phantom-zone/src/bool/evaluator.rs
src/bool/evaluator.rsRaw
1use std::{
2 borrow::BorrowMut,
3 cell::{OnceCell, RefCell},
4 clone,
5 collections::HashMap,
6 fmt::{Debug, Display},
7 iter::Once,
8 marker::PhantomData,
9 ops::Shr,
10 sync::OnceLock,
11 usize,
12};
13
14use itertools::{izip, partition, Itertools};
15use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Num, One, Pow, PrimInt, ToPrimitive, WrappingSub, Zero};
16use rand::Rng;
17use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;
18
19use crate::{
20 backend::{
21 ArithmeticOps, GetModulus, ModInit, ModularOpsU64, Modulus, ShoupMatrixFMA, VectorOps,
22 },
23 decomposer::{Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, NumInfo, RlweDecomposer},
24 lwe::{decrypt_lwe, encrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch, lwe_ksk_keygen, measure_noise_lwe, LweSecret},
25 multi_party::{
26 non_interactive_ksk_gen, non_interactive_ksk_zero_encryptions_for_other_party_i,
27 non_interactive_rgsw_ct, public_key_share,
28 },
29 ntt::{self, Ntt, NttBackendU64, NttInit},
30 pbs::{pbs, sample_extract, PbsInfo, PbsKey, WithShoupRepr},
31 random::{
32 DefaultSecureRng, NewWithSeed, RandomFill, RandomFillGaussianInModulus,
33 RandomFillUniformInModulus, RandomGaussianElementInModulus,
34 },
35 rgsw::{
36 decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, galois_key_gen, generate_auto_map, public_key_encrypt_rgsw,
37 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace, rlwe_by_rgsw, secret_key_encrypt_rgsw, IsTrivial, RgswCiphertext,
38 RlweCiphertext, RlweSecret,
39 },
40 utils::{
41 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight, generate_prime, mod_exponent, Global,
42 TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal,
43 },
44 Decryptor, Encryptor, Matrix, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, MultiPartyDecryptor, Row, RowEntity,
45 RowMut, Secret,
46};
47
48use super::{
49 keys::ClientKey,
50 parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
51 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare,
52 DecompositionCount, DecompostionLogBase, DoubleDecomposerParams, NonInteractiveClientKey,
53 SeededMultiPartyServerKey, SeededServerKey, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
54 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
55};
56
57pub struct NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
58 /// (ak*si + e + \beta ui, ak*si + e)
59 ni_rgsw_cts: (Vec<M>, Vec<M>),
60 ui_to_s_ksk: M,
61 others_ksk_zero_encs: Vec<M>,
62 user_index: usize,
63}
64
65impl<M> NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
66 fn zero_enc_for_ui_to_s_ksk_for_user_i(&self, user_i: usize) -> &M {
67 assert!(user_i != self.user_index);
68 if user_i < self.user_index {
69 &self.others_ksk_zero_encs[user_i]
70 } else {
71 &self.others_ksk_zero_encs[user_i - 1]
72 }
73 }
74}
75
76pub struct MultiPartyCrs<S> {
77 pub(super) seed: S,
78}
79
80pub struct NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<S> {
81 pub(super) seed: S,
82}
83
84impl<S: Default + Copy> NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<S> {
85 fn server_key_share_seed<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
86 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(self.seed);
87
88 // for main server key share seed sample once
89 let mut out = S::default();
90 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
91
92 out
93 }
94
95 fn ui_to_s_ks_seed<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
96 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(self.seed);
97
98 // puncture twice
99 let mut out = S::default();
100 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
101 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
102
103 out
104 }
105
106 fn ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(
107 &self,
108 user_i: usize,
109 ) -> S {
110 let ks_seed = self.ui_to_s_ks_seed::<R>();
111 let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(ks_seed);
112
113 // puncture user_i times
114 let mut out = S::default();
115 for _ in 0..user_i + 1 {
116 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &mut out);
117 }
118
119 out
120 }
121}
122
123impl<S: Default + Copy> MultiPartyCrs<S> {
124 /// Seed to generate public key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
125 ///
126 /// Public key seed equals the 1st seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
127 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
128 pub(super) fn public_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
129 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
130
131 let mut seed = S::default();
132 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
133 seed
134 }
135
136 /// Seed to generate server key share using MultiPartyCrs as the main seed.
137 ///
138 /// Server key seed equals the 2nd seed extracted from PRNG Seeded with
139 /// MiltiPartyCrs's seed.
140 pub(super) fn server_key_share_seed<Rng: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
141 let mut prng = Rng::new_with_seed(self.seed);
142
143 let mut seed = S::default();
144 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
145 RandomFill::<S>::random_fill(&mut prng, &mut seed);
146 seed
147 }
148}
149
150pub(crate) trait BooleanGates {
151 type Ciphertext: RowEntity;
152 type Key;
153
154 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
155 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
156 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
157 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
158 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
159 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut Self::Ciphertext, c1: &Self::Ciphertext, key: &Self::Key);
160 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c: &mut Self::Ciphertext);
161
162 fn and(
163 &mut self,
164 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
165 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
166 key: &Self::Key,
167 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
168 fn nand(
169 &mut self,
170 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
171 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
172 key: &Self::Key,
173 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
174 fn or(
175 &mut self,
176 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
177 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
178 key: &Self::Key,
179 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
180 fn nor(
181 &mut self,
182 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
183 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
184 key: &Self::Key,
185 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
186 fn xor(
187 &mut self,
188 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
189 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
190 key: &Self::Key,
191 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
192 fn xnor(
193 &mut self,
194 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
195 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
196 key: &Self::Key,
197 ) -> Self::Ciphertext;
198 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext;
199}
200
201struct ScratchMemory<M>
202where
203 M: Matrix,
204{
205 lwe_vector: M::R,
206 decomposition_matrix: M,
207}
208
209impl<M: MatrixEntity> ScratchMemory<M>
210where
211 M::R: RowEntity,
212{
213 fn new(parameters: &BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self {
214 // Vector to store LWE ciphertext with LWE dimesnion n
215 let lwe_vector = M::R::zeros(parameters.lwe_n().0 + 1);
216
217 // Matrix to store decomposed polynomials
218 // Max decompistion count + space for temporary RLWE
219 let d = std::cmp::max(
220 parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0,
221 std::cmp::max(
222 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().0 .0,
223 parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count().1 .0,
224 ),
225 ) + 2;
226 let decomposition_matrix = M::zeros(d, parameters.rlwe_n().0);
227
228 Self {
229 lwe_vector,
230 decomposition_matrix,
231 }
232 }
233}
234
235pub(super) trait BoolEncoding {
236 type Element;
237 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
238 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element;
239 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element;
240 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool;
241}
242
243impl<T> BoolEncoding for CiphertextModulus<T>
244where
245 CiphertextModulus<T>: Modulus<Element = T>,
246 T: PrimInt,
247{
248 type Element = T;
249
250 fn qby4(&self) -> Self::Element {
251 if self.is_native() {
252 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 2)
253 } else {
254 self.q().unwrap() >> 2
255 }
256 }
257 /// Q/8
258 fn true_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
259 if self.is_native() {
260 T::one() << (CiphertextModulus::<T>::_bits() - 3)
261 } else {
262 self.q().unwrap() >> 3
263 }
264 }
265 /// -Q/8
266 fn false_el(&self) -> Self::Element {
267 self.largest_unsigned_value() - self.true_el() + T::one()
268 }
269 fn decode(&self, m: Self::Element) -> bool {
270 let qby8 = self.true_el();
271 let m = (((m + qby8).to_f64().unwrap() * 4.0f64) / self.q_as_f64().unwrap()).round()
272 as usize
273 % 4usize;
274
275 if m == 0 {
276 return false;
277 } else if m == 1 {
278 return true;
279 } else {
280 panic!("Incorrect bool decryption. Got m={m} but expected m to be 0 or 1")
281 }
282 }
283}
284
285pub(super) struct BoolPbsInfo<M: Matrix, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
286 auto_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
287 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: (
288 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
289 DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
290 ),
291 lwe_decomposer: DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>,
292 g_k_dlog_map: Vec<usize>,
293 rlwe_nttop: Ntt,
294 rlwe_modop: RlweModOp,
295 lwe_modop: LweModOp,
296 embedding_factor: usize,
297 rlwe_qby4: M::MatElement,
298 rlwe_auto_maps: Vec<(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>)>,
299 parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
300}
301
302impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> PbsInfo for BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp>
303where
304 M::MatElement: PrimInt + WrappingSub + NumInfo + FromPrimitive + From<bool> + Display,
305 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
306 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement> + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
307 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
308{
309 type M = M;
310 type Modulus = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>;
311 type D = DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>;
312 type RlweModOp = RlweModOp;
313 type LweModOp = LweModOp;
314 type NttOp = NttOp;
315 fn rlwe_auto_map(&self, k: usize) -> &(Vec<usize>, Vec<bool>) {
316 &self.rlwe_auto_maps[k]
317 }
318 fn br_q(&self) -> usize {
319 *self.parameters.br_q()
320 }
321 fn lwe_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
322 &self.lwe_decomposer
323 }
324 fn rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(&self) -> &(Self::D, Self::D) {
325 &self.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer
326 }
327 fn auto_decomposer(&self) -> &Self::D {
328 &self.auto_decomposer
329 }
330 fn embedding_factor(&self) -> usize {
331 self.embedding_factor
332 }
333 fn g(&self) -> isize {
334 self.parameters.g() as isize
335 }
336 fn w(&self) -> usize {
337 self.parameters.w()
338 }
339 fn g_k_dlog_map(&self) -> &[usize] {
340 &self.g_k_dlog_map
341 }
342 fn lwe_n(&self) -> usize {
343 self.parameters.lwe_n().0
344 }
345 fn lwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
346 self.parameters.lwe_q()
347 }
348 fn rlwe_n(&self) -> usize {
349 self.parameters.rlwe_n().0
350 }
351 fn rlwe_q(&self) -> &Self::Modulus {
352 self.parameters.rlwe_q()
353 }
354 fn modop_lweq(&self) -> &Self::LweModOp {
355 &self.lwe_modop
356 }
357 fn modop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::RlweModOp {
358 &self.rlwe_modop
359 }
360 fn nttop_rlweq(&self) -> &Self::NttOp {
361 &self.rlwe_nttop
362 }
363}
364
365pub(crate) struct BoolEvaluator<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey>
366where
367 M: Matrix,
368{
369 pbs_info: BoolPbsInfo<M, Ntt, RlweModOp, LweModOp>,
370 scratch_memory: ScratchMemory<M>,
371 nand_test_vec: M::R,
372 and_test_vec: M::R,
373 or_test_vec: M::R,
374 nor_test_vec: M::R,
375 xor_test_vec: M::R,
376 xnor_test_vec: M::R,
377 _phantom: PhantomData<SKey>,
378}
379
380impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
381 BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
382{
383 pub(super) fn parameters(&self) -> &BoolParameters<M::MatElement> {
384 &self.pbs_info.parameters
385 }
386
387 pub(super) fn pbs_info(&self) -> &BoolPbsInfo<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp> {
388 &self.pbs_info
389 }
390}
391
392fn trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg<
393 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
394 D: DoubleDecomposerParams<Count = DecompositionCount>,
395>(
396 rgsw_ct_in: M,
397 rgrg_params: D,
398 rlrg_params: D,
399) -> M
400where
401 M::R: RowMut,
402 M::MatElement: Copy,
403{
404 let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) = (
405 rgrg_params.decomposition_count_a(),
406 rgrg_params.decomposition_count_b(),
407 );
408 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
409 rlrg_params.decomposition_count_a(),
410 rlrg_params.decomposition_count_b(),
411 );
412 let rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
413 let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
414 assert!(rgsw_ct_in.dimension().0 == rgsw_ct_rows_in);
415 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
416 assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
417
418 let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rgsw_ct_in.dimension().1);
419
420 // RLWE'(-sm) part A
421 izip!(
422 reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
423 rgsw_ct_in
424 .iter_rows()
425 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
426 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
427 )
428 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
429 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
430 });
431
432 // RLWE'(-sm) part B
433 izip!(
434 reduced_ct_i_out
435 .iter_rows_mut()
436 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
437 .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
438 rgsw_ct_in
439 .iter_rows()
440 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
441 .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
442 )
443 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
444 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
445 });
446
447 // RLWE'(m) Part A
448 izip!(
449 reduced_ct_i_out
450 .iter_rows_mut()
451 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
452 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
453 rgsw_ct_in
454 .iter_rows()
455 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
456 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
457 )
458 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
459 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
460 });
461
462 // RLWE'(m) Part B
463 izip!(
464 reduced_ct_i_out
465 .iter_rows_mut()
466 .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
467 .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
468 rgsw_ct_in
469 .iter_rows()
470 .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
471 .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
472 )
473 .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
474 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
475 });
476
477 reduced_ct_i_out
478}
479
480impl<M: Matrix, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, SKey>
481where
482 M: MatrixEntity + MatrixMut,
483 M::MatElement: PrimInt
484 + Debug
485 + Display
486 + NumInfo
487 + FromPrimitive
488 + WrappingSub
489 + SampleUniform
490 + From<bool>,
491 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
492 RlweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
493 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
494 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>
495 + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
496 LweModOp: ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
497 + VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
498 + GetModulus<Element = M::MatElement, M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
499 M::R: TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + RowEntity + Debug,
500 <M as Matrix>::R: RowMut,
501{
502 pub(super) fn new(parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>) -> Self
503 where
504 RlweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
505 LweModOp: ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
506 NttOp: NttInit<CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>,
507 {
508 //TODO(Jay): Run sanity checks for modulus values in parameters
509
510 // generates dlog map s.t. (+/-)g^{k} % q = a, for all a \in Z*_{q} and k \in
511 // [0, q/4). We store the dlog `k` at index `a`. This makes it easier to
512 // simply look up `k` at runtime as vec[a]. If a = g^{k} then dlog is
513 // stored as k. If a = -g^{k} then dlog is stored as k = q/4. This is done to
514 // differentiate sign.
