
} else if m == 1 {
true
} else {
panic!("Incorrect bool decryption. Got m={m} but expected m to be 0 or 1")
}
}
// TODO(Jay): scratch spaces must be thread local. Don't pass them as arguments
pub fn nand(
&self,
c0: &M::R,
c1: &M::R,
server_key: &ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, DefaultSecureRng, NttOp>,
scratch_lwen_plus1: &mut M::R,
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring: &mut M,
) -> M::R {
// ClientKey::with_local(|ck| {
// let c0_noise = measure_noise_lwe(
// c0,
// ck.sk_rlwe.values(),
// &self.rlwe_modop,
// &(self.rlwe_q() - self.rlweq_by8),
// );
// let c1_noise =
// measure_noise_lwe(c1, ck.sk_rlwe.values(), &self.rlwe_modop,
// &(self.rlweq_by8)); println!(
// "c0 noise: {c0_noise}; c1 noise:
// {c1_noise}"
// );
// });
let mut c_out = M::R::zeros(c0.as_ref().len());
let modop = &self.rlwe_modop;
izip!(
c_out.as_mut().iter_mut(),
c0.as_ref().iter(),
c1.as_ref().iter()
)
.for_each(|(o, i0, i1)| {
*o = modop.add(i0, i1);
});
// +Q/8
c_out.as_mut()[0] = modop.add(&c_out.as_ref()[0], &self.rlwe_qby4);
// ClientKey::with_local(|ck| {
// let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
// &c_out,
// ck.sk_rlwe.values(),
// &self.rlwe_modop,
// &(self.rlweq_by8),
// );
// println!("cout_noise: {noise}");
// });
// PBS
pbs(
self,
&self.nand_test_vec,
&mut c_out,
scratch_lwen_plus1,
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
&self.lwe_modop,
&self.rlwe_modop,
&self.rlwe_nttop,
server_key,
);
c_out
}
}
impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, ModOp> PbsParameters for BoolEvaluator<M, M::MatElement, NttOp, ModOp>
where
M::MatElement: PrimInt + WrappingSub + Debug,
{
type Element = M::MatElement;
type D = DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>;
fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: isize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>) {
let g = self.parameters.g as isize;
if k == g {
&self.rlwe_auto_maps[0]
} else if k == -g {
&self.rlwe_auto_maps[1]
} else {
panic!("RLWE auto map only supports k in [-g, g], but got k={k}");
}
}
fn br_q(&self) -> usize {
self.parameters.br_q
}
fn d_lwe(&self) -> usize {
self.parameters.d_lwe
}
fn d_rgsw(&self) -> usize {
self.parameters.d_rgsw
}
fn decomoposer_lwe(&self) -> &Self::D {
&self.decomposer_lwe
}
fn decomoposer_rlwe(&self) -> &Self::D {
&self.decomposer_rlwe
}
fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize {
self.embedding_factor
}
fn g(&self) -> isize {
self.parameters.g as isize
}
fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize] {
&self.g_k_dlog_map
}
fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize {
self.parameters.lwe_n
}
fn lwe_q(&self) -> Self::Element {
self.parameters.lwe_q
}
fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize {
self.parameters.rlwe_n
}
fn rlwe_q(&self) -> Self::Element {
self.parameters.rlwe_q
}
}
/// LMKCY+ Blind rotation
///
/// gk_to_si: [-g^0, -g^1, .., -g^{q/2-1}, g^0, ..., g^{q/2-1}]
fn blind_rotation<
MT: IsTrivial + MatrixMut,
Mmut: MatrixMut<MatElement = MT::MatElement> + Matrix,
D: Decomposer<Element = MT::MatElement>,
NttOp: Ntt<Element = MT::MatElement>,
ModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = MT::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = MT::MatElement>,
K: PbsKey<M = Mmut>,
P: PbsParameters<Element = MT::MatElement>,
>(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly: &mut MT,
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring: &mut Mmut,
g: isize,
w: usize,
q: usize,
gk_to_si: &[Vec<usize>],
decomposer: &D,
ntt_op: &NttOp,
mod_op: &ModOp,
parameters: &P,
pbs_key: &K,
) where
<Mmut as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
Mmut::MatElement: Copy + Zero,
<MT as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
{
let q_by_2 = q / 2;
// -(g^k)
for i in (1..q_by_2).rev() {
gk_to_si[q_by_2 + i].iter().for_each(|s_index| {
rlwe_by_rgsw(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(*s_index),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
decomposer,
ntt_op,
mod_op,
);
});
let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = parameters.rlwe_auto_map(g);
galois_auto(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.galois_key_for_auto(g),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
&auto_map_index,
&auto_map_sign,
mod_op,
ntt_op,
decomposer,
);
}
// -(g^0)
gk_to_si[q_by_2].iter().for_each(|s_index| {
