phantom-zone/src/bool/evaluator.rs
src/bool/evaluator.rsRaw
1use std::{
2 borrow::BorrowMut,
3 cell::{OnceCell, RefCell},
4 clone,
5 collections::HashMap,
6 fmt::{Debug, Display},
7 iter::Once,
8 marker::PhantomData,
9 ops::Shr,
10 sync::OnceLock,
11};
12
13use itertools::{izip, partition, Itertools};
14use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Num, One, Pow, PrimInt, ToPrimitive, WrappingSub, Zero};
15use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;
16
17use crate::{
18 backend::{ArithmeticOps, GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, Modulus, VectorOps},
19 decomposer::{Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, NumInfo, RlweDecomposer},
20 lwe::{decrypt_lwe, encrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch, lwe_ksk_keygen, measure_noise_lwe, LweSecret},
21 multi_party::public_key_share,
22 ntt::{self, Ntt, NttBackendU64, NttInit},
23 pbs::{pbs, sample_extract, PbsInfo, PbsKey},
24 random::{
25 DefaultSecureRng, NewWithSeed, RandomFill, RandomFillGaussianInModulus,
26 RandomFillUniformInModulus, RandomGaussianElementInModulus,
27 },
28 rgsw::{
29 decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, galois_key_gen, generate_auto_map, public_key_encrypt_rgsw,
30 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace, rlwe_by_rgsw, secret_key_encrypt_rgsw, IsTrivial, RgswCiphertext,
31 RlweCiphertext, RlweSecret,
32 },
33 utils::{
34 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, generate_prime, mod_exponent, Global,
35 TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal,
36 },
37 Decryptor, Encryptor, Matrix, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, MultiPartyDecryptor, Row, RowEntity,
38 RowMut, Secret,
39};
40
41use super::{
42 keys::ClientKey,
43 parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
44 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare,
45 SeededMultiPartyServerKey, SeededServerKey, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
46};
47
48pub struct MultiPartyCrs<S> {
49 pub(super) seed: S,
50}
51
52impl<S: Default + Copy> MultiPartyCrs<S> {
53 /// Seed to generate public key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
54 ///
55 /// Public key seed equals the 1st seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
56 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
57 pub(super) fn public_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
58 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
59
60 let mut seed = S::default();
61 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
62 seed
63 }
64
65 /// Seed to generate server key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
66 ///
67 /// Server key seed equals the 2nd seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
68 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
69 pub(super) fn server_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
70 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
71
72 let mut seed = S::default();
73 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
74 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
75 seed
76 }
77}
78
79pub(crate) trait BooleanGates {
80 type Ciphertext: RowEntity;
81 type Key;
82
83 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
84 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
85 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
86 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
87 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
88 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
89 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c: &mut Self::Ciphertext);
90
91 fn and(
92 &mut self,
93 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
94 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
95 key: &Self::Key,
96 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
97 fn nand(
98 &mut self,
99 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
100 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
101 key: &Self::Key,
102 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
103 fn or(
104 &mut self,
105 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
106 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
107 key: &Self::Key,
108 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
109 fn nor(
110 &mut self,
111 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
112 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
113 key: &Self::Key,
114 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
115 fn xor(
116 &mut self,
117 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
118 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
119 key: &Self::Key,
120 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
121 fn xnor(
122 &mut self,
123 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
124 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
125 key: &Self::Key,
126 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
127 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext;
128}
129
130struct ScratchMemory<M>
131where
132 M: Matrix,
133{
134 lwe_vector: M::R,
135 decomposition_matrix: M,
136}
137
138impl<M: MatrixEntity> ScratchMemory<M>
139where
140 M::R: RowEntity,
141{
142 fn new(parameters: &BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self {
143 // Vector to store LWE ciphertext with LWE dimesnion n
144 let lwe_vector = M::R::zeros(parameters.lwe_n().0 + 1);
145
146 // Matrix to store decomposed polynomials
147 // Max decompistion count + space for temporary RLWE
148 let d = std::cmp::max(
149 parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0,
150 std::cmp::max(
151 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().0 .0,
152 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().1 .0,
153 ),
154 ) + 2;
155 let decomposition_matrix = M::zeros(d, parameters.rlwe_n().0);
156
157 Self {
158 lwe_vector,
159 decomposition_matrix,
160 }
161 }
162}
163
164pub(super) trait BoolEncoding {
165 type Element;
166 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
167 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
168 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element;
169 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool;
170}
171
172impl<T> BoolEncoding for CiphertextModulus<T>
173where
174 CiphertextModulus<T>: Modulus<Element = T>,
175 T: PrimInt,
176{
177 type Element = T;
178
179 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element {
180 if self.is_native() {
181 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 2)
182 } else {
183 self.q().unwrap() >> 2
184 }
185 }
186 /// Q/8
187 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
188 if self.is_native() {
189 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 3)
190 } else {
191 self.q().unwrap() >> 3
192 }
193 }
194 /// -Q/8
195 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
196 self.largest_unsigned_value() - self.true_el() + T::one()
197 }
198 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool {
199 let qby8 = self.true_el();
200 let m = (((m + qby8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4.0f64) / self.q_as_f64().unwrap()).round()
201 as usize
202 % 4usize;
203
204 if m == 0 {
205 return false;
206 } else if m == 1 {
207 return true;
208 } else {
209 panic!("Incorrect bool decryption. Got m={m} but expected m to be 0 or 1")
210 }
211 }
212}
213
214pub(super) struct BoolPbsInfo<M: Matrix, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
215 auto_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
216 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: (
217 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
218 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
219 ),
220 lwe_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
221 g_k_dlog_map: Vec<usize>,
222 rlwe_nttop: Ntt,
223 rlwe_modop: RlweModOp,
224 lwe_modop: LweModOp,
225 embedding_factor: usize,
226 rlwe_qby4: M::MatElement,
227 rlwe_auto_maps: Vec<(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>)>,
228 parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
229}
230
231impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> PbsInfo for BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
232where
233 M::MatElement: PrimInt + WrappingSub + NumInfo + FromPrimitive + From<bool> + Display,
234 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
235 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
236 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
237{
238 type Modulus = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>;
239 type Element = M::MatElement;
240 type D = DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>;
241 type RlweModOp = RlweModOp;
242 type LweModOp = LweModOp;
243 type NttOp = NttOp;
244 fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: usize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>) {
245 &self.rlwe_auto_maps[k]
246 }
247 fn br_q(&self) -> usize {
248 *self.parameters.br_q()
249 }
250 fn lwe_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
251 &self.lwe_decomposer
252 }
253 fn rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(&self) -> &(Self::D, Self::D) {
254 &self.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer
255 }
256 fn auto_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
257 &self.auto_decomposer
258 }
259 fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize {
260 self.embedding_factor
261 }
262 fn g(&self) -> isize {
263 self.parameters.g() as isize
264 }
265 fn w(&self) -> usize {
266 self.parameters.w()
267 }
268 fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize] {
269 &self.g_k_dlog_map
270 }
271 fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize {
272 self.parameters.lwe_n().0
273 }
274 fn lwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
275 self.parameters.lwe_q()
276 }
277 fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize {
278 self.parameters.rlwe_n().0
279 }
280 fn rlwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
281 self.parameters.rlwe_q()
282 }
283 fn modop_lweq(&self) -> &Self::LweModOp {
284 &self.lwe_modop
285 }
286 fn modop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::RlweModOp {
287 &self.rlwe_modop
288 }
289 fn nttop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::NttOp {
290 &self.rlwe_nttop
291 }
292}
293
294pub(crate) struct BoolEvaluator<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
295where
296 M: Matrix,
297{
298 pbs_info: BoolPbsInfo<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp>,
299 scratch_memory: ScratchMemory<M>,
300 nand_test_vec: M::R,
301 and_test_vec: M::R,
302 or_test_vec: M::R,
303 nor_test_vec: M::R,
304 xor_test_vec: M::R,
305 xnor_test_vec: M::R,
306 _phantom: PhantomData<M>,
307}
308
309impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
310 pub(super) fn parameters(&self) -> &BoolParameters<M::MatElement> {
311 &self.pbs_info.parameters
312 }
313
314 pub(super) fn pbs_info(&self) -> &BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
315 &self.pbs_info
316 }
317}
318
319impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
320where
321 M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
322 M::MatElement: PrimInt
323 + Debug
324 + Display
325 + NumInfo
326 + FromPrimitive
327 + WrappingSub
328 + SampleUniform
329 + From<bool>,
330 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
331 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
332 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
333 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
334 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
335 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
336 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
337 M::R: TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + RowEntity + Debug,
338 <M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
339{
340 pub(super) fn new(parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self
341 where
342 RlweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
343 LweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
344 NttOp: NttInit<CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
345 {
346 //TODO(Jay): Run sanity checks for modulus values in parameters
347
348 // generates dlog map s.t. (+/-)g^{k} % q = a, for all a \in Z*_{q} and k \in
349 // [0, q/4). We store the dlog `k` at index `a`. This makes it easier to
350 // simply look up `k` at runtime as vec[a]. If a = g^{k} then dlog is
351 // stored as k. If a = -g^{k} then dlog is stored as k = q/4. This is done to
352 // differentiate sign.