515 let g = parameters.g();
516 let q = *parameters.br_q();
517 let mut g_k_dlog_map = vec![0usize; q];
518 for i in 0..q / 4 {
519 let v = mod_exponent(g as u64, i as u64, q as u64) as usize;
520 // g^i
521 g_k_dlog_map[v] = i;
522 // -(g^i)
523 g_k_dlog_map[q - v] = i + (q / 4);
524 }
525
526 let embedding_factor = (2 * parameters.rlwe_n().0) / q;
527
528 let rlwe_nttop = NttOp::new(parameters.rlwe_q(), parameters.rlwe_n().0);
529 let rlwe_modop = RlweModOp::new(*parameters.rlwe_q());
530 let lwe_modop = LweModOp::new(*parameters.lwe_q());
531
532 let q = *parameters.br_q();
533 let qby2 = q >> 1;
534 let qby8 = q >> 3;
535 // Q/8 (Q: rlwe_q)
536 let true_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().true_el();
537 // -Q/8
538 let false_m_el = parameters.rlwe_q().false_el();
539 let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = generate_auto_map(qby2, -(g as isize));
540
541 let init_test_vec = |partition_el: usize,
542 before_partition_el: M::MatElement,
543 after_partition_el: M::MatElement| {
544 let mut test_vec = M::R::zeros(qby2);
545 for i in 0..qby2 {
546 if i < partition_el {
547 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = before_partition_el;
548 } else {
549 test_vec.as_mut()[i] = after_partition_el;
550 }
551 }
552
553 // v(X) -> v(X^{-g})
554 let mut test_vec_autog = M::R::zeros(qby2);
555 izip!(
556 test_vec.as_ref().iter(),
557 auto_map_index.iter(),
558 auto_map_sign.iter()
559 )
560 .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
561 if !to_sign {
562 // negate
563 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
564 } else {
565 test_vec_autog.as_mut()[*to_index] = *v;
566 }
567 });
568
569 return test_vec_autog;
570 };
571
572 let nand_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
573 let and_test_vec = init_test_vec(3 * qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
574 let or_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
575 let nor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
576 let xor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, false_m_el, true_m_el);
577 let xnor_test_vec = init_test_vec(qby8, true_m_el, false_m_el);
578
579 // auto map indices and sign
580 // Auto maps are stored as [-g, g^{1}, g^{2}, ..., g^{w}]
581 let mut rlwe_auto_maps = vec![];
582 let ring_size = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
583 let g = parameters.g();
584 let br_q = parameters.br_q();
585 let auto_element_dlogs = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
586 assert!(auto_element_dlogs[0] == 0);
587 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
588 let el = if i == 0 {
589 -(g as isize)
590 } else {
591 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
592 };
593 rlwe_auto_maps.push(generate_auto_map(ring_size, el))
594 }
595
596 let rlwe_qby4 = parameters.rlwe_q().qby4();
597
598 let scratch_memory = ScratchMemory::new(¶meters);
599
600 let pbs_info = BoolPbsInfo {
601 auto_decomposer: parameters.auto_decomposer(),
602 lwe_decomposer: parameters.lwe_decomposer(),
603 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer: parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer(),
604 g_k_dlog_map,
605 embedding_factor,
606 lwe_modop,
607 rlwe_modop,
608 rlwe_nttop,
609 rlwe_qby4,
610 rlwe_auto_maps,
611 parameters: parameters,
612 };
613
614 BoolEvaluator {
615 pbs_info,
616 scratch_memory,
617 nand_test_vec,
618 and_test_vec,
619 or_test_vec,
620 nor_test_vec,
621 xnor_test_vec,
622 xor_test_vec,
623 _phantom: PhantomData,
624 }
625 }
626
627 pub(super) fn client_key(&self) -> ClientKey {
628 let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
629 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
630 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
631 );
632 let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
633 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
634 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
635 );
636 ClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_lwe)
637 }
638
639 pub(super) fn non_interactive_client_key(&self) -> NonInteractiveClientKey {
640 let sk_lwe = LweSecret::random(
641 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0 >> 1,
642 self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0,
643 );
644 let sk_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
645 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
646 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
647 );
648 let sk_u_rlwe = RlweSecret::random(
649 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 >> 1,
650 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0,
651 );
652 NonInteractiveClientKey::new(sk_rlwe, sk_u_rlwe, sk_lwe)
653 }
654
655 pub(super) fn single_party_server_key(
656 &self,
657 client_key: &ClientKey,
658 ) -> SeededServerKey<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]> {
659 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
660 let mut main_seed = [0u8; 32];
661 rng.fill_bytes(&mut main_seed);
662
663 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(main_seed);
664
665 let rlwe_n = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
666 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
667 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
668
669 // generate auto keys
670 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
671 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
672 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
673 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
674 let auto_els = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
675 for i in auto_els.into_iter() {
676 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
677 -(g as isize)
678 } else {
679 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
680 };
681 let mut gk = M::zeros(self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(), rlwe_n);
682 galois_key_gen(
683 &mut gk,
684 sk_rlwe.values(),
685 g_pow,
686 &auto_gadget,
687 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
688 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
689 &mut main_prng,
690 rng,
691 );
692 auto_keys.insert(i, gk);
693 }
694
695 // generate rgsw ciphertexts RGSW(si) where si is i^th LWE secret element
696 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
697 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
698 let (rlrg_d_a, rlrg_d_b) = (
699 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
700 self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
701 );
702 let rlrg_gadget_a = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
703 let rlrg_gadget_b = self.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
704 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
705 .values()
706 .iter()
707 .map(|si| {
708 // X^{si}; assume |emebedding_factor * si| < N
709 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
710 let si = (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32) * si;
711 // dbg!(si);
712 if si < 0 {
713 // X^{-i} = X^{2N - i} = -X^{N-i}
714 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
715 } else {
716 // X^{i}
717 m.as_mut()[si.abs() as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
718 }
719
720 let mut rgsw_si = M::zeros(rlrg_d_a * 2 + rlrg_d_b, ring_size);
721 secret_key_encrypt_rgsw(
722 &mut rgsw_si,
723 m.as_ref(),
724 &rlrg_gadget_a,
725 &rlrg_gadget_b,
726 sk_rlwe.values(),
727 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
728 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop,
729 &mut main_prng,
730 rng,
731 );
732
733 rgsw_si
734 })
735 .collect_vec();
736
737 // LWE KSK from RLWE secret s -> LWE secret z
738 let d_lwe_gadget = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
739 let mut lwe_ksk =
740 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
741 lwe_ksk_keygen(
742 &sk_rlwe.values(),
743 &sk_lwe.values(),
744 &mut lwe_ksk,
745 &d_lwe_gadget,
746 &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop,
747 &mut main_prng,
748 rng,
749 );
750
751 SeededServerKey::from_raw(
752 auto_keys,
753 rgsw_cts,
754 lwe_ksk,
755 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
756 main_seed,
757 )
758 })
759 }
760
761 pub(super) fn multi_party_server_key_share(
762 &self,
763 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
764 collective_pk: &M,
765 client_key: &ClientKey,
766 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>, [u8; 32]>
767 {
768 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
769 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
770
771 let sk_rlwe = client_key.sk_rlwe();
772 let sk_lwe = client_key.sk_lwe();
773
774 let g = self.pbs_info.parameters.g();
775 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
776 let rlwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
777 let lwe_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
778
779 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
780 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
781
782 // sanity check
783 assert!(sk_rlwe.values().len() == ring_size);
784 assert!(sk_lwe.values().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0);
785
786 // auto keys
787 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
788 let auto_gadget = self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
789 let auto_element_dlogs = self.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
790 let br_q = self.pbs_info.parameters.br_q();
791 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
792 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
793 -(g as isize)
794 } else {
795 (g.pow(i as u32) % br_q) as isize
796 };
797
798 let mut ksk_out = M::zeros(
799 self.pbs_info.auto_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
800 ring_size,
801 );
802 galois_key_gen(
803 &mut ksk_out,
804 sk_rlwe.values(),
805 g_pow,
806 &auto_gadget,
807 rlweq_modop,
808 rlweq_nttop,
809 &mut main_prng,
810 rng,
811 );
812 auto_keys.insert(i, ksk_out);
813 }
814
815 // rgsw ciphertexts of lwe secret elements
816 let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = self
817 .pbs_info
818 .parameters
819 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
820 let (rgrg_d_a, rgrg_d_b) = (
821 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
822 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count(),
823 );
824 let (rgrg_gadget_a, rgrg_gadget_b) = (
825 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(),
826 rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector(),
827 );
828 let rgsw_cts = sk_lwe
829 .values()
830 .iter()
831 .map(|si| {
832 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
833 //TODO(Jay): It will be nice to have a function that returns polynomial
834 // (monomial infact!) corresponding to secret element embedded in ring X^{2N+1}.
835 // Save lots of mistakes where one forgest to emebed si in bigger ring.
