phantom-zone/src/bool/evaluator.rs
src/bool/evaluator.rsRaw
1use std::{
2 borrow::BorrowMut,
3 cell::{OnceCell, RefCell},
4 clone,
5 collections::HashMap,
6 fmt::{Debug, Display},
7 iter::Once,
8 marker::PhantomData,
9 ops::Shr,
10 sync::OnceLock,
11 usize,
12};
13
14use itertools::{izip, partition, Itertools};
15use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Num, One, Pow, PrimInt, ToPrimitive, WrappingSub, Zero};
16use rand::Rng;
17use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;
18
19use crate::{
20 backend::{
21 ArithmeticOps, GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, Modulus, ShoupMatrixFMA, VectorOps,
22 },
23 decomposer::{Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, NumInfo, RlweDecomposer},
24 lwe::{decrypt_lwe, encrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch, lwe_ksk_keygen, measure_noise_lwe, LweSecret},
25 multi_party::{
26 non_interactive_ksk_gen, non_interactive_ksk_zero_encryptions_for_other_party_i,
27 non_interactive_rgsw_ct, public_key_share,
28 },
29 ntt::{self, Ntt, NttBackendU64, NttInit},
30 pbs::{pbs, sample_extract, PbsInfo, PbsKey, WithShoupRepr},
31 random::{
32 DefaultSecureRng, NewWithSeed, RandomFill, RandomFillGaussianInModulus,
33 RandomFillUniformInModulus, RandomGaussianElementInModulus,
34 },
35 rgsw::{
36 decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, galois_key_gen, generate_auto_map, public_key_encrypt_rgsw,
37 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace, rlwe_by_rgsw, secret_key_encrypt_rgsw, IsTrivial, RgswCiphertext,
38 RlweCiphertext, RlweSecret,
39 },
40 utils::{
41 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, generate_prime, mod_exponent, Global,
42 TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal,
43 },
44 Decryptor, Encryptor, Matrix, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, MultiPartyDecryptor, Row, RowEntity,
45 RowMut, Secret,
46};
47
48use super::{
49 keys::ClientKey,
50 parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
51 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare,
52 DecompositionCount, DecompostionLogBase, DoubleDecomposerParams, NonInteractiveClientKey,
53 SeededMultiPartyServerKey, SeededServerKey, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
54 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
55};
56
57pub struct NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
58 /// (ak*si + e + \beta ui, ak*si + e)
59 ni_rgsw_cts: (Vec<M>, Vec<M>),
60 ui_to_s_ksk: M,
61 others_ksk_zero_encs: Vec<M>,
62 user_index: usize,
63}
64
65impl<M> NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
66 fn zero_enc_for_ui_to_s_ksk_for_user_i(&self, user_i: usize) -> &M {
67 assert!(user_i != self.user_index);
68 if user_i < self.user_index {
69 &self.others_ksk_zero_encs[user_i]
70 } else {
71 &self.others_ksk_zero_encs[user_i - 1]
72 }
73 }
74}
75
76pub struct MultiPartyCrs<S> {
77 pub(super) seed: S,
78}
79
80pub struct NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<S> {
81 pub(super) seed: S,
82}
83
84impl<S: Default + Copy> NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<S> {
85 fn server_key_share_seed<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
86 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(self.seed);
87
88 // for main server key share seed sample once
89 let mut out = S::default();
90 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
91
92 out
93 }
94
95 fn ui_to_s_ks_seed<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
96 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(self.seed);
97
98 // puncture twice
99 let mut out = S::default();
100 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
101 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
102
103 out
104 }
105
106 fn ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(
107 &self,
108 user_i: usize,
109 ) -> S {
110 let ks_seed = self.ui_to_s_ks_seed::<R>();
111 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(ks_seed);
112
113 // puncture user_i times
114 let mut out = S::default();
115 for _ in 0..user_i {
116 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
117 }
118
119 out
120 }
121}
122
123impl<S: Default + Copy> MultiPartyCrs<S> {
124 /// Seed to generate public key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
125 ///
126 /// Public key seed equals the 1st seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
127 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
128 pub(super) fn public_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
129 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
130
131 let mut seed = S::default();
132 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
133 seed
134 }
135
136 /// Seed to generate server key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
137 ///
138 /// Server key seed equals the 2nd seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
139 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
140 pub(super) fn server_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
141 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
142
143 let mut seed = S::default();
144 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
145 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
146 seed
147 }
148}
149
150pub(crate) trait BooleanGates {
151 type Ciphertext: RowEntity;
152 type Key;
153
154 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
155 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
156 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
157 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
158 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
159 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
160 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c: &mut Self::Ciphertext);
161
162 fn and(
163 &mut self,
164 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
165 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
166 key: &Self::Key,
167 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
168 fn nand(
169 &mut self,
170 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
171 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
172 key: &Self::Key,
173 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
174 fn or(
175 &mut self,
176 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
177 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
178 key: &Self::Key,
179 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
180 fn nor(
181 &mut self,
182 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
183 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
184 key: &Self::Key,
185 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
186 fn xor(
187 &mut self,
188 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
189 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
190 key: &Self::Key,
191 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
192 fn xnor(
193 &mut self,
194 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
195 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
196 key: &Self::Key,
197 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
198 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext;
199}
200
201struct ScratchMemory<M>
202where
203 M: Matrix,
204{
205 lwe_vector: M::R,
206 decomposition_matrix: M,
207}
208
209impl<M: MatrixEntity> ScratchMemory<M>
210where
211 M::R: RowEntity,
212{
213 fn new(parameters: &BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self {
214 // Vector to store LWE ciphertext with LWE dimesnion n
215 let lwe_vector = M::R::zeros(parameters.lwe_n().0 + 1);
216
217 // Matrix to store decomposed polynomials
218 // Max decompistion count + space for temporary RLWE
219 let d = std::cmp::max(
220 parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0,
221 std::cmp::max(
222 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().0 .0,
223 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().1 .0,
224 ),
225 ) + 2;
226 let decomposition_matrix = M::zeros(d, parameters.rlwe_n().0);
227
228 Self {
229 lwe_vector,
230 decomposition_matrix,
231 }
232 }
233}
234
235pub(super) trait BoolEncoding {
236 type Element;
237 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
238 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
239 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element;
240 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool;
241}
242
243impl<T> BoolEncoding for CiphertextModulus<T>
244where
245 CiphertextModulus<T>: Modulus<Element = T>,
246 T: PrimInt,
247{
248 type Element = T;
249
250 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element {
251 if self.is_native() {
252 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 2)
253 } else {
254 self.q().unwrap() >> 2
255 }
256 }
257 /// Q/8
258 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
259 if self.is_native() {
260 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 3)
261 } else {
262 self.q().unwrap() >> 3
263 }
264 }
265 /// -Q/8
266 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
267 self.largest_unsigned_value() - self.true_el() + T::one()
268 }
269 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool {
270 let qby8 = self.true_el();
271 let m = (((m + qby8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4.0f64) / self.q_as_f64().unwrap()).round()
272 as usize
273 % 4usize;
274
275 if m == 0 {
276 return false;
277 } else if m == 1 {
278 return true;
279 } else {
280 panic!("Incorrect bool decryption. Got m={m} but expected m to be 0 or 1")
281 }
282 }
283}
284
285pub(super) struct BoolPbsInfo<M: Matrix, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
286 auto_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
287 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: (
288 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
289 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
290 ),
291 lwe_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
292 g_k_dlog_map: Vec<usize>,
293 rlwe_nttop: Ntt,
294 rlwe_modop: RlweModOp,
295 lwe_modop: LweModOp,
296 embedding_factor: usize,
297 rlwe_qby4: M::MatElement,
298 rlwe_auto_maps: Vec<(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>)>,
299 parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
300}
301
302impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> PbsInfo for BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
303where
304 M::MatElement: PrimInt + WrappingSub + NumInfo + FromPrimitive + From<bool> + Display,
305 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
306 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
307 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
308{
309 type M = M;
310 type Modulus = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>;
311 type D = DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>;
312 type RlweModOp = RlweModOp;
313 type LweModOp = LweModOp;
314 type NttOp = NttOp;
315 fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: usize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>) {
316 &self.rlwe_auto_maps[k]
317 }
318 fn br_q(&self) -> usize {
319 *self.parameters.br_q()
320 }
321 fn lwe_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
322 &self.lwe_decomposer
323 }
324 fn rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(&self) -> &(Self::D, Self::D) {
325 &self.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer
326 }
327 fn auto_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
328 &self.auto_decomposer
329 }
330 fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize {
331 self.embedding_factor
332 }
333 fn g(&self) -> isize {
334 self.parameters.g() as isize
335 }
336 fn w(&self) -> usize {
337 self.parameters.w()
338 }
339 fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize] {
340 &self.g_k_dlog_map
341 }
342 fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize {
343 self.parameters.lwe_n().0
344 }
345 fn lwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
346 self.parameters.lwe_q()
347 }
348 fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize {
349 self.parameters.rlwe_n().0
350 }
351 fn rlwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
352 self.parameters.rlwe_q()
353 }
354 fn modop_lweq(&self) -> &Self::LweModOp {
355 &self.lwe_modop
356 }
357 fn modop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::RlweModOp {
358 &self.rlwe_modop
359 }
360 fn nttop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::NttOp {
361 &self.rlwe_nttop
362 }
363}
364
365pub(crate) struct BoolEvaluator<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey>
366where
367 M: Matrix,
368{
369 pbs_info: BoolPbsInfo<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp>,
370 scratch_memory: ScratchMemory<M>,
371 nand_test_vec: M::R,
372 and_test_vec: M::R,
373 or_test_vec: M::R,
374 nor_test_vec: M::R,
375 xor_test_vec: M::R,
376 xnor_test_vec: M::R,
377 _phantom: PhantomData<SKey>,
378}
379
380impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
381 BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
382{
383 pub(super) fn parameters(&self) -> &BoolParameters<M::MatElement> {
384 &self.pbs_info.parameters
385 }
386
387 pub(super) fn pbs_info(&self) -> &BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
388 &self.pbs_info
389 }
390}
391
392fn trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg<
393 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
394 D: DoubleDecomposerParams<Count = DecompositionCount>,
395>(
396 rgsw_ct_in: M,
397 rgrg_params: D,
398 rlrg_params: D,
399) -> M
400where
401 M::R: RowMut,
402 M::MatElement: Copy,
403{
404 let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) = (
405 rgrg_params.decomposition_count_a(),
406 rgrg_params.decomposition_count_b(),
407 );
408 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
409 rlrg_params.decomposition_count_a(),
410 rlrg_params.decomposition_count_b(),
411 );
412 let rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
413 let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
414 assert!(rgsw_ct_in.dimension().0 == rgsw_ct_rows_in);
415 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
416 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
417
418 let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rgsw_ct_in.dimension().1);
419
420 // RLWE'(-sm) part A
421 izip!(
422 reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
423 rgsw_ct_in
424 .iter_rows()
425 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
426 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
427 )
428 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
429 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
430 });
431
432 // RLWE'(-sm) part B
433 izip!(
434 reduced_ct_i_out
435 .iter_rows_mut()
436 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
437 .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
438 rgsw_ct_in
439 .iter_rows()
440 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
441 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
442 )
443 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
444 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
445 });
446
447 // RLWE'(m) Part A
448 izip!(
449 reduced_ct_i_out
450 .iter_rows_mut()
451 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
452 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
453 rgsw_ct_in
454 .iter_rows()
455 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
456 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
457 )
458 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
459 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
460 });
461
462 // RLWE'(m) Part B
463 izip!(
464 reduced_ct_i_out
465 .iter_rows_mut()
466 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
467 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
468 rgsw_ct_in
469 .iter_rows()
470 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
471 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
472 )
473 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
474 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
475 });
476
477 reduced_ct_i_out
478}
479
480impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey>
481where
482 M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
483 M::MatElement: PrimInt
484 + Debug
485 + Display
486 + NumInfo
487 + FromPrimitive
488 + WrappingSub
489 + SampleUniform
490 + From<bool>,
491 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
492 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
493 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
494 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>
495 + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
496 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
497 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
498 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
499 M::R: TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + RowEntity + Debug,
500 <M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
501{
502 pub(super) fn new(parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self
503 where
504 RlweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
505 LweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
506 NttOp: NttInit<CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
507 {
508 //TODO(Jay): Run sanity checks for modulus values in parameters
509
510 // generates dlog map s.t. (+/-)g^{k} % q = a, for all a \in Z*_{q} and k \in
511 // [0, q/4). We store the dlog `k` at index `a`. This makes it easier to
512 // simply look up `k` at runtime as vec[a]. If a = g^{k} then dlog is
513 // stored as k. If a = -g^{k} then dlog is stored as k = q/4. This is done to
514 // differentiate sign.
