Browse Source

add CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats trait

par-agg-key-shares
Janmajaya Mall 9 months ago
parent
commit
c8cdd4c291
8 changed files with 147 additions and 684 deletions
  1. +0
    -1
      Cargo.toml
  2. +13
    -7
      src/bool/evaluator.rs
  3. +32
    -0
      src/bool/keys.rs
  4. +0
    -2
      src/bool/mod.rs
  5. +9
    -7
      src/bool/ni_mp_api.rs
  6. +2
    -2
      src/bool/noise.rs
  7. +3
    -2
      src/bool/parameters.rs
  8. +88
    -663
      src/bool/print_noise.rs

+ 0
- 1
Cargo.toml

@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ num-bigint-dig = { version = "0.8.4", features = ["prime"] }
criterion = "0.5.1"
[features]
default = ["interactive_mp"]
interactive_mp = []
non_interactive_mp = []

+ 13
- 7
src/bool/evaluator.rs

@ -134,6 +134,16 @@ pub struct NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs {
pub(super) seed: S,
}
impl NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<[u8; 32]> {
pub(super) fn random() -> Self {
DefaultSecureRng::with_local_mut(|rng| {
let mut seed = [0u8; 32];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut seed);
Self { seed }
})
}
}
impl<S: Default + Copy> NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs<S> {
fn key_seed<R: NewWithSeed<Seed = S> + RandomFill<S>>(&self) -> S {
let mut p_rng = R::new_with_seed(self.seed);
@ -2289,14 +2299,11 @@ mod tests {
NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain, PublicKey,
ShoupNonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
},
parameters::{
MP_BOOL_PARAMS, NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
SP_TEST_BOOL_PARAMS,
},
parameters::{MP_BOOL_PARAMS, NI_2P, SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS, SP_TEST_BOOL_PARAMS},
},
evaluator,
ntt::NttBackendU64,
parameters::OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
parameters::I_2P,
random::{RandomElementInModulus, DEFAULT_RNG},
rgsw::{
self, measure_noise, public_key_encrypt_rlwe, secret_key_encrypt_rlwe,
@ -2317,7 +2324,7 @@ mod tests {
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
ModulusPowerOf2<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
ShoupNonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
>::new(NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
>::new(NI_2P);
let mp_seed = NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs { seed: [1u8; 32] };
let ring_size = evaluator.parameters().rlwe_n().0;
@ -2433,5 +2440,4 @@ mod tests {
}
println!("Stats: {}", stats.std_dev().abs().log2());
}
}

+ 32
- 0
src/bool/keys.rs

@ -751,6 +751,22 @@ pub(super) mod impl_server_key_eval_domain {
&self.lwe_ksk
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl<M, P, R, N> super::super::print_noise::CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats
for ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, P, R, N>
{
type M = M;
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: usize) -> &Self::M {
self.galois_keys.get(&k).unwrap()
}
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M {
&self.lwe_ksk
}
fn rgsw_cts_lwe_si(&self, s_index: usize) -> &Self::M {
&self.rgsw_cts[s_index]
}
}
}
pub(crate) struct NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, P, R, N> {
@ -935,6 +951,22 @@ pub(super) mod impl_non_interactive_server_key_eval_domain {
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
impl<M, P, R, N> super::super::print_noise::CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats
for NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, P, R, N>
{
type M = M;
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: usize) -> &Self::M {
self.auto_keys.get(&k).unwrap()
}
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M {
&self.lwe_ksk
}
fn rgsw_cts_lwe_si(&self, s_index: usize) -> &Self::M {
&self.rgsw_cts[s_index]
}
}
}
pub struct SeededNonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKey<M: Matrix, S, P> {

+ 0
- 2
src/bool/mod.rs

@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ use keys::tests;
pub(crate) use keys::PublicKey;
#[cfg(feature = "interactive_mp")]
#[cfg(not(feature = "non_interactive_mp"))]
mod mp_api;
#[cfg(feature = "non_interactive_mp")]
mod ni_mp_api;
@ -16,7 +15,6 @@ mod ni_mp_api;
pub use ni_mp_api::*;
#[cfg(feature = "interactive_mp")]
#[cfg(not(feature = "non_interactive_mp"))]
pub use mp_api::*;
pub type ClientKey = keys::ClientKey<[u8; 32], u64>;