353 let g = parameters.g();
354 let q = *parameters.br_q();
355 let mut g_k_dlog_map = vec![0usize; q];
356 for i in 0..q / 4 {
357 let v = mod_exponent(g as u64, i as u64, q as u64) as usize;
358 // g^i
359 g_k_dlog_map[v] = i;
360 // -(g^i)
361 g_k_dlog_map[q - v] = i + (q / 4);
362 }
363
364 let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n().0) / q;
365
366 let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q(), parameters.rlwe_n().0);
367 let rlwe_modop = RlweModOp::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
368 let lwe_modop = LweModOp::new(*parameters.lwe_q());
369
370 let q = *parameters.br_q();
371 let qby2 = q >> 1;
372 let qby8 = q >> 3;
373 // Q/8 (Q: rlwe_q)
374 let true_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().true_el();
375 // -Q/8
376 let false_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().false_el();
377 let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(qby2, -(g as isize));
378
379 let init_test_vec = |partition_el: usize,
380 before_partition_el: M::MatElement,
381 after_partition_el: M::MatElement| {
382 let mut test_vec = M::R::zeros(qby2);
383 for i in 0..qby2 {
384 if i < partition_el {
385 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = before_partition_el;
386 } else {
387 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = after_partition_el;
388 }
389 }
390
391 // v(X) -> v(X^{-g})
392 let mut test_vec_autog = M::R::zeros(qby2);
393 izip!(
394 test_vec.as_ref().iter(),
395 auto_map_index.iter(),
396 auto_map_sign.iter()
397 )
398 .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
399 if !to_sign {
400 // negate
401 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
402 } else {
403 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = *v;
404 }
405 });
406
407 return test_vec_autog;
408 };
409
410 let nand_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
411 let and_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
412 let or_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
413 let nor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
414 let xor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
415 let xnor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
416
417 // auto map indices and sign
418 // Auto maps are stored as [-g, g^{1}, g^{2}, ..., g^{w}]
419 let mut rlwe_auto_maps = vec![];
420 let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
421 let g = parameters.g();
422 let br_q = parameters.br_q();
423 let auto_element_dlogs = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
424 assert!(auto_element_dlogs[0] == 0);
425 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
426 let el = if i == 0 {
427 -(g as isize)
428 } else {
429 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
430 };
431 rlwe_auto_maps.push(generate_auto_map(ring_size, el))
432 }
433
434 let rlwe_qby4 = parameters.rlwe_q().qby4();
435
436 let scratch_memory = ScratchMemory::new(¶meters);
437
438 let pbs_info = BoolPbsInfo {
439 auto_decomposer: parameters.auto_decomposer(),
440 lwe_decomposer: parameters.lwe_decomposer(),
441 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(),
442 g_k_dlog_map,
443 embedding_factor,
444 lwe_modop,
445 rlwe_modop,
446 rlwe_nttop,
447 rlwe_qby4,
448 rlwe_auto_maps,
449 parameters: parameters,
450 };
451
452 BoolEvaluator {
453 pbs_info,
454 scratch_memory,
455 nand_test_vec,
456 and_test_vec,
457 or_test_vec,
458 nor_test_vec,
459 xnor_test_vec,
460 xor_test_vec,
461 _phantom: PhantomData,
462 }
463 }
464
465 pub(super) fn client_key(&self) -> ClientKey {
466 let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
467 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
468 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
469 );
470 let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
471 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
472 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
473 );
474 ClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_lwe)
475 }
476
477 pub(super) fn server_key(
478 &self,
479 client_key: &ClientKey,
480 ) -> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]> {
481 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
482 let mut main_seed = [0u8; 32];
483 rng.fill_bytes(&mut main_seed);
484
485 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(main_seed);
486
487 let rlwe_n = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
488 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
489 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
490
491 // generate auto keys
492 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
493 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
494 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
495 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
496 let auto_els = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
497 for i in auto_els.into_iter() {
498 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
499 -(g as isize)
500 } else {
501 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
502 };
503 let mut gk = M::zeros(self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(), rlwe_n);
504 galois_key_gen(
505 &mut gk,
506 sk_rlwe.values(),
507 g_pow,
508 &auto_gadget,
509 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
510 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
511 &mut main_prng,
512 rng,
513 );
514 auto_keys.insert(i, gk);
515 }
516
517 // generate rgsw ciphertexts RGSW(si) where si is i^th LWE secret element
518 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
519 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
520 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
521 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
522 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
523 );
524 let rlrg_gadget_a = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
525 let rlrg_gadget_b = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
526 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
527 .values()
528 .iter()
529 .map(|si| {
530 // X^{si}; assume |emebedding_factor * si| < N
531 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
532 let si = (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32) * si;
533 // dbg!(si);
534 if si < 0 {
535 // X^{-i} = X^{2N - i} = -X^{N-i}
536 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
537 } else {
538 // X^{i}
539 m.as_mut()[si.abs() as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
540 }
541
542 let mut rgsw_si = M::zeros(rlrg_d_a * 2 + rlrg_d_b, ring_size);
543 secret_key_encrypt_rgsw(
544 &mut rgsw_si,
545 m.as_ref(),
546 &rlrg_gadget_a,
547 &rlrg_gadget_b,
548 sk_rlwe.values(),
549 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
550 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
551 &mut main_prng,
552 rng,
553 );
554
555 rgsw_si
556 })
557 .collect_vec();
558
559 // LWE KSK from RLWE secret s -> LWE secret z
560 let d_lwe_gadget = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
561 let mut lwe_ksk =
562 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
563 lwe_ksk_keygen(
564 &sk_rlwe.values(),
565 &sk_lwe.values(),
566 &mut lwe_ksk,
567 &d_lwe_gadget,
568 &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop,
569 &mut main_prng,
570 rng,
571 );
572
573 SeededServerKey::from_raw(
574 auto_keys,
575 rgsw_cts,
576 lwe_ksk,
577 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
578 main_seed,
579 )
580 })
581 }
582
583 pub(super) fn multi_party_server_key_share(
584 &self,
585 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
586 collective_pk: &M,
587 client_key: &ClientKey,
588 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]>
589 {
590 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
591 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
592
593 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
594 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
595
596 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
597 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
598 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
599 let lwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
600
601 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
602 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
603
604 // sanity check
605 assert!(sk_rlwe.values().len() == ring_size);
606 assert!(sk_lwe.values().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0);
607
608 // auto keys
609 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
610 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
611 let auto_element_dlogs = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
612 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
613 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
614 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
615 -(g as isize)
616 } else {
617 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
618 };
619
620 let mut ksk_out = M::zeros(
621 self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
622 ring_size,
623 );
624 galois_key_gen(
625 &mut ksk_out,
626 sk_rlwe.values(),
627 g_pow,
628 &auto_gadget,
629 rlweq_modop,
630 rlweq_nttop,
631 &mut main_prng,
632 rng,
633 );
634 auto_keys.insert(i, ksk_out);
635 }
636
637 // rgsw ciphertexts of lwe secret elements
638 let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = self
639 .pbs_info
640 .parameters
641 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
642 let (rgrg_d_a, rgrg_d_b) = (
643 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
644 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
645 );
646 let (rgrg_gadget_a, rgrg_gadget_b) = (
647 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(),
648 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector(),
649 );
650 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
651 .values()
652 .iter()
653 .map(|si| {
654 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
655 //TODO(Jay): It will be nice to have a function that returns polynomial
656 // (monomial infact!) corresponding to secret element embedded in ring X^{2N+1}.