515 let g = parameters.g();
516 let q = *parameters.br_q();
517 let mut g_k_dlog_map = vec![0usize; q];
518 for i in 0..q / 4 {
519 let v = mod_exponent(g as u64, i as u64, q as u64) as usize;
520 // g^i
521 g_k_dlog_map[v] = i;
522 // -(g^i)
523 g_k_dlog_map[q - v] = i + (q / 4);
524 }
525
526 let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n().0) / q;
527
528 let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q(), parameters.rlwe_n().0);
529 let rlwe_modop = RlweModOp::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
530 let lwe_modop = LweModOp::new(*parameters.lwe_q());
531
532 let q = *parameters.br_q();
533 let qby2 = q >> 1;
534 let qby8 = q >> 3;
535 // Q/8 (Q: rlwe_q)
536 let true_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().true_el();
537 // -Q/8
538 let false_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().false_el();
539 let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(qby2, -(g as isize));
540
541 let init_test_vec = |partition_el: usize,
542 before_partition_el: M::MatElement,
543 after_partition_el: M::MatElement| {
544 let mut test_vec = M::R::zeros(qby2);
545 for i in 0..qby2 {
546 if i < partition_el {
547 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = before_partition_el;
548 } else {
549 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = after_partition_el;
550 }
551 }
552
553 // v(X) -> v(X^{-g})
554 let mut test_vec_autog = M::R::zeros(qby2);
555 izip!(
556 test_vec.as_ref().iter(),
557 auto_map_index.iter(),
558 auto_map_sign.iter()
559 )
560 .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
561 if !to_sign {
562 // negate
563 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
564 } else {
565 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = *v;
566 }
567 });
568
569 return test_vec_autog;
570 };
571
572 let nand_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
573 let and_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
574 let or_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
575 let nor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
576 let xor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
577 let xnor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
578
579 // auto map indices and sign
580 // Auto maps are stored as [-g, g^{1}, g^{2}, ..., g^{w}]
581 let mut rlwe_auto_maps = vec![];
582 let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
583 let g = parameters.g();
584 let br_q = parameters.br_q();
585 let auto_element_dlogs = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
586 assert!(auto_element_dlogs[0] == 0);
587 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
588 let el = if i == 0 {
589 -(g as isize)
590 } else {
591 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
592 };
593 rlwe_auto_maps.push(generate_auto_map(ring_size, el))
594 }
595
596 let rlwe_qby4 = parameters.rlwe_q().qby4();
597
598 let scratch_memory = ScratchMemory::new(¶meters);
599
600 let pbs_info = BoolPbsInfo {
601 auto_decomposer: parameters.auto_decomposer(),
602 lwe_decomposer: parameters.lwe_decomposer(),
603 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(),
604 g_k_dlog_map,
605 embedding_factor,
606 lwe_modop,
607 rlwe_modop,
608 rlwe_nttop,
609 rlwe_qby4,
610 rlwe_auto_maps,
611 parameters: parameters,
612 };
613
614 BoolEvaluator {
615 pbs_info,
616 scratch_memory,
617 nand_test_vec,
618 and_test_vec,
619 or_test_vec,
620 nor_test_vec,
621 xnor_test_vec,
622 xor_test_vec,
623 _phantom: PhantomData,
624 }
625 }
626
627 pub(super) fn client_key(&self) -> ClientKey {
628 let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
629 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
630 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
631 );
632 let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
633 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
634 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
635 );
636 ClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_lwe)
637 }
638
639 pub(super) fn non_interactive_client_key(&self) -> NonInteractiveClientKey {
640 let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
641 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
642 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
643 );
644 let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
645 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
646 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
647 );
648 let sk_u_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
649 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
650 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
651 );
652 NonInteractiveClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_u_rlwe, sk_lwe)
653 }
654
655 pub(super) fn single_party_server_key(
656 &self,
657 client_key: &ClientKey,
658 ) -> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]> {
659 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
660 let mut main_seed = [0u8; 32];
661 rng.fill_bytes(&mut main_seed);
662
663 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(main_seed);
664
665 let rlwe_n = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
666 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
667 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
668
669 // generate auto keys
670 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
671 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
672 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
673 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
674 let auto_els = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
675 for i in auto_els.into_iter() {
676 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
677 -(g as isize)
678 } else {
679 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
680 };
681 let mut gk = M::zeros(self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(), rlwe_n);
682 galois_key_gen(
683 &mut gk,
684 sk_rlwe.values(),
685 g_pow,
686 &auto_gadget,
687 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
688 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
689 &mut main_prng,
690 rng,
691 );
692 auto_keys.insert(i, gk);
693 }
694
695 // generate rgsw ciphertexts RGSW(si) where si is i^th LWE secret element
696 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
697 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
698 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
699 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
700 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
701 );
702 let rlrg_gadget_a = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
703 let rlrg_gadget_b = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
704 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
705 .values()
706 .iter()
707 .map(|si| {
708 // X^{si}; assume |emebedding_factor * si| < N
709 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
710 let si = (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32) * si;
711 // dbg!(si);
712 if si < 0 {
713 // X^{-i} = X^{2N - i} = -X^{N-i}
714 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
715 } else {
716 // X^{i}
717 m.as_mut()[si.abs() as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
718 }
719
720 let mut rgsw_si = M::zeros(rlrg_d_a * 2 + rlrg_d_b, ring_size);
721 secret_key_encrypt_rgsw(
722 &mut rgsw_si,
723 m.as_ref(),
724 &rlrg_gadget_a,
725 &rlrg_gadget_b,
726 sk_rlwe.values(),
727 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
728 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
729 &mut main_prng,
730 rng,
731 );
732
733 rgsw_si
734 })
735 .collect_vec();
736
737 // LWE KSK from RLWE secret s -> LWE secret z
738 let d_lwe_gadget = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
739 let mut lwe_ksk =
740 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
741 lwe_ksk_keygen(
742 &sk_rlwe.values(),
743 &sk_lwe.values(),
744 &mut lwe_ksk,
745 &d_lwe_gadget,
746 &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop,
747 &mut main_prng,
748 rng,
749 );
750
751 SeededServerKey::from_raw(
752 auto_keys,
753 rgsw_cts,
754 lwe_ksk,
755 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
756 main_seed,
757 )
758 })
759 }
760
761 pub(super) fn multi_party_server_key_share(
762 &self,
763 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
764 collective_pk: &M,
765 client_key: &ClientKey,
766 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]>
767 {
768 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
769 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
770
771 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
772 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
773
774 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
775 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
776 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
777 let lwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
778
779 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
780 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
781
782 // sanity check
783 assert!(sk_rlwe.values().len() == ring_size);
784 assert!(sk_lwe.values().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0);
785
786 // auto keys
787 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
788 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
789 let auto_element_dlogs = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
790 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
791 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
792 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
793 -(g as isize)
794 } else {
795 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
796 };
797
798 let mut ksk_out = M::zeros(
799 self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
800 ring_size,
801 );
802 galois_key_gen(
803 &mut ksk_out,
804 sk_rlwe.values(),
805 g_pow,
806 &auto_gadget,
807 rlweq_modop,
808 rlweq_nttop,
809 &mut main_prng,
810 rng,
811 );
812 auto_keys.insert(i, ksk_out);
813 }
814
815 // rgsw ciphertexts of lwe secret elements
816 let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = self
817 .pbs_info
818 .parameters
819 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
820 let (rgrg_d_a, rgrg_d_b) = (
821 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
822 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
823 );
824 let (rgrg_gadget_a, rgrg_gadget_b) = (
825 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(),
826 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector(),
827 );
828 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
829 .values()
830 .iter()
831 .map(|si| {
832 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
833 //TODO(Jay): It will be nice to have a function that returns polynomial
834 // (monomial infact!) corresponding to secret element embedded in ring X^{2N+1}.
835 // Save lots of mistakes where one forgest to emebed si in bigger ring.