+ 9
- 7
src/bool/ni_mp_api.rs

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use super::{
NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain, SeededNonInteractiveMultiPartyServerKey,
ShoupNonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
},
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus, NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS},
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus, NI_2P},
ClientKey, ParameterSelector,
};
@ -39,9 +39,7 @@ static MULTI_PARTY_CRS: OnceLock> = OnceLo
pub fn set_parameter_set(select: ParameterSelector) {
match select {
ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveMultiPartyLessThanOrEqualTo16 => {
BOOL_EVALUATOR.with_borrow_mut(|v| {
*v = Some(BoolEvaluator::new(NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS))
});
BOOL_EVALUATOR.with_borrow_mut(|v| *v = Some(BoolEvaluator::new(NI_2P)));
}
_ => {
panic!("Paramerters not supported")
@ -358,7 +356,13 @@ mod tests {
use crate::{
backend::{GetModulus, Modulus},
bool::{evaluator::BooleanGates, keys::SinglePartyClientKey},
bool::{
evaluator::BooleanGates,
keys::{
tests::{ideal_sk_rlwe, measure_noise_lwe},
SinglePartyClientKey,
},
},
lwe::decrypt_lwe,
rgsw::decrypt_rlwe,
utils::{tests::Stats, TryConvertFrom1},
@ -368,8 +372,6 @@ mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn non_interactive_mp_bool_nand() {
set_parameter_set(ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveMultiPartyLessThanOrEqualTo16);

+ 2
- 2
src/bool/noise.rs

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ mod test {
},
evaluator::MultiPartyCrs,
ntt::NttBackendU64,
parameters::OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS,
parameters::I_2P,
random::DefaultSecureRng,
};
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ mod test {
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
ModulusPowerOf2<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
>::new(OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
>::new(I_2P);
let parties = 2;

+ 3
- 2
src/bool/parameters.rs

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ trait SingleDecomposerParams {
impl DoubleDecomposerParams
for (
DecompostionLogBase,
// Assume (Decomposition count for A, Decomposition count for B)
(DecompositionCount, DecompositionCount),
)
{
@ -486,7 +487,7 @@ pub(crate) const SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS: BoolParameters = BoolParameters::
variant: ParameterVariant::MultiParty,
};
pub(crate) const OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS: BoolParameters<u64> = BoolParameters::<u64> {
pub(crate) const I_2P: BoolParameters<u64> = BoolParameters::<u64> {
rlwe_q: CiphertextModulus::new_non_native(18014398509404161),
lwe_q: CiphertextModulus::new_non_native(1 << 15),
br_q: 1 << 11,
@ -508,7 +509,7 @@ pub(crate) const OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS: BoolParameters = BoolParam
variant: ParameterVariant::MultiParty,
};
pub(crate) const NON_INTERACTIVE_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS: BoolParameters<u64> = BoolParameters::<u64> {
pub(crate) const NI_2P: BoolParameters<u64> = BoolParameters::<u64> {
rlwe_q: CiphertextModulus::new_non_native(36028797018820609),
lwe_q: CiphertextModulus::new_non_native(1 << 20),
br_q: 1 << 11,