657 // Save lots of mistakes where one forgest to emebed si in bigger ring.
658 let si = *si * (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
659 if si < 0 {
660 // X^{-si} = X^{2N-si} = -X^{N-si}, assuming abs(si) < N
661 // (which it is given si is secret element)
662 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
663 } else {
664 m.as_mut()[si as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
665 }
666
667 // public key RGSW encryption has no part that can be seeded, unlike secret key
668 // RGSW encryption where RLWE'_A(m) is seeded
669 let mut out_rgsw = M::zeros(rgrg_d_a * 2 + rgrg_d_b * 2, ring_size);
670 public_key_encrypt_rgsw(
671 &mut out_rgsw,
672 &m.as_ref(),
673 collective_pk,
674 &rgrg_gadget_a,
675 &rgrg_gadget_b,
676 rlweq_modop,
677 rlweq_nttop,
678 rng,
679 );
680
681 out_rgsw
682 })
683 .collect_vec();
684
685 // LWE ksk
686 let mut lwe_ksk =
687 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
688 let lwe_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
689 let d_lwe_gadget_vec = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
690 lwe_ksk_keygen(
691 sk_rlwe.values(),
692 sk_lwe.values(),
693 &mut lwe_ksk,
694 &d_lwe_gadget_vec,
695 lwe_modop,
696 &mut main_prng,
697 rng,
698 );
699
700 CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare::new(
701 rgsw_cts,
702 auto_keys,
703 lwe_ksk,
704 cr_seed,
705 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
706 )
707 })
708 }
709
710 pub(super) fn multi_party_public_key_share(
711 &self,
712 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
713 client_key: &ClientKey,
714 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
715 <M as Matrix>::R,
716 [u8; 32],
717 BoolParameters<<M as Matrix>::MatElement>,
718 > {
719 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
720 let mut share_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0);
721 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
722 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
723 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
724 public_key_share(
725 &mut share_out,
726 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
727 modop,
728 nttop,
729 &mut main_prng,
730 rng,
731 );
732 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare::new(
733 share_out,
734 cr_seed,
735 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
736 )
737 })
738 }
739
740 pub(super) fn multi_party_decryption_share(
741 &self,
742 lwe_ct: &M::R,
743 client_key: &ClientKey,
744 ) -> <M as Matrix>::MatElement {
745 assert!(lwe_ct.as_ref().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
746 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
747 let mut neg_s = M::R::try_convert_from(
748 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
749 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
750 );
751 modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s.as_mut());
752
753 let mut neg_sa = M::MatElement::zero();
754 izip!(lwe_ct.as_ref().iter().skip(1), neg_s.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(ai, nsi)| {
755 neg_sa = modop.add(&neg_sa, &modop.mul(ai, nsi));
756 });
757
758 let e = DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
759 let mut e =
760 RandomGaussianElementInModulus::random(rng, self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
761 e
762 });
763 let share = modop.add(&neg_sa, &e);
764
765 share
766 }
767
768 pub(crate) fn multi_party_decrypt(&self, shares: &[M::MatElement], lwe_ct: &M::R) -> bool {
769 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
770 let mut sum_a = M::MatElement::zero();
771 shares
772 .iter()
773 .for_each(|share_i| sum_a = modop.add(&sum_a, &share_i));
774
775 let encoded_m = modop.add(&lwe_ct.as_ref()[0], &sum_a);
776 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().decode(encoded_m)
777 }
778
779 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt(&self, pk: &M, m: bool) -> M::R {
780 self.pk_encrypt_batched(pk, &vec![m]).remove(0)
781 }
782
783 /// Encrypts a batch booleans as multiple LWE ciphertexts.
784 ///
785 /// For public key encryption we first encrypt `m` as a RLWE ciphertext and
786 /// then sample extract LWE samples at required indices.