836 let si = *si * (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
837 if si < 0 {
838 // X^{-si} = X^{2N-si} = -X^{N-si}, assuming abs(si) < N
839 // (which it is given si is secret element)
840 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
841 } else {
842 m.as_mut()[si as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
843 }
844
845 // public key RGSW encryption has no part that can be seeded, unlike secret key
846 // RGSW encryption where RLWE'_A(m) is seeded
847 let mut out_rgsw = M::zeros(rgrg_d_a * 2 + rgrg_d_b * 2, ring_size);
848 public_key_encrypt_rgsw(
849 &mut out_rgsw,
850 &m.as_ref(),
851 collective_pk,
852 &rgrg_gadget_a,
853 &rgrg_gadget_b,
854 rlweq_modop,
855 rlweq_nttop,
856 rng,
857 );
858
859 out_rgsw
860 })
861 .collect_vec();
862
863 // LWE ksk
864 let mut lwe_ksk =
865 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
866 let lwe_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
867 let d_lwe_gadget_vec = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
868 lwe_ksk_keygen(
869 sk_rlwe.values(),
870 sk_lwe.values(),
871 &mut lwe_ksk,
872 &d_lwe_gadget_vec,
873 lwe_modop,
874 &mut main_prng,
875 rng,
876 );
877
878 CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare::new(
879 rgsw_cts,
880 auto_keys,
881 lwe_ksk,
882 cr_seed,
883 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
884 )
885 })
886 }
887
888 pub(super) fn aggregate_non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
889 &self,
890 cr_seed: &NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<[u8; 32]>,
891 total_users: usize,
892 key_shares: &[NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M>],
893 ) -> Vec<M>
894 where
895 M: Clone,
896 {
897 let rlwe_modop = &self.pbs_info().rlwe_modop;
898 let nttop = &self.pbs_info().rlwe_nttop;
899 let ring_size = self.parameters().rlwe_n().0;
900 let rlwe_q = self.parameters().rlwe_q();
901
902 // genrate key switching key from u_i to s
903 let ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count = self
904 .parameters()
905 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposition_count();
906 let mut ui_to_s_ksks = key_shares
907 .iter()
908 .map(|share| {
909 let mut useri_ui_to_s_ksk = share.ui_to_s_ksk.clone();
910 key_shares
911 .iter()
912 .filter(|x| x.user_index != share.user_index)
913 .for_each(|(other_share)| {
914 let op2 = other_share.zero_enc_for_ui_to_s_ksk_for_user_i(share.user_index);
915 assert!(op2.dimension() == (ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count.0, ring_size));
916 izip!(useri_ui_to_s_ksk.iter_rows_mut(), op2.iter_rows()).for_each(
917 |(add_to, add_from)| {
918 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(add_to.as_mut(), add_from.as_ref())
919 },
920 );
921 });
922 useri_ui_to_s_ksk
923 })
924 .collect_vec();
925
926 let mut key_prng =
927 DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed.server_key_share_seed::<DefaultSecureRng>());
928
929 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer = self
930 .parameters()
931 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
932
933 // Generate RGSW Cts
934 let rgsw_cts_all_users_eval = {
935 // temporarily put ui_to_s in evaluation domain and sample a_i's for u_i to s
936 // ksk for upcomong key switches
937 ui_to_s_ksks.iter_mut().for_each(|ksk_i| {
938 ksk_i
939 .iter_rows_mut()
940 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()))
941 });
942 let ui_to_s_ksks_part_a_eval = key_shares
943 .iter()
944 .map(|share| {
945 let mut ksk_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
946 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(share.user_index),
947 );
948 let mut ais = M::zeros(ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count.0, ring_size);
949 ais.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|r_ai| {
950 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(
951 &mut ksk_prng,
952 rlwe_q,
953 r_ai.as_mut(),
954 );
955 nttop.forward(r_ai.as_mut())
956 });
957 ais
958 })
959 .collect_vec();
960
961 let max_rgrg_deocmposer = if rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
962 > rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count()
963 {
964 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a()
965 } else {
966 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b()
967 };
968
969 let ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer = self
970 .parameters()
971 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>(
972 );
973
974 // Generate a_i*s + E = \sum_{j \in P} a_i*s_j + e for all rlwes in each
975 // non-interactive rgsws. Then decompose and put decompositions in evaluation
976 // for u_i -> s key switch.
977 let decomp_ni_rgsws_part_1_acc = {
978 let mut tmp_space = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
979
980 (0..self.parameters().lwe_n().0)
981 .into_iter()
982 .map(|lwe_index| {
983 (0..max_rgrg_deocmposer.decomposition_count())
984 .into_iter()
985 .map(|d_index| {
986 let mut sum = M::zeros(
987 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
988 ring_size,
989 );
990
991 // a_i*s + E
992 key_shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
993 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
994 tmp_space.as_mut(),
995 s.ni_rgsw_cts.1[lwe_index].get_row_slice(d_index),
996 );
997 });
998
999 tmp_space.as_ref().iter().enumerate().for_each(|(ri, el)| {
1000 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer
1001 .decompose_iter(el)
1002 .enumerate()
1003 .for_each(|(row_j, d_el)| {
1004 (sum.as_mut()[row_j]).as_mut()[ri] = d_el;
1005 });
1006 });
1007
1008 sum.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1009
1010 sum
1011 })
1012 .collect_vec()
1013 })
1014 .collect_vec()
1015 };
1016
1017 // Sample a_i's are used to generate non-interactive rgsw cts for all lwe
1018 // indices. Since a_i are just needed for key switches , decompose them
1019 // and put them in evaluation domain
1020 // Decomposition count used for RGSW ct in non-interactive key share gen equals
1021 // max of A and B decomposition required in RGSWxRGSW. This is because same
1022 // polynomials are used to generate RLWE'(m) and RLWE'(-sm)
1023 let decomp_ni_rgsw_neg_ais =
1024 {
1025 let mut tmp_space = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1026 (0..self.parameters().lwe_n().0)
1027 .into_iter()
1028 .map(|_| {
1029 // FIXME(Jay): well well, ais are only required for key switching to
1030 // generate RLWE'(m) and RLWE'(m) itself
1031 // requires RLWE(\beta^i m) for i \in RGSWxRGSW
1032 // part B decomposition count. However, we still need to puncture prng
1033 // for ais corresponding to ignored limbs.
1034 // Probably it will be nice idea to
1035 // avoid decomposition after punturing for a_i's corresponding to
1036 // ignored limbs. Moreover, note that, for
1037 // RGSWxRGSW often times decompostion count for part A
1038 // > part B. Hence, it's very likely that we are doing
1039 // unecesary decompositions for ignored limbs all the time.
1040 (0..max_rgrg_deocmposer.decomposition_count())
1041 .map(|_| {
1042 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(
1043 &mut key_prng,
1044 rlwe_q,
1045 tmp_space.as_mut(),
1046 );
1047
1048 // negate
1049 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(tmp_space.as_mut());
1050
1051 // decomposer a_i for ui -> s key switch
1052 let mut decomp_neg_ai = M::zeros(
1053 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
1054 ring_size,
1055 );
1056 tmp_space.as_ref().iter().enumerate().for_each(
1057 |(index, el)| {
1058 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer
1059 .decompose_iter(el)
1060 .enumerate()
1061 .for_each(|(row_j, d_el)| {
1062 (decomp_neg_ai.as_mut()[row_j]).as_mut()
1063 [index] = d_el;
1064 });
1065 },
1066 );
1067
1068 // put in evaluation domain
1069 decomp_neg_ai
1070 .iter_rows_mut()
1071 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1072
1073 decomp_neg_ai
1074 })
1075 .collect_vec()
1076 })
1077 .collect_vec()
1078 };
1079
1080 // genrate RGSW cts
1081 let rgsw_cts_all_users_eval = izip!(
1082 key_shares.iter(),
1083 ui_to_s_ksks.iter(),
1084 ui_to_s_ksks_part_a_eval.iter()
1085 )
1086 .map(
1087 |(share, user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval, user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval)| {
1088 // RGSW_s(X^{s[i]})
1089 let rgsw_cts_user_i_eval = izip!(
1090 share.ni_rgsw_cts.0.iter(),
1091 decomp_ni_rgsw_neg_ais.iter(),
1092 decomp_ni_rgsws_part_1_acc.iter()
1093 )
1094 .map(
1095 |(
1096 m_encs_under_ui,
1097 decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais,
1098 decomposed_acc_rgsw_part1,
1099 )| {
1100 let d_a = rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count();
1101 let d_b = rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count();
1102 let max_d = std::cmp::max(d_a, d_b);
1103
1104 assert!(decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais.len() == max_d);
1105
1106 // To be RGSW(X^{s[i]}) = [RLWE'(-sm), RLWE'(m)]
1107 let mut rgsw_ct_eval = M::zeros(d_a * 2 + d_b * 2, ring_size);
1108 let (rlwe_dash_nsm, rlwe_dash_m) =
1109 rgsw_ct_eval.split_at_row_mut(d_a * 2);
1110
1111 let mut scratch_row = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1112
1113 let mut m_encs_under_ui_eval = m_encs_under_ui.clone();
1114 m_encs_under_ui_eval
1115 .iter_rows_mut()
1116 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1117
1118 // RLWE(-sm)
1119 {
1120 // Recall that we have RLWE(a_i * s + e). We key
1121 // switch RLWE(a_i * s + e) using ksk(u_i -> s) to
1122 // get RLWE(a_i*s*u_i + e*u_i).
