arnaucube
arnaucube/go-snarkPublic Self-hosted repository
go-snark/snark.go
snark.goRaw
  1package snark
  2
  3import (
  4	"fmt"
  5	"math/big"
  6	"os"
  7
  8	"github.com/arnaucube/go-snark/bn128"
  9	"github.com/arnaucube/go-snark/circuitcompiler"
 10	"github.com/arnaucube/go-snark/fields"
 11	"github.com/arnaucube/go-snark/r1csqap"
 12)
 13
 14// Setup is the data structure holding the Trusted Setup data. The Setup.Toxic sub struct must be destroyed after the GenerateTrustedSetup function is completed
 15type Setup struct {
 16	Toxic struct {
 17		T      *big.Int // trusted setup secret
 18		Ka     *big.Int // prover
 19		Kb     *big.Int // prover
 20		Kc     *big.Int // prover
 21		Kbeta  *big.Int
 22		Kgamma *big.Int
 23		RhoA   *big.Int
 24		RhoB   *big.Int
 25		RhoC   *big.Int
 26	}
 27
 28	// public
 29	G1T [][3]*big.Int    // t encrypted in G1 curve, G1T == Pk.H
 30	G2T [][3][2]*big.Int // t encrypted in G2 curve
 31	Pk  struct {         // Proving Key pk:=(pkA, pkB, pkC, pkH)
 32		A  [][3]*big.Int
 33		B  [][3][2]*big.Int
 34		C  [][3]*big.Int
 35		Kp [][3]*big.Int
 36		Ap [][3]*big.Int
 37		Bp [][3]*big.Int
 38		Cp [][3]*big.Int
 39		Z  []*big.Int
 40	}
 41	Vk struct {
 42		Vka   [3][2]*big.Int
 43		Vkb   [3]*big.Int
 44		Vkc   [3][2]*big.Int
 45		IC    [][3]*big.Int
 46		G1Kbg [3]*big.Int    // g1 * Kbeta * Kgamma
 47		G2Kbg [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kbeta * Kgamma
 48		G2Kg  [3][2]*big.Int // g2 * Kgamma
 49		Vkz   [3][2]*big.Int
 50	}
 51}
 52
 53// Proof contains the parameters to proof the zkSNARK
 54type Proof struct {
 55	PiA  [3]*big.Int
 56	PiAp [3]*big.Int
 57	PiB  [3][2]*big.Int
 58	PiBp [3]*big.Int
 59	PiC  [3]*big.Int
 60	PiCp [3]*big.Int
 61	PiH  [3]*big.Int
 62	PiKp [3]*big.Int
 63	// PublicSignals []*big.Int
 64}
 65
 66type utils struct {
 67	Bn  bn128.Bn128
 68	FqR fields.Fq
 69	PF  r1csqap.PolynomialField
 70}
 71
 72// Utils is the data structure holding the BN128, FqR Finite Field over R, PolynomialField, that will be used inside the snarks operations
 73var Utils = prepareUtils()
 74
 75func prepareUtils() utils {
 76	bn, err := bn128.NewBn128()
 77	if err != nil {
 78		panic(err)
 79	}
 80	// new Finite Field
 81	fqR := fields.NewFq(bn.R)
 82	// new Polynomial Field
 83	pf := r1csqap.NewPolynomialField(fqR)
 84
 85	return utils{
 86		Bn:  bn,
 87		FqR: fqR,
 88		PF:  pf,
 89	}
 90}
 91
 92// GenerateTrustedSetup generates the Trusted Setup from a compiled Circuit. The Setup.Toxic sub data structure must be destroyed
 93func GenerateTrustedSetup(witnessLength int, circuit circuitcompiler.Circuit, alphas, betas, gammas [][]*big.Int) (Setup, error) {
 94	var setup Setup
 95	var err error
 96
 97	// input soundness
 98	// for i := 0; i < len(alphas); i++ {
 99	//         for j := 0; j < len(alphas[i]); j++ {
100	//                 if j <= circuit.NPublic {
101	//                         if bytes.Equal(alphas[i][j].Bytes(), Utils.FqR.Zero().Bytes()) {
102	//                                 alphas[i][j] = Utils.FqR.One()
103	//                         }
104	//                 }
105	//         }
106	// }
107
108	// generate random t value
109	setup.Toxic.T, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
110	if err != nil {
111		return Setup{}, err
112	}
113
114	// k for calculating pi' and Vk
115	setup.Toxic.Ka, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
116	if err != nil {
117		return Setup{}, err
118	}
119	setup.Toxic.Kb, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
120	if err != nil {
121		return Setup{}, err
122	}
123	setup.Toxic.Kc, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