rlwe_by_rgsw(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(*s_index),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
decomposer,
ntt_op,
mod_op,
);
});
let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = parameters.rlwe_auto_map(-g);
galois_auto(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.galois_key_for_auto(-g),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
&auto_map_index,
&auto_map_sign,
mod_op,
ntt_op,
decomposer,
);
// +(g^k)
for i in (1..q_by_2).rev() {
gk_to_si[i].iter().for_each(|s_index| {
rlwe_by_rgsw(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(*s_index),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
decomposer,
ntt_op,
mod_op,
);
});
let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = parameters.rlwe_auto_map(g);
galois_auto(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.galois_key_for_auto(g),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
&auto_map_index,
&auto_map_sign,
mod_op,
ntt_op,
decomposer,
);
}
// +(g^0)
gk_to_si[0].iter().for_each(|s_index| {
rlwe_by_rgsw(
trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
pbs_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(gk_to_si[q_by_2][*s_index]),
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
decomposer,
ntt_op,
mod_op,
);
});
}
/// - Mod down
/// - key switching
/// - mod down
/// - blind rotate
fn pbs<
M: Matrix + MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
P: PbsParameters<Element = M::MatElement>,
NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
ModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
K: PbsKey<M = M>,
>(
parameters: &P,
test_vec: &M::R,
lwe_in: &mut M::R,
scratch_lwen_plus1: &mut M::R,
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring: &mut M,
modop_lweq: &ModOp,
modop_rlweq: &ModOp,
nttop_rlweq: &NttOp,
pbs_key: &K,
) where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
M::MatElement: PrimInt + ToPrimitive + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display,
{
let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();
let br_q = parameters.br_q();
let rlwe_qf64 = rlwe_q.to_f64().unwrap();
let lwe_qf64 = lwe_q.to_f64().unwrap();
let br_qf64 = br_q.to_f64().unwrap();
let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n();
PBSTracer::with_local_mut(|t| {
let out = lwe_in
.as_ref()
.iter()
.map(|v| v.to_u64().unwrap())
.collect_vec();
t.ct_rlwe_q_mod = out;
});
// moddown Q -> Q_ks
lwe_in.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| {
*v =
M::MatElement::from_f64(((v.to_f64().unwrap() * lwe_qf64) / rlwe_qf64).round()).unwrap()
});
PBSTracer::with_local_mut(|t| {
let out = lwe_in
.as_ref()
.iter()
.map(|v| v.to_u64().unwrap())
.collect_vec();
t.ct_lwe_q_mod = out;
});
// key switch RLWE secret to LWE secret
scratch_lwen_plus1.as_mut().fill(M::MatElement::zero());
lwe_key_switch(
scratch_lwen_plus1,
lwe_in,
pbs_key.lwe_ksk(),
modop_lweq,
parameters.decomoposer_lwe(),
);
PBSTracer::with_local_mut(|t| {
let out = scratch_lwen_plus1
.as_ref()
.iter()
.map(|v| v.to_u64().unwrap())
.collect_vec();
t.ct_lwe_q_mod_after_ksk = out;
});
// odd mowdown Q_ks -> q
let g_k_dlog_map = parameters.g_k_dlog_map();
let mut g_k_si = vec![vec![]; br_q];
scratch_lwen_plus1
.as_ref()
.iter()
.skip(1)
.enumerate()
.for_each(|(index, v)| {
let odd_v = mod_switch_odd(v.to_f64().unwrap(), lwe_qf64, br_qf64);
let k = g_k_dlog_map[odd_v];
g_k_si[k].push(index);
});
PBSTracer::with_local_mut(|t| {
let out = scratch_lwen_plus1
.as_ref()
.iter()
.map(|v| mod_switch_odd(v.to_f64().unwrap(), lwe_qf64, br_qf64) as u64)
.collect_vec();
t.ct_br_q_mod = out;
});
// handle b and set trivial test RLWE
let g = parameters.g() as usize;
let g_times_b = (g * mod_switch_odd(
scratch_lwen_plus1.as_ref()[0].to_f64().unwrap(),
lwe_qf64,
br_qf64,
)) % (br_q);
// v = (v(X) * X^{g*b}) mod X^{q/2}+1
let br_qby2 = br_q / 2;
let mut gb_monomial_sign = true;
let mut gb_monomial_exp = g_times_b;
// X^{g*b} mod X^{q/2}+1
if gb_monomial_exp > br_qby2 {
gb_monomial_exp -= br_qby2;
gb_monomial_sign = false
}
// monomial mul
let mut trivial_rlwe_test_poly =
RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(M::zeros(2, rlwe_n), true);
if parameters.embedding_factor() == 1 {
monomial_mul(
test_vec.as_ref(),
trivial_rlwe_test_poly.get_row_mut(1).as_mut(),
gb_monomial_exp,
gb_monomial_sign,
br_qby2,
modop_rlweq,
);
} else {
// use lwe_in to store the `t = v(X) * X^{g*2} mod X^{q/2}+1` temporarily. This
// works because q/2 <= N (where N is lwe_in LWE dimension) always.