836 let si = *si * (self.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
837 if si < 0 {
838 // X^{-si} = X^{2N-si} = -X^{N-si}, assuming abs(si) < N
839 // (which it is given si is secret element)
840 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
841 } else {
842 m.as_mut()[si as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
843 }
844
845 // public key RGSW encryption has no part that can be seeded, unlike secret key
846 // RGSW encryption where RLWE'_A(m) is seeded
847 let mut out_rgsw = M::zeros(rgrg_d_a * 2 + rgrg_d_b * 2, ring_size);
848 public_key_encrypt_rgsw(
849 &mut out_rgsw,
850 &m.as_ref(),
851 collective_pk,
852 &rgrg_gadget_a,
853 &rgrg_gadget_b,
854 rlweq_modop,
855 rlweq_nttop,
856 rng,
857 );
858
859 out_rgsw
860 })
861 .collect_vec();
862
863 // LWE ksk
864 let mut lwe_ksk =
865 M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.decomposition_count() * ring_size);
866 let lwe_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
867 let d_lwe_gadget_vec = self.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer.gadget_vector();
868 lwe_ksk_keygen(
869 sk_rlwe.values(),
870 sk_lwe.values(),
871 &mut lwe_ksk,
872 &d_lwe_gadget_vec,
873 lwe_modop,
874 &mut main_prng,
875 rng,
876 );
877
878 CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare::new(
879 rgsw_cts,
880 auto_keys,
881 lwe_ksk,
882 cr_seed,
883 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
884 )
885 })
886 }
887
888 pub(super) fn aggregate_non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
889 &self,
890 cr_seed: &NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<[u8; 32]>,
891 total_users: usize,
892 key_shares: &[NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M>],
893 ) -> Vec<M>
894 where
895 M: Clone + Debug,
896 {
897 let rlwe_modop = &self.pbs_info().rlwe_modop;
898 let nttop = &self.pbs_info().rlwe_nttop;
899 let ring_size = self.parameters().rlwe_n().0;
900 let rlwe_q = self.parameters().rlwe_q();
901
902 // genrate key switching key from u_i to s
903 let ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count = self
904 .parameters()
905 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposition_count();
906 let mut ui_to_s_ksks = key_shares
907 .iter()
908 .map(|share| {
909 let mut useri_ui_to_s_ksk = share.ui_to_s_ksk.clone();
910 assert!(
911 useri_ui_to_s_ksk.dimension() == (ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count.0, ring_size)
912 );
913 key_shares
914 .iter()
915 .filter(|x| x.user_index != share.user_index)
916 .for_each(|(other_share)| {
917 let op2 = other_share.zero_enc_for_ui_to_s_ksk_for_user_i(share.user_index);
918 assert!(op2.dimension() == (ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count.0, ring_size));
919 izip!(useri_ui_to_s_ksk.iter_rows_mut(), op2.iter_rows()).for_each(
920 |(add_to, add_from)| {
921 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(add_to.as_mut(), add_from.as_ref())
922 },
923 );
924 });
925 useri_ui_to_s_ksk
926 })
927 .collect_vec();
928
929 let mut key_prng =
930 DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed.server_key_share_seed::<DefaultSecureRng>());
931
932 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer = self
933 .parameters()
934 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
935
936 // Generate RGSW Cts
937 let rgsw_cts_all_users_eval = {
938 // temporarily put ui_to_s in evaluation domain and sample a_i's for u_i to s
939 // ksk for upcomong key switches
940 ui_to_s_ksks.iter_mut().for_each(|ksk_i| {
941 ksk_i
942 .iter_rows_mut()
943 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()))
944 });
945 let ui_to_s_ksks_part_a_eval = key_shares
946 .iter()
947 .map(|share| {
948 let mut ksk_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
949 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(share.user_index),
950 );
951 let mut ais = M::zeros(ui_to_s_ksk_decomposition_count.0, ring_size);
952
953 ais.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|r_ai| {
954 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(
955 &mut ksk_prng,
956 rlwe_q,
957 r_ai.as_mut(),
958 );
959
960 nttop.forward(r_ai.as_mut())
961 });
962 ais
963 })
964 .collect_vec();
965
966 let max_rgrg_deocmposer = if rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
967 > rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count()
968 {
969 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a()
970 } else {
971 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b()
972 };
973
974 let ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer = self
975 .parameters()
976 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>(
977 );
978
979 // Generate a_i*s + E = \sum_{j \in P} a_i*s_j + e for all rlwes in each
980 // non-interactive rgsws. Then decompose and put decompositions in evaluation
981 // for u_i -> s key switch.
982 let decomp_ni_rgsws_part_1_acc = {
983 let mut tmp_space = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
984
985 (0..self.parameters().lwe_n().0)
986 .into_iter()
987 .map(|lwe_index| {
988 (0..max_rgrg_deocmposer.decomposition_count())
989 .into_iter()
990 .map(|d_index| {
991 let mut sum = M::zeros(
992 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
993 ring_size,
994 );
995
996 // set temp_space to all zeros
997 tmp_space.as_mut().fill(M::MatElement::zero());
998
999 // a_i*s + E
1000 key_shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
1001 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1002 tmp_space.as_mut(),
1003 s.ni_rgsw_cts.1[lwe_index].get_row_slice(d_index),
1004 );
1005 });
1006
1007 tmp_space.as_ref().iter().enumerate().for_each(|(ri, el)| {
1008 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer
1009 .decompose_iter(el)
1010 .enumerate()
1011 .for_each(|(row_j, d_el)| {
1012 (sum.as_mut()[row_j]).as_mut()[ri] = d_el;
1013 });
1014 });
1015
1016 sum.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1017
1018 sum
1019 })
1020 .collect_vec()
1021 })
1022 .collect_vec()
1023 };
1024
1025 // Sample a_i's are used to generate non-interactive rgsw cts for all lwe
1026 // indices. Since a_i are just needed for key switches , decompose them
1027 // and put them in evaluation domain
1028 // Decomposition count used for RGSW ct in non-interactive key share gen equals
1029 // max of A and B decomposition required in RGSWxRGSW. This is because same
1030 // polynomials are used to generate RLWE'(m) and RLWE'(-sm)
1031 let decomp_ni_rgsw_neg_ais =
1032 {
1033 let mut tmp_space = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1034 (0..self.parameters().lwe_n().0)
1035 .into_iter()
1036 .map(|_| {
1037 // FIXME(Jay): well well, ais are only required for key switching to
1038 // generate RLWE'(m) and RLWE'(m) itself
1039 // requires RLWE(\beta^i m) for i \in RGSWxRGSW
1040 // part B decomposition count. However, we still need to puncture prng
1041 // for ais corresponding to ignored limbs.
1042 // Probably it will be nice idea to
1043 // avoid decomposition after punturing for a_i's corresponding to
1044 // ignored limbs. Moreover, note that, for
1045 // RGSWxRGSW often times decompostion count for part A
1046 // > part B. Hence, it's very likely that we are doing
1047 // unecesary decompositions for ignored limbs all the time.
1048 (0..max_rgrg_deocmposer.decomposition_count())
1049 .map(|_| {
1050 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(
1051 &mut key_prng,
1052 rlwe_q,
1053 tmp_space.as_mut(),
1054 );
1055
1056 // negate
1057 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(tmp_space.as_mut());
1058
1059 // decomposer a_i for ui -> s key switch
1060 let mut decomp_neg_ai = M::zeros(
1061 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer.decomposition_count(),
1062 ring_size,
1063 );
1064 tmp_space.as_ref().iter().enumerate().for_each(
1065 |(index, el)| {
1066 ui_to_s_ksk_decomposer
1067 .decompose_iter(el)
1068 .enumerate()
1069 .for_each(|(row_j, d_el)| {
1070 (decomp_neg_ai.as_mut()[row_j]).as_mut()
1071 [index] = d_el;
1072 });
1073 },
1074 );
1075
1076 // put in evaluation domain
1077 decomp_neg_ai
1078 .iter_rows_mut()
1079 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1080
1081 decomp_neg_ai
1082 })
1083 .collect_vec()
1084 })
1085 .collect_vec()
1086 };
1087
1088 // genrate RGSW cts
1089 let rgsw_cts_all_users_eval = izip!(
1090 key_shares.iter(),
1091 ui_to_s_ksks.iter(),
1092 ui_to_s_ksks_part_a_eval.iter()
1093 )
1094 .map(
1095 |(share, user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval, user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval)| {
1096 // RGSW_s(X^{s[i]})
1097 let rgsw_cts_user_i_eval = izip!(
1098 share.ni_rgsw_cts.0.iter(),
1099 decomp_ni_rgsw_neg_ais.iter(),
1100 decomp_ni_rgsws_part_1_acc.iter()
1101 )
1102 .map(
1103 |(
1104 m_encs_under_ui,
1105 decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais,
1106 decomposed_acc_rgsw_part1,
1107 )| {
1108 let d_a = rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count();
1109 let d_b = rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count();
1110 let max_d = std::cmp::max(d_a, d_b);
1111
1112 assert!(decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais.len() == max_d);
1113
1114 // To be RGSW(X^{s[i]}) = [RLWE'(-sm), RLWE'(m)]
1115 let mut rgsw_ct_eval = M::zeros(d_a * 2 + d_b * 2, ring_size);
1116 let (rlwe_dash_nsm, rlwe_dash_m) =
1117 rgsw_ct_eval.split_at_row_mut(d_a * 2);
1118
1119 let mut scratch_row = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1120
1121 let mut m_encs_under_ui_eval = m_encs_under_ui.clone();
1122 m_encs_under_ui_eval
1123 .iter_rows_mut()
1124 .for_each(|r| nttop.forward(r.as_mut()));
1125
1126 // RLWE(-sm)
1127 {
1128 // Recall that we have RLWE(a_i * s + e). We key
1129 // switch RLWE(a_i * s + e) using ksk(u_i -> s) to
1130 // get RLWE(a_i*s*u_i + e*u_i).