124	if err != nil {
125		return Setup{}, err
126	}
127
128	// generate Kβ (Kbeta) and Kγ (Kgamma)
129	setup.Toxic.Kbeta, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
130	if err != nil {
131		return Setup{}, err
132	}
133	setup.Toxic.Kgamma, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
134	if err != nil {
135		return Setup{}, err
136	}
137
138	// generate ρ (Rho): ρA, ρB, ρC
139	setup.Toxic.RhoA, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
140	if err != nil {
141		return Setup{}, err
142	}
143	setup.Toxic.RhoB, err = Utils.FqR.Rand()
144	if err != nil {
145		return Setup{}, err
146	}
147	setup.Toxic.RhoC = Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoA, setup.Toxic.RhoB)
148
149	// calculated more down
150	// for i := 0; i < witnessLength; i++ {
151	//         tPow := Utils.FqR.Exp(setup.Toxic.T, big.NewInt(int64(i)))
152	//         tEncr1 := Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, tPow)
153	//         gt1 = append(gt1, tEncr1)
154	//         tEncr2 := Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, tPow)
155	//         gt2 = append(gt2, tEncr2)
156	// }
157	// gt1: g1, g1*t, g1*t^2, g1*t^3, ...
158	// gt2: g2, g2*t, g2*t^2, ...
159
160	setup.Vk.Vka = Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, setup.Toxic.Ka)
161	setup.Vk.Vkb = Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, setup.Toxic.Kb)
162	setup.Vk.Vkc = Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, setup.Toxic.Kc)
163
164	/*
165		Verification keys:
166		- Vk_betagamma1: setup.G1Kbg = g1 * Kbeta*Kgamma
167		- Vk_betagamma2: setup.G2Kbg = g2 * Kbeta*Kgamma
168		- Vk_gamma: setup.G2Kg = g2 * Kgamma
169	*/
170	kbg := Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.Kbeta, setup.Toxic.Kgamma)
171	setup.Vk.G1Kbg = Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, kbg)
172	setup.Vk.G2Kbg = Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, kbg)
173	setup.Vk.G2Kg = Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, setup.Toxic.Kgamma)
174
175	// for i := 0; i < circuit.NVars; i++ {
176	for i := 0; i < len(circuit.Signals); i++ {
177		at := Utils.PF.Eval(alphas[i], setup.Toxic.T)
178		// rhoAat := Utils.Bn.Fq1.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoA, at)
179		rhoAat := Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoA, at)
180		a := Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, rhoAat)
181		setup.Pk.A = append(setup.Pk.A, a)
182		if i <= circuit.NPublic {
183			setup.Vk.IC = append(setup.Vk.IC, a)
184		}
185
186		bt := Utils.PF.Eval(betas[i], setup.Toxic.T)
187		// rhoBbt := Utils.Bn.Fq1.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoB, bt)
188		rhoBbt := Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoB, bt)
189		bg1 := Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, rhoBbt)
190		bg2 := Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, rhoBbt)
191		setup.Pk.B = append(setup.Pk.B, bg2)
192
193		ct := Utils.PF.Eval(gammas[i], setup.Toxic.T)
194		// rhoCct := Utils.Bn.Fq1.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoC, ct)
195		rhoCct := Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoC, ct)
196		c := Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, rhoCct)
197		setup.Pk.C = append(setup.Pk.C, c)
198
199		kt := Utils.FqR.Add(Utils.FqR.Add(rhoAat, rhoBbt), rhoCct)
200		k := Utils.Bn.G1.Affine(Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, kt))
201
202		ktest := Utils.Bn.G1.Affine(Utils.Bn.G1.Add(Utils.Bn.G1.Add(a, bg1), c))
203		if !Utils.Bn.Fq2.Equal(k, ktest) {
204			os.Exit(1)
205			return setup, err
206		}
207
