zkSNARKs from scratch, a technical explanation

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Warning

- I'm not a mathematician, this talk is not for mathematicians
- In free time, have been studying zkSNARKS & implementing it in Go
- Talk about a technical explaination from an engineer point of view
- The idea is to try to transmit the learnings from long night study hours during last winter
- Also at the end will briefly overview how we use zkSNARKs in iden3
- This slides will be combined with
 - parts of the code from https://github.com/arnaucube/go-snark
 - whiteboard draws and writtings
- Don't use your own crypto. But it's fun to implement it (only for learning purposes)

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- zkSNARK (Pinocchio)
 - Circuit compiler
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 - Lagrange Interpolation
 - Trusted Setup
 - Proofs generation
 - Proofs verification
- Groth16
- How we use zkSNARKs in iden3
- libraries
- Circuit languages
- utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK libraries
 - BabyJubJub
 - Mimc
 - Poseidon
- References


Introduction

- zero knowledge concept
- examples
- some concept explanations
 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_proof
 - https://hackernoon.com/wtf-is-zero-knowledge-proofbe5b49735f27

zkSNARK overview


- protocol to prove the correctness of a computation
- useful for
 - scalability
 - privacy
 - interoperability
- examples:
 - \circ Alice can prove to Brenna that knows x such as f(x)=y
 - $\circ\,$ Brenna can prove to Alice that knows a certain input which Hash results in a certain known value
 - Carol can proof that is a member of an organization without revealing their identity
 - etc

zkSNARK flow




Generating and verifying proofs

Generating a proof:





Verifying a proof:




Foundations

- Modular aritmetic
- Groups
- Finite fields
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Basics of modular arithmetic

- Modulus, mod , %
- Remainder after division of two numbers



5 mod 12 = 5 14 mod 12 = 2 83 mod 10 = 3

 $5 + 3 \mod 6 = 8 \mod 6 = 2$

Groups

- a set with an operation
 - **operation** must be *associative*
- neutral element (*identity*): adding the neutral element to any element gives the element
- inverse: $e + e_{inverse} = identity$
- cyclic groups
 - finite group with a generator element
 - any element must be writable by a multiple of the generator element
- abelian group
 - group with *commutative* operation

Finite fields

- algebraic structure like Groups, but with two operations
- extended fields concept

(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_extension)

Elliptic curve

• point addition

$$(x_1,y_1)+(x_2,y_2)=(rac{x_1y_2+x_2y_1}{1+dx_1x_2y_1y_2},rac{y_1y_2-x_1x_2}{1-dx_1x_2y_1y_2})$$

- G1
- G2

(whiteboard explanation)

Pairings

- 3 typical types used for SNARKS:
 - BN (Barreto Naehrig) used in Ethereum
 - BLS (Barreto Lynn Scott) used in ZCash & Ethereum 2.0
 - MNT (Miyaji- Nakabayashi Takano) used in CodaProtocol
- $y^2 = x^3 + b$ with embedding degree 12
- function that maps (pairs) two points from sets S1 and S2
 into another set S3
- is a bilinear function
- $e(G_1, G_2) \to G_T$
- the groups must be
 - \circ cyclic
 - \circ same prime order (r)

• F_q , where

q= 21888242871839275222246405745257275088696311157297 823662689037894645226208583

• F_r , where

r = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416

034343698204186575808495617

Bilinear Pairings

$$egin{aligned} &e(P_1+P_2,Q_1)==e(P_1,Q_1)\cdot e(P_2,Q_1)\ &e(P_1,Q_1+Q_2)==e(P_1,Q_1)\cdot e(P_1,Q_2)\ &e(aP,bQ)==e(P,Q)^{ab}==e(bP,aQ)\ &e(g_1,g_2)^6==e(g_1,6\cdot g_2)\ &e(g_1,g_2)^6==e(6\cdot g_1,g_2)\ &e(g_1,g_2)^6==e(3\cdot g_1,2g_2)\ &e(g_1,g_2)^6==e(2\cdot g_1,3g_2)\ &e(g_1,g_2)^6==e(2\cdot g_1,$$



BLS signatures

(small overview, is offtopic here, but is interesting)

- key generation
 - $\circ\,$ random private key x in [0,r-1]
 - $\circ\,$ public key g^x
- signature

$$\circ \ h = Hash(m)$$
 (over G2)