+ 88
- 663
src/bool/print_noise.rs

@ -1,29 +1,34 @@
use std::{fmt::Debug, iter::Sum, thread::panicking};
use std::{fmt::Debug, iter::Sum};
use itertools::izip;
use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, Pow, PrimInt, Zero};
use num_traits::{FromPrimitive, PrimInt, Zero};
use rand_distr::uniform::SampleUniform;
use crate::{
backend::{GetModulus, Modulus},
decomposer::RlweDecomposer,
lwe::{decrypt_lwe, lwe_key_switch},
parameters::{self, BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
pbs::PbsKey,
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
random::{DefaultSecureRng, RandomFillUniformInModulus},
rgsw::{decrypt_rlwe, galois_auto, IsTrivial, RlweCiphertext},
utils::{encode_x_pow_si_with_emebedding_factor, tests::Stats, TryConvertFrom1, WithLocal},
ArithmeticOps, ClientKey, Decomposer, DefaultDecomposer, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, ModInit, Ntt,
NttInit, RowEntity, RowMut, VectorOps,
utils::{encode_x_pow_si_with_emebedding_factor, tests::Stats, TryConvertFrom1},
ArithmeticOps, ClientKey, Decomposer, MatrixEntity, MatrixMut, ModInit, Ntt, NttInit,
RowEntity, RowMut, VectorOps,
};
use super::{
keys::{
tests::{ideal_sk_lwe, ideal_sk_rlwe},
SeededMultiPartyServerKey, ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
},
BoolEvaluator,
};
use super::keys::tests::{ideal_sk_lwe, ideal_sk_rlwe};
pub(crate) trait CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats {
type M;
/// RGSW ciphertext X^{s[s_index]} in evaluation domain where s the LWE
/// secret
fn rgsw_cts_lwe_si(&self, s_index: usize) -> &Self::M;
/// Auto key in evaluation domain for automorphism g^k. For auto key for
/// automorphism corresponding to -g, set k = 0
fn galois_key_for_auto(&self, k: usize) -> &Self::M;
/// LWE key switching key
fn lwe_ksk(&self) -> &Self::M;
}
struct ServerKeyStats<T> {
brk_rgsw_cts: (Stats<T>, Stats<T>),
@ -68,10 +73,11 @@ fn collect_server_key_stats<
+ ArithmeticOps<Element = M::MatElement>
+ ModInit<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>>
+ GetModulus<M = CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>, Element = M::MatElement>,
S: CollectRuntimeServerKeyStats<M = M>,
>(
parameters: BoolParameters<M::MatElement>,
client_keys: &[ClientKey],
server_key: &ServerKeyEvaluationDomain<M, BoolParameters<u64>, DefaultSecureRng, NttOp>,
server_key: &S,
) -> ServerKeyStats<i64>
where
M::R: RowMut + RowEntity + TryConvertFrom1<[i32], CiphertextModulus<M::MatElement>> + Clone,
@ -103,7 +109,9 @@ where
// RGSW ciphertext noise
// Check noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secret elements
{
izip!(ideal_sk_lwe.iter(), server_key.rgsw_cts().iter()).for_each(|(s_i, rgsw_ct_i)| {
ideal_sk_lwe.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(s_index, s_i)| {
let rgsw_ct_i = server_key.rgsw_cts_lwe_si(s_index);
// X^{s[i]}
let m_si = encode_x_pow_si_with_emebedding_factor::<M::R, _>(
*s_i,
@ -347,22 +355,23 @@ where
mod tests {
use itertools::Itertools;
use crate::{
aggregate_public_key_shares, aggregate_server_key_shares,
bool::keys::ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
evaluator::MultiPartyCrs,
gen_client_key, gen_mp_keys_phase1, gen_mp_keys_phase2,
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_mp_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::WithLocal,
BoolEvaluator, DefaultDecomposer, ModularOpsU64, Ntt, NttBackendU64,
};
use super::collect_server_key_stats;
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "interactive_mp")]
fn qwerty() {
use crate::{
aggregate_public_key_shares, aggregate_server_key_shares,
bool::keys::ServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
evaluator::MultiPartyCrs,
gen_client_key, gen_mp_keys_phase1, gen_mp_keys_phase2,
parameters::{BoolParameters, CiphertextModulus},
random::DefaultSecureRng,
set_mp_seed, set_parameter_set,
utils::WithLocal,
BoolEvaluator, DefaultDecomposer, ModularOpsU64, Ntt, NttBackendU64,
};
set_parameter_set(crate::ParameterSelector::HighCommunicationButFast2Party);
set_mp_seed(MultiPartyCrs::random().seed);
let parties = 2;
@ -386,6 +395,7 @@ mod tests {
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(parameters, &cks, &server_key_eval);
println!(
@ -405,643 +415,58 @@ mod tests {