1131 // Given (u_i * a_i + e + \beta m), we obtain
1132 // RLWE(-sm) = RLWE(a_i*s*u_i + e*u_i) + (0, (u_i *
1133 // a_i + e + \beta m))
1134 //
1135 // Again RLWE'(-sm) only cares for RLWE(\beta -sm)
1136 // with scaling factor \beta corresponding to most
1137 // signficant d_a limbs. Hence, we skip (d_max -
1138 // d_a) least signficant limbs
1139
1140 let (rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_a, rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_b) =
1141 rlwe_dash_nsm.split_at_mut(d_a);
1142
1143 izip!(
1144 rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_a.iter_mut(),
1145 rlwe_dash_neg_sm_part_b.iter_mut(),
1146 decomposed_acc_rgsw_part1.iter().skip(max_d - d_a),
1147 m_encs_under_ui_eval.iter_rows().skip(max_d - d_a)
1148 )
1149 .for_each(
1150 |(rlwe_a, rlwe_b, decomp_ai_s, beta_m_enc_ui)| {
1151 // RLWE_s(a_i * s * u_i + u_i * e) = decomp<a_i * s + e> *
1152 // ksk(u_i -> s)
1153 izip!(
1154 decomp_ai_s.iter_rows(),
1155 user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval.iter_rows(),
1156 user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval.iter_rows()
1157 )
1158 .for_each(
1159 |(a0, part_b, part_a)| {
1160 // rlwe_b += decomp<a_i * s + e>[i] * ksk part_b[i]
1161 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1162 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1163 a0.as_ref(),
1164 part_b.as_ref(),
1165 );
1166 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1167 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1168 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1169 );
1170
1171 // rlwe_a += decomp<a_i * s + e>[i] * ksk
1172 // part_a[i]
1173 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1174 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1175 a0.as_ref(),
1176 part_a.as_ref(),
1177 );
1178 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1179 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1180 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1181 );
1182 },
1183 );
1184
1185 // RLWE_s(-sm) = RLWE_s(a_i * s * u_i + u_i
1186 // * e) + (0, a_i * u + e + m)
1187 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1188 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1189 beta_m_enc_ui.as_ref(),
1190 );
1191 },
1192 );
1193 }
1194
1195 // RLWE(m)
1196 {
1197 // Routine:
1198 // Let RLWE(-a_i * u_i) = (decomp<-a_i> \cdot ksk(u_i -> s)),
1199 // then RLWE(m) = RLWE(a'*s + e + m) = (a_i
1200 // * u_i + e + m, 0) + RLWE(-a_i * u_i)
1201 //
1202 // Since RLWE'(m) only cares for RLWE ciphertexts corresponding
1203 // to higher d_b limbs, we skip routine 1 for lower max(d_a,
1204 // d_b) - d_b limbs
1205 let (rlwe_dash_m_part_a, rlwe_dash_m_part_b) =
1206 rlwe_dash_m.split_at_mut(d_b);
1207
1208 izip!(
1209 rlwe_dash_m_part_a.iter_mut(),
1210 rlwe_dash_m_part_b.iter_mut(),
1211 decomposed_rgsw_i_neg_ais.iter().skip(max_d - d_b),
1212 m_encs_under_ui_eval.iter_rows().skip(max_d - d_b)
1213 )
1214 .for_each(
1215 |(rlwe_a, rlwe_b, decomp_neg_ai, beta_m_enc_ui)| {
1216 // RLWE_s(-a_i * ui) = decomp<-a_i> \cdot ksk(ui -> s)
1217 izip!(
1218 decomp_neg_ai.iter_rows(),
1219 user_uitos_ksk_partb_eval.iter_rows(),
1220 user_uitos_ksk_parta_eval.iter_rows()
1221 )
1222 .for_each(
1223 |(a0, part_b, part_a)| {
1224 // rlwe_b += decomp<a>[i] * ksk part_b[i]
1225 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1226 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1227 a0.as_ref(),
1228 part_b.as_ref(),
1229 );
1230 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1231 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1232 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1233 );
1234
1235 // rlwe_a += decomp<a>[i] * ksk
1236 // part_a[i]
1237 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul(
1238 scratch_row.as_mut(),
1239 a0.as_ref(),
1240 part_a.as_ref(),
1241 );
1242 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1243 rlwe_a.as_mut(),
1244 scratch_row.as_ref(),
1245 );
1246 },
1247 );
1248
1249 // RLWE_s(m) = (a_i * ui + e + \beta m, 0)
1250 // +
1251 // RLWE_s(-a_i * ui)
1252 rlwe_modop.elwise_add_mut(
1253 rlwe_b.as_mut(),
1254 beta_m_enc_ui.as_ref(),
1255 );
1256 },
1257 );
1258 }
1259
1260 rgsw_ct_eval
1261 },
1262 )
1263 .collect_vec();
1264 rgsw_cts_user_i_eval
1265 },
1266 )
1267 .collect_vec();
1268
1269 // put u_i -> s ksks back in coefficient domain
1270 ui_to_s_ksks.iter_mut().for_each(|ksk_i| {
1271 ksk_i
1272 .iter_rows_mut()
1273 .for_each(|r| nttop.backward(r.as_mut()))
1274 });
1275
1276 rgsw_cts_all_users_eval
1277 };
1278
1279 // RGSW x RGSW
1280 let lwe_n = self.parameters().lwe_n().0;
1281 let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
1282 std::cmp::max(
1283 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
1284 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
1285 ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
1286 + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
1287 ring_size,
1288 );
1289 let rgsw_cts_untrimmed = (0..lwe_n).map(|s_index| {
1290 // copy over s_index^th rgsw ct of user 0. Use it to accumulate RGSW products of
1291 // all RGSW ciphertexts at s_index
1292 let mut rgsw_i = rgsw_cts_all_users_eval[0][s_index].clone();
1293 rgsw_i
1294 .iter_rows_mut()
1295 .for_each(|r| nttop.backward(r.as_mut()));
1296
1297 rgsw_cts_all_users_eval
1298 .iter()
1299 .skip(1)
1300 .for_each(|user_i_rgsws| {
1301 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
1302 &mut rgsw_i,
1303 &user_i_rgsws[s_index],
1304 &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
1305 &mut scratch_matrix,
1306 nttop,
1307 rlwe_modop,
1308 );
1309 });
1310
1311 rgsw_i
1312 });
1313
1314 // After this point we don't require RGSW cts for RGSWxRGSW
1315 // multiplicaiton anymore. So we trim them to suit RLWExRGSW require for PBS
1316 let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts_untrimmed
1317 .map(|rgsw_ct| {
1318 trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg(
1319 rgsw_ct,
1320 self.parameters().rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1321 self.parameters().rlwe_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1322 )
1323 })
1324 .collect_vec();
1325 rgsw_cts
1326 }
1327
1328 pub(super) fn non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
1329 &self,
1330 // TODO(Jay): Should get a common reference seed here and derive the rest.
1331 cr_seed: &NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<[u8; 32]>,
1332 self_index: usize,
1333 total_users: usize,
1334 client_key: &NonInteractiveClientKey,
1335 ) -> NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare<M> {
1336 // TODO: check whether parameters support `total_users`
1337
1338 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1339 let nttop = self.pbs_info().nttop_rlweq();
1340 let rlwe_modop = self.pbs_info().modop_rlweq();
1341 let ring_size = self.pbs_info().rlwe_n();
1342 let rlwe_q = self.parameters().rlwe_q();
1343
1344 // ui_to_s_ksk
1345 let non_interactive_decomposer = self
1346 .parameters()
1347 .non_interactive_ui_to_s_key_switch_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>(
1348 );
1349 let non_interactive_gadget_vec = non_interactive_decomposer.gadget_vector();
1350 let ui_to_s_ksk = {
1351 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
1352 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(self_index),
1353 );
1354
1355 non_interactive_ksk_gen::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1356 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1357 client_key.sk_u_rlwe().values(),
1358 &non_interactive_gadget_vec,
1359 &mut p_rng,
1360 rng,
1361 nttop,
1362 rlwe_modop,
1363 )
1364 };
1365
1366 // zero encryptions for others uj_to_s ksk
1367 let all_users_except_self = (0..total_users).filter(|x| *x != self_index);
1368 let zero_encs_for_others = all_users_except_self
1369 .map(|other_user_index| {
1370 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(
1371 cr_seed.ui_to_s_ks_seed_for_user_i::<DefaultSecureRng>(other_user_index),
1372 );
1373 let zero_encs =
1374 non_interactive_ksk_zero_encryptions_for_other_party_i::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1375 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1376 &non_interactive_gadget_vec,
1377 &mut p_rng,
1378 rng,
1379 nttop,
1380 rlwe_modop,
1381 );
1382 zero_encs
1383 })
1384 .collect_vec();
1385
1386 // Main Key gen follows //
1387
1388 let mut key_prng =
1389 DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed.server_key_share_seed::<DefaultSecureRng>());
1390 // generate non-interactive rgsw cts
1391 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer = self
1392 .parameters()
1393 .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
1394
1395 let ni_rgrg_gadget_vec = {
1396 if rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
1397 > rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count()
1398 {
1399 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().gadget_vector()
1400 } else {
1401 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().gadget_vector()
1402 }
1403 };
1404 let ni_rgsw_cts: (Vec<M>, Vec<M>) = client_key
1405 .sk_lwe()
1406 .values()
1407 .iter()
1408 .map(|s_i| {
1409 // X^{s[i]}
1410 let mut m = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1411 if *s_i < 0 {
1412 // X^{-s[i]} -> -X^{N+s[i]}
1413 m.as_mut()[ring_size - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
1414 } else {
1415 m.as_mut()[*s_i as usize] = M::MatElement::one();
1416 }
1417
1418 non_interactive_rgsw_ct::<M, _, _, _, _, _>(
1419 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1420 client_key.sk_u_rlwe().values(),
1421 m.as_ref(),
1422 &ni_rgrg_gadget_vec,
1423 &mut key_prng,
1424 rng,
1425 nttop,
1426 rlwe_modop,
1427 )
1428 })
1429 .unzip();
1430
1431 NonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKeyShare {
1432 ni_rgsw_cts,
1433 ui_to_s_ksk,
1434 others_ksk_zero_encs: zero_encs_for_others,
1435 user_index: self_index,
1436 }
1437 })
1438 }
1439
1440 pub(super) fn multi_party_public_key_share(
1441 &self,
1442 cr_seed: [u8; 32],
1443 client_key: &ClientKey,
1444 ) -> CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare<
1445 <M as Matrix>::R,
1446 [u8; 32],
1447 BoolParameters<<M as Matrix>::MatElement>,
1448 > {
1449 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1450 let mut share_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0);
1451 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1452 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1453 let mut main_prng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(cr_seed);
1454 public_key_share(
1455 &mut share_out,
1456 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1457 modop,
1458 nttop,
1459 &mut main_prng,
1460 rng,
1461 );
1462 CommonReferenceSeededCollectivePublicKeyShare::new(
1463 share_out,
1464 cr_seed,
1465 self.pbs_info.parameters.clone(),
1466 )
1467 })
1468 }
1469
1470 pub(super) fn multi_party_decryption_share(
1471 &self,
1472 lwe_ct: &M::R,
1473 client_key: &ClientKey,
1474 ) -> <M as Matrix>::MatElement {
1475 assert!(lwe_ct.as_ref().len() == self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
1476 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1477 let mut neg_s = M::R::try_convert_from(
1478 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1479 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
1480 );
1481 modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s.as_mut());
1482
1483 let mut neg_sa = M::MatElement::zero();
1484 izip!(lwe_ct.as_ref().iter().skip(1), neg_s.as_ref().iter()).for_each(|(ai, nsi)| {
1485 neg_sa = modop.add(&neg_sa, &modop.mul(ai, nsi));
1486 });
1487
1488 let e = DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1489 let mut e =
1490 RandomGaussianElementInModulus::random(rng, self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
1491 e
1492 });
1493 let share = modop.add(&neg_sa, &e);
1494
1495 share
1496 }
1497
1498 pub(crate) fn multi_party_decrypt(&self, shares: &[M::MatElement], lwe_ct: &M::R) -> bool {
1499 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1500 let mut sum_a = M::MatElement::zero();
1501 shares
1502 .iter()
1503 .for_each(|share_i| sum_a = modop.add(&sum_a, &share_i));
1504
1505 let encoded_m = modop.add(&lwe_ct.as_ref()[0], &sum_a);
1506 self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().decode(encoded_m)
1507 }
1508
1509 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt(&self, pk: &M, m: bool) -> M::R {
1510 self.pk_encrypt_batched(pk, &vec![m]).remove(0)
1511 }
1512
1513 /// Encrypts a batch booleans as multiple LWE ciphertexts.
1514 ///
1515 /// For public key encryption we first encrypt `m` as a RLWE ciphertext and
1516 /// then sample extract LWE samples at required indices.