monomial_mul(
test_vec.as_ref(),
&mut lwe_in.as_mut()[..br_qby2],
gb_monomial_exp,
gb_monomial_sign,
br_qby2,
modop_rlweq,
);
// emebed poly `t` in ring X^{q/2}+1 inside the bigger ring X^{N}+1
let embed_factor = parameters.embedding_factor();
let partb_trivial_rlwe = trivial_rlwe_test_poly.get_row_mut(1);
lwe_in.as_ref()[..br_qby2]
.iter()
.enumerate()
.for_each(|(index, v)| {
partb_trivial_rlwe[embed_factor * index] = *v;
});
}
// blind rotate
blind_rotation(
&mut trivial_rlwe_test_poly,
scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
parameters.g(),
1,
br_q,
&g_k_si,
parameters.decomoposer_rlwe(),
nttop_rlweq,
modop_rlweq,
parameters,
pbs_key,
);
// ClientKey::with_local(|ck| {
// let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n();
// let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; ring_size]; 2];
// izip!(
// rlwe_ct[0].iter_mut(),
// trivial_rlwe_test_poly.0.get_row_slice(0)
// )
// .for_each(|(t, f)| {
// *t = f.to_u64().unwrap();
// });
// izip!(
// rlwe_ct[1].iter_mut(),
// trivial_rlwe_test_poly.0.get_row_slice(1)
// )
// .for_each(|(t, f)| {
// *t = f.to_u64().unwrap();
// });
// let mut m_out = vec![vec![0u64; ring_size]];
// let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q.to_u64().unwrap());
// let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(rlwe_q.to_u64().unwrap(), ring_size);
// decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe_ct, ck.sk_rlwe.values(), &mut m_out, &nttop, &modop);
// println!("RLWE post PBS message: {:?}", m_out[0]);
// });
// sample extract
sample_extract(lwe_in, &trivial_rlwe_test_poly, modop_rlweq, 0);
}
fn mod_switch_odd(v: f64, from_q: f64, to_q: f64) -> usize {
let odd_v = (((v * to_q) / (from_q)).floor()).to_usize().unwrap();
//TODO(Jay): check correctness of this
odd_v + ((odd_v & 1) ^ 1)
}
// TODO(Jay): Add tests for sample extract
fn sample_extract<M: Matrix + MatrixMut, ModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>>(
lwe_out: &mut M::R,
rlwe_in: &M,
mod_op: &ModOp,
index: usize,
) where
<M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
M::MatElement: Copy,
{
let ring_size = rlwe_in.dimension().1;
// index..=0
let to = &mut lwe_out.as_mut()[1..];
let from = rlwe_in.get_row_slice(0);
for i in 0..index + 1 {
to[i] = from[index - i];
}
// -(N..index)
for i in index + 1..ring_size {
to[i] = mod_op.neg(&from[ring_size + index - i]);
}
// set b
lwe_out.as_mut()[0] = *rlwe_in.get(1, index);
}
/// TODO(Jay): Write tests for monomial mul
fn monomial_mul<El, ModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = El>>(
p_in: &[El],
p_out: &mut [El],
mon_exp: usize,
mon_sign: bool,
ring_size: usize,
mod_op: &ModOp,
) where
El: Copy,
{
debug_assert!(p_in.as_ref().len() == ring_size);
debug_assert!(p_in.as_ref().len() == p_out.as_ref().len());
debug_assert!(mon_exp < ring_size);
p_in.as_ref().iter().enumerate().for_each(|(index, v)| {
let mut to_index = index + mon_exp;
let mut to_sign = mon_sign;
if to_index >= ring_size {
to_index = to_index - ring_size;
to_sign = !to_sign;
}
if !to_sign {
p_out.as_mut()[to_index] = mod_op.neg(v);
} else {
p_out.as_mut()[to_index] = *v;
}
});
}
thread_local! {
static PBS_TRACER: RefCell<PBSTracer<Vec<Vec<u64>>>> = RefCell::new(PBSTracer::default());
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct PBSTracer<M>
where
M: Matrix + Default,
{
pub(crate) ct_rlwe_q_mod: M::R,
pub(crate) ct_lwe_q_mod: M::R,
pub(crate) ct_lwe_q_mod_after_ksk: M::R,
pub(crate) ct_br_q_mod: Vec<u64>,
}
impl PBSTracer<Vec<Vec<u64>>> {
fn trace(&self, parameters: &BoolParameters<u64>, sk_lwe: &[i32], sk_rlwe: &[i32]) {
assert!(parameters.rlwe_n == sk_rlwe.len());
assert!(parameters.lwe_n == sk_lwe.len());
let modop_rlweq = ModularOpsU64::new(parameters.rlwe_q as u64);
// noise after mod down Q -> Q_ks
let m_back0 = decrypt_lwe(&self.ct_rlwe_q_mod, sk_rlwe, &modop_rlweq);
let modop_lweq = ModularOpsU64::new(parameters.lwe_q as u64);
// noise after mod down Q -> Q_ks
let m_back1 = decrypt_lwe(&self.ct_lwe_q_mod, sk_rlwe, &modop_lweq);
// noise after key switch from RLWE -> LWE
let m_back2 = decrypt_lwe(&self.ct_lwe_q_mod_after_ksk, sk_lwe, &modop_lweq);
// noise after mod down odd from Q_ks -> q
let modop_br_q = ModularOpsU64::new(parameters.br_q as u64);
let m_back3 = decrypt_lwe(&self.ct_br_q_mod, sk_lwe, &modop_br_q);
println!(
"
M initial mod Q: {m_back0},
M after mod down Q -> Q_ks: {m_back1},
M after key switch from RLWE -> LWE: {m_back2},
M after mod dwon Q_ks -> q: {m_back3}
"
);
}
}
impl WithLocal for PBSTracer<Vec<Vec<u64>>> {
fn with_local<F, R>(func: F) -> R
where
F: Fn(&Self) -> R,
{
PBS_TRACER.with_borrow(|t| func(t))
}
fn with_local_mut<F, R>(func: F) -> R
where
F: Fn(&mut Self) -> R,
{
PBS_TRACER.with_borrow_mut(|t| func(t))
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use std::iter::Sum;
use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
use rand_distr::Uniform;
use crate::{
backend::ModularOpsU64,
bool,
ntt::NttBackendU64,
random::DEFAULT_RNG,
rgsw::{
self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe, secret_key_encrypt_rlwe,
tests::{_measure_noise_rgsw, _secret_encrypt_rlwe},
RgswCiphertext, RgswCiphertextEvaluationDomain, SeededRgswCiphertext,
SeededRlweCiphertext,
},
utils::negacyclic_mul,
};
use self::parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_BOOL_PARAMS};
use super::*;
// #[test]
// fn trial() {
// dbg!(generate_prime(28, 1 << 11, 1 << 28));
// }
#[test]
fn bool_encrypt_decrypt_works() {
// let prime = generate_prime(32, 2 * 1024, 1 << 32);
// dbg!(prime);
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
// let sever_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
let mut m = true;
for _ in 0..1000 {
let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m, &client_key);
let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_ct, &client_key);
assert_eq!(m, m_back);
m = !m;
}
}
#[test]
fn bool_nand() {
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|r| {
let rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded([19u8; 32]);
*r = rng;
});
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
// println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
let server_key_eval_domain =
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&seeded_server_key,
);
let mut scratch_lwen_plus1 = vec![0u64; bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n + 1];
let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![