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
}
}
// #[test]
// fn noise_tester() {
// let bool_evaluator = BoolEvaluator::<
// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
// NttBackendU64,
// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
// ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain<Vec<Vec<u64>>>,
// >::new(OPTIMISED_SMALL_MP_BOOL_PARAMS);
// // let (_, collective_pk, _, _, server_key_eval, ideal_client_key) =
// // _multi_party_all_keygen(&bool_evaluator, 20);
// let no_of_parties = 2;
// let lwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_q();
// let rlwe_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_q();
// let lwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.lwe_n().0;
// let rlwe_n = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.rlwe_n().0;
// let lwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_modop;
// let rlwe_nttop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_nttop;
// let rlwe_modop = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_modop;
// // let rgsw_rgsw_decomposer = &bool_evaluator
// // .pbs_info
// // .parameters
// // .rgsw_rgsw_decomposer::<DefaultDecomposer<u64>>();
// // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_a = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector();
// // let rgsw_rgsw_gadget_b = rgsw_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
// let rlwe_rgsw_decomposer =
// &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_rgsw_decomposer; let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_a
// = rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.gadget_vector(); let rlwe_rgsw_gadget_b =
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.gadget_vector();
// let auto_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.pbs_info.auto_decomposer;
// let auto_gadget = auto_decomposer.gadget_vector();
// let parties = (0..no_of_parties)
// .map(|_| bool_evaluator.client_key())
// .collect_vec();
// let int_mp_seed = MultiPartyCrs::random();
// let mut ideal_rlwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_n()];
// parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
// izip!(
// ideal_rlwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// InteractiveMultiPartyClientKey::sk_rlwe(k).iter()
// )
// .for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
// });
// });
// let mut ideal_lwe_sk = vec![0i32; bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_n()];
// parties.iter().for_each(|k| {
// izip!(
// ideal_lwe_sk.iter_mut(),
// InteractiveMultiPartyClientKey::sk_lwe(k).iter()
// )
// .for_each(|(ideal_i, s_i)| {
// *ideal_i = *ideal_i + s_i;
// });
// });
// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// // check noise in freshly encrypted RLWE ciphertext (ie var_fresh)
// if false {
// let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// for _ in 0..10 {
// // generate a new collective public key
// let mut pk_cr_seed = [0u8; 32];
// rng.fill_bytes(&mut pk_cr_seed);
// let public_key_share = parties
// .iter()
// .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(&int_mp_seed, k))
// .collect_vec(); let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
// DefaultSecureRng,
// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
// >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// 2]; public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// collective_pk.key(),
// &m,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// &mut rng,
// );
// let mut m_back = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// decrypt_rlwe(
// &rlwe_ct,
// &ideal_rlwe_sk,
// &mut m_back,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_back.as_mut_slice(),
// m.as_slice());
// check.add_more(Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_back,
// rlwe_q).as_slice()); }
// println!("Public key Std: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
// }
// if true {
// // Generate server key shares
// let public_key_share = parties
// .iter()
// .map(|k|
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_public_key_share(&int_mp_seed, k))
// .collect_vec(); let collective_pk = PublicKey::<
// Vec<Vec<u64>>,
// DefaultSecureRng,
// ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