 $\circ\,$ signature $\sigma=h^x$

• verification

$$\circ$$
 check that: $e(g,\sigma) == e(g^x, Hash(m))$
 $e(g,h^x) == e(g^x,h)$

• aggregate signatures

$$\circ \ s = s0 + s1 + s2...$$

verify aggregated signatures

e(G,S) == e(P,H(m))

 $e(G, s0 + s1 + s2...) == e(p0, H(m)) \cdot e(p1, H(m)) \cdot e(p2, H(m))...$

More info:

https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/papers/BLSmultisig.html

Circuit compiler

- not a software compiler -> a constraint prover
 - $\circ\,$ what this means
- constraint concept
 - o value0 == value1 <operation> value2
- want to proof that a certain computation has been done correctly
- graphic of circuit with gates (whiteboard)
- about high level programing languages for zkSNARKS, by Harry Roberts: https://www.youtube.com/watch?
 v=nKrBJo3E3FY

Circuit code example:

$$f(x) = x^5 + 2 \cdot x + 6$$

```
func exp5(private a):
        b = a * a
        c = a * b
       d = a * c
        e = a * d
        return e
func main(private s0, public s1):
        s2 = exp5(s0)
        s3 = s0 * 2
        s4 = s3 + s2
        s5 = s4 + 6
        equals(s1, s5)
        out = 1 * 1
```

Inputs and Witness

For a certain circuit, with the inputs that we calculate the Witness for the circuit signals

- private inputs: [8]
 - \circ in this case the private input is the 'secret' x value that computed into the equation gives the expected f(x)
- public inputs: [32790]
 - $\circ\,$ in this case the public input is the result of the equation
- signals: [one s1 s0 b0 c0 d0 s2 s3 s4 s5 out]
- witness: [1 32790 8 64 512 4096 32768 16 32784 32790 1]

R1CS

- Rank 1 Constraint System
- way to write down the constraints by 3 linear combinations
- 1 constraint per operation
- $(A, B, C) = A.s \cdot B.s C.s = 0$
- from flat code constraints we can generate the R1CS

R1CS

 $\begin{aligned} (a_{11}s_1 + a_{12}s_2 + ... + a_{1n}s_n) \cdot (b_{11}s_1 + b_{12}s_2 + ... + b_{1n}s_n) - (c_{11}s_1 + c_{12}s_2 + ... + c_{1n}s_n) &= 0 \\ (a_{21}s_1 + a_{22}s_2 + ... + a_{2n}s_n) \cdot (b_{21}s_1 + b_{22}s_2 + ... + b_{2n}s_n) - (c_{21}s_1 + c_{22}s_2 + ... + c_{2n}s_n) &= 0 \\ (a_{31}s_1 + a_{32}s_2 + ... + a_{3n}s_n) \cdot (b_{31}s_1 + b_{32}s_2 + ... + b_{3n}s_n) - (c_{31}s_1 + c_{32}s_2 + ... + c_{3n}s_n) &= 0 \\ [...] \\ (a_{m1}s_1 + a_{m2}s_2 + ... + a_{mn}s_n) \cdot (b_{m1}s_1 + b_{m2}s_2 + ... + b_{mn}s_n) - (c_{m1}s_1 + c_{m2}s_2 + ... + c_{mn}s_n) &= 0 \end{aligned}$

*where s are the signals of the circuit, and we need to find a, b, c that satisfies the equations

R1CS constraint example:

- signals: [one s1 s0 b0 c0 d0 s2 s3 s4 s5 out]
- witness: [1 32790 8 64 512 4096 32768 16 32784 32790 1]
- First constraint flat code: b0 == s0 * s0
- R1CS first constraint:
 - $A_1 = [0010000000]$
 - $B_1 = [0010000000]$
 - $C_1 = [0001000000]$

R1CS example:

A	B	C:
[0010000000]	[0010000000]	[0001000000]
[0010000000]	[0001000000]	[00001000000]
[0010000000]	[00001000000]	[00000100000]
[0010000000]	[00000100000]	[0000010000]
[0010000000]	[2000000000]	[0000001000]
[00000011000]	[1000000000]	[0000000100]
[6000000100]	[1000000000]	[0000000010]
[0000000010]	[1000000000]	[0100000000]
[0100000000]	[1000000000]	[0000000010]
[1000000000]	[1000000000]	[0000000001]

