

# zkSNARKs from scratch, a technical explanation

iden3

[iden3.io](https://iden3.io)

[github.com/iden3](https://github.com/iden3)

[twitter.com/identthree](https://twitter.com/identthree)



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2019-08-20

# Warning

- I'm not a mathematician, this talk is not for mathematicians
- In free time, have been studying zkSNARKS & implementing it in Go
- Talk about a technical explanation from an engineer point of view
- The idea is to try to transmit the learnings from long night study hours during last winter
- Also at the end will briefly overview how we use zkSNARKs in iden3
- This slides will be combined with
  - parts of the code from <https://github.com/arnaucube/go-snark>
  - whiteboard draws and writings
- Don't use your own crypto. But it's fun to implement it (only for learning purposes)

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- libraries
- Circuit languages
- utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK libraries
  - BabyJubJub
  - Mimc
  - Poseidon
- References


# Introduction

- zero knowledge concept
- examples
- some concept explanations
  - [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge\\_proof](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof)
  - <https://hackernoon.com/wtf-is-zero-knowledge-proof-be5b49735f27>

# zkSNARK overview


- protocol to prove the correctness of a computation
- useful for
  - scalability
  - privacy
  - interoperability
- examples:
  - Alice can prove to Brenna that knows  $x$  such as  $f(x) = y$
  - Brenna can prove to Alice that knows a certain input which *Hash* results in a certain known value
  - Carol can proof that is a member of an organization without revealing their identity
  - etc

# zkSNARK flow




# Generating and verifying proofs

Generating a proof:



Verifying a proof:




# Foundations

- Modular arithmetic
- Groups
- Finite fields
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography

# Basics of modular arithmetic

- Modulus, `mod` , `%`
- Remainder after division of two numbers



$$\begin{aligned}5 \bmod 12 &= 5 \\14 \bmod 12 &= 2 \\83 \bmod 10 &= 3\end{aligned}$$

$$5 + 3 \bmod 6 = 8 \bmod 6 = 2$$

# Groups

- a **set** with an **operation**
  - **operation** must be *associative*
- neutral element (*identity*): adding the neutral element to any element gives the element
- inverse:  $e + e_{inverse} = identity$
- cyclic groups
  - finite group with a generator element
  - any element must be writable by a multiple of the generator element
- abelian group
  - group with *commutative* operation

# Finite fields

- algebraic structure like Groups, but with **two operations**
- extended fields concept  
([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field\\_extension](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_extension))

# Elliptic curve

- point addition

$$(x_1, y_1) + (x_2, y_2) = \left( \frac{x_1 y_2 + x_2 y_1}{1 + dx_1 x_2 y_1 y_2}, \frac{y_1 y_2 - x_1 x_2}{1 - dx_1 x_2 y_1 y_2} \right)$$

- G1
- G2

*(whiteboard explanation)*

# Pairings

- 3 typical types used for SNARKS:
  - BN (Barreto Naehrig) - used in Ethereum
  - BLS (Barreto Lynn Scott) - used in ZCash & Ethereum 2.0
  - MNT (Miyaji- Nakabayashi - Takano) - used in CodaProtocol
- $y^2 = x^3 + b$  with embedding degree 12
- function that maps (pairs) two points from sets  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  into another set  $S_3$
- is a **bilinear** function
- $e(G_1, G_2) \rightarrow G_T$
- the groups must be
  - cyclic
  - same prime order ( $r$ )

- $F_q$ , where

$q =$  21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297  
823662689037894645226208583

- $F_r$ , where

$r =$  21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416  
034343698204186575808495617

# Bilinear Pairings

$$e(P_1 + P_2, Q_1) == e(P_1, Q_1) \cdot e(P_2, Q_1)$$

$$e(P_1, Q_1 + Q_2) == e(P_1, Q_1) \cdot e(P_1, Q_2)$$

$$e(aP, bQ) == e(P, Q)^{ab} == e(bP, aQ)$$

$$e(g_1, g_2)^6 == e(g_1, 6 \cdot g_2)$$

$$e(g_1, g_2)^6 == e(6 \cdot g_1, g_2)$$

$$e(g_1, g_2)^6 == e(3 \cdot g_1, 2g_2)$$

$$e(g_1, g_2)^6 == e(2 \cdot g_1, 3g_2)$$



# BLS signatures

*(small overview, is offtopic here, but is interesting)*

- key generation
  - random private key  $x$  in  $[0, r - 1]$
  - public key  $g^x$
- signature
  - $h = Hash(m)$  (over G2)
  - signature  $\sigma = h^x$
- verification
  - check that:  $e(g, \sigma) == e(g^x, Hash(m))$   
 $e(g, h^x) == e(g^x, h)$