vec![0u64; bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_n];
bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw + 2
];
let mut m0 = false;
let mut m1 = true;
let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
for _ in 0..1000 {
let ct_back = bool_evaluator.nand(
&ct0,
&ct1,
&server_key_eval_domain,
&mut scratch_lwen_plus1,
&mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
);
let m_out = !(m0 && m1);
// Trace and measure PBS noise
{
let noise0 = {
let ideal = if m0 {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.rlwe_q() - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&ct0,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&ct0,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
let noise1 = {
let ideal = if m1 {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.rlwe_q() - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&ct1,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&ct1,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
// Trace PBS
PBSTracer::with_local(|t| {
t.trace(
&SP_BOOL_PARAMS,
&client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
)
});
// Calculate noise in ciphertext post PBS
let noise_out = {
let ideal = if m_out {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.rlwe_q() - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&ct_back,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&ct_back,
client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
dbg!(m0, m1, m_out);
println!(
"ct0 (noise, message): {:?} \n ct1 (noise, message): {:?} \n PBS (noise, message): {:?}", noise0, noise1, noise_out
);
}
let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
println!("----------");
m1 = m0;
m0 = m_out;
ct1 = ct0;
ct0 = ct_back;
}
}
#[test]
fn multi_party_encryption_decryption() {
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
let no_of_parties = 500;
let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
.collect_vec();
let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.rlwe_n()];
parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
println!("{:?}", &ideal_rlwe_sk);
let mut m = true;
for i in 0..100 {
let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
let public_key_share = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
.collect_vec();
let collective_pk = PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64>::from(
public_key_share.as_slice(),
);
let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(&collective_pk.key, m);
let decryption_shares = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_ct, k))
.collect_vec();
let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_ct);
{
let ideal_m = if m {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_q - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
&lwe_ct,
&ideal_rlwe_sk,
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal_m,
);
println!("Noise: {noise}");
}
assert_eq!(m_back, m);
m = !m;
}
}
#[test]
fn ms() {
let logbig_q = 50;
let logsmall_q = 20;
let big_q = 1 << logbig_q;
let small_q = 1 << logsmall_q;
let lwe_n = 493;
let no_of_parties = 10;
let parties_lwe_sk = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| LweSecret::random(lwe_n >> 1, lwe_n))
.collect_vec();
// Ideal secrets
let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; lwe_n];
parties_lwe_sk.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let logp = 3;
let modop_bigq = ModularOpsU64::new(big_q);
let modop_smallq = ModularOpsU64::new(small_q);
for i in 0..100 {
let m = thread_rng().sample(Uniform::new(0u64, (1u64 << logp)));
let bigq_m = m << (logbig_q - logp);
let smallq_m = m << (logsmall_q - logp);
// encrypt
let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
encrypt_lwe(&mut lwe_ct, &bigq_m, &ideal_lwe_sk, &modop_bigq, &mut rng);
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(&lwe_ct, &ideal_lwe_sk, &modop_bigq, &bigq_m);
println!("Noise Before: {noise}");
// mod switch
let lwe_ct_ms = lwe_ct
.iter()
.map(|v| (((*v as f64) * small_q as f64) / (big_q as f64)).round() as u64)
.collect_vec();
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(&lwe_ct_ms, &ideal_lwe_sk, &modop_smallq, &smallq_m);
println!("Noise After: {noise}");
}
}
#[test]
fn multi_party_lwe_keyswitch() {
let lwe_logq = 18;
let lwe_q = 1 << lwe_logq;
let d_lwe = 1;
let logb_lwe = 6;
let lweq_modop = ModularOpsU64::new(lwe_q);
let decomposer = DefaultDecomposer::new(lwe_q, logb_lwe, d_lwe);
let lwe_gadgect_vec = decomposer.gadget_vector();
let logp = 2;
let from_lwe_n = 2048;
let to_lwe_n = 500;
let no_of_parties = 10;
let parties_from_lwe_sk = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| LweSecret::random(from_lwe_n >> 1, from_lwe_n))
.collect_vec();
let parties_to_lwe_sk = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| LweSecret::random(to_lwe_n >> 1, to_lwe_n))
.collect_vec();
// Ideal secrets
let mut ideal_from_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; from_lwe_n];
parties_from_lwe_sk.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_from_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
let mut ideal_to_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; to_lwe_n];
parties_to_lwe_sk.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_to_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
// Generate Lwe KSK share
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let mut ksk_seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut ksk_seed);
let lwe_ksk_shares = izip!(parties_from_lwe_sk.iter(), parties_to_lwe_sk.iter())
.map(|(from_sk, to_sk)| {
let mut ksk_out = vec![0u64; from_lwe_n * d_lwe];
let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(ksk_seed);
lwe_ksk_keygen(
from_sk.values(),
to_sk.values(),
&mut ksk_out,
&lwe_gadgect_vec,
&lweq_modop,
&mut p_rng,
&mut rng,
);
ksk_out
})
.collect_vec();
// Create collective LWE ksk
let mut sum_partb = vec![0u64; d_lwe * from_lwe_n];
lwe_ksk_shares.iter().for_each(|share| {
lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(sum_partb.as_mut_slice(), share.as_slice())
});
let mut lwe_ksk = vec![vec![0u64; to_lwe_n + 1]; d_lwe * from_lwe_n];
let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(ksk_seed);
izip!(lwe_ksk.iter_mut(), sum_partb.iter()).for_each(|(lwe_i, part_bi)| {
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &lwe_q, &mut lwe_i.as_mut_slice()[1..]);
lwe_i[0] = *part_bi;
});
for i in 0..128 {
println!("############## ITERATION {i} ##############");
// Encrypt m
let m = 1;