QAP

- Quadratic Arithmetic Programs
- 3 polynomials, linear combinations of R1CS
- very good article about QAP by Vitalik Buterin https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/quadratic-arithmeticprograms-from-zero-to-hero-f6d558cea649

12301822215246771225479310530587180326924466410660410571987723340079226099186 207373126408054204754549494290501155152332427593106045838689095296352999297246] [10 7035506637376909892864916132404124135664831414419439610474422774256509873563 1594280547272261494858463402596020 96924724297651442988368966536890071387497534 160101265653641841481768666075375187423390512968677323553341950344010261511705 7957288294033236513087495421973738547816019974734579152031951313661413713518 178981985983260073431910713646114176565317325686141646155238173126007 92 3328836936758889773383307540424543919716730419229938556437435220041737542042 104978879130860095299553818031196722634510979854971545666925492871031820056752 5603433604244171598314171629527420472817366501515235776181866657089173990371 19387272263938393750299749215783062133 862295085120482006857489238967803789781] [127 1517411122900921183066050430038272205543412405060587777715903282299513270226 228002529914992450231733393179763282172378795837667024413522960276831338877 4061822847744865502276435634054301434256081511033994027514983107153921252 242 8455093817680970029426770997082883380559047012313485488668143110265828802639 4131012514348363181421746260735487924701664622347054631316172702350132367616 134141488433320558219669812987427397678082882178274250966226749628619414851 3380227083184173785075222851268236599 71839275222246465745257275688548364400416634343698204186575808495407 206642226325193355620392538599819168831169334033714698148390020504361157788229 1693298788353439303876733333483753089335331904210737679777638516559340738329 1389295415615535399674536214244202426683702812930 41844020930665712868256226070 18491005176105887713793578186878802184179920342434795679936712078451021551892 13246946988061061358463710143744246694215208038168454118425683992083900766648 1673538569576044584700923105934624911452603614484759591952585284319420245603 533525920 0010823335422561400406460802833663822601408371276437270477853320807 135055349855298052802059674656014645080677237340117810079427676680397642950247 13125345638773065385006785667381706277056660013721698372071805079936257386007 [21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400 416034343698204186575808495407 20064222632519335520392538599819168831169334033714698148390020504361157788229 16932987888353439303876733333483753089335331904210737679777638516559340738329 13892954156155539967453621424420242660370281293041844020930665712868256226070 18491005 176105887713793578186877802184179920342434795679936712078451021551892 13246946988061061358463710143744246694215208038168454118425683992083900766648 16735385695760445847009231059394624911452603614484759591952585284319420245603 533552592000108233354225614004064608028336638229 01408371276437270477853320807 13505549855298052802059674656014645080677237340117810079427676680397642950247 1312534658773065385006785667381706277056606013721698372071805079936257386087] [120 72960809572279758407415465801554425029516121466805344781232734728258002831538 4742 452622231842964820054578139076269185478953423474107801277573758091841091 20408759788835324211853824616179700013118706436313839429726010755446147365596 197298139219773466693385996289822182683983179466486119845916853495955138491269 14728963432508512284969977199412708028335670 211113289777113583233883304466824 42256468877578600776282155553598279496261420349524762185797292197130607473462 13740952469543545000632465828967067138922028762483399337988317072683702000026 41344458757918630975354321963263741833924688311890695376031883013019874938061 2043409 340327032337299066338208856266000267485247402468768830688621435730700988 [21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495572 14852736234462365329381489612853150952943532985996594733223781412319298622152 1024057077218194662183671125938822513071369 82209347362859790432018823344] [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]]