// >::from(public_key_share.as_slice());
// let server_key_shares = parties
// .iter()
// .enumerate()
// .map(|(user_id, k)| {
// bool_evaluator.multi_party_server_key_share(
// user_id,
// no_of_parties,
// &int_mp_seed,
// collective_pk.key(),
// k,
// )
// })
// .collect_vec();
// let seeded_server_key =
//
// bool_evaluator.aggregate_multi_party_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
// }
// // server key in Evaluation domain
// let runtime_server_key =
// ShoupServerKeyEvaluationDomain::from(ServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<
// _,
// _,
// DefaultSecureRng,
// NttBackendU64,
// >::from(&seeded_server_key));
// // check noise in RLWE x RGSW(X^{s_i}) where RGSW is accunulated RGSW
// ciphertext if false {
// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// ideal_lwe_sk.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(index, s_i)| {
// let rgsw_ct_i =
// runtime_server_key.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(index).as_ref();
// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// 2]; public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// collective_pk.key(),
// &m,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// &mut rng,
// );
// let mut rlwe_after = RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng> {
// data: rlwe_ct.clone(),
// is_trivial: false,
// _phatom: PhantomData,
// };
// let mut scratch = vec![
// vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// std::cmp::max(
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.0.decomposition_count(),
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer.1.decomposition_count()
// ) + 2
// ];
// rlwe_by_rgsw(
// &mut rlwe_after,
// rgsw_ct_i,
// &mut scratch,
// rlwe_rgsw_decomposer,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// // m1 = X^{s[i]}
// let mut m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// let s_i = *s_i * (bool_evaluator.pbs_info.embedding_factor as
// i32); if s_i < 0 {
// m1[rlwe_n - (s_i.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q.neg_one()
// } else {
// m1[s_i as usize] = 1;
// }
// // (m+e) * m1
// let mut m_plus_e_times_m1 = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// decrypt_rlwe(
// &rlwe_ct,
// &ideal_rlwe_sk,
// &mut m_plus_e_times_m1,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// rlwe_nttop.forward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
// rlwe_nttop.forward(m1.as_mut_slice());
// rlwe_modop.elwise_mul_mut(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice(),
// m1.as_slice());
// rlwe_nttop.backward(m_plus_e_times_m1.as_mut_slice());
// // Resulting RLWE ciphertext will equal: (m0m1 + em1) +
// e_{rlsw x rgsw}. // Hence, resulting rlwe ciphertext will
// have error em1 + e_{rlwe x rgsw}. // Here we're only
// concerned with e_{rlwe x rgsw}, that is noise added by //
// RLWExRGSW. Also note in practice m1 is a monomial, for ex, X^{s_{i}}, for
// // some i and var(em1) = var(e).
// let mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// decrypt_rlwe(
// &rlwe_after,
// &ideal_rlwe_sk,
// &mut m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// // diff
// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(
// m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e.as_mut_slice(),
// m_plus_e_times_m1.as_slice(),
// );
// // let noise = measure_noise(
// // &rlwe_after,
// // &m_plus_e_times_m1,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// // );
// // print!("NOISE: {}", noise);
// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(
// &m_plus_e_times_m1_more_e,
// rlwe_q,
// ));
// });
// println!(
// "RLWE x RGSW, where RGSW has noise var_brk, std: {} {}",
// check.std_dev(),
// check.std_dev().abs().log2()
// )
// }
// // check noise in Auto key
// if false {
// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// let mut neg_s_poly =
// Vec::<u64>::try_convert_from(ideal_rlwe_sk.as_slice(), rlwe_q);
// rlwe_modop.elwise_neg_mut(neg_s_poly.as_mut_slice());
// let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
// let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
// let auto_element_dlogs =
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs(); for i in
// auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() { let g_pow = if i == 0 {
// -g
// } else {
// (((g as usize).pow(i as u32)) % br_q) as isize
// };
// // -s[X^k]
// let (auto_indices, auto_sign) = generate_auto_map(rlwe_n,
// g_pow); let mut neg_s_poly_auto_i = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// izip!(neg_s_poly.iter(), auto_indices.iter(),
// auto_sign.iter()).for_each( |(v, to_i, to_sign)| {
// if !to_sign {
// neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
// } else {
// neg_s_poly_auto_i[*to_i] = *v;
// }
// },
// );
// let mut auto_key_i =
// runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref().clone(); //send i^th auto
// key to coefficient domain auto_key_i
// .iter_mut()
// .for_each(|r| rlwe_nttop.backward(r.as_mut_slice()));
// auto_gadget.iter().enumerate().for_each(|(i, b_i)| {
// // B^i * -s[X^k]
// let mut m_ideal = neg_s_poly_auto_i.clone();
// rlwe_modop.elwise_scalar_mul_mut(m_ideal.as_mut_slice(),
// b_i);
// let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// let mut rlwe_ct = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
// rlwe_ct[0].copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[i]);
// rlwe_ct[1]
//
// .copy_from_slice(&auto_key_i[auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + i]);
// decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe_ct, &ideal_rlwe_sk, &mut m_out,
// rlwe_nttop, rlwe_modop);
// // diff
// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
// m_ideal.as_slice());
// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(&m_out,
// rlwe_q)); });
// }
// println!("Auto key noise std dev: {}",
// check.std_dev().abs().log2()); }
// // check noise in RLWE(X^k) after sending RLWE(X) -> RLWE(X^k)using
// collective // auto key
// if false {
// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// let br_q = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.br_q();
// let g = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.g();
// let auto_element_dlogs =
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.parameters.auto_element_dlogs(); for i in
// auto_element_dlogs.into_iter() { for _ in 0..10 {
// let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// RandomFillUniformInModulus::random_fill(&mut rng, rlwe_q,
// m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
// DefaultSecureRng> { data: vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// 2], is_trivial: false,
// _phatom: PhantomData,
// };
// public_key_encrypt_rlwe::<_, _, _, _, i32, _>(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// collective_pk.key(),
// &m,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// &mut rng,
// );
// // We're only interested in noise increased as a result
// of automorphism. // Hence, we take m+e as the bench.
// let mut m_plus_e = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// decrypt_rlwe(
// &rlwe_ct,
// &ideal_rlwe_sk,
// &mut m_plus_e,
// rlwe_nttop,
// rlwe_modop,
// );
// let auto_key =
// runtime_server_key.galois_key_for_auto(i).as_ref(); let
// (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) = bool_evaluator.pbs_info.rlwe_auto_map(i);
// let mut scratch =
// vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// auto_decomposer.decomposition_count() + 2]; galois_auto(
// &mut rlwe_ct,
// auto_key,
// &mut scratch,
// &auto_map_index,
// &auto_map_sign,
// rlwe_modop,
// rlwe_nttop,
// auto_decomposer,
// );
// // send m+e from X to X^k
// let mut m_plus_e_auto = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// izip!(m_plus_e.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
// auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(v, to_index,
// to_sign)| { if !to_sign {
// m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = rlwe_modop.neg(v);
// } else {
// m_plus_e_auto[*to_index] = *v
// }
// },
// );
// let mut m_out = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// decrypt_rlwe(&rlwe_ct, &ideal_rlwe_sk, &mut m_out,
// rlwe_nttop, rlwe_modop);
// // diff
// rlwe_modop.elwise_sub_mut(m_out.as_mut_slice(),
// m_plus_e_auto.as_slice());
//
// check.add_more(&Vec::<i64>::try_convert_from(m_out.as_slice(), rlwe_q));
// }
// }
// println!("Rlwe Auto Noise Std: {}",
// check.std_dev().abs().log2()); }