787 ///
788 /// - TODO(Jay:) Communication can be improved by not sample exctracting and
789 /// instead just truncate degree 0 values (part Bs)
790 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt_batched(&self, pk: &M, m: &[bool]) -> Vec<M::R> {
791 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
792 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
793 assert!(
794 m.len() <= ring_size,
795 "Cannot batch encrypt > ring_size{ring_size} elements at once"
796 );
797
798 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
799 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
800
801 // RLWE(0)
802 // sample ephemeral key u
803 let mut u = vec![0i32; ring_size];
804 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(u.as_mut(), ring_size >> 1, rng);
805 let mut u = M::R::try_convert_from(&u, &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
806 nttop.forward(u.as_mut());
807
808 let mut ua = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
809 ua.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(0));
810 let mut ub = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
811 ub.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(1));
812
813 // a*u
814 nttop.forward(ua.as_mut());
815 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ua.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
816 nttop.backward(ua.as_mut());
817
818 // b*u
819 nttop.forward(ub.as_mut());
820 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ub.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
821 nttop.backward(ub.as_mut());
822
823 let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, ring_size);
824 // sample error
825 rlwe.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|ri| {
826 RandomFillGaussianInModulus::<[M::MatElement], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>::random_fill(
827 rng,
828 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
829 ri.as_mut(),
830 );
831 });
832
833 // a*u + e0
834 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(0), ua.as_ref());
835 // b*u + e1
836 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), ub.as_ref());
837
838 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
839 let mut m_vec = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
840 izip!(m_vec.as_mut().iter_mut(), m.iter()).for_each(|(m_el, m_bool)| {
841 if *m_bool {
842 // Q/8
843 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
844 } else {
845 // -Q/8
846 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
847 }
848 });
849
850 // b*u + e1 + m
851 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), m_vec.as_ref());
852 // rlwe.set(1, 0, modop.add(rlwe.get(1, 0), &m));
853
854 // sample extract index required indices
855 let samples = m.len();
856 (0..samples)
857 .into_iter()
858 .map(|i| {
859 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(ring_size + 1);
860 sample_extract(&mut lwe_out, &rlwe, modop, i);
861 lwe_out
862 })
863 .collect_vec()
864 })
865 }
866
867 /// TODO(Jay): Fetch client key from thread local
868 pub fn sk_encrypt(&self, m: bool, client_key: &ClientKey) -> M::R {
869 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
870 let m = if m {
871 // Q/8
872 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
873 } else {
874 // -Q/8
875 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
876 };
877
878 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
879 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
880 encrypt_lwe(
881 &mut lwe_out,
882 &m,
883 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
884 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
885 rng,
886 );
887 lwe_out
888 })
889 }
890
891 pub fn sk_decrypt(&self, lwe_ct: &M::R, client_key: &ClientKey) -> bool {
892 let m = decrypt_lwe(
893 lwe_ct,
894 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
895 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
896 );
897 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().decode(m)
898 }
899
900 pub(super) fn aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares<S>(
901 &self,
902 shares: &[CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
903 M,
904 BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
905 S,
906 >],
907 ) -> SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, S, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>
908 where
909 S: PartialEq + Clone,
910 M: Clone,
911 {
912 assert!(shares.len() > 0);
913 let parameters = shares[0].parameters().clone();
914 let cr_seed = shares[0].cr_seed();
915
916 let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
917 let g = parameters.g() as isize;
918 let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
919 let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();
920
921 // sanity checks
922 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|s| {
923 assert!(s.parameters() == ¶meters);
924 assert!(s.cr_seed() == cr_seed);
925 });
926
927 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
928 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
929
930 // auto keys
931 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
932 let auto_elements_dlog = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
933 for i in auto_elements_dlog.into_iter() {
934 let mut key = M::zeros(parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n);
935
936 shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
937 let auto_key_share_i = s.auto_keys().get(&i).expect("Auto key {i} missing");
938 assert!(
939 auto_key_share_i.dimension()
940 == (parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n)
941 );
942 izip!(key.iter_rows_mut(), auto_key_share_i.iter_rows()).for_each(
943 |(partb_out, partb_share)| {
944 rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(partb_out.as_mut(), partb_share.as_ref());
945 },
946 );
947 });
948
949 auto_keys.insert(i, key);
950 }
951
952 // rgsw ciphertext (most expensive part!)
953 let lwe_n = parameters.lwe_n().0;
954 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer =
955 parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
956 let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
957 std::cmp::max(
958 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
959 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
960 ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
961 + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
962 rlwe_n,
963 );
964
965 let mut tmp_rgsw =
966 RgswCiphertext::<M, _>::empty(rlwe_n, &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer, rlwe_q.clone()).data;
967 let rgsw_cts = (0..lwe_n).into_iter().map(|index| {
968 // copy over rgsw ciphertext for index^th secret element from first share and
969 // treat it as accumulating rgsw ciphertext
970 let mut rgsw_i = shares[0].rgsw_cts()[index].clone();
971
972 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|si| {
973 // copy over si's RGSW[index] ciphertext and send to evaluation domain
974 izip!(tmp_rgsw.iter_rows_mut(), si.rgsw_cts()[index].iter_rows()).for_each(
975 |(to_ri, from_ri)| {
976 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
977 rlweq_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut())
978 },
979 );
980
981 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
982 &mut rgsw_i,
983 &tmp_rgsw,
984 &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
985 &mut scratch_matrix,
986 rlweq_nttop,
987 rlweq_modop,
988 );
989 });
990
991 rgsw_i
992 });
993 // d_a and d_b may differ for RGSWxRGSW multiplication and RLWExRGSW
994 // multiplication. After this point RGSW ciphertexts will only be used for
995 // RLWExRGSW multiplication (in blind rotation). Thus we drop any additional
996 // RLWE ciphertexts in RGSW ciphertexts after RGSw x RGSW multiplication
997 let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposition_count();
998 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count();
999 let rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
1000 let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
1001 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
1002 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
1003 let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
1004 .map(|ct_i_in| {
1005 assert!(ct_i_in.dimension() == (rgsw_ct_rows_in, rlwe_n));
1006 let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rlwe_n);
1007
1008 // RLWE'(-sm) part A
1009 izip!(
1010 reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
1011 ct_i_in
1012 .iter_rows()
1013 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
1014 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
1015 )
1016 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1017 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1018 });
1019
1020 // RLWE'(-sm) part B
1021 izip!(
1022 reduced_ct_i_out
1023 .iter_rows_mut()
1024 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
1025 .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
1026 ct_i_in
1027 .iter_rows()
1028 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
1029 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
1030 )
1031 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1032 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1033 });
1034
1035 // RLWE'(m) Part A
1036 izip!(
1037 reduced_ct_i_out
1038 .iter_rows_mut()
1039 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
1040 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
1041 ct_i_in
1042 .iter_rows()
1043 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
1044 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
1045 )
1046 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1047 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1048 });
1049
1050 // RLWE'(m) Part B
1051 izip!(
1052 reduced_ct_i_out
1053 .iter_rows_mut()
1054 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
1055 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
1056 ct_i_in
1057 .iter_rows()
1058 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
1059 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
1060 )
1061 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1062 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1063 });
1064
1065 reduced_ct_i_out
1066 })
1067 .collect_vec();
1068
1069 // LWE ksks
1070 let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1071 let lweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
1072 shares.iter().for_each(|si| {
1073 assert!(si.lwe_ksk().as_ref().len() == rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1074 lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(lwe_ksk.as_mut(), si.lwe_ksk().as_ref())
1075 });
1076
1077 SeededMultiPartyServerKey::new(rgsw_cts, auto_keys, lwe_ksk, cr_seed.clone(), parameters)
1078 }
1079}
1080
1081impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
1082where
1083 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1084 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity,
1085 M::MatElement: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo,
1086 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1087 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1088 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
1089 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1090 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1091 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
1092 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1093{
1094 /// Returns c0 + c1 + Q/4
1095 fn _add_and_shift_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1096 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1097 modop.elwise_add_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1098 // +Q/4
1099 c0.as_mut()[0] = modop.add(&c0.as_ref()[0], &self.pbs_info.rlwe_qby4);
1100 }
1101
1102 /// Returns 2(c0 - c1) + Q/4
1103 fn _subtract_double_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1104 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1105 // c0 - c1
1106 modop.elwise_sub_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1107
1108 // double
1109 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.add(v, v));