1517 ///
1518 /// - TODO(Jay:) Communication can be improved by not sample exctracting and
1519 /// instead just truncate degree 0 values (part Bs)
1520 pub(crate) fn pk_encrypt_batched(&self, pk: &M, m: &[bool]) -> Vec<M::R> {
1521 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1522 let ring_size = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
1523 assert!(
1524 m.len() <= ring_size,
1525 "Cannot batch encrypt > ring_size{ring_size} elements at once"
1526 );
1527
1528 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1529 let nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1530
1531 // RLWE(0)
1532 // sample ephemeral key u
1533 let mut u = vec![0i32; ring_size];
1534 fill_random_ternary_secret_with_hamming_weight(u.as_mut(), ring_size >> 1, rng);
1535 let mut u = M::R::try_convert_from(&u, &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q());
1536 nttop.forward(u.as_mut());
1537
1538 let mut ua = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1539 ua.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(0));
1540 let mut ub = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1541 ub.as_mut().copy_from_slice(pk.get_row_slice(1));
1542
1543 // a*u
1544 nttop.forward(ua.as_mut());
1545 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ua.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
1546 nttop.backward(ua.as_mut());
1547
1548 // b*u
1549 nttop.forward(ub.as_mut());
1550 modop.elwise_mul_mut(ub.as_mut(), u.as_ref());
1551 nttop.backward(ub.as_mut());
1552
1553 let mut rlwe = M::zeros(2, ring_size);
1554 // sample error
1555 rlwe.iter_rows_mut().for_each(|ri| {
1556 RandomFillGaussianInModulus::<[M::MatElement], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>::random_fill(
1557 rng,
1558 &self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q(),
1559 ri.as_mut(),
1560 );
1561 });
1562
1563 // a*u + e0
1564 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(0), ua.as_ref());
1565 // b*u + e1
1566 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), ub.as_ref());
1567
1568 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
1569 let mut m_vec = M::R::zeros(ring_size);
1570 izip!(m_vec.as_mut().iter_mut(), m.iter()).for_each(|(m_el, m_bool)| {
1571 if *m_bool {
1572 // Q/8
1573 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
1574 } else {
1575 // -Q/8
1576 *m_el = self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
1577 }
1578 });
1579
1580 // b*u + e1 + m
1581 modop.elwise_add_mut(rlwe.get_row_mut(1), m_vec.as_ref());
1582 // rlwe.set(1, 0, modop.add(rlwe.get(1, 0), &m));
1583
1584 // sample extract index required indices
1585 let samples = m.len();
1586 (0..samples)
1587 .into_iter()
1588 .map(|i| {
1589 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(ring_size + 1);
1590 sample_extract(&mut lwe_out, &rlwe, modop, i);
1591 lwe_out
1592 })
1593 .collect_vec()
1594 })
1595 }
1596
1597 /// TODO(Jay): Fetch client key from thread local
1598 pub fn sk_encrypt(&self, m: bool, client_key: &ClientKey) -> M::R {
1599 //FIXME(Jay): Figure out a way to get Q/8 form modulus
1600 let m = if m {
1601 // Q/8
1602 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().true_el()
1603 } else {
1604 // -Q/8
1605 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().false_el()
1606 };
1607
1608 DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
1609 let mut lwe_out = M::R::zeros(self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0 + 1);
1610 encrypt_lwe(
1611 &mut lwe_out,
1612 &m,
1613 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1614 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
1615 rng,
1616 );
1617 lwe_out
1618 })
1619 }
1620
1621 pub fn sk_decrypt(&self, lwe_ct: &M::R, client_key: &ClientKey) -> bool {
1622 let m = decrypt_lwe(
1623 lwe_ct,
1624 client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
1625 &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
1626 );
1627 self.pbs_info.rlwe_q().decode(m)
1628 }
1629
1630 pub(super) fn aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares<S>(
1631 &self,
1632 shares: &[CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
1633 M,
1634 BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
1635 S,
1636 >],
1637 ) -> SeededMultiPartyServerKey<M, S, BoolParameters<M::MatElement>>
1638 where
1639 S: PartialEq + Clone,
1640 M: Clone,
1641 {
1642 assert!(shares.len() > 0);
1643 let parameters = shares[0].parameters().clone();
1644 let cr_seed = shares[0].cr_seed();
1645
1646 let rlwe_n = parameters.rlwe_n().0;
1647 let g = parameters.g() as isize;
1648 let rlwe_q = parameters.rlwe_q();
1649 let lwe_q = parameters.lwe_q();
1650
1651 // sanity checks
1652 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|s| {
1653 assert!(s.parameters() == ¶meters);
1654 assert!(s.cr_seed() == cr_seed);
1655 });
1656
1657 let rlweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1658 let rlweq_nttop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
1659
1660 // auto keys
1661 let mut auto_keys = HashMap::new();
1662 let auto_elements_dlog = parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
1663 for i in auto_elements_dlog.into_iter() {
1664 let mut key = M::zeros(parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n);
1665
1666 shares.iter().for_each(|s| {
1667 let auto_key_share_i = s.auto_keys().get(&i).expect("Auto key {i} missing");
1668 assert!(
1669 auto_key_share_i.dimension()
1670 == (parameters.auto_decomposition_count().0, rlwe_n)
1671 );
1672 izip!(key.iter_rows_mut(), auto_key_share_i.iter_rows()).for_each(
1673 |(partb_out, partb_share)| {
1674 rlweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(partb_out.as_mut(), partb_share.as_ref());
1675 },
1676 );
1677 });
1678
1679 auto_keys.insert(i, key);
1680 }
1681
1682 // rgsw ciphertext (most expensive part!)
1683 let lwe_n = parameters.lwe_n().0;
1684 let rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer =
1685 parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<M::MatElement>>();
1686 let mut scratch_matrix = M::zeros(
1687 std::cmp::max(
1688 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count(),
1689 rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count(),
1690 ) + (rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() * 2
1691 + rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() * 2),
1692 rlwe_n,
1693 );
1694
1695 let mut tmp_rgsw =
1696 RgswCiphertext::<M, _>::empty(rlwe_n, &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer, rlwe_q.clone()).data;
1697 let rgsw_cts = (0..lwe_n).into_iter().map(|index| {
1698 // copy over rgsw ciphertext for index^th secret element from first share and
1699 // treat it as accumulating rgsw ciphertext
1700 let mut rgsw_i = shares[0].rgsw_cts()[index].clone();
1701
1702 shares.iter().skip(1).for_each(|si| {
1703 // copy over si's RGSW[index] ciphertext and send to evaluation domain
1704 izip!(tmp_rgsw.iter_rows_mut(), si.rgsw_cts()[index].iter_rows()).for_each(
1705 |(to_ri, from_ri)| {
1706 to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
1707 rlweq_nttop.forward(to_ri.as_mut())
1708 },
1709 );
1710
1711 rgsw_by_rgsw_inplace(
1712 &mut rgsw_i,
1713 &tmp_rgsw,
1714 &rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposer,
1715 &mut scratch_matrix,
1716 rlweq_nttop,
1717 rlweq_modop,
1718 );
1719 });
1720
1721 rgsw_i
1722 });
1723 // d_a and d_b may differ for RGSWxRGSW multiplication and RLWExRGSW
1724 // multiplication. After this point RGSW ciphertexts will only be used for
1725 // RLWExRGSW multiplication (in blind rotation). Thus we drop any additional
1726 // RLWE ciphertexts in RGSW ciphertexts after RGSw x RGSW multiplication
1727 let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
1728 .map(|ct_i_in| {
1729 trim_rgsw_ct_matrix_from_rgrg_to_rlrg(
1730 ct_i_in,
1731 self.parameters().rgsw_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1732 self.parameters().rlwe_by_rgsw_decomposition_params(),
1733 )
1734 })
1735 .collect_vec();
1736
1737 // LWE ksks
1738 let mut lwe_ksk = M::R::zeros(rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1739 let lweq_modop = &self.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
1740 shares.iter().for_each(|si| {
1741 assert!(si.lwe_ksk().as_ref().len() == rlwe_n * parameters.lwe_decomposition_count().0);
1742 lweq_modop.elwise_add_mut(lwe_ksk.as_mut(), si.lwe_ksk().as_ref())
1743 });
1744
1745 SeededMultiPartyServerKey::new(rgsw_cts, auto_keys, lwe_ksk, cr_seed.clone(), parameters)
1746 }
1747}
1748
1749impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey> BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
1750where
1751 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1752 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity,
1753 M::MatElement: PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo,
1754 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1755 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1756 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1757{
1758 /// Returns c0 + c1 + Q/4
1759 fn _add_and_shift_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1760 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1761 modop.elwise_add_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1762 // +Q/4
1763 c0.as_mut()[0] = modop.add(&c0.as_ref()[0], &self.pbs_info.rlwe_qby4);
1764 }
1765
1766 /// Returns 2(c0 - c1) + Q/4
1767 fn _subtract_double_lwe_cts(&self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R) {
1768 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1769 // c0 - c1
1770 modop.elwise_sub_mut(c0.as_mut(), c1.as_ref());
1771
1772 // double
1773 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.add(v, v));
1774 }
1775}
1776
1777impl<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey> BooleanGates
1778 for BoolEvaluator<M, NttOp, RlweModOp, LweModOp, Skey>
1779where
1780 M: MatrixMut + MatrixEntity,
1781 M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + Clone,
1782 M::MatElement:
1783 PrimInt + FromPrimitive + One + Copy + Zero + Display + WrappingSub + NumInfo + From<bool>,
1784 RlweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1785 + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
1786 + ShoupMatrixFMA<M::R>,
1787 LweModOp: VectorOps<Element = M::MatElement> + ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>,
1788 NttOp: Ntt<Element = M::MatElement>,
1789 Skey: PbsKey<AutoKey = <Skey as PbsKey>::RgswCt, LweKskKey = M>,
1790 <Skey as PbsKey>::RgswCt: WithShoupRepr<M = M>,
1791{
1792 type Ciphertext = M::R;
1793 type Key = Skey;
1794
1795 fn nand_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1796 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1797
1798 // PBS
1799 pbs(
1800 &self.pbs_info,
1801 &self.nand_test_vec,
1802 c0,
1803 server_key,
1804 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1805 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1806 );
1807 }
1808
1809 fn and_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1810 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1811
1812 // PBS
1813 pbs(
1814 &self.pbs_info,
1815 &self.and_test_vec,
1816 c0,
1817 server_key,
1818 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1819 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1820 );
1821 }
1822
1823 fn or_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1824 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1825
1826 // PBS
1827 pbs(
1828 &self.pbs_info,
1829 &self.or_test_vec,
1830 c0,
1831 server_key,
1832 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1833 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1834 );
1835 }
1836
1837 fn nor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1838 self._add_and_shift_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1839
1840 // PBS
1841 pbs(
1842 &self.pbs_info,
1843 &self.nor_test_vec,
1844 c0,
1845 server_key,
1846 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1847 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1848 )
1849 }
1850
1851 fn xor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1852 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1853
1854 // PBS
1855 pbs(
1856 &self.pbs_info,
1857 &self.xor_test_vec,
1858 c0,
1859 server_key,
1860 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1861 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1862 );
1863 }
1864
1865 fn xnor_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R, c1: &M::R, server_key: &Self::Key) {
1866 self._subtract_double_lwe_cts(c0, c1);
1867
1868 // PBS
1869 pbs(
1870 &self.pbs_info,
1871 &self.xnor_test_vec,
1872 c0,
1873 server_key,
1874 &mut self.scratch_memory.lwe_vector,
1875 &mut self.scratch_memory.decomposition_matrix,
1876 );
1877 }
1878
1879 fn not_inplace(&mut self, c0: &mut M::R) {
1880 let modop = &self.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
1881 c0.as_mut().iter_mut().for_each(|v| *v = modop.neg(v));
1882 }
1883
1884 fn and(
1885 &mut self,
1886 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1887 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1888 key: &Self::Key,
1889 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1890 let mut out = c0.clone();
1891 self.and_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1892 out
1893 }
1894
1895 fn nand(
1896 &mut self,
1897 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1898 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1899 key: &Self::Key,
1900 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1901 let mut out = c0.clone();
1902 self.nand_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1903 out
1904 }
1905
1906 fn or(
1907 &mut self,
1908 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1909 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1910 key: &Self::Key,
1911 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1912 let mut out = c0.clone();
1913 self.or_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1914 out
1915 }
1916
1917 fn nor(
1918 &mut self,
1919 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1920 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1921 key: &Self::Key,
1922 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1923 let mut out = c0.clone();
1924 self.nor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1925 out
1926 }
1927
1928 fn xnor(
1929 &mut self,
1930 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1931 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1932 key: &Self::Key,
1933 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1934 let mut out = c0.clone();
1935 self.xnor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1936 out
1937 }
1938
1939 fn xor(
1940 &mut self,
1941 c0: &Self::Ciphertext,
1942 c1: &Self::Ciphertext,
1943 key: &Self::Key,
1944 ) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1945 let mut out = c0.clone();
1946 self.xor_inplace(&mut out, c1, key);
1947 out
1948 }
1949
1950 fn not(&mut self, c: &Self::Ciphertext) -> Self::Ciphertext {
1951 let mut out = c.clone();
1952 self.not_inplace(&mut out);
1953 out
1954 }
1955}
1956
1957#[cfg(test)]
1958mod tests {