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8225462698266584775979105651094698217799722653648406556937380700272734382903 3921643514537870143985814362691928453364915288407872819912594916761499022187 194714160547403552497900317777551784297521149164536763884914860807641396307548 75696839931777493476935486535681 0968122976621810545210528962281190806438069_26057431990284851455655244934830089391129065238594517075831195460200295828_167723003910800160532372259897189675380900363719066096157810012811221383414697_118843604402357493344597796723604232859496335344963353443961437896722 3 [2]188242871839275222246495745257272588548364400416934343698204186575898495407 91201011965996980992693357271905312668951518335066689765490184110732535464493 17692996321493414137982511310749630696575594557002961094489381717482111866693 136700183491255473494492598844222518 5579510914889458485948554373930910028387 17768997164708411621393089108476218457300720822282183435960556037574388980009 16431382322540455913366919868488273868556098553367870226067888003950311794303 168113865390654433304198088571212126721767298797639819334237596044116973584 36 3108834496843897323151574147244789637544351623392771532023912259764966203546 13391348590340556576943807959424763439591047942198976567220915200259227788099 145414946856895184925572186316871/2488521615875675787466815135324432235425519 [252 2188824287183927522224640574525 7508854836440041603434369820418657588648874 19152112512859365819465660527100115702479818850364030050735924652583244513 086560893993297332415212465590183026367538411959758812544574696387647815793341152737388321885757086284600559483206 8759 16636584599463949118575479922350060822511239469621770548040058668199459998893 12160134928799597345692447636254041715860202444675574635387891214764338053125 8132090233634730724931824356744890397481510384876790537415652249873651073024 21508238655314287805193516756624386 8229 16932987888353439303876733333483753099335531904210737679777638516559340738329 13892954156153539967453621424420242660370281293041844020930665712868256226070 18491005176105887713793578186878802184179920342434795679936712078451021551892 1324694698806106135846371014374424 6694215208038168454118425683992083900766648 16735385695760445847009231059394624911452603614484759591952585284319420245603 5335259200010823335422561400406460802833663822601408371276437270477853320807 135053498552980528020596746560146450806077237340117810079427676680397642950 247 13125345638773065385096785667381706277056606013721698372071805079936257386087] [130 14331587594656668300280384714156549165120952881224784391707157503115112705101 20685258094954457913404688604099285961657908658567772138697330662829479338625 1453063742236023313774278946 5015504 / 2350597510790279308341441866829464313824762347564519561215605757139713561161 97378794800360346958496034258537946556209835332704931152213749670109048928432 1793312279536944190104402735261434964534067920944469454004235391453556835426027124500008560234260977149249706147980614620316936643101143 17577909330112989377389350645520797801765774783865852977404460604199520810713 56843805341769546322324219505981195005092533650110424287646570837271389 78802 16245180256443212079011004264058133854781989203433775489463510919724232867840 6398004325559038145113807605283246323826029432089200779515024846434861615241 570006324787481125579333482949408205430946989594167561033807400692078346240 989820506853181510133001318010559645 621358740660348113922198883106561445693 9383389832334867862513123097886210315118017823938272659494629448535784966437 7573966580379856348742874862805115357814573612949295040881703056370603354743]

Lagrange Interpolation

(Polynomial Interpolation)

• for a group of points, we can find the smallest degree polynomial that goees through all that points

 $\circ\,$ this polynomial is unique for each group of points



$$L(x) = \sum_{j=0}^n y_j l_j(x)$$

$$\ell_j(x) := \prod_{\substack{0 \leq m \leq k \ m
eq j}} rac{x-x_m}{x_j-x_m} = rac{(x-x_0)}{(x_j-x_0)} \cdots rac{(x-x_{j-1})}{(x_j-x_{j-1})} rac{(x-x_{j+1})}{(x_j-x_{j+1})} \cdots rac{(x-x_k)}{(x_j-x_k)},$$

Shamir's Secret Sharing

(small overview, is offtopic here, but is interesting)

- from a secret to be shared, we generate 5 parts, but we can specify a number of parts that are needed to recover the secret
- so for example, we generate 5 parts, where we will need only 3 of that 5 parts to recover the secret, and the order doesn't matter
- we have the ability to define the thresholds of M parts to be created, and N parts to be able the recover

Shamir's Secret Sharing - Secret generation

- we want that are necessary n parts of m to recover s \circ where n < m
- need to create a polynomial of degree n-1

$$f(x) = lpha_0 + lpha_1 x + lpha_2 x^2 + lpha_3 x^3 + ... + + lpha_{n-1} x^{n-1}$$

- where $lpha_0$ is the secret s
- α_i are random values that build the polynomial *where α_0 is the secret to share, and α_i are the random values inside the FiniteField

$$f(x) = lpha_0 + lpha_1 x + lpha_2 x^2 + lpha_3 x^3 + ... + + lpha_{n-1} x^{n-1}$$