// // Check noise growth in ksk
// // TODO check in LWE key switching keys
// if false {
// // 1. encrypt LWE ciphertext
// // 2. Key switching
// // 3.
// let mut check = Stats { samples: vec![] };
// for _ in 0..1024 {
// // Encrypt m \in Q_{ks} using RLWE sk
// let mut lwe_in_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
// let m = RandomElementInModulus::random(&mut rng,
// &lwe_q.q().unwrap()); encrypt_lwe(&mut lwe_in_ct, &m,
// &ideal_rlwe_sk, lwe_modop, &mut rng);
// // Key switch
// let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
// lwe_key_switch(
// &mut lwe_out,
// &lwe_in_ct,
// runtime_server_key.lwe_ksk(),
// lwe_modop,
// bool_evaluator.pbs_info.lwe_decomposer(),
// );
// // We only care about noise added by LWE key switch
// // m+e
// let m_plus_e = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_in_ct, &ideal_rlwe_sk,
// lwe_modop);
// let m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
// &ideal_lwe_sk, lwe_modop);
// let diff = lwe_modop.sub(&m_plus_e_plus_lwe_ksk_noise,
// &m_plus_e);
// check.add_more(&vec![lwe_q.map_element_to_i64(&diff)]);
// }
// println!("Lwe ksk std dev: {}", check.std_dev().abs().log2());
// }
// }
// // Check noise in fresh RGSW ciphertexts, ie X^{s_j[i]}, must equalnoise
// in // // fresh RLWE ciphertext
// if true {}
// // test LWE ksk from RLWE -> LWE
// // if false {
// // let logp = 2;
// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// // let m = 1;
// // let encoded_m = m << (lwe_logq - logp);
// // // Encrypt
// // let mut lwe_ct = vec![0u64; rlwe_n + 1];
// // encrypt_lwe(
// // &mut lwe_ct,
// // &encoded_m,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// // lwe_modop,
// // &mut rng,
// // );
// // // key switch
// // let lwe_decomposer = &bool_evaluator.decomposer_lwe;
// // let mut lwe_out = vec![0u64; lwe_n + 1];
// // lwe_key_switch(
// // &mut lwe_out,
// // &lwe_ct,
// // &server_key_eval.lwe_ksk,
// // lwe_modop,
// // lwe_decomposer,
// // );
// // let encoded_m_back = decrypt_lwe(&lwe_out,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(), lwe_modop); let m_back
// // = ((encoded_m_back as f64 * (1 << logp) as f64) /
// // (lwe_q as f64)).round() as u64; dbg!(m_back, m);
// // let noise = measure_noise_lwe(
// // &lwe_out,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values(),
// // lwe_modop,
// // &encoded_m,
// // );
// // println!("Noise: {noise}");
// // }
// // Measure noise in RGSW ciphertexts of ideal LWE secrets
// // if true {
// // let gadget_vec = gadget_vector(
// // bool_evaluator.parameters.rlwe_logq,
// // bool_evaluator.parameters.logb_rgsw,
// // bool_evaluator.parameters.d_rgsw,
// // );
// // for i in 0..20 {
// // // measure noise in RGSW(s[i])
// // let si =
// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
// // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
// // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
// // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
// // } else {
// // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
// // }
// // let mut rgsw_si = server_key_eval.rgsw_cts[i].clone();
// // rgsw_si
// // .iter_mut()
// // .for_each(|ri| rlwe_nttop.backward(ri.as_mut()));
// // println!("####### Noise in RGSW(X^s_{i}) #######");
// // _measure_noise_rgsw(
// // &rgsw_si,
// // &si_poly,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// // &gadget_vec,
// // rlwe_q,
// // );
// // println!("####### ##################### #######");
// // }
// // }
// // // measure noise grwoth in RLWExRGSW
// // if true {
// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// // let mut carry_m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
// // carry_m.as_mut_slice());
// // // RGSW(carrym)
// // let trivial_rlwect = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n],carry_m.clone()];
// // let mut rlwe_ct = RlweCiphertext::<_,
// // DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(trivial_rlwect, true);
// // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// // d_rgsw + 2]; let mul_mod =
// // |v0: &u64, v1: &u64| (((*v0 as u128 * *v1 as u128) % (rlwe_q
// as u128)) as u64);
// // for i in 0..bool_evaluator.parameters.lwe_n {
// // rlwe_by_rgsw(
// // &mut rlwe_ct,
// // server_key_eval.rgsw_ct_lwe_si(i),
// // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
// // rlwe_decomposer,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // );
// // // carry_m[X] * s_i[X]
// // let si =
// // ideal_client_key.sk_lwe.values[i] *
// // (bool_evaluator.embedding_factor as i32); let mut
// // si_poly = vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; if si < 0 {
// // si_poly[rlwe_n - (si.abs() as usize)] = rlwe_q - 1;
// // } else {
// // si_poly[(si.abs() as usize)] = 1;
// // }
// // carry_m = negacyclic_mul(&carry_m, &si_poly, mul_mod,
// // rlwe_q);
// // let noise = measure_noise(
// // &rlwe_ct,
// // &carry_m,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// // );
// // println!("Noise RLWE(carry_m) accumulating {i}^th secret
// // monomial: {noise}"); }
// // }
// // // Check galois keys
// // if false {
// // let g = bool_evaluator.g() as isize;
// // let mut rng = DefaultSecureRng::new();
// // let mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// // d_rgsw + 2]; for i in [g, -g] {
// // let mut m = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// // RandomUniformDist1::random_fill(&mut rng, &rlwe_q,
// // m.as_mut_slice()); let mut rlwe_ct = {
// // let mut data = vec![vec![0u64; rlwe_n]; 2];
// // public_key_encrypt_rlwe(
// // &mut data,
// // &collective_pk.key,
// // &m,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // &mut rng,
// // );
// // RlweCiphertext::<_, DefaultSecureRng>::from_raw(data,
// // false) };
#[test]
#[cfg(feature = "non_interactive_mp")]
fn querty2() {
use crate::{
aggregate_server_key_shares, bool::keys::NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain,
evaluator::NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs, gen_client_key, gen_server_key_share,
parameters::CiphertextModulus, random::DefaultSecureRng, set_common_reference_seed,
set_parameter_set, utils::WithLocal, BoolEvaluator, DefaultDecomposer, ModularOpsU64,
NttBackendU64,
};
// // let auto_key = server_key_eval.galois_key_for_auto(i);
// // let (auto_map_index, auto_map_sign) =
// // generate_auto_map(rlwe_n, i); galois_auto(
// // &mut rlwe_ct,
// // auto_key,
// // &mut scratch_matrix_dplus2_ring,
// // &auto_map_index,
// // &auto_map_sign,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // rlwe_decomposer,
// // );
set_parameter_set(crate::ParameterSelector::NonInteractiveMultiPartyLessThanOrEqualTo16);
set_common_reference_seed(NonInteractiveMultiPartyCrs::random().seed);
let parties = 2;
let cks = (0..parties).map(|i| gen_client_key()).collect_vec();
let server_key_shares = cks
.iter()
.enumerate()
.map(|(user_id, k)| gen_server_key_share(user_id, parties, k))
.collect_vec();
let server_key = aggregate_server_key_shares(&server_key_shares);
// // // send m(X) -> m(X^i)
// // let mut m_k = vec![0u64; rlwe_n];
// // izip!(m.iter(), auto_map_index.iter(),
// // auto_map_sign.iter()).for_each( |(mi, to_index,to_sign)|
// // // { if !to_sign {
// // m_k[*to_index] = rlwe_q - *mi; } else {
// // m_k[*to_index] = *mi;
// // }
// // },
// // );
let server_key_eval =
NonInteractiveServerKeyEvaluationDomain::<_, _, DefaultSecureRng, NttBackendU64>::from(
&server_key,
);
// // // measure noise
// // let noise = measure_noise(
// // &rlwe_ct,
// // &m_k,
// // rlwe_nttop,
// // rlwe_modop,
// // ideal_client_key.sk_rlwe.values(),
// // );
let parameters = BoolEvaluator::with_local(|e| e.parameters().clone());
let server_key_stats = collect_server_key_stats::<
_,
DefaultDecomposer<u64>,
NttBackendU64,
ModularOpsU64<CiphertextModulus<u64>>,
_,
>(parameters, &cks, &server_key_eval);
// // println!("Noise after auto k={i}: {noise}");
// // }
// // }
// }
println!(
"Rgsw nsm std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.0.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"Rgsw m std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.brk_rgsw_cts.1.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"rlwe post 1 auto std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_1_auto.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
println!(
"key switching noise rlwe secret s to lwe secret z std log2 {}",
server_key_stats.post_lwe_key_switch.std_dev().abs().log2()
);
}
}

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