- aggregate signatures
  - $s = s_0 + s_1 + s_2 \dots$
- verify aggregated signatures

$$e(G, S) == e(P, H(m))$$

$$e(G, s_0 + s_1 + s_2 \dots) == e(p_0, H(m)) \cdot e(p_1, H(m)) \cdot e(p_2, H(m)) \dots$$

More info:

<https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/BLSmultisig.html>

# Circuit compiler

- not a software compiler -> a constraint prover
  - what this means
- constraint concept
  - `value0 == value1 <operation> value2`
- want to proof that a certain computation has been done correctly
- graphic of circuit with gates (whiteboard)
- about high level programming languages for zkSNARKS, by *Harry Roberts*: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nKrBJo3E3FY>

Circuit code example:

$$f(x) = x^5 + 2 \cdot x + 6$$

```
func exp5(private a):  
    b = a * a  
    c = a * b  
    d = a * c  
    e = a * d  
    return e  
  
func main(private s0, public s1):  
    s2 = exp5(s0)  
    s3 = s0 * 2  
    s4 = s3 + s2  
    s5 = s4 + 6  
    equals(s1, s5)  
    out = 1 * 1
```

# Inputs and Witness

For a certain circuit, with the inputs that we calculate the Witness for the circuit signals

- private inputs: [8]
  - in this case the private input is the 'secret'  $x$  value that computed into the equation gives the expected  $f(x)$
- public inputs: [32790]
  - in this case the public input is the result of the equation
- signals: [one s1 s0 b0 c0 d0 s2 s3 s4 s5 out]
- witness: [1 32790 8 64 512 4096 32768 16 32784 32790 1]

# R1CS

- Rank 1 Constraint System
- way to write down the constraints by 3 linear combinations
- 1 constraint per operation
- $(A, B, C) = A.s \cdot B.s - C.s = 0$
- from flat code constraints we can generate the R1CS

# R1CS

$$(a_{11}s_1 + a_{12}s_2 + \dots + a_{1n}s_n) \cdot (b_{11}s_1 + b_{12}s_2 + \dots + b_{1n}s_n) - (c_{11}s_1 + c_{12}s_2 + \dots + c_{1n}s_n) = 0$$

$$(a_{21}s_1 + a_{22}s_2 + \dots + a_{2n}s_n) \cdot (b_{21}s_1 + b_{22}s_2 + \dots + b_{2n}s_n) - (c_{21}s_1 + c_{22}s_2 + \dots + c_{2n}s_n) = 0$$

$$(a_{31}s_1 + a_{32}s_2 + \dots + a_{3n}s_n) \cdot (b_{31}s_1 + b_{32}s_2 + \dots + b_{3n}s_n) - (c_{31}s_1 + c_{32}s_2 + \dots + c_{3n}s_n) = 0$$

[...]

$$(a_{m1}s_1 + a_{m2}s_2 + \dots + a_{mn}s_n) \cdot (b_{m1}s_1 + b_{m2}s_2 + \dots + b_{mn}s_n) - (c_{m1}s_1 + c_{m2}s_2 + \dots + c_{mn}s_n) = 0$$

\*where  $s$  are the signals of the circuit, and we need to find  $a, b, c$  that satisfies the equations

## R1CS constraint example:

- signals: [one s1 s0 b0 c0 d0 s2 s3 s4 s5 out]
- witness: [1 32790 8 64 512 4096 32768 16 32784 32790 1]
- First constraint flat code:  $b_0 == s_0 * s_0$
- R1CS first constraint:

$$A_1 = [00100000000]$$

$$B_1 = [00100000000]$$

$$C_1 = [00010000000]$$

R1CS example:

$A$	$B$	$C:$
[00100000000]	[00100000000]	[00010000000]
[00100000000]	[00010000000]	[00001000000]
[00100000000]	[00001000000]	[00000100000]
[00100000000]	[00000100000]	[00000010000]
[00100000000]	[20000000000]	[00000001000]
[00000011000]	[10000000000]	[00000000100]
[600000000100]	[10000000000]	[00000000010]
[000000000010]	[10000000000]	[01000000000]
[010000000000]	[10000000000]	[000000000010]
[100000000000]	[10000000000]	[000000000001]

# QAP


- Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
- 3 polynomials, linear combinations of R1CS
- very good article about QAP by Vitalik Buterin  
<https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/quadratic-arithmetic-programs-from-zero-to-hero-f6d558cea649>



# Lagrange Interpolation

(Polynomial Interpolation)

- for a group of points, we can find the smallest degree polynomial that goes through all that points
  - this polynomial is unique for each group of points



$$L(x) = \sum_{j=0}^n y_j l_j(x)$$

$$l_j(x) := \prod_{\substack{0 \leq m \leq k \\ m \neq j}} \frac{x - x_m}{x_j - x_m} = \frac{(x - x_0)}{(x_j - x_0)} \cdots \frac{(x - x_{j-1})}{(x_j - x_{j-1})} \frac{(x - x_{j+1})}{(x_j - x_{j+1})} \cdots \frac{(x - x_k)}{(x_j - x_k)},$$

## Shamir's Secret Sharing

*(small overview, is offtopic here, but is interesting)*

- from a secret to be shared, we generate 5 parts, but we can specify a number of parts that are needed to recover the secret
- so for example, we generate 5 parts, where we will need only 3 of that 5 parts to recover the secret, and the order doesn't matter
- we have the ability to define the thresholds of  $M$  parts to be created, and  $N$  parts to be able the recover

## Shamir's Secret Sharing - Secret generation

- we want that are necessary  $n$  parts of  $m$  to recover  $s$ 
  - where  $n < m$

- need to create a polynomial of degree  $n - 1$

$$f(x) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1x + \alpha_2x^2 + \alpha_3x^3 + \dots + \alpha_{n-1}x^{n-1}$$

- where  $\alpha_0$  is the secret  $s$
- $\alpha_i$  are random values that build the polynomial  
\*where  $\alpha_0$  is the secret to share, and  $\alpha_i$  are the random values inside the *FiniteField*

$$f(x) = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 x + \alpha_2 x^2 + \alpha_3 x^3 + \dots + \alpha_{n-1} x^{n-1}$$

- the packets that we will generate are  $P = (x, f(x))$ 
  - where  $x$  is each one of the values between 1 and  $m$ 
    - $P_1 = (1, f(1))$
    - $P_2 = (2, f(2))$
    - $P_3 = (3, f(3))$
    - ...
    - $P_m = (m, f(m))$

## Shamir's Secret Sharing - Secret recovery

- in order to recover the secret  $s$ , we will need a minimum of  $n$  points of the polynomial
  - the order doesn't matter
- with that  $n$  parts, we do Lagrange Interpolation/Polynomial Interpolation, recovering the original polynomial

# QAP

$$(\alpha_1(x)s_1 + \alpha_2(x)s_2 + \dots + \alpha_n(x)s_n) \cdot (\beta_1(x)s_1 + \beta_2(x)s_2 + \dots + \beta_n(x)s_n) - (\gamma_1(x)s_1 + \gamma_2(x)s_2 + \dots + \gamma_n(x)s_n) = P(x)$$

$$|----- A(x) -----|----- B(x) -----|----- C(x) -----|$$

- $P(x) = A(x)B(x) - C(x)$
- $P(x) = Z(x)h(x)$
- $Z(x)$ : divisor polynomial
  - $Z(x) = (x - x_1)(x - x_2)\dots(x - x_m) \Rightarrow \dots \Rightarrow (x_1, 0), (x_2, 0), \dots, (x_m, 0)$ 
    - optimizations with FFT
- $h(x) = P(x)/Z(x)$