1959 use bool::parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_BOOL_PARAMS};
1960 use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
1961 use rand_distr::Uniform;
1962
1963 use crate::{
1964 backend::ModulusPowerOf2,
1965 bool::{
1966 self, CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare, PublicKey,
1967 SeededMultiPartyServerKey, NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
1968 },
1969 ntt::NttBackendU64,
1970 random::{RandomElementInModulus, DEFAULT_RNG},
1971 rgsw::{
1972 self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe, secret_key_encrypt_rlwe,
1973 tests::{_measure_noise_rgsw, _sk_encrypt_rlwe},
1974 RgswCiphertext, RgswCiphertextEvaluationDomain, SeededRgswCiphertext,
1975 SeededRlweCiphertext,
1976 },
1977 utils::{negacyclic_mul, Stats},
1978 };
1979
1980 use super::*;
1981
1982 #[test]
1983 fn bool_encrypt_decrypt_works() {
1984 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
1985 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
1986 NttBackendU64,
1987 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1988 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
1989 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
1990 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
1991 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
1992
1993 let mut m = true;
1994 for _ in 0..1000 {
1995 let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m, &client_key);
1996 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_ct, &client_key);
1997 assert_eq!(m, m_back);
1998 m = !m;
1999 }
2000 }
2001
2002 #[test]
2003 fn bool_nand() {
2004 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2005 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2006 NttBackendU64,
2007 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2008 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2009 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<_>,
2010 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2011
2012 // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
2013 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
2014 let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.single_party_server_key(&client_key);
2015 let runtime_server_key =
2016 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2017 _,
2018 _,
2019 DefaultSecureRng,
2020 NttBackendU64,
2021 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2022
2023 let mut m0 = false;
2024 let mut m1 = true;
2025
2026 let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
2027 let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
2028
2029 for _ in 0..500 {
2030 let ct_back = bool_evaluator.nand(&ct0, &ct1, &runtime_server_key);
2031
2032 let m_out = !(m0 && m1);
2033
2034 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
2035 assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
2036
2037 m1 = m0;
2038 m0 = m_out;
2039
2040 ct1 = ct0;
2041 ct0 = ct_back;
2042 }
2043 }
2044
2045 #[test]
2046 fn bool_xor() {
2047 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2048 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2049 NttBackendU64,
2050 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2051 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2052 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<_>,
2053 >::new(SP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2054
2055 // println!("{:?}", bool_evaluator.nand_test_vec);
2056 let client_key = bool_evaluator.client_key();
2057 let seeded_server_key = bool_evaluator.single_party_server_key(&client_key);
2058 let runtime_server_key =
2059 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2060 _,
2061 _,
2062 DefaultSecureRng,
2063 NttBackendU64,
2064 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2065
2066 let mut m0 = false;
2067 let mut m1 = true;
2068
2069 let mut ct0 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m0, &client_key);
2070 let mut ct1 = bool_evaluator.sk_encrypt(m1, &client_key);
2071
2072 for _ in 0..1000 {
2073 let ct_back = bool_evaluator.xor(&ct0, &ct1, &runtime_server_key);
2074 let m_out = (m0 ^ m1);
2075
2076 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&ct_back, &client_key);
2077 assert!(m_out == m_back, "Expected {m_out}, got {m_back}");
2078
2079 m1 = m0;
2080 m0 = m_out;
2081
2082 ct1 = ct0;
2083 ct0 = ct_back;
2084 }
2085 }
2086
2087 #[test]
2088 fn multi_party_encryption_decryption() {
2089 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2090 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2091 NttBackendU64,
2092 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2093 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2094 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2095 >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2096
2097 let no_of_parties = 500;
2098 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2099 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2100 .collect_vec();
2101
2102 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2103 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2104 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2105 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2106 });
2107 });
2108
2109 let mut m = true;
2110 for i in 0..100 {
2111 let pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2112
2113 let public_key_share = parties
2114 .iter()
2115 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2116 .collect_vec();
2117
2118 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2119 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2120 DefaultSecureRng,
2121 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2122 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2123 let lwe_ct = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m);
2124
2125 let decryption_shares = parties
2126 .iter()
2127 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_ct, k))
2128 .collect_vec();
2129
2130 let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_ct);
2131
2132 {
2133 let ideal_m = if m {
2134 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().true_el()
2135 } else {
2136 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q().false_el()
2137 };
2138 let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
2139 &lwe_ct,
2140 &ideal_rlwe_sk,
2141 &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop,
2142 &ideal_m,
2143 );
2144 println!("Noise: {noise}");
2145 }
2146
2147 assert_eq!(m_back, m);
2148 m = !m;
2149 }
2150 }
2151
2152 fn _collecitve_public_key_gen(rlwe_q: u64, parties_rlwe_sk: &[RlweSecret]) -> Vec<Vec<u64>> {
2153 let ring_size = parties_rlwe_sk[0].values.len();
2154 assert!(ring_size.is_power_of_two());
2155 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2156 let nttop = NttBackendU64::new(&rlwe_q, ring_size);
2157 let modop = ModularOpsU64::new(rlwe_q);
2158
2159 // Generate Pk shares
2160 let pk_seed = [0u8; 32];
2161 let pk_shares = parties_rlwe_sk.iter().map(|sk| {
2162 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
2163 let mut share_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2164 public_key_share(
2165 &mut share_out,
2166 sk.values(),
2167 &modop,
2168 &nttop,
2169 &mut p_rng,
2170 &mut rng,
2171 );
2172 share_out
2173 });
2174
2175 let mut pk_part_b = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2176 pk_shares.for_each(|share| modop.elwise_add_mut(&mut pk_part_b, &share));
2177 let mut pk_part_a = vec![0u64; ring_size];
2178 let mut p_rng = DefaultSecureRng::new_seeded(pk_seed);
2179 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut p_rng, &rlwe_q, pk_part_a.as_mut_slice());
2180
2181 vec![pk_part_a, pk_part_b]
2182 }
2183
2184 fn _multi_party_all_keygen(
2185 bool_evaluator: &BoolEvaluator<
2186 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2187 NttBackendU64,
2188 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2189 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2190 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2191 >,
2192 no_of_parties: usize,
2193 ) -> (
2194 Vec<ClientKey>,
2195 PublicKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>>,
2196 Vec<
2197 CommonReferenceSeededMultiPartyServerKeyShare<
2198 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2199 BoolParameters<u64>,
2200 [u8; 32],
2201 >,
2202 >,
2203 SeededMultiPartyServerKey<Vec<Vec<u64>>, [u8; 32], BoolParameters<u64>>,
2204 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2205 ClientKey,
2206 ) {
2207 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2208 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2209 .collect_vec();
2210
2211 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2212
2213 // Collective public key
2214 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2215 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2216 let public_key_share = parties
2217 .iter()
2218 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2219 .collect_vec();
2220 let collective_pk =
2221 PublicKey::<Vec<Vec<u64>>, DefaultSecureRng, _>::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2222
2223 // Server key
2224 let mut pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2225 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pbs_cr_seed);
2226 let server_key_shares = parties
2227 .iter()
2228 .map(|k| {
2229 bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, &collective_pk.key(), k)
2230 })
2231 .collect_vec();
2232 let seeded_server_key =
2233 bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
2234 let runtime_server_key =
2235 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2236 _,
2237 _,
2238 DefaultSecureRng,
2239 NttBackendU64,
2240 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2241
2242 // construct ideal rlwe sk for meauring noise
2243 let ideal_client_key = {
2244 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2245 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2246 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2247 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2248 });
2249 });
2250 let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];
2251 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2252 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2253 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2254 });
2255 });
2256
2257 ClientKey::new(
2258 RlweSecret {
2259 values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
2260 },
2261 LweSecret {
2262 values: ideal_lwe_sk,
2263 },
2264 )
2265 };
2266
2267 (
2268 parties,
2269 collective_pk,
2270 server_key_shares,
2271 seeded_server_key,
2272 runtime_server_key,
2273 ideal_client_key,
2274 )
2275 }
2276
2277 #[test]
2278 fn multi_party_nand() {
2279 let mut bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2280 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2281 NttBackendU64,
2282 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2283 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2284 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2285 >::new(MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2286
2287 let (parties, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
2288 _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 2);
2289
2290 let mut m0 = true;
2291 let mut m1 = false;
2292
2293 let mut lwe0 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m0);
2294 let mut lwe1 = bool_evaluator.pk_encrypt(collective_pk.key(), m1);
2295
2296 for _ in 0..2000 {
2297 let lwe_out = bool_evaluator.nand(&lwe0, &lwe1, &server_key_eval);
2298
2299 let m_expected = !(m0 & m1);
2300
2301 // multi-party decrypt
2302 let decryption_shares = parties
2303 .iter()
2304 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_decryption_share(&lwe_out, k))
2305 .collect_vec();
2306 let m_back = bool_evaluator.multi_party_decrypt(&decryption_shares, &lwe_out);
2307
2308 let m_back = bool_evaluator.sk_decrypt(&lwe_out, &ideal_client_key);
2309
2310 assert!(
2311 m_expected == m_back,
2312 "Expected {m_expected}, got
2313{m_back}"
2314 );
2315 m1 = m0;
2316 m0 = m_expected;
2317
2318 lwe1 = lwe0;
2319 lwe0 = lwe_out;
2320 }
2321 }
2322
2323 #[test]
2324 fn noise_tester() {
2325 let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
2326 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2327 NttBackendU64,
2328 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2329 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2330 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
2331 >::new(SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
2332
2333 // let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
2334 // _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
2335 let no_of_parties = 16;
2336 let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
2337 let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
2338 let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0;
2339 let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
2340 let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
2341 let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
2342 let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
2343
2344 // let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator
2345 // .pbs_info
2346 // .parameters
2347 // .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
2348 // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_a = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
2349 // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_b = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
2350
2351 let rlwe_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer;
2352 let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
2353 let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
2354
2355 let auto_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.auto_decomposer;
2356 let auto_gadget = auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
2357
2358 let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
2359 .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
2360 .collect_vec();
2361
2362 let ideal_client_key = {
2363 let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
2364 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2365 izip!(ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2366 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2367 });
2368 });
2369 let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];
2370 parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
2371 izip!(ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values()).for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
2372 *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
2373 });
2374 });
2375
2376 ClientKey::new(
2377 RlweSecret {
2378 values: ideal_rlwe_sk,
2379 },
2380 LweSecret {
2381 values: ideal_lwe_sk,
2382 },
2383 )
2384 };
2385
2386 // check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
2387 if true {
2388 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2389 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2390 for _ in 0..10 {
