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lattice slides: last polishments
arnaucube git@arnaucube.com
Thu, 17 Sep 2026 16:56:20 +0200
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283d3ccd24d29f4798eec3783975fe725f0a4c9d

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1240f60f2b7d36d376d352932ad0b933f673aa26

M slides/slides_lattices-intro.tex → slides/slides_lattices-intro.tex

@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ \pause

\item hash-based schemes don't have much algebraic structure \begin{itemize} - \item good for less attacks, not so fun to build stuff with + \item good for less attacks, not so fun to build stuff with (less room to compose) \item eg. elliptic curves have algebraic structure, allows for signature aggregation, thresholds, etc \end{itemize}

@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@

\begin{frame}{First, some tools} \centering \includegraphics[width=8.0cm]{./zelda-dangerous-out-there} - - Rings, Ideals, Modules, Kernels, $\ldots$ \end{frame} \begin{frame}{Recap of concepts}

@@ -329,11 +327,12 @@ \begin{defn}[Lattice]

A lattice $\Ll$ in $\Rr^n$ is the set of all integer linear combinations of $m$ linearly independent vectors $b_1, \ldots, b_m \in \Rr^n$, with $m \leq n$. \pause - $B = b_1, \ldots, b_m \in \Rr^n$ is the \emph{basis} of $\Ll$. We denote it $\Ll=\Ll(B)$. - - $$\Ll(B) := B \cdot \Rr^n = \{ \sum_{i=1}^n c_i b_i ~|~ c_i \in \Rr^n \}$$ + $B = \{b_1, \ldots, b_m\} \in \Rr^{n \times m}$ is the \emph{basis} of $\Ll$. We denote it $\Ll=\Ll(B)$. + \vspace*{-0.3cm} + $$\Ll(B) := B \cdot \Zz^n = \{ \sum_{i=1}^n c_i b_i ~|~ c_i \in \Zz^n \}$$ \end{defn} + \small \pause \begin{tcolorbox}[colback=gray!15, colframe=gray!15] \emph{Intuition: endless grid of dots where you can only move by taking whole-number

@@ -438,6 +437,7 @@ \end{itemize}

\end{frame} +\begin{comment} \begin{frame}{q-ary lattice} \vspace{-0.4cm} a full-rank lattice is q-ary if $q \Zz^d \subseteq \Ll \subseteq \Zz^d$

@@ -485,6 +485,7 @@ % - membership is extremely simple (Ax (mod q))

% % Notation: \perp ddenotes that the vectors are orthogonal to the rows of \(A\) modulo \(q\), i.e. they lie in the modular kernel. \end{frame} +\end{comment} \begin{frame}{Polynomial rings} \small{

@@ -517,7 +518,7 @@ a_i b_j X^{i+j}

\right) \in \Zz_q[X]/(X^n+1)$$ - \hspace*{4em}Since $X^n=-1$ then $X^{n+k} = -X^k$\\ + \hspace*{4em}Since $X^n=-1$ then $X^{n+k} = X^n \cdot X^k= -1 \cdot X^k = -X^k$\\ $\Longrightarrow~ \mathcal{O}(n^2)$ naively, $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ using NTT. \end{itemize} }

@@ -631,12 +632,21 @@

% TODO diagrams of SVP, CVP, SIS \begin{frame}{Hard problems in lattices - SIS} +\begin{columns}[c,onlytextwidth] +\begin{column}{0.76\textwidth} \begin{defn}[SIS (Short Integer Solution)] given $q \in \Zz$ and matrix $A \in \Zz_q^{m \times n}$, find a non-zero short $z \in \Zz^n$ s.th. $$A \cdot z = 0 \pmod q$$ \small{"short": $z \in \{\beta, \beta\}^n$ for some bound $\beta$, often $z \in \{-1, 0, 1 \}^n$.} \end{defn} +\end{column} +\begin{column}{0.34\textwidth} + \pause + \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{./sis-equation} +\end{column} +\end{columns} +\vspace{0.2cm} \pause The set of all solutions to the SIS problem forms the (q-ary) lattice

@@ -691,11 +701,25 @@ cryptographic protocols (eg. in LaBRADOR))

\end{frame} \begin{frame}{Hard problems - LWE} +\begin{columns}[c,onlytextwidth] +\begin{column}{0.76\textwidth} \begin{defn}[LWE (Learning With Errors)] - choose a matrix $A \in^R \Zz_q^{m \times n}$, a secret vector $s \in^R \Zz_q^n$, and an error vector $e \in^R [-B, B]^m$. Let $b = As +e \pmod q \in \Zz_q^m$. + choose a matrix $A \in^R \Zz_q^{m \times n}$, a secret vector $s \in^R \Zz_q^n$, and an error vector $e \in^R [-B, B]^m$. Let + $$b = As +e \pmod q \in \Zz_q^m$$ Given the pair $(A, b)$, the goal is to recover $s$. \end{defn} +\end{column} +\begin{column}{0.34\textwidth} + \pause + \includegraphics[width=\linewidth]{./lwe-equation} +\end{column} +\end{columns} + + \vspace{0.2cm} + + \pause + \small Search-LWE \& Decisional-LWE problems. \pause

@@ -706,10 +730,9 @@ &= \{ A^T s + qz ~|~ s \in \Zz_q^n, z \in \Zz^m \}

\end{align*} \pause + Observe: if $e=0$, is a system of linear equations, which can be efficiently determined using Gaussian elimination over $\Zz_q$. Hardness comes from the noise/error term $e \neq 0$ (and the norm bound). - \pause - Similarly as with SIS, we also have Ring-LWE and Module-LWE variants of LWE. \end{frame} \begin{frame}

@@ -1311,11 +1334,14 @@ \setlength{\leftmarginii}{1.2em}

\begin{frame}{} \small + \textbf{Takeaways} % \vspace*{-0.2cm} \begin{itemize} \item quantum thread forces us to prepare for it. Most companies are already preparing for migration to post-quantum + \pause \item no tool (scheme) for all use cases (eg. Ethereum validators vs wallets) + \pause \item lattice-based cryptography: \scriptsize{