*The following explanation is for the [Pinocchio protocol](#), all the examples will be for this protocol. The [Groth16](#) is explained also in the end of this slides.*

# Trusted Setup

- concept
- $\tau$  (Tau)
- "Toxic waste"
- Proving Key
- Verification Key

$$g_1 t^0, g_1 t^1, g_1 t^2, g_1 t^3, g_1 t^4, \dots$$

$$g_2 t^0, g_2 t^1, g_2 t^2, g_2 t^3, g_2 t^4, \dots$$

Proving Key:

$pk = (C, pk_A, pk'_A, pk_B, pk'_B, pk_C, pk'_C, pk_H)$  where:

- $pk_A = \{A_i(\tau)\rho_A P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk'_A = \{A_i(\tau)\alpha_A \rho_A P_1\}_{i=n+1}^{m+3}$
- $pk_B = \{B_i(\tau)\rho_B P_2\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk'_B = \{B_i(\tau)\alpha_B \rho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_C = \{C_i(\tau)\rho_C P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3} = \{C_i(\tau)\rho_A \rho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk'_C = \{C_i(\tau)\alpha_C \rho_C P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3} = \{C_i(\tau)\alpha_C \rho_A \rho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_K = \{\beta(A_i(\tau)\rho_A + B_i(\tau)\rho_B C_i(\tau)\rho_A \rho_B)P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_H = \{\tau^i P_1\}_{i=0}^d$

where:

- $d$ : degree of polynomial  $Z(x)$
- $m$ : number of circuit signals

Verification Key:

$$vk = (vk_A, vk_B, vk_C, vk_\gamma, vk_{\beta\gamma}^1, vk_{\beta\gamma}^2, vk_Z, vk_{IC})$$

- $vk_A = \alpha_A P_2, vk_B = \alpha_B P_1, vk_C = \alpha_C P_2$
- $vk_{\beta\gamma} = \gamma P_2, vk_{\beta\gamma}^1 = \beta\gamma P_1, vk_{\beta\gamma}^2 = \beta\gamma P_2$
- $vk_Z = Z(\tau)\rho_A\rho_B P_2, vk_{IC} = (A_i(\tau)\rho_A P_1)_{i=0}^n$

```

type Pk struct { // Proving Key pk:=(pkA, pkB, pkC, pkH)
    G1T [][3]*big.Int // t encrypted in G1 curve, G1T
    A   [][3]*big.Int
    B   [][3][2]*big.Int
    C   [][3]*big.Int
    Kp  [][3]*big.Int
    Ap  [][3]*big.Int
    Bp  [][3]*big.Int
    Cp  [][3]*big.Int
    Z   []*big.Int
}

```

```

type Vk struct {
    Vka   [3][2]*big.Int
    Vkb   [3]*big.Int
    Vkc   [3][2]*big.Int
    IC    [][3]*big.Int
    G1Kbg [3]*big.Int // g1 * Kbeta * Kgamma
    G2Kbg [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kbeta * Kgamma
    G2Kg  [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kgamma
    Vkz   [3][2]*big.Int
}

```

```
// Setup is the data structure holding the Trusted Setup of
type Setup struct {
    Toxic struct {
        T      *big.Int // trusted setup secret
        Ka     *big.Int
        Kb     *big.Int
        Kc     *big.Int
        Kbeta  *big.Int
        Kgamma *big.Int
        RhoA   *big.Int
        RhoB   *big.Int
        RhoC   *big.Int
    }
    Pk Pk
    Vk Vk
}
}
```

## Proofs generation

- $A, B, C, Z$  (from the QAP)
- random  $\delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3$
- $H(z) = \frac{A(z)B(z) - C(z)}{Z(z)}$ 
  - $A(z) = A_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i A_i(x) + \delta_1 Z(z)$
  - $B(z) = B_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i B_i(x) + \delta_2 Z(z)$
  - $C(z) = C_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i C_i(x) + \delta_3 Z(z)$   
(where  $m$  is the number of public inputs)