2391 // generate a new collective public key
2392 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2393 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2394 let public_key_share = parties
2395 .iter()
2396 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2397 .collect_vec();
2398 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2399 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2400 DefaultSecureRng,
2401 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2402 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2403
2404 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2405 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2406 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2407 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2408 &mut rlwe_ct,
2409 collective_pk.key(),
2410 &m,
2411 rlwe_modop,
2412 rlwe_nttop,
2413 &mut rng,
2414 );
2415
2416 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2417 decrypt_rlwe(
2418 &rlwe_ct,
2419 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2420 &mut m_back,
2421 rlwe_nttop,
2422 rlwe_modop,
2423 );
2424
2425 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(), m.as_slice());
2426
2427 check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q).as_slice());
2428 }
2429
2430 println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2431 }
2432
2433 if true {
2434 // Generate server key shares
2435 let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2436 let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2437 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2438 let public_key_share = parties
2439 .iter()
2440 .map(|k| bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(pk_cr_seed, k))
2441 .collect_vec();
2442 let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
2443 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
2444 DefaultSecureRng,
2445 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
2446 >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
2447
2448 let pbs_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
2449 rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
2450 let server_key_shares = parties
2451 .iter()
2452 .map(|k| {
2453 bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(pbs_cr_seed, collective_pk.key(), k)
2454 })
2455 .collect_vec();
2456
2457 let seeded_server_key =
2458 bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
2459
2460 // Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
2461 if false {
2462 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2463 izip!(
2464 ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values.iter(),
2465 seeded_server_key.rgsw_cts().iter()
2466 )
2467 .for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
2468 // X^{s[i]}
2469 let mut m_si = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2470 let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
2471 if s_i < 0 {
2472 m_si[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
2473 } else {
2474 m_si[s_i as usize] = 1;
2475 }
2476
2477 // RLWE'(-sm)
2478 let mut neg_s_eval =
2479 Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
2480 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_eval);
2481 rlwe_nttop.forward(&mut neg_s_eval);
2482 for j in 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count() {
2483 // RLWE(B^{j} * -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]})
2484
2485 // -s[X]*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
2486 let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
2487 rlwe_nttop.forward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
2488 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), neg_s_eval.as_slice());
2489 rlwe_nttop.backward(m_ideal.as_mut_slice());
2490 rlwe_modop
2491 .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a[j]);
2492
2493 // RLWE(-s*X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
2494 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2495 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&rgsw_ct_i[j]);
2496 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2497 &rgsw_ct_i[j + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()],
2498 );
2499
2500 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2501 decrypt_rlwe(
2502 &rlwe_ct,
2503 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2504 &mut m_back,
2505 rlwe_nttop,
2506 rlwe_modop,
2507 );
2508
2509 // diff
2510 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
2511 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q));
2512 }
2513
2514 // RLWE'(m)
2515 for j in 0..rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count() {
2516 // RLWE(B^{j} * X^{s_lwe[i]})
2517
2518 // X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j
2519 let mut m_ideal = m_si.clone();
2520 rlwe_modop
2521 .elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), &rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b[j]);
2522
2523 // RLWE(X^{s_lwe[i]}*B_j)
2524 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2525 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(
2526 &rgsw_ct_i[j + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count())],
2527 );
2528 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2529 &rgsw_ct_i[j
2530 + (2 * rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.a().decomposition_count()
2531 + rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.b().decomposition_count())],
2532 );
2533
2534 let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2535 decrypt_rlwe(
2536 &rlwe_ct,
2537 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2538 &mut m_back,
2539 rlwe_nttop,
2540 rlwe_modop,
2541 );
2542
2543 // diff
2544 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut m_back, &m_ideal);
2545 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back, rlwe_q));
2546 }
2547 });
2548 println!(
2549 "RGSW Std: {} {} ;; max={}",
2550 check.mean(),
2551 check.std_dev().abs().log2(),
2552 check.samples.iter().max().unwrap()
2553 );
2554 }
2555
2556 // server key in Evaluation domain
2557 let runtime_server_key =
2558 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
2559 _,
2560 _,
2561 DefaultSecureRng,
2562 NttBackendU64,
2563 >::from(&seeded_server_key));
2564
2565 // check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated RGSW ciphertext
2566 if false {
2567 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2568
2569 ideal_client_key
2570 .sk_lwe()
2571 .values()
2572 .iter()
2573 .enumerate()
2574 .for_each(|(index, s_i)| {
2575 let rgsw_ct_i = runtime_server_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(index).as_ref();
2576
2577 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2578 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2579 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2580 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2581 &mut rlwe_ct,
2582 collective_pk.key(),
2583 &m,
2584 rlwe_modop,
2585 rlwe_nttop,
2586 &mut rng,
2587 );
2588
2589 let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {
2590 data: rlwe_ct.clone(),
2591 is_trivial: false,
2592 _phatom: PhantomData,
2593 };
2594 let mut scratch = vec![
2595 vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2596 std::cmp::max(
2597 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
2598 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count()
2599 ) + 2
2600 ];
2601 rlwe_by_rgsw(
2602 &mut rlwe_after,
2603 rgsw_ct_i,
2604 &mut scratch,
2605 rlwe_rgsw_decomposer,
2606 rlwe_nttop,
2607 rlwe_modop,
2608 );
2609
2610 // m1 = X^{s[i]}
2611 let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2612 let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as i32);
2613 if s_i < 0 {
2614 m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one()
2615 } else {
2616 m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
2617 }
2618
2619 // (m+e) * m1
2620 let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2621 decrypt_rlwe(
2622 &rlwe_ct,
2623 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2624 &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
2625 rlwe_nttop,
2626 rlwe_modop,
2627 );
2628 rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
2629 rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
2630
2631 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(), m1.as_slice());
2632 rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
2633
2634 // Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) + e_{rlsw x rgsw}.
2635 // Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}.
2636 // Here we're only concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise added by
2637 // RLWExRGSW. Also note in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
2638 // some i and var(em1) = var(e).
2639 let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2640 decrypt_rlwe(
2641 &rlwe_after,
2642 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2643 &mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
2644 rlwe_nttop,
2645 rlwe_modop,
2646 );
2647
2648 // diff
2649 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
2650 m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
2651 m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
2652 );
2653
2654 // let noise = measure_noise(
2655 // &rlwe_after,
2656 // &m_plus_e_times_m1,
2657 // rlwe_nttop,
2658 // rlwe_modop,
2659 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2660 // );
2661 // print!("NOISE: {}", noise);
2662
2663 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
2664 &m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
2665 rlwe_q,
2666 ));
2667 });
2668 println!(
2669 "RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
2670 check.std_dev(),
2671 check.std_dev().abs().log2()
2672 )
2673 }
2674
2675 // check noise in Auto key
2676 if false {
2677 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2678
2679 let mut neg_s_poly =
2680 Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), rlwe_q);
2681 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_poly.as_mut_slice());
2682
2683 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2684 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2685 let auto_element_dlogs = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
2686 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
2687 let g_pow = if i == 0 {
2688 -g
2689 } else {
2690 (((g as usize).pow(i as u32)) % br_q) as isize
2691 };
2692
2693 // -s[X^k]
2694 let (auto_indices, auto_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, g_pow);
2695 let mut neg_s_poly_auto_i = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2696 izip!(neg_s_poly.iter(), auto_indices.iter(), auto_sign.iter()).for_each(
2697 |(v, to_i, to_sign)| {
2698 if !to_sign {
2699 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
2700 } else {
2701 neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = *v;
2702 }
2703 },
2704 );
2705
2706 let mut auto_key_i = runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref().clone(); //send i^th auto key to coefficient domain
2707 auto_key_i
2708 .iter_mut()
2709 .for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut_slice()));
2710 auto_gadget.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(i, b_i)| {
2711 // B^i * -s[X^k]
2712 let mut m_ideal = neg_s_poly_auto_i.clone();
2713
2714 rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(), b_i);
2715
2716 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2717 let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
2718 rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[i]);
2719 rlwe_ct[1].copy_from_slice(
2720 &auto_key_i[auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + i],
2721 );
2722 decrypt_rlwe(
2723 &rlwe_ct,
2724 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2725 &mut m_out,
2726 rlwe_nttop,
2727 rlwe_modop,
2728 );
2729
2730 // diff
2731 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(), m_ideal.as_slice());
2732
2733 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_out, rlwe_q));
2734 });
2735 }
2736
2737 println!("Auto key noise std dev: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2738 }
2739
2740 // check noise in RLWE(X^k) after sending RLWE(X) -> RLWE(X^k)using collective
2741 // auto key
2742 if true {
2743 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2744 let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
2745 let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
2746 let auto_element_dlogs = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs();
2747 for i in auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() {
2748 for _ in 0..10 {
2749 let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2750 RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q, m.as_mut_slice());
2751 let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {
2752 data: vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2],
2753 is_trivial: false,
2754 _phatom: PhantomData,
2755 };
2756 public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
2757 &mut rlwe_ct,
2758 collective_pk.key(),
2759 &m,
2760 rlwe_modop,
2761 rlwe_nttop,
2762 &mut rng,
2763 );
2764
2765 // We're only interested in noise increased as a result of automorphism.
2766 // Hence, we take m+e as the bench.
2767 let mut m_plus_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2768 decrypt_rlwe(
2769 &rlwe_ct,
2770 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2771 &mut m_plus_e,
2772 rlwe_nttop,
2773 rlwe_modop,
2774 );
2775
2776 let auto_key = runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref();
2777 let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
2778 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_auto_map(i);
2779 let mut scratch =
2780 vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + 2];
2781 galois_auto(
2782 &mut rlwe_ct,
2783 auto_key,
2784 &mut scratch,
2785 &auto_map_index,
2786 &auto_map_sign,
2787 rlwe_modop,
2788 rlwe_nttop,
2789 auto_decomposer,
2790 );
2791
2792 // send m+e from X to X^k
2793 let mut m_plus_e_auto = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2794 izip!(m_plus_e.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(), auto_map_sign.iter())
2795 .for_each(|(v, to_index, to_sign)| {
2796 if !to_sign {
2797 m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
2798 } else {
2799 m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = *v
2800 }
2801 });
2802
2803 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2804 decrypt_rlwe(
2805 &rlwe_ct,
2806 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2807 &mut m_out,
2808 rlwe_nttop,
2809 rlwe_modop,
2810 );
2811
2812 // diff
2813 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(), m_plus_e_auto.as_slice());
2814
2815 check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(m_out.as_slice(), rlwe_q));
2816 }
2817 }
2818
2819 println!("Rlwe Auto Noise Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2820 }
2821
2822 // Check noise growth in ksk
2823 // TODO check in LWE key switching keys
2824 if true {
2825 // 1. encrypt LWE ciphertext
2826 // 2. Key switching
2827 // 3.