1110 }
1111}
1112
1113impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> BooleanGates for BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
1114where
1115 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1116 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + Clone,
1117 M::MatElement:
1118 PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo + From<bool>,
1119 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1120 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1121 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
1122 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1123 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1124 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
1125 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1126{
1127 type Ciphertext = M::R;
1128 type Key = ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, BoolParameters<u64>, DefaultSecureRng, NttOp>;
1129
1130 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1131 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1132
1133 // PBS
1134 pbs(
1135 &self.pbs_info,
1136 &self.nand_test_vec,
1137 c0,
1138 server_key,
1139 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1140 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1141 );
1142 }
1143
1144 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1145 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1146
1147 // PBS
1148 pbs(
1149 &self.pbs_info,
1150 &self.and_test_vec,
1151 c0,
1152 server_key,
1153 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1154 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1155 );
1156 }
1157
1158 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1159 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1160
1161 // PBS
1162 pbs(
1163 &self.pbs_info,
1164 &self.or_test_vec,
1165 c0,
1166 server_key,
1167 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1168 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1169 );
1170 }
1171
1172 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1173 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1174
1175 // PBS
1176 pbs(
1177 &self.pbs_info,
1178 &self.nor_test_vec,
1179 c0,
1180 server_key,
1181 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1182 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1183 )
1184 }
1185
1186 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1187 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1188
1189 // PBS
1190 pbs(
1191 &self.pbs_info,
1192 &self.xor_test_vec,
1193 c0,
1194 server_key,
1195 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1196 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1197 );
1198 }
1199
1200 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1201 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1202
1203 // PBS
1204 pbs(
1205 &self.pbs_info,
1206 &self.xnor_test_vec,
1207 c0,
1208 server_key,
1209 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1210 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1211 );
1212 }
1213
1214 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R) {
1215 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1216 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.neg(v));
1217 }
1218
1219 fn and(
1220 &mut self,
1221 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1222 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1223 key: &Self::Key,
1224 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1225 let mut out = c0.clone();
1226 self.and_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1227 out
1228 }
1229
1230 fn nand(
1231 &mut self,
1232 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1233 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1234 key: &Self::Key,
1235 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1236 let mut out = c0.clone();
1237 self.nand_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1238 out
1239 }
1240
1241 fn or(
1242 &mut self,
1243 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1244 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1245 key: &Self::Key,
1246 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1247 let mut out = c0.clone();
1248 self.or_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1249 out
1250 }
1251
1252 fn nor(
1253 &mut self,
1254 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1255 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1256 key: &Self::Key,
1257 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1258 let mut out = c0.clone();
1259 self.nor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1260 out
1261 }
1262
1263 fn xnor(
1264 &mut self,
1265 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1266 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1267 key: &Self::Key,
1268 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1269 let mut out = c0.clone();
1270 self.xnor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1271 out
1272 }
1273
1274 fn xor(
1275 &mut self,
1276 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1277 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1278 key: &Self::Key,
1279 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1280 let mut out = c0.clone();
1281 self.xor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1282 out
1283 }
1284
1285 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1286 let mut out = c.clone();
1287 self.not_inplace(&mut out);
1288 out
1289 }
1290}
1291
1292// #[cfg(test)]
1293// mod tests {
1294// use bool::parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_BOOL_PARAMS};
1295// use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
1296// use rand_distr::Uniform;
1297
1298// use crate::{
1299// backend::{GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, WordSizeModulus},
1300// bool::{
1301// self, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare, PublicKey,
1302// SeededMultiPartyServerKey,
1303// },
1304// ntt::NttBackendU64,
1305// random::{RandomElementInModulus, DEFAULT_RNG},
1306// rgsw::{
1307// self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe,
1308// secret_key_encrypt_rlwe, tests::{_measure_noise_rgsw,
1309// _sk_encrypt_rlwe}, RgswCiphertext,
1310// RgswCiphertextEvaluationDomain, SeededRgswCiphertext,
1311// SeededRlweCiphertext, },
1312// utils::{negacyclic_mul, Stats},
1313// };
1314
1315// use super::*;
1316
1317// #[test]
1318// fn bool_encrypt_decrypt_works() {
1319// let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1320// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1321// NttBackendU64,
1322// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1323// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1324// >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1325// let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
1326
1327// let mut m = true;
1328// for _ in 0..1000 {
1329// let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m, &client_key);
1330// let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_ct, &client_key);
1331// assert_eq!(m, m_back);
1332// m = !m;
1333// }
1334// }
1335
1336// #[test]
1337// fn bool_nand() {
1338// let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1339// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1340// NttBackendU64,
1341// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1342// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1343// >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1344
1345// // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
1346// let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
1347// let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
1348// let server_key_eval_domain =
1349// ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
1350// NttBackendU64>::from( &seeded_server_key,
1351// );
1352
1353// let mut m0 = false;
1354// let mut m1 = true;
1355
1356// let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
1357// let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
1358
1359// for _ in 0..500 {
1360// let ct_back = bool_evaluator.nand(&ct0, &ct1,
1361// &server_key_eval_domain);
1362
1363// let m_out = !(m0 && m1);
1364
1365// let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
1366// assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
1367
1368// m1 = m0;
1369// m0 = m_out;
1370
1371// ct1 = ct0;
1372// ct0 = ct_back;
1373// }
1374// }
1375
1376// #[test]
1377// fn bool_xor() {
1378// let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1379// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1380// NttBackendU64,
1381// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1382// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1383// >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1384
1385// // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
1386// let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
1387// let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.server_key(&client_key);
1388// let server_key_eval_domain =
1389// ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
1390// NttBackendU64>::from( &seeded_server_key,
1391// );
1392
1393// let mut m0 = false;
1394// let mut m1 = true;
1395
1396// let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
1397// let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
1398
1399// for _ in 0..1000 {
1400// let ct_back = bool_evaluator.xor(&ct0, &ct1,
1401// &server_key_eval_domain); let m_out = (m0 ^ m1);
1402
1403// let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
1404// assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
1405
1406// m1 = m0;
1407// m0 = m_out;
1408
1409// ct1 = ct0;
1410// ct0 = ct_back;
1411// }
1412// }
1413
1414// #[test]
1415// fn multi_party_encryption_decryption() {
1416// let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1417// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1418// NttBackendU64,
1419// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1420// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1421// >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1422
1423// let no_of_parties = 500;
1424// let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
1425// .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
1426// .collect_vec();
1427
1428// let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
1429// parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
1430// izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
1431// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| { *ideal_i =
1432// *ideal_i + s_i; });
1433// });
1434
1435// let mut m = true;
1436// for i in 0..100 {
1437// let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1438
1439// let public_key_share = parties
1440// .iter()
1441// .map(|k|
1442// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
1443// .collect_vec();
1444
1445// let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
1446// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1447// DefaultSecureRng,
1448// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1449// >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
1450// let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m);
1451
1452// let decryption_shares = parties
1453// .iter()
1454// .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_ct,
1455// k)) .collect_vec();
1456
1457// let m_back =
1458// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_ct);
1459
1460// {
1461// let ideal_m = if m {
1462// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().true_el()
1463// } else {
1464// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().false_el()
1465// };
1466// let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
1467// &lwe_ct,
1468// &ideal_rlwe_sk,
1469// &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
1470// &ideal_m,
1471// );
1472// println!("Noise: {noise}");
1473// }
1474
1475// assert_eq!(m_back, m);
1476// m = !m;
1477// }
1478// }
1479
1480// fn _collecitve_public_key_gen(rlwe_q: u64, parties_rlwe_sk:
1481// &[RlweSecret]) -> Vec<Vec<u64>> { let ring_size =
1482// parties_rlwe_sk[0].values.len(); assert!(ring_size.