- $\pi_A = \langle c, pk_A \rangle$
- $\pi'_A = \langle c, pk'_A \rangle$
- $\pi_B = \langle c, pk_B \rangle$ 
  - example:

```

for i := 0; i < circuit.NVars; i++ {
    proof.PiB = Utils.Bn.G2.Add(proof.PiB, Utils.E
    proof.PiBp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiBp, Utils
}

```

$$(c = 1 + \text{witness} + \delta_1 + \delta_2 + \delta_3)$$

- $\pi'_B = \langle c, pk'_B \rangle$
- $\pi_C = \langle c, pk_C \rangle$
- $\pi'_C = \langle c, pk'_C \rangle$
- $\pi_K = \langle c, pk_K \rangle$
- $\pi_H = \langle h, pk_K H \rangle$
- proof:  $\pi = (\pi_A, \pi'_A, \pi_B, \pi'_B, \pi_C, \pi'_C, \pi_K, \pi_H)$

# Proofs verification

- $vk_{kx} = vk_{IC,0} + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i vk_{IC,i}$

Verification:

- $e(\pi_A, vk_a) == e(\pi_{A'}, g_2)$

- $e(vk_b, \pi_B) == e(\pi_{B'}, g_2)$

- $e(\pi_C, vk_c) == e(\pi_{C'}, g_2)$

- $e(vk_{kx} + \pi_A, \pi_B) == e(\pi_H, vk_{kz}) \cdot e(\pi_C, g_2)$

- $e(vk_{kx} + \pi_A + \pi_C, V_{\beta\gamma}^2) \cdot e(vk_{\beta\gamma}^1, \pi_B) == e(\pi_k, vk_{\gamma}^1)$



Example (whiteboard):

$$\frac{e(\pi_A, \pi_B)}{e(\pi_C, g_2)} = e(g_1 h(t), g_2 z(t))$$

$$\frac{e(A_1 + A_2 + \dots + A_n, B_1 + B_2 + \dots + B_n)}{e(C_1 + C_2 + \dots + C_n, g_2)} = e(g_1 h(t), g_2 z(t))$$

$$\frac{e(g_1 \alpha_1(t) s_1 + g_1 \alpha_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_1 \alpha_n(t) s_n, g_2 \beta_1(t) s_1 + g_2 \beta_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_2 \beta_n(t) s_n)}{e(g_1 \gamma_1(t) s_1 + g_1 \gamma_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_1 \gamma_n(t) s_n, g_2)} = e(g_1 h(t), g_2 z(t))$$

$$\begin{aligned} & e(g_1 \alpha_1(t) s_1 + g_1 \alpha_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_1 \alpha_n(t) s_n, g_2 \beta_1(t) s_1 + g_2 \beta_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_2 \beta_n(t) s_n) \\ &= e(g_1 h(t), g_2 z(t)) \cdot e(g_1 \gamma_1(t) s_1 + g_1 \gamma_2(t) s_2 + \dots + g_1 \gamma_n(t) s_n, g_2) \end{aligned}$$

# Groth16

## Trusted Setup

$$\tau = \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, x$$

$$\sigma_1 =$$

- $\alpha, \beta, \delta, \{x^i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$
- $\left\{ \frac{\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\gamma} \right\}_{i=0}^l$
- $\left\{ \frac{\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\delta} \right\}_{i=l+1}^m$
- $\left\{ \frac{x^i t(x)}{\delta} \right\}_{i=0}^{n-2}$

$$\sigma_2 = (\beta, \gamma, \delta, \{x^i\}_{i=0}^{n-1})$$

(where  $u_i(x), v_i(x), w_i(x)$  are the QAP)



```

type Pk struct { // Proving Key
    BACDelta [][][3]*big.Int // {(  $\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)$  )
    Z        []*big.Int
    G1       struct {
        Alpha    [3]*big.Int
        Beta     [3]*big.Int
        Delta    [3]*big.Int
        At       [][][3]*big.Int // { $a(\tau)$ } from 0 to
        BACGamma [][][3]*big.Int // {(  $\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x)$ 
    }
    G2 struct {
        Beta     [3][2]*big.Int
        Gamma    [3][2]*big.Int
        Delta    [3][2]*big.Int
        BACGamma [][][3][2]*big.Int // {(  $\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x)$ 
    }
    PowersTauDelta [][][3]*big.Int // powers of  $\tau$  encrypt
}