let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; from_lwe_n + 1];
encrypt_lwe(&mut lwe_ct, &m, &ideal_from_lwe_sk, &lweq_modop, &mut rng);
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(&lwe_ct, &ideal_from_lwe_sk, &lweq_modop, &m);
println!("Noise before key switch: {noise}");
// Key switch
let lwe_ct_key_switched = {
let mut lwe_ct_key_switched = vec![0u64; to_lwe_n + 1];
lwe_key_switch(
&mut lwe_ct_key_switched,
&lwe_ct,
&lwe_ksk,
&lweq_modop,
&decomposer,
);
lwe_ct_key_switched
};
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(&lwe_ct_key_switched, &ideal_to_lwe_sk, &lweq_modop, &m);
println!("Noise after key switch: {noise}");
}
}
fn _collecitve_public_key_gen(rlwe_q: u64, parties_rlwe_sk: &[RlweSecret]) -> Vec<Vec<u64>> {
let ring_size = parties_rlwe_sk[0].values.len();
assert!(ring_size.is_power_of_two());
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(rlwe_q, ring_size);
let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q);
// Generate Pk shares
let pk_seed = [0u8; 32];
let pk_shares = parties_rlwe_sk.iter().map(|sk| {
let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
let mut share_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
public_key_share(
&mut share_out,
sk.values(),
&modop,
&nttop,
&mut p_rng,
&mut rng,
);
share_out
});
let mut pk_part_b = vec![0u64; ring_size];
pk_shares.for_each(|share| modop.elwise_add_mut(&mut pk_part_b, &share));
let mut pk_part_a = vec![0u64; ring_size];
let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &rlwe_q, pk_part_a.as_mut_slice());
vec![pk_part_a, pk_part_b]
}
fn _multi_party_all_keygen(
bool_evaluator: &BoolEvaluator<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>,
no_of_parties: usize,
) -> (
Vec<ClientKey>,
PublicKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64>,
Vec<
CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
Vec<Vec<u64>>,
BoolParameters<u64>,
[u8; 32],
>,
>,
SeededMultiPartyServerKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, [u8; 32], BoolParameters<u64>>,
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>,
ClientKey,
) {
let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
.collect_vec();
// Collective public key
let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
let public_key_share = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
.collect_vec();
let collective_pk = PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64>::from(
public_key_share.as_slice(),
);
// Server key
let pbs_cr_seed = [1u8; 32];
let server_key_shares = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_sever_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, &collective_pk.key, k))
.collect_vec();
let seeded_server_key =
aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares::<_, _, _, ModularOpsU64, NttBackendU64>(
&server_key_shares,
&bool_evaluator.decomposer_rlwe,
);
let server_key_eval = ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&seeded_server_key,
);
// construct ideal rlwe sk for meauring noise
let ideal_client_key = {
let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.rlwe_n()];
parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.lwe_n()];
parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
ClientKey {
sk_lwe: LweSecret {
values: ideal_lwe_sk,
},
sk_rlwe: RlweSecret {
values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
},
}
};
(
parties,
collective_pk,
server_key_shares,
seeded_server_key,
server_key_eval,
ideal_client_key,
)
}
#[test]
fn mp_key_correcntess() {
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
_multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_q;
let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_q;
let d_rgsw = bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw;
let lwe_logq = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_logq;
let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n;
let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_n;
let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.lwe_modop;
let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.rlwe_nttop;
let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop;
let rlwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_rlwe;
// test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
if false {
let logp = 2;
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let m = 1;
let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
// Encrypt
let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
encrypt_lwe(
&mut lwe_ct,
&encoded_m,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
lwe_modop,
&mut rng,
);
// key switch
let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
lwe_key_switch(
&mut lwe_out,
&lwe_ct,
&server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
lwe_modop,
lwe_decomposer,
);
let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out, ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop);
let m_back =
((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) / (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64;
dbg!(m_back, m);
let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
&lwe_out,
ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
lwe_modop,
&encoded_m,
);
println!("Noise: {noise}");
}
// Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
if true {
let gadget_vec = rlwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
for i in 0..20 {
// measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
let si =
ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] * (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);
let mut si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
if si < 0 {
si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
} else {
si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
}
let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
rgsw_si
.iter_mut()
.for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
_measure_noise_rgsw(
&rgsw_si,
&si_poly,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&gadget_vec,
rlwe_q,
);
println!("####### ##################### #######");
}
}
// measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
if true {
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q, carry_m.as_mut_slice());
// RGSW(carrym)
let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n], carry_m.clone()];
let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; d_rgsw + 2];
let mul_mod =