208		setup.Pk.Ap = append(setup.Pk.Ap, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(a, setup.Toxic.Ka))
209		setup.Pk.Bp = append(setup.Pk.Bp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(bg1, setup.Toxic.Kb))
210		setup.Pk.Cp = append(setup.Pk.Cp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(c, setup.Toxic.Kc))
211		k_ := Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, kt)
212		setup.Pk.Kp = append(setup.Pk.Kp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(k_, setup.Toxic.Kbeta))
213	}
214
215	// z pol
216	zpol := []*big.Int{big.NewInt(int64(1))}
217	// for i := 0; i < len(circuit.Constraints); i++ {
218	for i := 1; i < len(alphas)-1; i++ {
219		zpol = Utils.PF.Mul(
220			zpol,
221			[]*big.Int{
222				Utils.FqR.Neg( // neg over R
223					big.NewInt(int64(i))),
224				big.NewInt(int64(1)),
225			})
226	}
227	setup.Pk.Z = zpol
228
229	zt := Utils.PF.Eval(zpol, setup.Toxic.T)
230	// rhoCzt := Utils.Bn.Fq1.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoC, zt)
231	rhoCzt := Utils.FqR.Mul(setup.Toxic.RhoC, zt)
232	setup.Vk.Vkz = Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G2.G, rhoCzt)
233
234	// encrypt t values with curve generators
235	var gt1 [][3]*big.Int
236	gt1 = append(gt1, Utils.Bn.G1.G) // the first is t**0 * G1 = 1 * G1 = G1
237	tEncr := setup.Toxic.T
238	for i := 1; i < len(zpol); i++ { //should be G1T = pkH = (tau**i * G1) from i=0 to d, where d is degree of pol Z(x)
239		gt1 = append(gt1, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(Utils.Bn.G1.G, tEncr))
240		// tEncr = Utils.Bn.Fq1.Mul(tEncr, setup.Toxic.T)
241		tEncr = Utils.FqR.Mul(tEncr, setup.Toxic.T)
242	}
243	setup.G1T = gt1
244
245	return setup, nil
246}
247
248// GenerateProofs generates all the parameters to proof the zkSNARK from the Circuit, Setup and the Witness
249func GenerateProofs(circuit circuitcompiler.Circuit, setup Setup, w []*big.Int, px []*big.Int) (Proof, error) {
250	var proof Proof
251	proof.PiA = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
252	proof.PiAp = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
253	proof.PiB = Utils.Bn.Fq6.Zero()
254	proof.PiBp = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
255	proof.PiC = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
256	proof.PiCp = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
257	proof.PiH = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
258	proof.PiKp = [3]*big.Int{Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero(), Utils.Bn.G1.F.Zero()}
259
260	for i := circuit.NPublic + 1; i < circuit.NVars; i++ {
261		proof.PiA = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiA, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.A[i], w[i]))
262		proof.PiAp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiAp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.Ap[i], w[i]))
263	}
264
265	for i := 0; i < circuit.NVars; i++ {
266		proof.PiB = Utils.Bn.G2.Add(proof.PiB, Utils.Bn.G2.MulScalar(setup.Pk.B[i], w[i]))
267		proof.PiBp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiBp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.Bp[i], w[i]))
268
269		proof.PiC = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiC, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.C[i], w[i]))
270		proof.PiCp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiCp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.Cp[i], w[i]))
271
272		proof.PiKp = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiKp, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Pk.Kp[i], w[i]))
273	}
274
275	hx := Utils.PF.DivisorPolynomial(px, setup.Pk.Z) // maybe move this calculation to a previous step