1123 // Given (u_i * a_i + e + \beta m), we obtain
1124 // RLWE(-sm) = RLWE(a_i*s*u_i + e*u_i) + (0, (u_i *
1125 // a_i + e + \beta m))
1126 //
1127 // Again RLWE'(-sm) only cares for RLWE(\beta -sm)
1128 // with scaling factor \beta corresponding to most
1129 // signficant d_a limbs. Hence, we skip (d_max -
1130 // d_a) least signficant limbs
1131
1132 let (rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_a, rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_b) =
1133 rlwe_dash_nsm.split_at_mut(d_a);
1134
1135 izip!(
1136 rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_a.iter_mut(),
1137 rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_b.iter_mut(),
1138 decomposed_acc_rgsw_part1.iter().skip(max_d - d_a),
1139 m_encs_under_ui_eval.iter_rows().skip(max_d - d_a)
1140 )
1141 .for_each(
1142 |(rlwe_a, rlwe_b, decomp_ai_s, beta_m_enc_ui)| {
1143 // RLWE_s(a_i * s * u_i + u_i * e) = decomp<a_i * s + e> *
1144 // ksk(u_i -> s)
1145 izip!(
1146 decomp_ai_s.iter_rows(),
1147 user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval.iter_rows(),
1148 user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval.iter_rows()
1149 )
1150 .for_each(
1151 |(a0, part_b, part_a)| {
1152 // rlwe_b += decomp<a_i * s + e>[i] * ksk part_b[i]
1153 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1154 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1155 a0.as_ref(),
1156 part_b.as_ref(),
1157 );
1158 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1159 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1160 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1161 );
1162
1163 // rlwe_a += decomp<a_i * s + e>[i] * ksk
1164 // part_a[i]
1165 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1166 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1167 a0.as_ref(),
1168 part_a.as_ref(),
1169 );
1170 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1171 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1172 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1173 );
1174 },
1175 );
1176
1177 // RLWE_s(-sm) = RLWE_s(a_i * s * u_i + u_i
1178 // * e) + (0, a_i * u + e + m)
1179 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1180 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1181 beta_m_enc_ui.as_ref(),
1182 );
1183 },
1184 );
1185 }
1186
1187 // RLWE(m)
1188 {
1189 // Routine:
1190 // Let RLWE(-a_i * u_i) = (decomp<-a_i> \cdot ksk(u_i -> s)),
1191 // then RLWE(m) = RLWE(a'*s + e + m) = (a_i
1192 // * u_i + e + m, 0) + RLWE(-a_i * u_i)
1193 //
1194 // Since RLWE'(m) only cares for RLWE ciphertexts corresponding
1195 // to higher d_b limbs, we skip routine 1 for lower max(d_a,
1196 // d_b) - d_b limbs
1197 let (rlwe_dash_m_part_a, rlwe_dash_m_part_b) =
1198 rlwe_dash_m.split_at_mut(d_b);
1199
1200 izip!(
1201 rlwe_dash_m_part_a.iter_mut(),
1202 rlwe_dash_m_part_b.iter_mut(),
1203 decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais.iter().skip(max_d - d_b),
1204 m_encs_under_ui_eval.iter_rows().skip(max_d - d_b)
1205 )
1206 .for_each(
1207 |(rlwe_a, rlwe_b, decomp_neg_ai, beta_m_enc_ui)| {
1208 // RLWE_s(-a_i * ui) = decomp<-a_i> \cdot ksk(ui -> s)
1209 izip!(
1210 decomp_neg_ai.iter_rows(),
1211 user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval.iter_rows(),
1212 user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval.iter_rows()
1213 )
1214 .for_each(
1215 |(a0, part_b, part_a)| {
1216 // rlwe_b += decomp<a>[i] * ksk part_b[i]
1217 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1218 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1219 a0.as_ref(),
1220 part_b.as_ref(),
1221 );
1222 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1223 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1224 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1225 );
1226
1227 // rlwe_a += decomp<a>[i] * ksk
1228 // part_a[i]
1229 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1230 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1231 a0.as_ref(),
1232 part_a.as_ref(),
1233 );
1234 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1235 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1236 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1237 );
1238 },
1239 );
1240
1241 // RLWE_s(m) = (a_i * ui + e + \beta m, 0)
1242 // +
1243 // RLWE_s(-a_i * ui)
1244 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1245 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1246 beta_m_enc_ui.as_ref(),
1247 );
1248 },
1249 );
1250 }
1251
1252 rgsw_ct_eval
1253 },
1254 )
1255 .collect_vec();
1256 rgsw_cts_user_i_eval
1257 },
1258 )
1259 .collect_vec();
1260
1261 // put u_i -> s ksks back in coefficient domain
1262 ui_to_s_ksks.iter_mut().for_each(|ksk_i| {
1263 ksk_i
1264 .iter_rows_mut()
1265 .for_each(|r| nttop.backward(r.as_mut()))
1266 });
1267
1268 rgsw_cts_all_users_eval
1269 };
1270
1271 // RGSW x RGSW
1272 let lwe_n = self.parameters().lwe_n().0;
1273 let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
1274 std::cmp::max(
1275 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
1276 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
1277 ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
1278 + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
1279 ring_size,
1280 );
1281 let rgsw_cts_untrimmed = (0..lwe_n).map(|s_index| {
1282 // copy over s_index^th rgsw ct of user 0. Use it to accumulate RGSW products of
1283 // all RGSW ciphertexts at s_index
1284 let mut rgsw_i = rgsw_cts_all_users_eval[0][s_index].clone();
1285 rgsw_i
1286 .iter_rows_mut()
1287 .for_each(|r| nttop.backward(r.as_mut()));
1288
1289 rgsw_cts_all_users_eval
1290 .iter()
1291 .skip(1)
1292 .for_each(|user_i_rgsws| {
1293 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
1294 &mut rgsw_i,
1295 &user_i_rgsws[s_index],
1296 &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
1297 &mut scratch_matrix,
1298 nttop,
1299 rlwe_modop,
1300 );
1301 });
1302
1303 rgsw_i
1304 });
1305
1306 // After this point we don't require RGSW cts for RGSWxRGSW
1307 // multiplicaiton anymore. So we trim them to suit RLWExRGSW require for PBS
1308 let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts_untrimmed
1309 .map(|rgsw_ct| {
1310 trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg(
1311 rgsw_ct,
1312 self.parameters().rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1313 self.parameters().rlwe_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1314 )
1315 })
1316 .collect_vec();
1317 rgsw_cts
1318 }
1319
1320 pub(super) fn non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
1321 &self,
1322 // TODO(Jay): Should get a common reference seed here and derive the rest.
1323 cr_seed: &NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<[u8; 32]>,
1324 self_index: usize,
1325 total_users: usize,
1326 client_key: &NonInteractiveClientKey,
1327 ) -> NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
1328 // TODO: check whether parameters support `total_users`
1329
1330 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1331 let nttop = self.pbs_info().nttop_rlweq();
1332 let rlwe_modop = self.pbs_info().modop_rlweq();
1333 let ring_size = self.pbs_info().rlwe_n();
1334 let rlwe_q = self.parameters().rlwe_q();
1335
1336 // ui_to_s_ksk
1337 let non_interactive_decomposer = self
1338 .parameters()
1339 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>(
1340 );
1341 let non_interactive_gadget_vec = non_interactive_decomposer.gadget_vector();
1342 let ui_to_s_ksk = {
1343 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
1344 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(self_index),
1345 );
1346 non_interactive_ksk_gen::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1347 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1348 client_key.sk_u_rlwe().values(),
1349 &non_interactive_gadget_vec,
1350 &mut p_rng,
1351 rng,
1352 nttop,
1353 rlwe_modop,
1354 )
1355 };
1356
1357 // zero encryptions for others uj_to_s ksk
1358 let all_users_except_self = (0..total_users).filter(|x| *x != self_index);
1359 let zero_encs_for_others = all_users_except_self
1360 .map(|other_user_index| {
1361 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
1362 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(other_user_index),
1363 );
1364 let zero_encs =
1365 non_interactive_ksk_zero_encryptions_for_other_party_i::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1366 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1367 &non_interactive_gadget_vec,
1368 &mut p_rng,
1369 rng,
1370 nttop,
1371 rlwe_modop,
1372 );
1373 zero_encs
1374 })
1375 .collect_vec();
1376
1377 // Main Key gen follows //
1378
1379 let mut key_prng =
1380 DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed.server_key_share_seed::<DefaultSecureRng>());
1381 // generate non-interactive rgsw cts
1382 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer = self
1383 .parameters()
1384 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
1385
1386 let ni_rgrg_gadget_vec = {
1387 if rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
1388 > rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count()
1389 {
1390 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().gadget_vector()
1391 } else {
1392 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().gadget_vector()
1393 }
1394 };
1395 let ni_rgsw_cts: (Vec<M>, Vec<M>) = client_key
1396 .sk_lwe()
1397 .values()
1398 .iter()
1399 .map(|s_i| {
1400 // X^{s[i]}
1401 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1402 if *s_i < 0 {
1403 // X^{-s[i]} -> -X^{N+s[i]}
1404 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
1405 } else {
1406 m.as_mut()[*s_i as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
1407 }
1408
1409 non_interactive_rgsw_ct::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1410 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1411 client_key.sk_u_rlwe().values(),
1412 m.as_ref(),
1413 &ni_rgrg_gadget_vec,
1414 &mut key_prng,
1415 rng,
1416 nttop,
1417 rlwe_modop,
1418 )
1419 })
1420 .unzip();
1421
1422 NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare {
1423 ni_rgsw_cts,
1424 ui_to_s_ksk,
1425 others_ksk_zero_encs: zero_encs_for_others,
1426 user_index: self_index,
1427 }
1428 })
1429 }
1430
1431 pub(super) fn multi_party_public_key_share(
1432 &self,
1433 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
1434 client_key: &ClientKey,
1435 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
1436 <M as Matrix>::R,
1437 [u8; 32],
1438 BoolParameters<<M as Matrix>::MatElement>,
1439 > {
1440 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1441 let mut share_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0);
1442 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1443 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1444 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
1445 public_key_share(
1446 &mut share_out,
1447 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1448 modop,
1449 nttop,
1450 &mut main_prng,
1451 rng,
1452 );
1453 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare::new(
1454 share_out,
1455 cr_seed,
1456 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
1457 )
1458 })
1459 }
1460
1461 pub(super) fn multi_party_decryption_share(
1462 &self,
1463 lwe_ct: &M::R,
1464 client_key: &ClientKey,
1465 ) -> <M as Matrix>::MatElement {
1466 assert!(lwe_ct.as_ref().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
1467 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1468 let mut neg_s = M::R::try_convert_from(
1469 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1470 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
1471 );
1472 modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s.as_mut());
1473
1474 let mut neg_sa = M::MatElement::zero();
1475 izip!(lwe_ct.as_ref().iter().skip(1), neg_s.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(ai, nsi)| {
1476 neg_sa = modop.add(&neg_sa, &modop.mul(ai, nsi));
1477 });
1478
1479 let e = DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1480 let mut e =
1481 RandomGaussianElementInModulus::random(rng, self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
1482 e
1483 });
1484 let share = modop.add(&neg_sa, &e);
1485
1486 share
1487 }
1488
1489 pub(crate) fn multi_party_decrypt(&self, shares: &[M::MatElement], lwe_ct: &M::R) -> bool {
1490 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1491 let mut sum_a = M::MatElement::zero();
1492 shares
1493 .iter()
1494 .for_each(|share_i| sum_a = modop.add(&sum_a, &share_i));
1495
1496 let encoded_m = modop.add(&lwe_ct.as_ref()[0], &sum_a);
1497 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().decode(encoded_m)
1498 }
1499
1500 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt(&self, pk: &M, m: bool) -> M::R {
1501 self.pk_encrypt_batched(pk, &vec![m]).remove(0)
1502 }
1503
1504 /// Encrypts a batch booleans as multiple LWE ciphertexts.