• the packets that we will generate are $P=\left(x,f(x)
ight)$

 \circ where x is each one of the values between 1 and m

•
$$P_1 = (1, f(1))$$

• $P_2 = (2, f(2))$
• $P_3 = (3, f(3))$

• •••

•
$$P_m = (m, f(m))$$

Shamir's Secret Sharing - Secret recovery

- in order to recover the secret s, we will need a minimum of n points of the polynomial
 - $\circ\,$ the order doesn't matter
- with that n parts, we do Lagrange Interpolation/Polynomial Interpolation, recovering the original polynomial

QAP

 $(lpha_1(x)s_1 + lpha_2(x)s_2 + ... + lpha_n(x)s_n) \cdot (eta_1(x)s_1 + eta_2(x)s_2 + ... + eta_n(x)s_n) - (\gamma_1(x)s_1 + \gamma_2(x)s_2 + ... + \gamma_n(x)s_n) = P(x)$

•
$$P(x) = A(x)B(x) - C(x)$$

- P(x) = Z(x)h(x)
- Z(x): divisor polynomial • $Z(x) = (x - x_1)(x - x_2)...(x - x_m) => ... => (x_1, 0), (x_2, 0), ..., (x_m, 0)$ • optimizations with FFT
- h(x) = P(x)/Z(x)

The following explanation is for the Pinocchio protocol, all the examples will be for this protocol. The Groth16 is explained also in the end of this slides.

Trusted Setup

- concept
- au (Tau)
- "Toxic waste"
- Proving Key
- Verification Key

$g_1t^0, g_1t^1, g_1t^2, g_1t^3, g_1t^4, ... \ g_2t^0, g_2t^1, g_2t^2, g_2t^3, g_2t^4, ...$

Proving Key:

$pk = (C, pk_A, pk_A^\prime, pk_B, pk_B^\prime, pk_C, pk_C^\prime, pk_H)$ where:

- $pk_A = \{A_i(au)
 ho_A P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk'_A = \{A_i(au) lpha_A
 ho_A P_1\}_{i=n+1}^{m+3}$
- $\bullet \; pk_B = \{B_i(au)
 ho_B P_2\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $\bullet \ pk_B' = \{B_i(au) lpha_B
 ho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_C = \{C_i(au)
 ho_C P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3} = \{C_i(au)
 ho_A
 ho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk'_C = \{C_i(au) lpha_C
 ho_C P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3} = \{C_i(au) lpha_C
 ho_A
 ho_B P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_K = \{eta(A_i(au)
 ho_A + B_i(au)
 ho_B C_i(au)
 ho_A
 ho_B)P_1\}_{i=0}^{m+3}$
- $pk_{H} = \{ au^{i}P_{1}\}_{i=0}^{d}$

where:

- d: degree of polynomial Z(x)
- m: number of circuit signals

Verification Key:


$$vk = (vk_A, vk_B, vk_C, vk_\gamma, vk_{eta\gamma}^1, vk_{eta\gamma}^2, vk_Z, vk_{IC})$$

•
$$vk_A=lpha_AP_2$$
, $vk_B=lpha_BP_1$, $vk_C=lpha_CP_2$

•
$$vk_{eta\gamma}=\gamma P_2$$
, $vk_{eta\gamma}^1=eta\gamma P_1$, $vk_{eta\gamma}^2=eta\gamma P_2$

•
$$vk_Z=Z(au)
ho_A
ho_BP_2$$
, $vk_{IC}=(A_i(au)
ho_AP_1)_{i=0}^n$

```
type Pk struct { // Proving Key pk:=(pkA, pkB, pkC, pkH)
       G1T [][3]*big.Int // t encrypted in G1 curve, G1T
           [][3]*big.Int
       A
       B [][3][2]*big.Int
       C [][3]*big.Int
       Kp [][3]*big.Int
       Ap [][3]*big.Int
       Bp [][3]*big.Int
       Cp [][3]*big.Int
       Z []*big.Int
}
type Vk struct {
       Vka [3][2]*big.Int
       Vkb [3]*big.Int
       Vkc [3][2]*big.Int
       IC [][3]*big.Int
       G1Kbg [3]*big.Int // g1 * Kbeta * Kgamma
       G2Kbg [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kbeta * Kgamma
       G2Kg [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kgamma
       Vkz [3][2]*big.Int
}
```