|v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) % (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);
for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
rlwe_by_rgsw(
&mut rlwe_ct,
server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
&mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
rlwe_decomposer,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
// carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
let si =
ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] * (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);
let mut si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
if si < 0 {
si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
} else {
si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
}
carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod, rlwe_q);
let noise = measure_noise(
&rlwe_ct,
&carry_m,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
);
println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret monomial: {noise}");
}
}
// Check galois keys
if false {
let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; d_rgsw + 2];
for i in [g, -g] {
let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
let mut rlwe_ct = {
let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
&mut data,
&collective_pk.key,
&m,
rlwe_modop,
rlwe_nttop,
&mut rng,
);
RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data, false)
};
let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i);
galois_auto(
&mut rlwe_ct,
auto_key,
&mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
&auto_map_index,
&auto_map_sign,
rlwe_modop,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_decomposer,
);
// send m(X) -> m(X^i)
let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(), auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each(
|(mi, to_index, to_sign)| {
if !to_sign {
m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi;
} else {
m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
}
},
);
// measure noise
let noise = measure_noise(
&rlwe_ct,
&m_k,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
);
println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
}
}
}
#[test]
fn multi_party_nand() {
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
let (parties, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
_multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 50);
// PBS
let mut scratch_lwen_plus1 = vec![0u64; bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n + 1];
let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![
vec![0u64; bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_n];
bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw + 2
];
let mut m0 = true;
let mut m1 = false;
let mut lwe0 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(&collective_pk.key, m0);
let mut lwe1 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(&collective_pk.key, m1);
for _ in 0..2000 {
let lwe_out = bool_evaluator.nand(
&lwe0,
&lwe1,
&server_key_eval,
&mut scratch_lwen_plus1,
&mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
);
let m_expected = !(m0 & m1);
// measure noise
{
let noise0 = {
let ideal = if m0 {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.rlwe_q() - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&lwe0,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&lwe0,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
let noise1 = {
let ideal = if m1 {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.rlwe_q() - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&lwe1,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&lwe1,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
// Trace PBS
PBSTracer::with_local(|t| {
t.trace(
&MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
&ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
&ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
)
});
let noise_out = {
let ideal_m = if m_expected {
bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
} else {
bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_q - bool_evaluator.rlweq_by8
};
let n = measure_noise_lwe(
&lwe_out,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
&ideal_m,
);
let v = decrypt_lwe(
&lwe_out,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop,
);
(n, v)
};
dbg!(m0, m1, m_expected);
println!(
"ct0 (noise, message): {:?} \n ct1 (noise, message): {:?} \n PBS (noise, message): {:?}", noise0, noise1, noise_out
);
}
// multi-party decrypt
let decryption_shares = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_out, k))
.collect_vec();
let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_out);
// let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_out, &ideal_client_key);
assert!(m_expected == m_back, "Expected {m_expected}, got {m_back}");
m1 = m0;
m0 = m_expected;
lwe1 = lwe0;
lwe0 = lwe_out;
}
}
struct Stats<T> {
samples: Vec<T>,
}
impl<T: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + Debug> Stats<T>
where
// T: for<'a> Sum<&'a T>,
T: for<'a> std::iter::Sum<&'a T> + std::iter::Sum<T>,
{
fn mean(&self) -> f64 {
self.samples.iter().sum::<T>().to_f64().unwrap() / (self.samples.len() as f64)
}
fn std_dev(&self) -> f64 {
let mean = self.mean();
// diff
let diff_sq = self
.samples
.iter()
.map(|v| {
let t = v.to_f64().unwrap() - mean;
t * t
})
.into_iter()
.sum::<f64>();
(diff_sq / (self.samples.len() as f64)).sqrt()
}
fn add_more(&mut self, values: &[T]) {
self.samples.extend(values.iter());
}
}
#[test]
fn tester() {
// pub(super) const TEST_MP_BOOL_PARAMS: BoolParameters<u64> =
// BoolParameters::<u64> { rlwe_q: 1152921504606830593,
// rlwe_logq: 60,
// lwe_q: 1 << 20,
// lwe_logq: 20,
// br_q: 1 << 11,
// rlwe_n: 1 << 11,
// lwe_n: 500,
// d_rgsw: 4,
// logb_rgsw: 12,
// d_lwe: 5,
// logb_lwe: 4,
// g: 5,
// w: 1,
// };
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
// let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
// _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
let no_of_parties = 2;
let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_q;
let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_q;
let d_rgsw = bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw;
let lwe_logq = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_logq;
let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n;
let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_n;
let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.lwe_modop;
let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.rlwe_nttop;