1483// is_power_of_two()); let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
1484// let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(&rlwe_q, ring_size);
1485// let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q);
1486
1487// // Generate Pk shares
1488// let pk_seed = [0u8; 32];
1489// let pk_shares = parties_rlwe_sk.iter().map(|sk| {
1490// let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
1491// let mut share_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
1492// public_key_share(
1493// &mut share_out,
1494// sk.values(),
1495// &modop,
1496// &nttop,
1497// &mut p_rng,
1498// &mut rng,
1499// );
1500// share_out
1501// });
1502
1503// let mut pk_part_b = vec![0u64; ring_size];
1504// pk_shares.for_each(|share| modop.elwise_add_mut(&mut pk_part_b,
1505// &share)); let mut pk_part_a = vec![0u64; ring_size];
1506// let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
1507// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &rlwe_q,
1508// pk_part_a.as_mut_slice());
1509
1510// vec![pk_part_a, pk_part_b]
1511// }
1512
1513// fn _multi_party_all_keygen(
1514// bool_evaluator: &BoolEvaluator<
1515// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1516// NttBackendU64,
1517// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1518// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1519// >,
1520// no_of_parties: usize,
1521// ) -> (
1522// Vec<ClientKey>,
1523// PublicKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng,
1524// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>>, Vec<
1525// CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
1526// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1527// BoolParameters<u64>,
1528// [u8; 32],
1529// >,
1530// >,
1531// SeededMultiPartyServerKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, [u8; 32],
1532// BoolParameters<u64>>, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1533// DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>, ClientKey,
1534// ) {
1535// let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
1536// .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
1537// .collect_vec();
1538
1539// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
1540
1541// // Collective public key
1542// let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1543// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
1544// let public_key_share = parties
1545// .iter()
1546// .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed,
1547// k)) .collect_vec();
1548// let collective_pk =
1549// PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng,
1550// _>::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
1551
1552// // Server key
1553// let mut pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1554// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pbs_cr_seed);
1555// let server_key_shares = parties
1556// .iter()
1557// .map(|k| {
1558// bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed,
1559// &collective_pk.key(), k) })
1560// .collect_vec();
1561// let seeded_server_key =
1562//
1563// bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
1564// let server_key_eval = ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_,
1565// DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from( &seeded_server_key,
1566// );
1567
1568// // construct ideal rlwe sk for meauring noise
1569// let ideal_client_key = {
1570// let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32;
1571// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()]; parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
1572// izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
1573// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
1574// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i; });
1575// });
1576// let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32;
1577// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()]; parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
1578// izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(),
1579// k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| { *ideal_i
1580// = *ideal_i + s_i; });
1581// });
1582
1583// ClientKey::new(
1584// RlweSecret {
1585// values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
1586// },
1587// LweSecret {
1588// values: ideal_lwe_sk,
1589// },
1590// )
1591// };
1592
1593// (
1594// parties,
1595// collective_pk,
1596// server_key_shares,
1597// seeded_server_key,
1598// server_key_eval,
1599// ideal_client_key,
1600// )
1601// }
1602
1603// #[test]
1604// fn multi_party_nand() {
1605// let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1606// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1607// NttBackendU64,
1608// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1609// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1610// >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1611
1612// let (parties, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key)
1613// = _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 2);
1614
1615// let mut m0 = true;
1616// let mut m1 = false;
1617
1618// let mut lwe0 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m0);
1619// let mut lwe1 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m1);
1620
1621// for _ in 0..2000 {
1622// let lwe_out = bool_evaluator.nand(&lwe0, &lwe1,
1623// &server_key_eval);
1624
1625// let m_expected = !(m0 & m1);
1626
1627// // multi-party decrypt
1628// let decryption_shares = parties
1629// .iter()
1630// .map(|k|
1631// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_out, k))
1632// .collect_vec(); let m_back =
1633// bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_out);
1634
1635// // let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_out,
1636// &ideal_client_key);
1637
1638// assert!(m_expected == m_back, "Expected {m_expected}, got
1639// {m_back}"); m1 = m0;
1640// m0 = m_expected;
1641
1642// lwe1 = lwe0;
1643// lwe0 = lwe_out;
1644// }
1645// }
1646
1647// #[test]
1648// fn noise_tester() {
1649// let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1650// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1651// NttBackendU64,
1652// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1653// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1654// >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1655
1656// // let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
1657// // _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
1658// let no_of_parties = 2;
1659// let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
1660// let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
1661// let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0;
1662// let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
1663// let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
1664// let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1665// let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1666
1667// // let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator
1668// // .pbs_info
1669// // .parameters
1670// // .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
1671// // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_a = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
1672// // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_b = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
1673
1674// let rlwe_rgsw_decomposer =
1675// &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer; let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a
1676// = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(); let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b =
1677// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
1678
1679// let auto_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.auto_decomposer;
1680// let auto_gadget = auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
1681
1682// let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
1683// .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
1684// .collect_vec();
1685
1686// let ideal_client_key = {
1687// let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32;
1688// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()]; parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
1689// izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
1690// k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
1691// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i; });
1692// });
1693// let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32;
1694// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()]; parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
1695// izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(),
1696// k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| { *ideal_i
1697// = *ideal_i + s_i; });
1698// });
1699
1700// ClientKey::new(
1701// RlweSecret {
1702// values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
1703// },
1704// LweSecret {
1705// values: ideal_lwe_sk,
1706// },
1707// )
1708// };
1709
1710// // check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
1711// if true {
1712// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
1713// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
1714// for _ in 0..10 {
1715// // generate a new collective public key
1716// let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1717// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
1718// let public_key_share = parties
1719// .iter()
1720// .map(|k|
1721// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
1722// .collect_vec(); let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
1723// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1724// DefaultSecureRng,
1725// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1726// >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
1727
1728// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1729// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
1730// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1731// 2]; public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
1732// &mut rlwe_ct,
1733// collective_pk.key(),
1734// &m,
1735// rlwe_modop,
1736// rlwe_nttop,
1737// &mut rng,
1738// );
1739
1740// let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1741// decrypt_rlwe(
1742// &rlwe_ct,
1743// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1744// &mut m_back,
1745// rlwe_nttop,
1746// rlwe_modop,
1747// );
1748
1749// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(),
1750// m.as_slice());
1751
1752// check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
1753// rlwe_q).as_slice()); }
1754
1755// println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
1756// }
1757
1758// if true {
1759// // Generate server key shares
1760// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
1761// let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1762// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
1763// let public_key_share = parties
1764// .iter()
1765// .map(|k|
1766// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
1767// .collect_vec(); let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
1768// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1769// DefaultSecureRng,
1770// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1771// >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
1772
1773// let pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
1774// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
1775// let server_key_shares = parties
1776// .iter()
1777// .map(|k| {
1778// bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed,
1779// collective_pk.key(), k) })
1780// .collect_vec();
1781
1782// let seeded_server_key =
1783//
1784// bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
1785
1786// // Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
1787// if false {
1788// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
1789// izip!(
1790// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values.iter(),
1791// seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts().iter()
1792// )
1793// .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
1794// // X^{s[i]}
1795// let mut m_si = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1796// let s_i = *s_i *
1797// (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32); if s_i
1798// < 0 { m_si[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] =
1799// rlwe_q.neg_one(); } else {
1800// m_si[s_i as usize] = 1;
1801// }
1802
1803// // RLWE'(-sm)
1804// let mut neg_s_eval =
1805//
1806// Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
1807// rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_eval);
1808// rlwe_nttop.forward(&mut neg_s_eval);
1809// for j in
1810// 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() {
1811// // RLWE(B^{j} * -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]})
1812
1813// // -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
1814// let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
1815// rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
1816// rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(),
1817// neg_s_eval.as_slice());
1818// rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
1819// rlwe_modop
1820// .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a[j]);
1821
1822// // RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
1823// let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
1824// rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j]);
1825// rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
1826// &rgsw_ct_i[j +
1827// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()], );
1828
1829// let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1830// decrypt_rlwe(
1831// &rlwe_ct,
1832// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1833// &mut m_back,
1834// rlwe_nttop,
1835// rlwe_modop,
1836// );
1837
1838// // diff
1839// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
1840// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
1841// rlwe_q)); }
1842
1843// // RLWE'(m)
1844// for j in
1845// 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() {
1846// // RLWE(B^{j} * X^{s_lwe[i]})
1847
1848// // X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
1849// let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
1850// rlwe_modop
1851// .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(),
1852// &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b[j]);
1853
1854// // RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
1855// let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
1856// rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(
1857// &rgsw_ct_i[j + (2 *
1858// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count())], );
1859// rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
1860// &rgsw_ct_i[j
1861// + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().