1505 ///
1506 /// For public key encryption we first encrypt `m` as a RLWE ciphertext and
1507 /// then sample extract LWE samples at required indices.
1508 ///
1509 /// - TODO(Jay:) Communication can be improved by not sample exctracting and
1510 /// instead just truncate degree 0 values (part Bs)
1511 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt_batched(&self, pk: &M, m: &[bool]) -> Vec<M::R> {
1512 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1513 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
1514 assert!(
1515 m.len() <= ring_size,
1516 "Cannot batch encrypt > ring_size{ring_size} elements at once"
1517 );
1518
1519 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1520 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1521
1522 // RLWE(0)
1523 // sample ephemeral key u
1524 let mut u = vec![0i32; ring_size];
1525 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(u.as_mut(), ring_size >> 1, rng);
1526 let mut u = M::R::try_convert_from(&u, &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
1527 nttop.forward(u.as_mut());
1528
1529 let mut ua = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1530 ua.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(0));
1531 let mut ub = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1532 ub.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(1));
1533
1534 // a*u
1535 nttop.forward(ua.as_mut());
1536 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ua.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
1537 nttop.backward(ua.as_mut());
1538
1539 // b*u
1540 nttop.forward(ub.as_mut());
1541 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ub.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
1542 nttop.backward(ub.as_mut());
1543
1544 let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, ring_size);
1545 // sample error
1546 rlwe.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|ri| {
1547 RandomFillGaussianInModulus::<[M::MatElement], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>::random_fill(
1548 rng,
1549 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
1550 ri.as_mut(),
1551 );
1552 });
1553
1554 // a*u + e0
1555 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(0), ua.as_ref());
1556 // b*u + e1
1557 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), ub.as_ref());
1558
1559 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
1560 let mut m_vec = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1561 izip!(m_vec.as_mut().iter_mut(), m.iter()).for_each(|(m_el, m_bool)| {
1562 if *m_bool {
1563 // Q/8
1564 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
1565 } else {
1566 // -Q/8
1567 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
1568 }
1569 });
1570
1571 // b*u + e1 + m
1572 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), m_vec.as_ref());
1573 // rlwe.set(1, 0, modop.add(rlwe.get(1, 0), &m));
1574
1575 // sample extract index required indices
1576 let samples = m.len();
1577 (0..samples)
1578 .into_iter()
1579 .map(|i| {
1580 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(ring_size + 1);
1581 sample_extract(&mut lwe_out, &rlwe, modop, i);
1582 lwe_out
1583 })
1584 .collect_vec()
1585 })
1586 }
1587
1588 /// TODO(Jay): Fetch client key from thread local
1589 pub fn sk_encrypt(&self, m: bool, client_key: &ClientKey) -> M::R {
1590 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
1591 let m = if m {
1592 // Q/8
1593 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
1594 } else {
1595 // -Q/8
1596 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
1597 };
1598
1599 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1600 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
1601 encrypt_lwe(
1602 &mut lwe_out,
1603 &m,
1604 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1605 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
1606 rng,
1607 );
1608 lwe_out
1609 })
1610 }
1611
1612 pub fn sk_decrypt(&self, lwe_ct: &M::R, client_key: &ClientKey) -> bool {
1613 let m = decrypt_lwe(
1614 lwe_ct,
1615 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1616 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
1617 );
1618 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().decode(m)
1619 }
1620
1621 pub(super) fn aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares<S>(
1622 &self,
1623 shares: &[CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
1624 M,
1625 BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
1626 S,
1627 >],
1628 ) -> SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, S, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>
1629 where
1630 S: PartialEq + Clone,
1631 M: Clone,
1632 {
1633 assert!(shares.len() > 0);
1634 let parameters = shares[0].parameters().clone();
1635 let cr_seed = shares[0].cr_seed();
1636
1637 let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
1638 let g = parameters.g() as isize;
1639 let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
1640 let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();
1641
1642 // sanity checks
1643 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|s| {
1644 assert!(s.parameters() == ¶meters);
1645 assert!(s.cr_seed() == cr_seed);
1646 });
1647
1648 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1649 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1650
1651 // auto keys
1652 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
1653 let auto_elements_dlog = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
1654 for i in auto_elements_dlog.into_iter() {
1655 let mut key = M::zeros(parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n);
1656
1657 shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
1658 let auto_key_share_i = s.auto_keys().get(&i).expect("Auto key {i} missing");
1659 assert!(
1660 auto_key_share_i.dimension()
1661 == (parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n)
1662 );
1663 izip!(key.iter_rows_mut(), auto_key_share_i.iter_rows()).for_each(
1664 |(partb_out, partb_share)| {
1665 rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(partb_out.as_mut(), partb_share.as_ref());
1666 },
1667 );
1668 });
1669
1670 auto_keys.insert(i, key);
1671 }
1672
1673 // rgsw ciphertext (most expensive part!)
1674 let lwe_n = parameters.lwe_n().0;
1675 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer =
1676 parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
1677 let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
1678 std::cmp::max(
1679 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
1680 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
1681 ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
1682 + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
1683 rlwe_n,
1684 );
1685
1686 let mut tmp_rgsw =
1687 RgswCiphertext::<M, _>::empty(rlwe_n, &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer, rlwe_q.clone()).data;
1688 let rgsw_cts = (0..lwe_n).into_iter().map(|index| {
1689 // copy over rgsw ciphertext for index^th secret element from first share and
1690 // treat it as accumulating rgsw ciphertext
1691 let mut rgsw_i = shares[0].rgsw_cts()[index].clone();
1692
1693 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|si| {
1694 // copy over si's RGSW[index] ciphertext and send to evaluation domain
1695 izip!(tmp_rgsw.iter_rows_mut(), si.rgsw_cts()[index].iter_rows()).for_each(
1696 |(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1697 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1698 rlweq_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut())
1699 },
1700 );
1701
1702 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
1703 &mut rgsw_i,
1704 &tmp_rgsw,
1705 &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
1706 &mut scratch_matrix,
1707 rlweq_nttop,
1708 rlweq_modop,
1709 );
1710 });
1711
1712 rgsw_i
1713 });
1714 // d_a and d_b may differ for RGSWxRGSW multiplication and RLWExRGSW
1715 // multiplication. After this point RGSW ciphertexts will only be used for
1716 // RLWExRGSW multiplication (in blind rotation). Thus we drop any additional
1717 // RLWE ciphertexts in RGSW ciphertexts after RGSw x RGSW multiplication
1718 let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
1719 .map(|ct_i_in| {
1720 trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg(
1721 ct_i_in,
1722 self.parameters().rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1723 self.parameters().rlwe_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1724 )
1725 })
1726 .collect_vec();
1727
1728 // LWE ksks
1729 let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1730 let lweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
1731 shares.iter().for_each(|si| {
1732 assert!(si.lwe_ksk().as_ref().len() == rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1733 lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(lwe_ksk.as_mut(), si.lwe_ksk().as_ref())
1734 });
1735
1736 SeededMultiPartyServerKey::new(rgsw_cts, auto_keys, lwe_ksk, cr_seed.clone(), parameters)
1737 }
1738}
1739
1740impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
1741where
1742 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1743 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity,
1744 M::MatElement: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo,
1745 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1746 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1747 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1748{
1749 /// Returns c0 + c1 + Q/4
1750 fn _add_and_shift_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1751 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1752 modop.elwise_add_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1753 // +Q/4
1754 c0.as_mut()[0] = modop.add(&c0.as_ref()[0], &self.pbs_info.rlwe_qby4);
1755 }
1756
1757 /// Returns 2(c0 - c1) + Q/4
1758 fn _subtract_double_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1759 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1760 // c0 - c1
1761 modop.elwise_sub_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1762
1763 // double
1764 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.add(v, v));
1765 }
1766}
1767
1768impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey> BooleanGates
1769 for BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
1770where
1771 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1772 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + Clone,
1773 M::MatElement:
1774 PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo + From<bool>,
1775 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1776 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1777 + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
1778 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1779 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1780 Skey: PbsKey<AutoKey = <Skey as PbsKey>::RgswCt, LweKskKey = M>,
1781 <Skey as PbsKey>::RgswCt: WithShoupRepr<M = M>,
1782{
1783 type Ciphertext = M::R;
1784 type Key = Skey;
1785
1786 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1787 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1788
1789 // PBS
1790 pbs(
1791 &self.pbs_info,
1792 &self.nand_test_vec,
1793 c0,
1794 server_key,
1795 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1796 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1797 );
1798 }
1799
1800 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1801 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1802
1803 // PBS
1804 pbs(
1805 &self.pbs_info,
1806 &self.and_test_vec,
1807 c0,
1808 server_key,
1809 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1810 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1811 );
1812 }
1813
1814 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1815 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1816
1817 // PBS
1818 pbs(
1819 &self.pbs_info,
1820 &self.or_test_vec,
1821 c0,
1822 server_key,
1823 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1824 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1825 );
1826 }
1827
1828 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1829 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1830
1831 // PBS
1832 pbs(
1833 &self.pbs_info,
1834 &self.nor_test_vec,
1835 c0,
1836 server_key,
1837 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1838 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1839 )
1840 }
1841
1842 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1843 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1844
1845 // PBS
1846 pbs(
1847 &self.pbs_info,
1848 &self.xor_test_vec,
1849 c0,
1850 server_key,
1851 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1852 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1853 );
1854 }
1855
1856 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1857 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1858
1859 // PBS
1860 pbs(
1861 &self.pbs_info,
1862 &self.xnor_test_vec,
1863 c0,
1864 server_key,
1865 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1866 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1867 );
1868 }
1869
1870 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R) {
1871 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1872 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.neg(v));
1873 }
1874
1875 fn and(
1876 &mut self,
1877 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1878 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1879 key: &Self::Key,
1880 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1881 let mut out = c0.clone();
1882 self.and_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1883 out
1884 }
1885
1886 fn nand(
1887 &mut self,
1888 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1889 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1890 key: &Self::Key,
1891 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1892 let mut out = c0.clone();
1893 self.nand_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1894 out
1895 }
1896
1897 fn or(
1898 &mut self,
1899 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1900 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1901 key: &Self::Key,
1902 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1903 let mut out = c0.clone();
1904 self.or_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1905 out
1906 }
1907
1908 fn nor(
1909 &mut self,
1910 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1911 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1912 key: &Self::Key,
1913 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1914 let mut out = c0.clone();
1915 self.nor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1916 out
1917 }
1918
1919 fn xnor(
1920 &mut self,
1921 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1922 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1923 key: &Self::Key,
1924 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1925 let mut out = c0.clone();
1926 self.xnor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1927 out
1928 }
1929
1930 fn xor(
1931 &mut self,
1932 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1933 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1934 key: &Self::Key,