let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.rlwe_modop;
let rlwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_rlwe;
let rlwe_gadget_vector = rlwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
.map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
.collect_vec();
let ideal_client_key = {
let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.rlwe_n()];
parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.lwe_n()];
parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe.values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
*ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
});
});
ClientKey {
sk_lwe: LweSecret {
values: ideal_lwe_sk,
},
sk_rlwe: RlweSecret {
values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
},
}
};
// check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
if false {
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
for _ in 0..10 {
// generate a new collective public key
let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
let public_key_share = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
.collect_vec();
let collective_pk =
PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64>::from(
public_key_share.as_slice(),
);
let m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
&mut rlwe_ct,
&collective_pk.key,
&m,
rlwe_modop,
rlwe_nttop,
&mut rng,
);
let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_ct,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&mut m_back,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(), m.as_slice());
check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, &rlwe_q).as_slice());
}
println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
}
if true {
// Generate server key shares
let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
let public_key_share = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
.collect_vec();
let collective_pk = PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64>::from(
public_key_share.as_slice(),
);
let pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
let server_key_shares = parties
.iter()
.map(|k| {
bool_evaluator.multi_party_sever_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, &collective_pk.key, k)
})
.collect_vec();
let seeded_server_key =
aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares::<_, _, _, ModularOpsU64, NttBackendU64>(
&server_key_shares,
rlwe_decomposer,
);
// Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
if true {
let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
izip!(
ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values.iter(),
seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts.iter()
)
.for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
// X^{s[i]}
let mut m_si = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);
if s_i < 0 {
m_si[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
} else {
m_si[s_i as usize] = 1;
}
_measure_noise_rgsw(
&rgsw_ct_i,
&m_si,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&rlwe_gadget_vector,
rlwe_q,
);
// RLWE(-sm)
let mut neg_s_eval =
Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(), &rlwe_q);
rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_eval);
rlwe_nttop.forward(&mut neg_s_eval);
for j in 0..rlwe_decomposer.d() {
// -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), neg_s_eval.as_slice());
rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
rlwe_modop
.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_gadget_vector[j]);
// RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j]);
rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j + rlwe_decomposer.d()]);
let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_ct,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&mut m_back,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
// diff
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, &rlwe_q));
}
// RLWE'(m)
for j in 0..rlwe_decomposer.d() {
// X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
rlwe_modop
.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_gadget_vector[j]);
// RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j + (2 * rlwe_decomposer.d())]);
rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j + (3 * rlwe_decomposer.d())]);
let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_ct,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&mut m_back,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
// diff
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, &rlwe_q));
}
});
println!(
"RGSW Std: {} {} ;; max={}",
check.mean(),
check.std_dev().abs().log2(),
check.samples.iter().max().unwrap()
);
}
// check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated RGSW ciphertext
if false {
let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// server key in Evaluation domain
let server_key_eval_domain =
ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&seeded_server_key,
);
izip!(
ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts.iter()
)
.for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
let mut rgsw_ct_i = rgsw_ct_i.clone();
rgsw_ct_i
.iter_mut()
.for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.forward(ri.as_mut()));
let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
&mut rlwe_ct,
&collective_pk.key,
&m,
rlwe_modop,
rlwe_nttop,
&mut rng,
);
// RLWE(m*X^{s[i]}) = RLWE(m) x RGSW(X^{s[i]})
let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(
vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n], m.clone()],
true,
);
// let mut rlwe_after =
// RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(rlwe_ct.clone(), false);
let mut scratch = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; rlwe_decomposer.d() + 2];
rlwe_by_rgsw(
&mut rlwe_after,
&rgsw_ct_i,
&mut scratch,
rlwe_decomposer,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
// m1 = X^{s[i]}
let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32);
if s_i < 0 {
m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
} else {
m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
}
// (m+e) * m1
let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = m.clone();
// decrypt_rlwe(
// &rlwe_ct,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(), m1.as_slice());
rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
// Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) + e_{rlsw x rgsw}.
// Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}.