1862// decomposition_count()
1863// + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().
1864// decomposition_count())],
1865// );
1866
1867// let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1868// decrypt_rlwe(
1869// &rlwe_ct,
1870// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1871// &mut m_back,
1872// rlwe_nttop,
1873// rlwe_modop,
1874// );
1875
1876// // diff
1877// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
1878// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
1879// rlwe_q)); }
1880// });
1881// println!(
1882// "RGSW Std: {} {} ;; max={}",
1883// check.mean(),
1884// check.std_dev().abs().log2(),
1885// check.samples.iter().max().unwrap()
1886// );
1887// }
1888
1889// // server key in Evaluation domain
1890// let server_key_eval_domain =
1891// ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, DefaultSecureRng,
1892// NttBackendU64>::from( &seeded_server_key,
1893// );
1894
1895// // check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated
1896// RGSW ciphertext if false {
1897// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
1898
1899// izip!(
1900// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(),
1901// server_key_eval_domain.rgsw_cts().iter()
1902// )
1903// .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
1904// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1905// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
1906// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64;
1907// rlwe_n]; 2]; public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32,
1908// _>( &mut rlwe_ct,
1909// collective_pk.key(),
1910// &m,
1911// rlwe_modop,
1912// rlwe_nttop,
1913// &mut rng,
1914// );
1915
1916// // RLWE(m*X^{s[i]}) = RLWE(m) x RGSW(X^{s[i]})
1917// // let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_,
1918// DefaultSecureRng>::new_trivial(vec![ // vec![0u64;
1919// rlwe_n], // m.clone(),
1920// // ]);
1921// let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_,
1922// DefaultSecureRng> { data: rlwe_ct.clone(),
1923// is_trivial: false,
1924// _phatom: PhantomData,
1925// };
1926// let mut scratch = vec![
1927// vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1928// std::cmp::max(
1929// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
1930// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count()
1931// ) + 2
1932// ];
1933// rlwe_by_rgsw(
1934// &mut rlwe_after,
1935// rgsw_ct_i,
1936// &mut scratch,
1937// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer,
1938// rlwe_nttop,
1939// rlwe_modop,
1940// );
1941
1942// // m1 = X^{s[i]}
1943// let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1944// let s_i = *s_i *
1945// (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32); if s_i
1946// < 0 { m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] =
1947// rlwe_q.neg_one() } else {
1948// m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
1949// }
1950
1951// // (m+e) * m1
1952// let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1953// decrypt_rlwe(
1954// &rlwe_ct,
1955// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1956// &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
1957// rlwe_nttop,
1958// rlwe_modop,
1959// );
1960// rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
1961// rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
1962//
1963// rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(), m1.as_slice());
1964// rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
1965
1966// // Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) +
1967// e_{rlsw x rgsw}. // Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will
1968// have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}. // Here we're only
1969// concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise added by //
1970// RLWExRGSW. Also note in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
1971// // some i and var(em1) = var(e).
1972// let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
1973// decrypt_rlwe(
1974// &rlwe_after,
1975// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1976// &mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
1977// rlwe_nttop,
1978// rlwe_modop,
1979// );
1980
1981// // diff
1982// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
1983// m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
1984// m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
1985// );
1986
1987// // let noise = measure_noise(
1988// // &rlwe_after,
1989// // &m_plus_e_times_m1,
1990// // rlwe_nttop,
1991// // rlwe_modop,
1992// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
1993// // );
1994// // print!("NOISE: {}", noise);
1995
1996// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
1997// &m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
1998// rlwe_q,
1999// ));
2000// });
2001// println!(
2002// "RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
2003// check.std_dev(),
2004// check.std_dev().abs().log2()
2005// )
2006// }
2007
2008// // check noise in Auto key
2009// if false {
2010// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2011
2012// let mut neg_s_poly =
2013//
2014// Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
2015// rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_poly.as_mut_slice());
2016
2017// let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2018// let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2019// let auto_element_dlogs =
2020// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs(); for
2021// i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() { let g_pow = if i ==
2022// 0 { -g
2023// } else {
2024// (((g as usize).pow(i as u32)) % br_q) as isize
2025// };
2026
2027// // -s[X^k]
2028// let (auto_indices, auto_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n,
2029// g_pow); let mut neg_s_poly_auto_i = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2030// izip!(neg_s_poly.iter(), auto_indices.iter(),
2031// auto_sign.iter()).for_each( |(v, to_i, to_sign)| {
2032// if !to_sign {
2033// neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
2034// } else {
2035// neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = *v;
2036// }
2037// },
2038// );
2039
2040// let mut auto_key_i =
2041// server_key_eval_domain.galois_key_for_auto(i).clone(); //
2042// send i^th auto key to coefficient domain auto_key_i
2043// .iter_mut()
2044// .for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut_slice()));
2045// auto_gadget.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(i, b_i)| {
2046// // B^i * -s[X^k]
2047// let mut m_ideal = neg_s_poly_auto_i.clone();
2048//
2049// rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), b_i);
2050
2051// let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2052// let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2053// rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[i]);
2054// rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2055// &auto_key_i[auto_decomposer.decomposition_count()
2056// + i], );
2057// decrypt_rlwe(
2058// &rlwe_ct,
2059// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2060// &mut m_out,
2061// rlwe_nttop,
2062// rlwe_modop,
2063// );
2064
2065// // diff
2066// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
2067// m_ideal.as_slice());
2068
2069// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_out,
2070// rlwe_q)); });
2071// }
2072
2073// println!("Auto key noise std dev: {}",
2074// check.std_dev().abs().log2()); }
2075
2076// // check noise in RLWE(X^k) after sending RLWE(X) -> RLWE(X^k)
2077// using collective // auto key
2078// if true {
2079// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2080// let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2081// let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2082// let auto_element_dlogs =
2083// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs(); for
2084// i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() { for _ in 0..10 {
2085// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2086// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng,
2087// rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct =
2088// RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> { data:
2089// vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2], is_trivial: false,
2090// _phatom: PhantomData,
2091// };
2092// public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2093// &mut rlwe_ct,
2094// collective_pk.key(),
2095// &m,
2096// rlwe_modop,
2097// rlwe_nttop,
2098// &mut rng,
2099// );
2100
2101// // We're only interested in noise increased as a
2102// result of automorphism. // Hence, we take m+e as the
2103// bench. let mut m_plus_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2104// decrypt_rlwe(
2105// &rlwe_ct,
2106// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2107// &mut m_plus_e,
2108// rlwe_nttop,
2109// rlwe_modop,
2110// );
2111
2112// let auto_key =
2113// server_key_eval_domain.galois_key_for_auto(i); let
2114// (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
2115// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_auto_map(i); let mut
2116// scratch = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2117// auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + 2];
2118// galois_auto( &mut rlwe_ct,
2119// auto_key,
2120// &mut scratch,
2121// &auto_map_index,
2122// &auto_map_sign,
2123// rlwe_modop,
2124// rlwe_nttop,
2125// auto_decomposer,
2126// );
2127
2128// // send m+e from X to X^k
2129// let mut m_plus_e_auto = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2130// izip!(m_plus_e.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
2131// auto_map_sign.iter()) .for_each(|(v, to_index,
2132// to_sign)| { if !to_sign {
2133// m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] =
2134// rlwe_modop.neg(v); } else {
2135// m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = *v
2136// }
2137// });
2138
2139// let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2140// decrypt_rlwe(
2141// &rlwe_ct,
2142// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2143// &mut m_out,
2144// rlwe_nttop,
2145// rlwe_modop,
2146// );
2147
2148// // diff
2149// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
2150// m_plus_e_auto.as_slice());
2151
2152//
2153// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(m_out.as_slice(), rlwe_q));
2154// }
2155// }
2156
2157// println!("Rlwe Auto Noise Std: {}",
2158// check.std_dev().abs().log2()); }
2159
2160// // Check noise growth in ksk
2161// // TODO check in LWE key switching keys
2162// if true {
2163// // 1. encrypt LWE ciphertext
2164// // 2. Key switching
2165// // 3.