1935 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1936 let mut out = c0.clone();
1937 self.xor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1938 out
1939 }
1940
1941 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1942 let mut out = c.clone();
1943 self.not_inplace(&mut out);
1944 out
1945 }
1946}
1947
1948#[cfg(test)]
1949mod tests {
1950 use bool::parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_BOOL_PARAMS};
1951 use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
1952 use rand_distr::Uniform;
1953
1954 use crate::{
1955 backend::ModulusPowerOf2,
1956 bool::{
1957 self, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare, PublicKey,
1958 SeededMultiPartyServerKey, NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
1959 },
1960 ntt::NttBackendU64,
1961 random::{RandomElementInModulus, DEFAULT_RNG},
1962 rgsw::{
1963 self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe, secret_key_encrypt_rlwe,
1964 tests::{_measure_noise_rgsw, _sk_encrypt_rlwe},
1965 RgswCiphertext, RgswCiphertextEvaluationDomain, SeededRgswCiphertext,
1966 SeededRlweCiphertext,
1967 },
1968 utils::{negacyclic_mul, Stats},
1969 };
1970
1971 use super::*;
1972
1973 #[test]
1974 fn bool_encrypt_decrypt_works() {
1975 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1976 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1977 NttBackendU64,
1978 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1979 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1980 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
1981 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1982 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
1983
1984 let mut m = true;
1985 for _ in 0..1000 {
1986 let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m, &client_key);
1987 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_ct, &client_key);
1988 assert_eq!(m, m_back);
1989 m = !m;
1990 }
1991 }
1992
1993 #[test]
1994 fn bool_nand() {
1995 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1996 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1997 NttBackendU64,
1998 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1999 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2000 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<_>,
2001 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2002
2003 // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
2004 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
2005 let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.single_party_server_key(&client_key);
2006 let runtime_server_key =
2007 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2008 _,
2009 _,
2010 DefaultSecureRng,
2011 NttBackendU64,
2012 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2013
2014 let mut m0 = false;
2015 let mut m1 = true;
2016
2017 let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
2018 let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
2019
2020 for _ in 0..500 {
2021 let ct_back = bool_evaluator.nand(&ct0, &ct1, &runtime_server_key);
2022
2023 let m_out = !(m0 && m1);
2024
2025 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
2026 assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
2027
2028 m1 = m0;
2029 m0 = m_out;
2030
2031 ct1 = ct0;
2032 ct0 = ct_back;
2033 }
2034 }
2035
2036 #[test]
2037 fn bool_xor() {
2038 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2039 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2040 NttBackendU64,
2041 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2042 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2043 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<_>,
2044 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2045
2046 // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
2047 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
2048 let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.single_party_server_key(&client_key);
2049 let runtime_server_key =
2050 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2051 _,
2052 _,
2053 DefaultSecureRng,
2054 NttBackendU64,
2055 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2056
2057 let mut m0 = false;
2058 let mut m1 = true;
2059
2060 let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
2061 let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
2062
2063 for _ in 0..1000 {
2064 let ct_back = bool_evaluator.xor(&ct0, &ct1, &runtime_server_key);
2065 let m_out = (m0 ^ m1);
2066
2067 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
2068 assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
2069
2070 m1 = m0;
2071 m0 = m_out;
2072
2073 ct1 = ct0;
2074 ct0 = ct_back;
2075 }
2076 }
2077
2078 #[test]
2079 fn multi_party_encryption_decryption() {
2080 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2081 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2082 NttBackendU64,
2083 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2084 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2085 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2086 >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2087
2088 let no_of_parties = 500;
2089 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2090 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2091 .collect_vec();
2092
2093 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2094 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2095 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2096 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2097 });
2098 });
2099
2100 let mut m = true;
2101 for i in 0..100 {
2102 let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2103
2104 let public_key_share = parties
2105 .iter()
2106 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2107 .collect_vec();
2108
2109 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2110 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2111 DefaultSecureRng,
2112 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2113 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2114 let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m);
2115
2116 let decryption_shares = parties
2117 .iter()
2118 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_ct, k))
2119 .collect_vec();
2120
2121 let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_ct);
2122
2123 {
2124 let ideal_m = if m {
2125 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().true_el()
2126 } else {
2127 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().false_el()
2128 };
2129 let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
2130 &lwe_ct,
2131 &ideal_rlwe_sk,
2132 &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
2133 &ideal_m,
2134 );
2135 println!("Noise: {noise}");
2136 }
2137
2138 assert_eq!(m_back, m);
2139 m = !m;
2140 }
2141 }
2142
2143 fn _collecitve_public_key_gen(rlwe_q: u64, parties_rlwe_sk: &[RlweSecret]) -> Vec<Vec<u64>> {
2144 let ring_size = parties_rlwe_sk[0].values.len();
2145 assert!(ring_size.is_power_of_two());
2146 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2147 let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(&rlwe_q, ring_size);
2148 let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q);
2149
2150 // Generate Pk shares
2151 let pk_seed = [0u8; 32];
2152 let pk_shares = parties_rlwe_sk.iter().map(|sk| {
2153 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
2154 let mut share_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2155 public_key_share(
2156 &mut share_out,
2157 sk.values(),
2158 &modop,
2159 &nttop,
2160 &mut p_rng,
2161 &mut rng,
2162 );
2163 share_out
2164 });
2165
2166 let mut pk_part_b = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2167 pk_shares.for_each(|share| modop.elwise_add_mut(&mut pk_part_b, &share));
2168 let mut pk_part_a = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2169 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
2170 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &rlwe_q, pk_part_a.as_mut_slice());
2171
2172 vec![pk_part_a, pk_part_b]
2173 }
2174
2175 fn _multi_party_all_keygen(
2176 bool_evaluator: &BoolEvaluator<
2177 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2178 NttBackendU64,
2179 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2180 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2181 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2182 >,
2183 no_of_parties: usize,
2184 ) -> (
2185 Vec<ClientKey>,
2186 PublicKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>>,
2187 Vec<
2188 CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
2189 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2190 BoolParameters<u64>,
2191 [u8; 32],
2192 >,
2193 >,
2194 SeededMultiPartyServerKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, [u8; 32], BoolParameters<u64>>,
2195 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2196 ClientKey,
2197 ) {
2198 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2199 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2200 .collect_vec();
2201
2202 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2203
2204 // Collective public key
2205 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2206 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2207 let public_key_share = parties
2208 .iter()
2209 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2210 .collect_vec();
2211 let collective_pk =
2212 PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, _>::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2213
2214 // Server key
2215 let mut pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2216 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pbs_cr_seed);
2217 let server_key_shares = parties
2218 .iter()
2219 .map(|k| {
2220 bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, &collective_pk.key(), k)
2221 })
2222 .collect_vec();
2223 let seeded_server_key =
2224 bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
2225 let runtime_server_key =
2226 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2227 _,
2228 _,
2229 DefaultSecureRng,
2230 NttBackendU64,
2231 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2232
2233 // construct ideal rlwe sk for meauring noise
2234 let ideal_client_key = {
2235 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2236 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2237 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2238 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2239 });
2240 });
2241 let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];
2242 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2243 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2244 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2245 });
2246 });
2247
2248 ClientKey::new(
2249 RlweSecret {
2250 values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
2251 },
2252 LweSecret {
2253 values: ideal_lwe_sk,
2254 },
2255 )
2256 };
2257
2258 (
2259 parties,
2260 collective_pk,
2261 server_key_shares,
2262 seeded_server_key,
2263 runtime_server_key,
2264 ideal_client_key,
2265 )
2266 }
2267
2268 #[test]
2269 fn multi_party_nand() {
2270 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2271 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2272 NttBackendU64,
2273 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2274 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2275 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2276 >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2277
2278 let (parties, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
2279 _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 2);
2280
2281 let mut m0 = true;
2282 let mut m1 = false;
2283
2284 let mut lwe0 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m0);
2285 let mut lwe1 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m1);
2286
2287 for _ in 0..2000 {
2288 let lwe_out = bool_evaluator.nand(&lwe0, &lwe1, &server_key_eval);
2289
2290 let m_expected = !(m0 & m1);
2291
2292 // multi-party decrypt
2293 let decryption_shares = parties
2294 .iter()
2295 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_out, k))
2296 .collect_vec();
2297 let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_out);
2298
2299 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_out, &ideal_client_key);
2300
2301 assert!(
2302 m_expected == m_back,
2303 "Expected {m_expected}, got
2304{m_back}"
2305 );
2306 m1 = m0;
2307 m0 = m_expected;
2308
2309 lwe1 = lwe0;
2310 lwe0 = lwe_out;
2311 }
2312 }
2313
2314 #[test]
2315 fn noise_tester() {
2316 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2317 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2318 NttBackendU64,
2319 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2320 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2321 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2322 >::new(SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2323
2324 // let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
2325 // _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
2326 let no_of_parties = 16;
2327 let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
2328 let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
2329 let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0;
2330 let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
2331 let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
2332 let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
2333 let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
2334
2335 // let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator
2336 // .pbs_info
2337 // .parameters
2338 // .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
2339 // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_a = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
2340 // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_b = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
2341
2342 let rlwe_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer;
2343 let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
2344 let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
2345
2346 let auto_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.auto_decomposer;
2347 let auto_gadget = auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
2348
2349 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2350 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2351 .collect_vec();
2352
2353 let ideal_client_key = {
2354 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2355 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2356 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2357 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2358 });
2359 });
2360 let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];
2361 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2362 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2363 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2364 });
2365 });
2366
2367 ClientKey::new(
2368 RlweSecret {
2369 values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
2370 },
2371 LweSecret {
2372 values: ideal_lwe_sk,
2373 },
2374 )
2375 };
2376