2828 let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
2829
2830 for _ in 0..1024 {
2831 // Encrypt m \in Q_{ks} using RLWE sk
2832 let mut lwe_in_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2833 let m = RandomElementInModulus::random(&mut rng, &lwe_q.q().unwrap());
2834 encrypt_lwe(
2835 &mut lwe_in_ct,
2836 &m,
2837 ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(),
2838 lwe_modop,
2839 &mut rng,
2840 );
2841
2842 // Key switch
2843 let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2844 lwe_key_switch(
2845 &mut lwe_out,
2846 &lwe_in_ct,
2847 runtime_server_key.lwe_ksk(),
2848 lwe_modop,
2849 bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer(),
2850 );
2851
2852 // We only care about noise added by LWE key switch
2853 // m+e
2854 let m_plus_e =
2855 decrypt_lwe(&lwe_in_ct, ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2856
2857 let m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise =
2858 decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out, ideal_client_key.sk_lwe().values(), lwe_modop);
2859
2860 let diff = lwe_modop.sub(&m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise, &m_plus_e);
2861
2862 check.add_more(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&diff)]);
2863 }
2864
2865 println!("Lwe ksk std dev: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
2866 }
2867 }
2868
2869 // Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equalnoise in
2870 // // fresh RLWE ciphertext
2871 if true {}
2872 // test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
2873 // if false {
2874 // let logp = 2;
2875 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2876
2877 // let m = 1;
2878 // let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
2879
2880 // // Encrypt
2881 // let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
2882 // encrypt_lwe(
2883 // &mut lwe_ct,
2884 // &encoded_m,
2885 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2886 // lwe_modop,
2887 // &mut rng,
2888 // );
2889
2890 // // key switch
2891 // let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
2892 // let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
2893 // lwe_key_switch(
2894 // &mut lwe_out,
2895 // &lwe_ct,
2896 // &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
2897 // lwe_modop,
2898 // lwe_decomposer,
2899 // );
2900
2901 // let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
2902 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop); let m_back
2903 // = ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
2904 // (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64; dbg!(m_back, m);
2905
2906 // let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
2907 // &lwe_out,
2908 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
2909 // lwe_modop,
2910 // &encoded_m,
2911 // );
2912
2913 // println!("Noise: {noise}");
2914 // }
2915
2916 // Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
2917 // if true {
2918 // let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
2919 // bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
2920 // bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
2921 // bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
2922 // );
2923
2924 // for i in 0..20 {
2925 // // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
2926 // let si =
2927 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2928 // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2929 // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2930 // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2931 // } else {
2932 // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2933 // }
2934
2935 // let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
2936 // rgsw_si
2937 // .iter_mut()
2938 // .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
2939
2940 // println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
2941 // _measure_noise_rgsw(
2942 // &rgsw_si,
2943 // &si_poly,
2944 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2945 // &gadget_vec,
2946 // rlwe_q,
2947 // );
2948 // println!("####### ##################### #######");
2949 // }
2950 // }
2951
2952 // // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
2953 // if true {
2954 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
2955 // let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2956 // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
2957 // carry_m.as_mut_slice());
2958
2959 // // RGSW(carrym)
2960 // let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n],carry_m.clone()];
2961 // let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
2962 // DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
2963
2964 // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
2965 // d_rgsw + 2]; let mul_mod =
2966 // |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) % (rlwe_q as u128)) as u64);
2967
2968 // for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
2969 // rlwe_by_rgsw(
2970 // &mut rlwe_ct,
2971 // server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
2972 // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
2973 // rlwe_decomposer,
2974 // rlwe_nttop,
2975 // rlwe_modop,
2976 // );
2977
2978 // // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
2979 // let si =
2980 // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
2981 // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
2982 // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
2983 // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
2984 // } else {
2985 // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
2986 // }
2987 // carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
2988 // rlwe_q);
2989
2990 // let noise = measure_noise(
2991 // &rlwe_ct,
2992 // &carry_m,
2993 // rlwe_nttop,
2994 // rlwe_modop,
2995 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
2996 // );
2997 // println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
2998 // monomial: {noise}"); }
2999 // }
3000
3001 // // Check galois keys
3002 // if false {
3003 // let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
3004 // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
3005 // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
3006 // d_rgsw + 2]; for i in [g, -g] {
3007 // let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
3008 // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
3009 // m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = {
3010 // let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
3011 // public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
3012 // &mut data,
3013 // &collective_pk.key,
3014 // &m,
3015 // rlwe_modop,
3016 // rlwe_nttop,
3017 // &mut rng,
3018 // );
3019 // RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
3020 // false) };
3021
3022 // let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
3023 // let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
3024 // generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i); galois_auto(
3025 // &mut rlwe_ct,
3026 // auto_key,
3027 // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
3028 // &auto_map_index,
3029 // &auto_map_sign,
3030 // rlwe_modop,
3031 // rlwe_nttop,
3032 // rlwe_decomposer,
3033 // );
3034
3035 // // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
3036 // let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
3037 // izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
3038 // auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(mi, to_index,to_sign)|
3039 // // { if !to_sign {
3040 // m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi; } else {
3041 // m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
3042 // }
3043 // },
3044 // );
3045
3046 // // measure noise
3047 // let noise = measure_noise(
3048 // &rlwe_ct,
3049 // &m_k,
3050 // rlwe_nttop,
3051 // rlwe_modop,
3052 // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
3053 // );
3054
3055 // println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
3056 // }
3057 // }
3058 }
3059
3060 #[test]
3061 fn testtest() {
3062 let evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
3063 Vec<Vec<u64>>,
3064 NttBackendU64,
3065 ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
3066 ModulusPowerOf2<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
3067 ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
3068 >::new(NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
3069 let mp_seed = NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs { seed: [1u8; 32] };
3070
3071 let ring_size = evaluator.parameters().rlwe_n().0;
3072 let rlwe_q = evaluator.parameters().rlwe_q();
3073 let rlwe_modop = evaluator.pbs_info().modop_rlweq();
3074 let nttop = evaluator.pbs_info().nttop_rlweq();
3075
3076 let parties = 2;
3077
3078 let cks = (0..parties)
3079 .map(|_| evaluator.non_interactive_client_key())
3080 .collect_vec();
3081
3082 let key_shares = (0..parties)
3083 .map(|i| evaluator.non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(&mp_seed, i, parties, &cks[i]))
3084 .collect_vec();
3085 // dbg!(key_shares[1].user_index);
3086
3087 let rgsw_cts = evaluator.aggregate_non_interactive_multi_party_key_share(
3088 &mp_seed,
3089 parties,
3090 &key_shares,
3091 );
3092
3093 let mut ideal_rlwe = vec![0; ring_size];
3094 cks.iter().for_each(|k| {
3095 izip!(ideal_rlwe.iter_mut(), k.sk_rlwe().values().iter()).for_each(|(a, b)| {
3096 *a = *a + b;
3097 });
3098 });
3099
3100 let mut ideal_lwe = vec![0; evaluator.parameters().lwe_n().0];
3101 cks.iter().for_each(|k| {
3102 izip!(ideal_lwe.iter_mut(), k.sk_lwe().values().iter()).for_each(|(a, b)| {
3103 *a = *a + b;
3104 });
3105 });
3106
3107 let mut stats = Stats::new();
3108
3109 let (rlrg_decomp_a, rlrg_decomp_b) = evaluator
3110 .parameters()
3111 .rlwe_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
3112 let gadget_vec_a = rlrg_decomp_a.gadget_vector();
3113 let gadget_vec_b = rlrg_decomp_b.gadget_vector();
3114 let d_a = rlrg_decomp_a.decomposition_count();
3115 let d_b = rlrg_decomp_b.decomposition_count();
3116 let s_poly = Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_rlwe.as_slice(), rlwe_q);
3117 let mut neg_s_poly_eval = s_poly.clone();
3118 rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(&mut neg_s_poly_eval);
3119 nttop.forward(neg_s_poly_eval.as_mut());
3120
3121 rgsw_cts.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(s_index, ct)| {
3122 // X^{lwe_s[i]}
3123 let mut m = vec![0u64; ring_size];
3124 if ideal_lwe[s_index] < 0 {
3125 m[ring_size - (ideal_lwe[s_index].abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one();
3126 } else {
3127 m[(ideal_lwe[s_index] as usize)] = 1;
3128 }
3129
3130 let mut neg_sm = m.clone();
3131 nttop.forward(&mut neg_sm);
3132 rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(&mut neg_sm, &neg_s_poly_eval);
3133 nttop.backward(&mut neg_sm);
3134
3135 // RLWE'(-sm)
3136 gadget_vec_a.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(index, beta)| {
3137 // RLWE(\beta -sm)
3138
3139 // \beta * -sX^[lwe_s[i]]
3140 let mut beta_neg_sm = neg_sm.clone();
3141 rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(&mut beta_neg_sm, beta);
3142
3143 // extract RLWE(-sm \beta)
3144 let mut rlwe = vec![vec![0u64; ring_size]; 2];
3145 rlwe[0].copy_from_slice(&ct[index]);
3146 rlwe[1].copy_from_slice(&ct[index + d_a]);
3147
3148 // decrypt
3149 let mut m_out = vec![0u64; ring_size];
3150 decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe, &ideal_rlwe, &mut m_out, nttop, rlwe_modop);
3151 // println!("{:?}", &beta_neg_sm);
3152
3153 let mut diff = m_out;
3154 rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(&mut diff, &beta_neg_sm);
3155
3156 stats.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&diff, rlwe_q));
3157 });
3158 });
3159
3160 println!("Stats: {}", stats.std_dev().abs().log2());
3161 }
3162}
3163
3164// let (rgswrgsw_d_a, rgswrgsw_d_b) =
3165// self.pbs_info.parameters.rgsw_rgsw_decomposition_count(); let (rlrg_d_a,
3166// rlrg_d_b) = self.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_rgsw_decomposition_count(); let
3167// rgsw_ct_rows_in = rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 * 2;
3168// let rgsw_ct_rows_out = rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0 * 2;
3169// assert!(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 >= rlrg_d_a.0, "RGSWxRGSW part A decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part A decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_a.0 , rlrg_d_a.0);
3170// assert!(rgswrgsw_d_b.0 >= rlrg_d_b.0, "RGSWxRGSW part B decomposition count {} must be >= RLWExRGSW part B decomposition count {}", rgswrgsw_d_b.0 , rlrg_d_b.0);
3171// let rgsw_cts = rgsw_cts
3172// .map(|ct_i_in| {
3173// assert!(ct_i_in.dimension() == (rgsw_ct_rows_in, rlwe_n));
3174// let mut reduced_ct_i_out = M::zeros(rgsw_ct_rows_out, rlwe_n);
3175
3176// // RLWE'(-sm) part A
3177// izip!(
3178// reduced_ct_i_out.iter_rows_mut().take(rlrg_d_a.0),
3179// ct_i_in
3180// .iter_rows()
3181// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0)
3182// .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
3183// )
3184// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3185// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3186// });
3187
3188// // RLWE'(-sm) part B
3189// izip!(
3190// reduced_ct_i_out
3191// .iter_rows_mut()
3192// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0)
3193// .take(rlrg_d_a.0),
3194// ct_i_in
3195// .iter_rows()
3196// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 + (rgswrgsw_d_a.0 - rlrg_d_a.0))
3197// .take(rlrg_d_a.0)
3198// )
3199// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3200// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3201// });
3202
3203// // RLWE'(m) Part A
3204// izip!(
3205// reduced_ct_i_out
3206// .iter_rows_mut()
3207// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2)
3208// .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
3209// ct_i_in
3210// .iter_rows()
3211// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0))
3212// .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
3213// )
3214// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3215// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3216// });
3217
3218// // RLWE'(m) Part B
3219// izip!(
3220// reduced_ct_i_out
3221// .iter_rows_mut()
3222// .skip(rlrg_d_a.0 * 2 + rlrg_d_b.0)
3223// .take(rlrg_d_b.0),
3224// ct_i_in
3225// .iter_rows()
3226// .skip(rgswrgsw_d_a.0 * 2 + rgswrgsw_d_b.0 +
3227// (rgswrgsw_d_b.0 - rlrg_d_b.0)) .take(rlrg_d_b.0)
3228// )
3229// .for_each(|(to_ri, from_ri)| {
3230// to_ri.as_mut().copy_from_slice(from_ri.as_ref());
3231// });
3232
3233// reduced_ct_i_out
3234// })
3235// .collect_vec();