Proofs generation

- A, B, C, Z (from the QAP)
- random $\delta_1, \delta_2, \delta_3$

•
$$H(z) = rac{A(z)B(z) - C(z)}{Z(z)}$$

 $\circ A(z) = A_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i A_i(x) + \delta_1 Z(z)$
 $\circ B(z) = B_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i B_i(x) + \delta_2 Z(z)$
 $\circ C(z) = C_0(z) + \sum_{i=1}^m s_i B_i(x) + \delta_2 Z(z)$
(where *m* is the number of public inputs)

- $\bullet \,\, \pi_A = < c, pk_A >$
- $\bullet \ \pi_A' = < c, pk_A' >$
- $\bullet \,\, \pi_B = < c, pk_B >$

• example:

for i := 0; i < circuit.NVars; i++ {
 proof.PiB = Utils.Bn.G2.Add(proof.PiB, Utils.E
 proof.PiBp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiBp, Utils
}</pre>

(
$$c=1+witness+\delta_1+\delta_2+\delta_3$$

$$\bullet \ \pi_B' = < c, pk_B' >$$

- $\bullet \,\, \pi_C = < c, pk_C >$
- $\pi'_C = < c, pk'_C >$
- $\bullet \,\, \pi_K = < c, pk_K >$
- $\bullet \,\, \pi_H = < h, pk_K H >$
- proof: $\pi = (\pi_A, \pi'_A, \pi_B, \pi'_B, \pi_C, \pi'_C, \pi_K, \pi_H)$

Proofs verification

•
$$vk_{kx} = vk_{IC,0} + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i vk_{IC,i}$$

Verification:

$$\bullet \ e(\pi_A,vk_a) == e(\pi_{A'},g_2)$$

- $\bullet \; e(vk_b, \pi_B) == e(\pi_{B'}, g_2)$
- $\bullet \; e(\pi_C, vk_c) == e(\pi_{C'}, g_2)$
- $\bullet \; e(vk_{kx}+\pi_A,\pi_B) == e(\pi_H,vk_{kz}) \cdot e(\pi_C,g_2)$
- $ullet e(vk_{kx}+\pi_A+\pi_C,V^2_{eta\gamma})\cdot e(vk^1_{eta\gamma},\pi_B)==e(\pi_k,vk^1_{\gamma})$



Example (whiteboard):

$$rac{e(\pi_A,\pi_B)}{e(\pi_C,g_2)} = e(g_1h(t),g_2z(t))$$

$$rac{e(A_1+A_2+...+A_n,B_1+B_2+...+B_n)}{e(C_1+C_2+...+C_n,g_2)}=e(g_1h(t),g_2z(t))$$

$$\frac{e(g_1\alpha_1(t)s_1 + g_1\alpha_2(t)s_2 + ... + g_1\alpha_n(t)s_n, g_2\beta_1(t)s_1 + g_2\beta_2(t)s_2 + ... + g_2\beta_n(t)s_n)}{e(g_1\gamma_1(t)s_1 + g_1\gamma_2(t)s_2 + ... + g_1\gamma_n(t)s_n, g_2)} = e(g_1h(t), g_2z(t))$$

$$e(g_1lpha_1(t)s_1+g_1lpha_2(t)s_2+...+g_1lpha_n(t)s_n,g_2eta_1(t)s_1+g_2eta_2(t)s_2+...+g_2eta_n(t)s_n)\ =e(g_1h(t),g_2z(t))\cdot e(g_1\gamma_1(t)s_1+g_1\gamma_2(t)s_2+...+g_1\gamma_n(t)s_n,g_2)$$