2377 // check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
2378 if true {
2379 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2380 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2381 for _ in 0..10 {
2382 // generate a new collective public key
2383 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2384 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2385 let public_key_share = parties
2386 .iter()
2387 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2388 .collect_vec();
2389 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2390 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2391 DefaultSecureRng,
2392 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2393 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2394
2395 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2396 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2397 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2398 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2399 &mut rlwe_ct,
2400 collective_pk.key(),
2401 &m,
2402 rlwe_modop,
2403 rlwe_nttop,
2404 &mut rng,
2405 );
2406
2407 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2408 decrypt_rlwe(
2409 &rlwe_ct,
2410 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2411 &mut m_back,
2412 rlwe_nttop,
2413 rlwe_modop,
2414 );
2415
2416 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(), m.as_slice());
2417
2418 check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q).as_slice());
2419 }
2420
2421 println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2422 }
2423
2424 if true {
2425 // Generate server key shares
2426 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2427 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2428 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2429 let public_key_share = parties
2430 .iter()
2431 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2432 .collect_vec();
2433 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2434 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2435 DefaultSecureRng,
2436 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2437 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2438
2439 let pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2440 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2441 let server_key_shares = parties
2442 .iter()
2443 .map(|k| {
2444 bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, collective_pk.key(), k)
2445 })
2446 .collect_vec();
2447
2448 let seeded_server_key =
2449 bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
2450
2451 // Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
2452 if false {
2453 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2454 izip!(
2455 ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values.iter(),
2456 seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts().iter()
2457 )
2458 .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
2459 // X^{s[i]}
2460 let mut m_si = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2461 let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
2462 if s_i < 0 {
2463 m_si[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
2464 } else {
2465 m_si[s_i as usize] = 1;
2466 }
2467
2468 // RLWE'(-sm)
2469 let mut neg_s_eval =
2470 Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
2471 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_eval);
2472 rlwe_nttop.forward(&mut neg_s_eval);
2473 for j in 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() {
2474 // RLWE(B^{j} * -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]})
2475
2476 // -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
2477 let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
2478 rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
2479 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), neg_s_eval.as_slice());
2480 rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
2481 rlwe_modop
2482 .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a[j]);
2483
2484 // RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
2485 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2486 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j]);
2487 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2488 &rgsw_ct_i[j + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()],
2489 );
2490
2491 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2492 decrypt_rlwe(
2493 &rlwe_ct,
2494 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2495 &mut m_back,
2496 rlwe_nttop,
2497 rlwe_modop,
2498 );
2499
2500 // diff
2501 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
2502 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q));
2503 }
2504
2505 // RLWE'(m)
2506 for j in 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() {
2507 // RLWE(B^{j} * X^{s_lwe[i]})
2508
2509 // X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
2510 let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
2511 rlwe_modop
2512 .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b[j]);
2513
2514 // RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
2515 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2516 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(
2517 &rgsw_ct_i[j + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count())],
2518 );
2519 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2520 &rgsw_ct_i[j
2521 + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
2522 + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count())],
2523 );
2524
2525 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2526 decrypt_rlwe(
2527 &rlwe_ct,
2528 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2529 &mut m_back,
2530 rlwe_nttop,
2531 rlwe_modop,
2532 );
2533
2534 // diff
2535 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
2536 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q));
2537 }
2538 });
2539 println!(
2540 "RGSW Std: {} {} ;; max={}",
2541 check.mean(),
2542 check.std_dev().abs().log2(),
2543 check.samples.iter().max().unwrap()
2544 );
2545 }
2546
2547 // server key in Evaluation domain
2548 let runtime_server_key =
2549 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2550 _,
2551 _,
2552 DefaultSecureRng,
2553 NttBackendU64,
2554 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2555
2556 // check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated RGSW ciphertext
2557 if false {
2558 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2559
2560 ideal_client_key
2561 .sk_lwe()
2562 .values()
2563 .iter()
2564 .enumerate()
2565 .for_each(|(index, s_i)| {
2566 let rgsw_ct_i = runtime_server_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(index).as_ref();
2567
2568 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2569 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2570 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2571 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2572 &mut rlwe_ct,
2573 collective_pk.key(),
2574 &m,
2575 rlwe_modop,
2576 rlwe_nttop,
2577 &mut rng,
2578 );
2579
2580 let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {
2581 data: rlwe_ct.clone(),
2582 is_trivial: false,
2583 _phatom: PhantomData,
2584 };
2585 let mut scratch = vec![
2586 vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2587 std::cmp::max(
2588 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
2589 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count()
2590 ) + 2
2591 ];
2592 rlwe_by_rgsw(
2593 &mut rlwe_after,
2594 rgsw_ct_i,
2595 &mut scratch,
2596 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer,
2597 rlwe_nttop,
2598 rlwe_modop,
2599 );
2600
2601 // m1 = X^{s[i]}
2602 let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2603 let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
2604 if s_i < 0 {
2605 m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one()
2606 } else {
2607 m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
2608 }
2609
2610 // (m+e) * m1
2611 let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2612 decrypt_rlwe(
2613 &rlwe_ct,
2614 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2615 &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
2616 rlwe_nttop,
2617 rlwe_modop,
2618 );
2619 rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
2620 rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
2621
2622 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(), m1.as_slice());
2623 rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
2624
2625 // Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) + e_{rlsw x rgsw}.
2626 // Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}.
2627 // Here we're only concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise added by
2628 // RLWExRGSW. Also note in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
2629 // some i and var(em1) = var(e).
2630 let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2631 decrypt_rlwe(
2632 &rlwe_after,
2633 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2634 &mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
2635 rlwe_nttop,
2636 rlwe_modop,
2637 );
2638
2639 // diff
2640 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
2641 m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
2642 m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
2643 );
2644
2645 // let noise = measure_noise(
2646 // &rlwe_after,
2647 // &m_plus_e_times_m1,
2648 // rlwe_nttop,
2649 // rlwe_modop,
2650 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2651 // );
2652 // print!("NOISE: {}", noise);
2653
2654 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
2655 &m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
2656 rlwe_q,
2657 ));
2658 });
2659 println!(
2660 "RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
2661 check.std_dev(),
2662 check.std_dev().abs().log2()
2663 )
2664 }
2665
2666 // check noise in Auto key
2667 if false {
2668 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2669
2670 let mut neg_s_poly =
2671 Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
2672 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_poly.as_mut_slice());
2673
2674 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2675 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2676 let auto_element_dlogs = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
2677 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
2678 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
2679 -g
2680 } else {
2681 (((g as usize).pow(i as u32)) % br_q) as isize
2682 };
2683
2684 // -s[X^k]
2685 let (auto_indices, auto_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, g_pow);
2686 let mut neg_s_poly_auto_i = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2687 izip!(neg_s_poly.iter(), auto_indices.iter(), auto_sign.iter()).for_each(
2688 |(v, to_i, to_sign)| {
2689 if !to_sign {
2690 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
2691 } else {
2692 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = *v;
2693 }
2694 },
2695 );
2696
2697 let mut auto_key_i = runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref().clone(); //send i^th auto key to coefficient domain
2698 auto_key_i
2699 .iter_mut()
2700 .for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut_slice()));
2701 auto_gadget.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(i, b_i)| {
2702 // B^i * -s[X^k]
2703 let mut m_ideal = neg_s_poly_auto_i.clone();
2704
2705 rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), b_i);
2706
2707 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2708 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2709 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[i]);
2710 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2711 &auto_key_i[auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + i],
2712 );
2713 decrypt_rlwe(
2714 &rlwe_ct,
2715 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2716 &mut m_out,
2717 rlwe_nttop,
2718 rlwe_modop,
2719 );
2720
2721 // diff
2722 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(), m_ideal.as_slice());
2723
2724 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_out, rlwe_q));
2725 });
2726 }
2727
2728 println!("Auto key noise std dev: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2729 }
2730
2731 // check noise in RLWE(X^k) after sending RLWE(X) -> RLWE(X^k)using collective
2732 // auto key
2733 if true {
2734 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2735 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2736 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2737 let auto_element_dlogs = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
2738 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
2739 for _ in 0..10 {
2740 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2741 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2742 let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {
2743 data: vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2],
2744 is_trivial: false,
2745 _phatom: PhantomData,
2746 };
2747 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2748 &mut rlwe_ct,
2749 collective_pk.key(),
2750 &m,
2751 rlwe_modop,
2752 rlwe_nttop,
2753 &mut rng,
2754 );
2755
2756 // We're only interested in noise increased as a result of automorphism.
2757 // Hence, we take m+e as the bench.
2758 let mut m_plus_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2759 decrypt_rlwe(
2760 &rlwe_ct,
2761 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2762 &mut m_plus_e,
2763 rlwe_nttop,
2764 rlwe_modop,
2765 );
2766
2767 let auto_key = runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref();
2768 let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
2769 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_auto_map(i);
2770 let mut scratch =
2771 vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + 2];
2772 galois_auto(
2773 &mut rlwe_ct,
2774 auto_key,
2775 &mut scratch,
2776 &auto_map_index,
2777 &auto_map_sign,
2778 rlwe_modop,
2779 rlwe_nttop,
2780 auto_decomposer,
2781 );
2782
2783 // send m+e from X to X^k
2784 let mut m_plus_e_auto = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2785 izip!(m_plus_e.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(), auto_map_sign.iter())
2786 .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
2787 if !to_sign {
2788 m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
2789 } else {
2790 m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = *v
2791 }
2792 });
2793
2794 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2795 decrypt_rlwe(
2796 &rlwe_ct,
2797 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2798 &mut m_out,
2799 rlwe_nttop,
2800 rlwe_modop,
2801 );
2802
2803 // diff
2804 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(), m_plus_e_auto.as_slice());
2805
2806 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(m_out.as_slice(), rlwe_q));
2807 }
2808 }
2809
2810 println!("Rlwe Auto Noise Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2811 }
2812
2813 // Check noise growth in ksk
2814 // TODO check in LWE key switching keys
2815 if true {
2816 // 1. encrypt LWE ciphertext
2817 // 2. Key switching
2818 // 3.