276
277	// piH = pkH,0 + sum (  hi * pk H,i ), where pkH = G1T, hi=hx
278	// proof.PiH = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiH, setup.G1T[0])
279	for i := 0; i < len(hx); i++ {
280		proof.PiH = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(proof.PiH, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.G1T[i], hx[i]))
281	}
282
283	return proof, nil
284}
285
286// VerifyProof verifies over the BN128 the Pairings of the Proof
287func VerifyProof(circuit circuitcompiler.Circuit, setup Setup, proof Proof, publicSignals []*big.Int, debug bool) bool {
288	// e(piA, Va) == e(piA', g2)
289	pairingPiaVa := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiA, setup.Vk.Vka)
290	pairingPiapG2 := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiAp, Utils.Bn.G2.G)
291	if !Utils.Bn.Fq12.Equal(pairingPiaVa, pairingPiapG2) {
292		fmt.Println("❌ e(piA, Va) == e(piA', g2), valid knowledge commitment for A")
293		return false
294	}
295	if debug {
296		fmt.Println("✓ e(piA, Va) == e(piA', g2), valid knowledge commitment for A")
297	}
298
299	// e(Vb, piB) == e(piB', g2)
300	pairingVbPib := Utils.Bn.Pairing(setup.Vk.Vkb, proof.PiB)
301	pairingPibpG2 := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiBp, Utils.Bn.G2.G)
302	if !Utils.Bn.Fq12.Equal(pairingVbPib, pairingPibpG2) {
303		fmt.Println("❌ e(Vb, piB) == e(piB', g2), valid knowledge commitment for B")
304		return false
305	}
306	if debug {
307		fmt.Println("✓ e(Vb, piB) == e(piB', g2), valid knowledge commitment for B")
308	}
309
310	// e(piC, Vc) == e(piC', g2)
311	pairingPicVc := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiC, setup.Vk.Vkc)
312	pairingPicpG2 := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiCp, Utils.Bn.G2.G)
313	if !Utils.Bn.Fq12.Equal(pairingPicVc, pairingPicpG2) {
314		fmt.Println("❌ e(piC, Vc) == e(piC', g2), valid knowledge commitment for C")
315		return false
316	}
317	if debug {
318		fmt.Println("✓ e(piC, Vc) == e(piC', g2), valid knowledge commitment for C")
319	}
320
321	// Vkx, to then calculate Vkx+piA
322	vkxpia := setup.Vk.IC[0]
323	for i := 0; i < len(publicSignals); i++ {
324		vkxpia = Utils.Bn.G1.Add(vkxpia, Utils.Bn.G1.MulScalar(setup.Vk.IC[i+1], publicSignals[i]))
325	}
326
327	// e(Vkx+piA, piB) == e(piH, Vkz) * e(piC, g2)
328	if !Utils.Bn.Fq12.Equal(
329		Utils.Bn.Pairing(Utils.Bn.G1.Add(vkxpia, proof.PiA), proof.PiB), // TODO Add(vkxpia, proof.PiA) can go outside in order to save computation, as is reused later
330		Utils.Bn.Fq12.Mul(
331			Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiH, setup.Vk.Vkz),
332			Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiC, Utils.Bn.G2.G))) {
333		fmt.Println("❌ e(Vkx+piA, piB) == e(piH, Vkz) * e(piC, g2), QAP disibility checked")
334		return false
335	}
336	if debug {
337		fmt.Println("✓ e(Vkx+piA, piB) == e(piH, Vkz) * e(piC, g2), QAP disibility checked")
338	}
339
340	// e(Vkx+piA+piC, g2KbetaKgamma) * e(g1KbetaKgamma, piB)
341	// == e(piK, g2Kgamma)
342	piApiC := Utils.Bn.G1.Add(Utils.Bn.G1.Add(vkxpia, proof.PiA), proof.PiC)
343	pairingPiACG2Kbg := Utils.Bn.Pairing(piApiC, setup.Vk.G2Kbg)
344	pairingG1KbgPiB := Utils.Bn.Pairing(setup.Vk.G1Kbg, proof.PiB)
345	pairingL := Utils.Bn.Fq12.Mul(pairingPiACG2Kbg, pairingG1KbgPiB)
346	pairingR := Utils.Bn.Pairing(proof.PiKp, setup.Vk.G2Kg)
347	if !Utils.Bn.Fq12.Equal(pairingL, pairingR) {
348		fmt.Println("❌ e(Vkx+piA+piC, g2KbetaKgamma) * e(g1KbetaKgamma, piB) == e(piK, g2Kgamma)")
349		return false
350	}
351	if debug {
352		fmt.Println("✓ e(Vkx+piA+piC, g2KbetaKgamma) * e(g1KbetaKgamma, piB) == e(piK, g2Kgamma)")
353	}
354
355	return true
356}