// Here we're only concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise caused due to
// RLWExRGSW. Also note, in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
// some i and var(em1) = var(e).
let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
decrypt_rlwe(
&rlwe_after,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
&mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
);
// diff
rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
);
let noise = measure_noise(
&rlwe_after,
&m_plus_e_times_m1,
rlwe_nttop,
rlwe_modop,
ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
);
print!("NOISE: {}", noise);
check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
&m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
&rlwe_q,
));
});
println!(
"RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
check.std_dev(),
check.std_dev().abs().log2()
)
}
}
// Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equal noise in
// fresh RLWE ciphertext
if true {}
// test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
// if false {
// let logp = 2;
// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// let m = 1;
// let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
// // Encrypt
// let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
// encrypt_lwe(
// &mut lwe_ct,
// &encoded_m,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// lwe_modop,
// &mut rng,
// );
// // key switch
// let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
// let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
// lwe_key_switch(
// &mut lwe_out,
// &lwe_ct,
// &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
// lwe_modop,
// lwe_decomposer,
// );
// let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop); let m_back
// = ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
// (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64; dbg!(m_back, m);
// let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
// &lwe_out,
// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
// lwe_modop,
// &encoded_m,
// );
// println!("Noise: {noise}");
// }
// Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
// if true {
// let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
// bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
// bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
// bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
// );
// for i in 0..20 {
// // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
// let si =
// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
// (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
// si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
// si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
// } else {
// si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
// }
// let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
// rgsw_si
// .iter_mut()
// .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
// println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
// _measure_noise_rgsw(
// &rgsw_si,
// &si_poly,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// &gadget_vec,
// rlwe_q,
// );
// println!("####### ##################### #######");
// }
// }
// // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
// if true {
// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
// carry_m.as_mut_slice());
// // RGSW(carrym)
// let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n], carry_m.clone()];
// let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
// DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
// let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// d_rgsw + 2]; let mul_mod =
// |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) % (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);
// for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
// rlwe_by_rgsw(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
// &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
// rlwe_decomposer,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
// let si =
// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
// (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
// si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
// si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
// } else {
// si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
// }
// carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
// rlwe_q);
// let noise = measure_noise(
// &rlwe_ct,
// &carry_m,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// );
// println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
// monomial: {noise}"); }
// }
// // Check galois keys
// if false {
// let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// d_rgsw + 2]; for i in [g, -g] {
// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// RandomUniformDist::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = {
// let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
// public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
// &mut data,
// &collective_pk.key,
// &m,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// &mut rng,
// );
// RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
// false) };
// let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
// let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
// generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i); galois_auto(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// auto_key,
// &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
// &auto_map_index,
// &auto_map_sign,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_decomposer,
// );
// // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
// let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
// auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(mi, to_index, to_sign)|
// { if !to_sign {
// m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi;
// } else {
// m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
// }
// },
// );
// // measure noise
// let noise = measure_noise(
// &rlwe_ct,
// &m_k,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// );
// println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
// }
// }
}
fn test_2() {
let bool_evaluator =
BoolEvaluator::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, u64, NttBackendU64, ModularOpsU64>::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
}
}