2166// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2167
2168// for _ in 0..1024 {
2169// // Encrypt m \in Q_{ks} using RLWE sk
2170// let mut lwe_in_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2171// let m = RandomElementInModulus::random(&mut rng,
2172// &lwe_q.q().unwrap()); encrypt_lwe(
2173// &mut lwe_in_ct,
2174// &m,
2175// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2176// lwe_modop,
2177// &mut rng,
2178// );
2179
2180// // Key switch
2181// let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2182// lwe_key_switch(
2183// &mut lwe_out,
2184// &lwe_in_ct,
2185// server_key_eval_domain.lwe_ksk(),
2186// lwe_modop,
2187// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer(),
2188// );
2189
2190// // We only care about noise added by LWE key switch
2191// // m+e
2192// let m_plus_e =
2193// decrypt_lwe(&lwe_in_ct,
2194// ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2195
2196// let m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise =
2197// decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
2198// ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2199
2200// let diff = lwe_modop.sub(&m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise,
2201// &m_plus_e);
2202
2203// check.add_more(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&diff)]);
2204// }
2205
2206// println!("Lwe ksk std dev: {}",
2207// check.std_dev().abs().log2()); }
2208// }
2209
2210// // Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equal
2211// noise in // fresh RLWE ciphertext
2212// if true {}
2213// // test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
2214// // if false {
2215// // let logp = 2;
2216// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2217
2218// // let m = 1;
2219// // let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
2220
2221// // // Encrypt
2222// // let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2223// // encrypt_lwe(
2224// // &mut lwe_ct,
2225// // &encoded_m,
2226// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2227// // lwe_modop,
2228// // &mut rng,
2229// // );
2230
2231// // // key switch
2232// // let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
2233// // let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2234// // lwe_key_switch(
2235// // &mut lwe_out,
2236// // &lwe_ct,
2237// // &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
2238// // lwe_modop,
2239// // lwe_decomposer,
2240// // );
2241
2242// // let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
2243// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop); let m_back
2244// // = ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
2245// // (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64; dbg!(m_back, m);
2246
2247// // let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
2248// // &lwe_out,
2249// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
2250// // lwe_modop,
2251// // &encoded_m,
2252// // );
2253
2254// // println!("Noise: {noise}");
2255// // }
2256
2257// // Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
2258// // if true {
2259// // let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
2260// // bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
2261// // bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
2262// // bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
2263// // );
2264
2265// // for i in 0..20 {
2266// // // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
2267// // let si =
2268// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2269// // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2270// // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2271// // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2272// // } else {
2273// // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2274// // }
2275
2276// // let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
2277// // rgsw_si
2278// // .iter_mut()
2279// // .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
2280
2281// // println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
2282// // _measure_noise_rgsw(
2283// // &rgsw_si,
2284// // &si_poly,
2285// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2286// // &gadget_vec,
2287// // rlwe_q,
2288// // );
2289// // println!("####### ##################### #######");
2290// // }
2291// // }
2292
2293// // // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
2294// // if true {
2295// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2296// // let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2297// // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
2298// // carry_m.as_mut_slice());
2299
2300// // // RGSW(carrym)
2301// // let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n],
2302// carry_m.clone()]; // let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
2303// // DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
2304
2305// // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2306// // d_rgsw + 2]; let mul_mod =
2307// // |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) %
2308// (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);
2309
2310// // for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
2311// // rlwe_by_rgsw(
2312// // &mut rlwe_ct,
2313// // server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
2314// // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
2315// // rlwe_decomposer,
2316// // rlwe_nttop,
2317// // rlwe_modop,
2318// // );
2319
2320// // // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
2321// // let si =
2322// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2323// // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2324// // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2325// // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2326// // } else {
2327// // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2328// // }
2329// // carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
2330// // rlwe_q);
2331
2332// // let noise = measure_noise(
2333// // &rlwe_ct,
2334// // &carry_m,
2335// // rlwe_nttop,
2336// // rlwe_modop,
2337// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2338// // );
2339// // println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
2340// // monomial: {noise}"); }
2341// // }
2342
2343// // // Check galois keys
2344// // if false {
2345// // let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
2346// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2347// // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2348// // d_rgsw + 2]; for i in [g, -g] {
2349// // let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2350// // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
2351// // m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = {
2352// // let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2353// // public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
2354// // &mut data,
2355// // &collective_pk.key,
2356// // &m,
2357// // rlwe_modop,
2358// // rlwe_nttop,
2359// // &mut rng,
2360// // );
2361// // RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
2362// // false) };
2363
2364// // let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
2365// // let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
2366// // generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i); galois_auto(
2367// // &mut rlwe_ct,
2368// // auto_key,
2369// // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
2370// // &auto_map_index,
2371// // &auto_map_sign,
2372// // rlwe_modop,
2373// // rlwe_nttop,
2374// // rlwe_decomposer,
2375// // );
2376
2377// // // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
2378// // let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2379// // izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
2380// // auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(mi, to_index,
2381// to_sign)| // { if !to_sign {
2382// // m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi;
2383// // } else {
2384// // m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
2385// // }
2386// // },
2387// // );
2388
2389// // // measure noise
2390// // let noise = measure_noise(
2391// // &rlwe_ct,
2392// // &m_k,
2393// // rlwe_nttop,
2394// // rlwe_modop,
2395// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2396// // );
2397
2398// // println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
2399// // }
2400// // }
2401// }
2402// }