```

```
type Vk struct {  
    IC [][]3*big.Int  
    G1 struct {  
        Alpha [3]*big.Int  
    }  
    G2 struct {  
        Beta  [3][2]*big.Int  
        Gamma [3][2]*big.Int  
        Delta [3][2]*big.Int  
    }  
}
```

```
// Setup is the data structure holding the Trusted Setup of the  
type Setup struct {  
    Toxic struct {  
        T *big.Int // trusted setup secret  
        Kalpha *big.Int  
        Kbeta *big.Int  
        Kgamma *big.Int  
        Kdelta *big.Int  
    }  
    Pk Pk  
    Vk Vk  
}
```

## Proofs Generation

$$\pi_A = \alpha + \sum_{i=0}^m \alpha_i u_i(x) + r\delta$$

$$\pi_B = \beta + \sum_{i=0}^m \alpha_i v_i(x) + s\delta$$

$$\pi_C = \frac{\sum_{i=l+1}^m \alpha_i (\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)) + h(x)t(x)}{\delta} + \pi_A s + \pi_B r - r s \delta$$

$$\pi = \pi_A^1, \pi_B^1, \pi_C^2$$

## Proof Verification

$$[\pi_A]_1 \cdot [\pi_B]_2 = [\alpha]_1 \cdot [\beta]_2 + \sum_{i=0}^l a_i \left[ \frac{\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\gamma} \right]_1 \cdot [\gamma]_2 + [\pi_C]_1 \cdot [\delta]_2$$

$$e(\pi_A, \pi_B) = e(\alpha, \beta) \cdot e(\text{pub}, \gamma) \cdot e(\pi_C, \delta)$$

## How we use zkSNARKs in iden3

- proving a credentials without revealing it's content
- proving that an identity has a claim issued by another identity, without revealing all the data
- proving any property of an identity
- *ITF* (Identity Transition Function), a way to prove with a zkSNARK that an identity has been updated following the defined protocol
  - identities can not cheat when issuing claims
- etc

## Other ideas for free time side project

- Zendermint (Tendermint + zkSNARKs)

# zkSNARK libraries

- [bellman](#) (rust)
- [libsnark](#) (c++)
- [snarkjs](#) (javascript)
- [websnark](#) (wasm)
- [go-snark](#) (golang) [do not use in production]



# Circuit languages

language	snark library with which plugs in
<a href="#">Zokrates</a>	libsnark, bellman
<a href="#">Snarky</a>	libsnark
<a href="#">circom</a>	snarkjs, websnark, bellman
<a href="#">go-snark-circuit</a>	go-snark

# Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK

- we work over  $F_r$ , where

$r =$  21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416  
034343698204186575808495617

- BabyJubJub
- Mimc
- Poseidon

## *Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK*

### **BabyJubJub**

- explanation: <https://medium.com/zokrates/efficient-ecc-in-zksnarks-using-zokrates-bd9ae37b8186>
- implementations:
  - go: <https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto>
  - javascript & circom: <https://github.com/iden3/circomlib>
  - rust: <https://github.com/arnaucube/babyjubjub-rs>
  - c++: [https://github.com/barryWhiteHat/baby\\_jubjub\\_ecc](https://github.com/barryWhiteHat/baby_jubjub_ecc)

## ***Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK***

### **Mimc7**

- explanation: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/492.pdf>
- implementations in:
  - go: <https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto>
  - javascript & circom: <https://github.com/iden3/circomlib>
  - rust: <https://github.com/arnaucube/mimc-rs>

## *Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK*

### **Poseidon**

- explanation: <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf>
- implementations in:
  - go: <https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto>
  - javascript & circom: <https://github.com/iden3/circomlib>

# References

- Succinct Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge for a von Neumann Architecture , Eli Ben-Sasson, Alessandro Chiesa, Eran Tromer, Madars Virza <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/879.pdf>
- Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable computation , Bryan Parno, Craig Gentry, Jon Howell, Mariana Raykova <https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/279.pdf>
- On the Size of Pairing-based Non-interactive Arguments , Jens Groth <https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf>
- (also all the links through the slides)

Thank you very much



iden3

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