Groth16

Trusted Setup

$$au=lpha,eta,\gamma,\delta,x$$

 $\sigma_1 =$

$$\begin{array}{l} \bullet \ \alpha,\beta,\delta,\{x^i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \\ \bullet \ \{ \frac{\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\gamma} \}_{i=0}^l \\ \bullet \ \{ \frac{\beta u_i(x) + \alpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\delta} \}_{i=l+1}^m \\ \bullet \ \{ \frac{x^i t(x)}{\delta} \}_{i=0}^{n-2} \\ \sigma_2 = (\beta,\gamma,\delta,\{x^i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}) \\ (\text{where } u_i(x), v_i(x), w_i(x) \text{ are the } QAP. \end{array}$$



```
type Pk struct { // Proving Key
        BACDelta [][3]*big.Int // {(\beta ui(x) + \alpha vi(x) + wi(x))
        Ζ
                  []*big.Int
        G1
                  struct {
                 Alpha [3]*big.Int
                 Beta [3]*big.Int
                 Delta [3]*big.Int
                 At
                           [][3]*big.Int // {a(\tau)} from 0 to
                 BACGamma [][3]*big.Int // {(\beta ui(x) + \alpha vi(x)
        G2 struct {
                 Beta
                           [3][2]*big.Int
                 Gamma [3][2]*big.Int
                           [3][2]*big.Int
                 Delta
                 BACGamma [][3][2]*big.Int // {(\beta ui(x)+\alpha vi
        }
        PowersTauDelta [][3]*big.Int // powers of τ encryp
}
```

```
type Vk struct {
    IC [][3]*big.Int
    G1 struct {
        Alpha [3]*big.Int
        S2 struct {
            Beta [3][2]*big.Int
            Gamma [3][2]*big.Int
            Delta [3][2]*big.Int
        }
}
```

```
// Setup is the data structure holding the Trusted Setup of
type Setup struct {
        T   *big.Int // trusted setup secret
        Kalpha *big.Int
        Kbeta *big.Int
        Kdelta *big.Int
        }
        Pk Pk
        Vk Vk
}
```

Proofs Generation

$$egin{aligned} &\pi_A = lpha + \sum_{i=0}^m lpha_i u_i(x) + r\delta \ &\pi_B = eta + \sum_{i=0}^m lpha_i v_i(x) + s\delta \ &\pi_C = rac{\sum_{i=l+1}^m a_i (eta u_i(x) + lpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)) + h(x)t(x)}{\delta} + \pi_A s + \pi_B r - rs\delta \ &\pi = \pi_A^1, \pi_B^1, \pi_C^2 \end{aligned}$$

Proof Verification

$$egin{aligned} & [\pi_A]_1 \cdot [\pi_B]_2 = [lpha]_1 \cdot [eta]_2 + \sum_{i=0}^l a_i [rac{eta u_i(x) + lpha v_i(x) + w_i(x)}{\gamma}]_1 \cdot [\gamma]_2 + [\pi_C]_1 \cdot [\delta]_2 \ & e(\pi_A, \pi_B) = e(lpha, eta) \cdot e(pub, \gamma) \cdot e(\pi_C, \delta) \end{aligned}$$

How we use zkSNARKs in iden3

- proving a credentials without revealing it's content
- proving that an identity has a claim issued by another identity, without revealing all the data
- proving any property of an identity
- ITF (Identity Transition Function), a way to prove with a zkSNARK that an identity has been updated following the defined protocol
 - $\circ\,$ identities can not cheat when issuing claims
- etc

Other ideas for free time side project

• Zendermint (Tendermint + zkSNARKs)

zkSNARK libraries

- bellman (rust)
- libsnark (c++)
- snarkjs (javascript)
- websnark (wasm)
- go-snark (golang) [do not use in production]

Circuit languages



language	snark library with which plugs in
Zokrates	libsnark, bellman
Snarky	libsnark
circom	snarkjs, websnark, bellman
go-snark-circuit	go-snark

Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK

- we work over F_r , where

r = 21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416

034343698204186575808495617

- BabyJubJub
- Mimc
- Poseidon

Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK BabyJubJub

- explaination: https://medium.com/zokrates/efficient-ecc-inzksnarks-using-zokrates-bd9ae37b8186
- implementations:
 - go: https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto
 - javascript & circom: https://github.com/iden3/circomlib
 - o rust: https://github.com/arnaucube/babyjubjub-rs
 - o c++: https://github.com/barryWhiteHat/baby_jubjub_ecc

Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK Mimc7

- explaination: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/492.pdf
- implementations in:
 - go: https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto
 - javascript & circom: https://github.com/iden3/circomlib
 - o rust: https://github.com/arnaucube/mimc-rs

Utilities (Elliptic curve & Hash functions) inside the zkSNARK Poseidon

- explaination: https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/458.pdf
- implementations in:
 - go: https://github.com/iden3/go-iden3-crypto
 - javascript & circom: https://github.com/iden3/circomlib

References

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- Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable computation, Bryan Parno, Craig Gentry, Jon Howell, Mariana Raykova https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/279.pdf
- On the Size of Pairing-based Non-interactive Arguments, Jens Groth https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/260.pdf
- (also all the links through the slides)

Thank you very much



iden3.io github.com/iden3 twitter.com/identhree arnaucube.com github.com/arnaucube twitter.com/arnaucube