2819 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2820
2821 for _ in 0..1024 {
2822 // Encrypt m \in Q_{ks} using RLWE sk
2823 let mut lwe_in_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2824 let m = RandomElementInModulus::random(&mut rng, &lwe_q.q().unwrap());
2825 encrypt_lwe(
2826 &mut lwe_in_ct,
2827 &m,
2828 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2829 lwe_modop,
2830 &mut rng,
2831 );
2832
2833 // Key switch
2834 let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2835 lwe_key_switch(
2836 &mut lwe_out,
2837 &lwe_in_ct,
2838 runtime_server_key.lwe_ksk(),
2839 lwe_modop,
2840 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer(),
2841 );
2842
2843 // We only care about noise added by LWE key switch
2844 // m+e
2845 let m_plus_e =
2846 decrypt_lwe(&lwe_in_ct, ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2847
2848 let m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise =
2849 decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out, ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2850
2851 let diff = lwe_modop.sub(&m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise, &m_plus_e);
2852
2853 check.add_more(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&diff)]);
2854 }
2855
2856 println!("Lwe ksk std dev: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2857 }
2858 }
2859
2860 // Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equalnoise in
2861 // // fresh RLWE ciphertext
2862 if true {}
2863 // test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
2864 // if false {
2865 // let logp = 2;
2866 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2867
2868 // let m = 1;
2869 // let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
2870
2871 // // Encrypt
2872 // let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2873 // encrypt_lwe(
2874 // &mut lwe_ct,
2875 // &encoded_m,
2876 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2877 // lwe_modop,
2878 // &mut rng,
2879 // );
2880
2881 // // key switch
2882 // let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
2883 // let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2884 // lwe_key_switch(
2885 // &mut lwe_out,
2886 // &lwe_ct,
2887 // &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
2888 // lwe_modop,
2889 // lwe_decomposer,
2890 // );
2891
2892 // let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
2893 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop); let m_back
2894 // = ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
2895 // (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64; dbg!(m_back, m);
2896
2897 // let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
2898 // &lwe_out,
2899 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
2900 // lwe_modop,
2901 // &encoded_m,
2902 // );
2903
2904 // println!("Noise: {noise}");
2905 // }
2906
2907 // Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
2908 // if true {
2909 // let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
2910 // bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
2911 // bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
2912 // bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
2913 // );
2914
2915 // for i in 0..20 {
2916 // // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
2917 // let si =
2918 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2919 // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2920 // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2921 // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2922 // } else {
2923 // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2924 // }
2925
2926 // let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
2927 // rgsw_si
2928 // .iter_mut()
2929 // .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
2930
2931 // println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
2932 // _measure_noise_rgsw(
2933 // &rgsw_si,
2934 // &si_poly,
2935 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2936 // &gadget_vec,
2937 // rlwe_q,
2938 // );
2939 // println!("####### ##################### #######");
2940 // }
2941 // }
2942
2943 // // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
2944 // if true {
2945 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2946 // let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2947 // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
2948 // carry_m.as_mut_slice());
2949
2950 // // RGSW(carrym)
2951 // let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n],carry_m.clone()];
2952 // let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
2953 // DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
2954
2955 // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2956 // d_rgsw + 2]; let mul_mod =
2957 // |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) % (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);
2958
2959 // for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
2960 // rlwe_by_rgsw(
2961 // &mut rlwe_ct,
2962 // server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
2963 // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
2964 // rlwe_decomposer,
2965 // rlwe_nttop,
2966 // rlwe_modop,
2967 // );
2968
2969 // // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
2970 // let si =
2971 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2972 // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2973 // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2974 // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2975 // } else {
2976 // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2977 // }
2978 // carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
2979 // rlwe_q);
2980
2981 // let noise = measure_noise(
2982 // &rlwe_ct,
2983 // &carry_m,
2984 // rlwe_nttop,
2985 // rlwe_modop,
2986 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2987 // );
2988 // println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
2989 // monomial: {noise}"); }
2990 // }
2991
2992 // // Check galois keys
2993 // if false {
2994 // let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
2995 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2996 // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2997 // d_rgsw + 2]; for i in [g, -g] {
2998 // let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2999 // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
3000 // m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = {
3001 // let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
3002 // public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
3003 // &mut data,
3004 // &collective_pk.key,
3005 // &m,
3006 // rlwe_modop,
3007 // rlwe_nttop,
3008 // &mut rng,
3009 // );
3010 // RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
3011 // false) };
3012
3013 // let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
3014 // let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
3015 // generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i); galois_auto(
3016 // &mut rlwe_ct,
3017 // auto_key,
3018 // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
3019 // &auto_map_index,
3020 // &auto_map_sign,
3021 // rlwe_modop,
3022 // rlwe_nttop,
3023 // rlwe_decomposer,
3024 // );
3025
3026 // // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
3027 // let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
3028 // izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
3029 // auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(mi, to_index,to_sign)|
3030 // // { if !to_sign {
3031 // m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi; } else {
3032 // m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
3033 // }
3034 // },
3035 // );
3036
3037 // // measure noise
3038 // let noise = measure_noise(
3039 // &rlwe_ct,
3040 // &m_k,
3041 // rlwe_nttop,
3042 // rlwe_modop,
3043 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
3044 // );
3045
3046 // println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
3047 // }
3048 // }
3049 }
3050
3051 #[test]
3052 fn testtest() {
3053 let evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
3054 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
3055 NttBackendU64,
3056 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
3057 ModulusPowerOf2<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
3058 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
3059 >::new(NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
3060 let mp_seed = NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs { seed: [0u8; 32] };
3061
3062 let ring_size = evaluator.parameters().rlwe_n().0;
3063 let rlwe_q = evaluator.parameters().rlwe_q();
3064 let rlwe_modop = evaluator.pbs_info().modop_rlweq();
3065 let nttop = evaluator.pbs_info().nttop_rlweq();
3066
3067 let parties = 2;
3068
3069 let cks = (0..parties)
3070 .map(|_| evaluator.non_interactive_client_key())
3071 .collect_vec();
3072
3073 let key_shares = (0..parties)
3074 .map(|i| evaluator.non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(&mp_seed, i, parties, &cks[i]))
3075 .collect_vec();
3076 // dbg!(key_shares[1].user_index);
3077
3078 let rgsw_cts = evaluator.aggregate_non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
3079 &mp_seed,
3080 parties,
3081 &key_shares,
3082 );
3083
3084 let mut ideal_rlwe = vec![0; ring_size];
3085 cks.iter().for_each(|k| {
3086 izip!(ideal_rlwe.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values().iter()).for_each(|(a, b)| {
3087 *a = *a + b;
3088 });
3089 });
3090
3091 let mut ideal_lwe = vec![0; evaluator.parameters().lwe_n().0];
3092 cks.iter().for_each(|k| {
3093 izip!(ideal_lwe.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values().iter()).for_each(|(a, b)| {
3094 *a = *a + b;
3095 });
3096 });
3097
3098 let mut stats = Stats::new();
3099
3100 let (rlrg_decomp_a, rlrg_decomp_b) = evaluator
3101 .parameters()
3102 .rlwe_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
3103 let gadget_vec_a = rlrg_decomp_a.gadget_vector();
3104 let gadget_vec_b = rlrg_decomp_b.gadget_vector();
3105 let d_a = rlrg_decomp_a.decomposition_count();
3106 let d_b = rlrg_decomp_b.decomposition_count();
3107 let s_poly = Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_rlwe.as_slice(), rlwe_q);
3108 let mut neg_s_poly_eval = s_poly.clone();
3109 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_poly_eval);
3110 nttop.forward(neg_s_poly_eval.as_mut());
3111 rgsw_cts.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(s_index, ct)| {
3112 // X^{lwe_s[i]}
3113 let mut m = vec![0u64; ring_size];
3114 if ideal_lwe[s_index] < 0 {
3115 m[ring_size - (ideal_lwe[s_index].abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
3116 } else {
3117 m[(ideal_lwe[s_index] as usize)] = 1;
3118 }
3119
3120 let mut neg_sm = m.clone();
3121 nttop.forward(&mut neg_sm);
3122 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(&mut neg_sm, &neg_s_poly_eval);
3123 nttop.backward(&mut neg_sm);
3124
3125 // RLWE'(-sm)
3126 gadget_vec_a.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(index, beta)| {
3127 // RLWE(\beta -sm)
3128
3129 // \beta * -sX^[lwe_s[i]]
3130 let mut beta_neg_sm = neg_sm.clone();
3131 rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(&mut beta_neg_sm, beta);
3132
3133 // extract RLWE(-sm \beta)
3134 let mut rlwe = vec![vec![0u64; ring_size]; 2];
3135 rlwe[0].copy_from_slice(&ct[index]);
3136 rlwe[1].copy_from_slice(&ct[index + d_a]);
3137
3138 // decrypt
3139 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
3140 decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe, &ideal_rlwe, &mut m_out, nttop, rlwe_modop);
3141
3142 let mut diff = m_out;
3143 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut diff, &beta_neg_sm);
3144
3145 stats.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&diff, rlwe_q));
3146 });
3147 });
3148
3149 println!("Stats: {}", stats.std_dev().abs().log2());
3150 }
3151}
3152
3153// let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) =
3154// self.pbs_info.parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposition_count(); let (rlrg_d_a,
3155// rlrg_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count(); let
3156// rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
3157// let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
3158// assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
3159// assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
3160// let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
3161// .map(|ct_i_in| {
3162// assert!(ct_i_in.dimension() == (rgsw_ct_rows_in, rlwe_n));
3163// let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rlwe_n);
3164
3165// // RLWE'(-sm) part A
3166// izip!(
3167// reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
3168// ct_i_in
3169// .iter_rows()
3170// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
3171// .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
3172// )
3173// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3174// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3175// });
3176
3177// // RLWE'(-sm) part B
3178// izip!(
3179// reduced_ct_i_out
3180// .iter_rows_mut()
3181// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
3182// .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
3183// ct_i_in
3184// .iter_rows()
3185// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
3186// .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
3187// )
3188// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3189// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3190// });
3191
3192// // RLWE'(m) Part A
3193// izip!(
3194// reduced_ct_i_out
3195// .iter_rows_mut()
3196// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
3197// .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
3198// ct_i_in
3199// .iter_rows()
3200// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
3201// .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
3202// )
3203// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3204// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3205// });
3206
3207// // RLWE'(m) Part B
3208// izip!(
3209// reduced_ct_i_out
3210// .iter_rows_mut()
3211// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
3212// .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
3213// ct_i_in
3214// .iter_rows()
3215// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 +
3216// (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0)) .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
3217// )
3218// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3219// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3220// });
3221
3222// reduced_ct_i_out
3223// })
3224// .collect_vec();